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Abstract 
The aim of this thesis is threefold: to investigate, from the viewpoint of the home 
country, the effects of macroeconomic variables and policies on the flow of remittances; 
and to investigate the microeconomic foundations of the effects of remittances on both 
household expenditure and the labour force, with a specific application to Kosovo. For 
the macroeconomic determinants of remittances, a unique dataset is assembled using 
World Bank data with policy variable data collected from individual countries in the 
sample. For the implications of remittances on household expenditure and the labour 
force the United Nations Development Program Remittances Survey is used.  
The estimates suggest that the key determinants of remittances/GDP and remittances per 
capita are real living standards in both the home (negatively) and the main host country 
(positively). The effect of GDP in the host country is not linear, but increases at 
decreasing rate. An original contribution of this section is the inclusion of specific 
policies applied to migrants and their remittances. However, despite the support for such 
policies in the literature, the policy variables modelled are statistically insignificant 
across several specifications.  
In considering the effect of remittances on consumption, whether the household receives 
remittances or not is interacted with the log of income to examine if the spending of 
remittances is different from other sources of income. This variable is statistically 
insignificant for the share of expenditure on current consumption and education. 
However, the effect for the share of expenditure on durable goods is positive, albeit 
small. The model extends the literature by considering the migrant‟s involvement in 
various ways with the home family as possible control mechanisms for the use of 
remittances. The results give three significant effects suggesting that, compared to other 
households, when income increases: households who receive advice on spending 
remittances increase the share of expenditure on current consumption; households who 
get more visits decrease the share of expenditure on current consumption and increase the 
share of expenditure on education. 
In addition, addressing the impact of remittances on the labour supply of individuals in 
Kosovo, the results suggests that remittances per capita are insignificant with regard to 
working age members being active in labour market and being employed for males and 
females. However, when the total value of remittances per household is used, the estimate 
suggests an increase in the probability of males becoming active in the labour market, 
though the effect is very small.  
Overall, the findings suggest that the policies aimed at increasing remittances from 
migrants are not effective. Furthermore, there is little evidence that changes in income 
levels for households receiving remittances are spent very differently from the 
households not receiving them; small differences are found for the durable goods share 
and if the migrant has some direct involvement with the home family. Finally, contrary to 
expectations, remittances are not found to affect the labour supply in the majority of the 
empirical work in this thesis. Such findings may indicate that the policy relevance for 
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remittances is not as important as suggested by the literature for developing countries, 
especially for those with a similar profile to Kosovo.   
 
  
Acknowledgments 
This project has been a long endeavour with lots of challenges and difficulties, but at the 
same time, with lots of great moments. These great moments were made possible from 
the support that I received from many people to whom I will always feel indebted and 
will always express my appreciation for their help. I will always remain grateful to my 
supervisors, Professor Jean Mangan and Dr. Ian Jackson for the guidance, encouragement 
and comments throughout this process. In addition to my appreciation for the 
professional support that I received from my supervisors, I would also like to express my 
gratitude to them for their patience throughout this process, especially having in mind 
that I was not an exceptionally disciplined candidate to work with. I would also like to 
express my thanks to my local supervisor, Dr. Avdullah Hoti, who was supportive in this 
project. I would also like to express my gratitude to the Business School professors, 
whose comments through the conferences have made the Ph.D. experience productive 
and stimulating, especially Professor Iraj Hashi for his contribution to this programme. I 
would also like thank the Business School staff, especially Jenny Herbert who 
substantially facilitated this process but also encouraged me. I would like to express my 
gratitude to Chevening Programme of the UK Government, Open Society Foundation and 
Staffordshire University for financially supporting this project and making it possible for 
me to undertake this academic objective. The financial support from the Tempus 
Programme is also appreciated. I would also like to express my thanks to all those who 
contributed in a way or another to this process.  
I also would like to thank the Central Bank of the Republic of Kosovo for being 
supportive for this process. Special thanks to my friends Valentin Toçi and Arben 
Mustafa who were always ready to discuss the ideas and provide useful insights for the 
thesis.  
Last but most, my parents, Ymer and Hanushe, whose love, motivation and desire for the 
success of this project was the core factor that gave me the strength and courage for this 
ambitious project. I would also like to thank my brother Berat and my sisters Sulli and 
Nora who were always ready to support and encourage me.  
 
<< I dedicate this thesis to my parents >> 
  
iii 
 
Table of Contents 
CHAPTER I ........................................................................................................................ 1 
INTRODUCTION .............................................................................................................. 1 
1.1 Introduction ...................................................................................................... 2 
1.2 Research Questions........................................................................................... 4 
1.3 Structure of the thesis ....................................................................................... 9 
CHAPTER II ..................................................................................................................... 11 
BACKGROUND INFORMATION ON MIGRATION AND REMITTANCES WITH 
SPECIAL REFERENCE TO KOSOVO .......................................................................... 11 
2.1 Introduction .................................................................................................... 12 
2.2 Trends in Migration and Remittances in Developing Countries .................... 13 
2.2.1 Remittances Flows to Developing Countries ................................................. 16 
2.3 General Characteristics of Kosovo‟s Economy .............................................. 21 
2.3.1 The Structure of Kosovo‟s GDP ..................................................................... 25 
2.3.2 Labour Market ................................................................................................ 26 
2.3.3 Migration and Remittances ............................................................................. 30 
2.3.4 Profile of Kosovan Migrants .......................................................................... 35 
2.4 Conclusions .................................................................................................... 37 
CHAPTER III ................................................................................................................... 40 
MACROECONOMIC DETERMINANTS OF REMITTANCES ................................... 40 
3.1 Introduction .................................................................................................... 41 
3.2 Theory on the Macroeconomic Determinants of Remittances ....................... 42 
3.2.1 Altruistic Motives ........................................................................................... 46 
3.2.2 Self-Interest Motives ...................................................................................... 49 
3.3 Literature Review on the Macroeconomic Determinants of Remittances ...... 52 
3.4 Review of Policy Initiatives for Remittances ................................................. 58 
3.5 Model Specification ........................................................................................ 66 
3.6 Data Description ............................................................................................. 70 
3.6.1 Policy Initiatives Variable .............................................................................. 75 
3.7 Estimation Method and Results ...................................................................... 79 
iv 
 
3.7.1 Test for Common Factor Restriction .............................................................. 82 
3.7.2 Results of the Estimated Model ...................................................................... 87 
3.8 Conclusions and Implications ......................................................................... 97 
CHAPTER IV ................................................................................................................. 100 
THE IMPACT OF REMITTANCES ON HOUSEHOLD EXPENDITURE PATTERNS
......................................................................................................................................... 100 
4.1 Introduction .................................................................................................. 101 
4.2 Literature Review ......................................................................................... 103 
4.3 The Theoretical Model and Expected Signs ................................................. 109 
4.4 Estimation of Expenditure Categories .......................................................... 133 
4.4.1 Diagnostic Tests for the Estimated Models and the Specification Search ... 133 
4.5 Interpretation of the results ........................................................................... 139 
4.6 Conclusions .................................................................................................. 158 
CHAPTER V .................................................................................................................. 162 
THE EFFECT OF REMITTANCES ON LABOUR FORCE PARTICIPATION AND 
EMPLOYMENT ............................................................................................................. 162 
5.1 Introduction .................................................................................................. 163 
5.2 Literature Review on the Labour Force Participation Non-Labour Income 165 
5.2.1 Remittances effect ........................................................................................ 165 
5.2.2 Other forms of non-wage income and their effects ...................................... 171 
5.3 Theoretical Background ............................................................................... 172 
5.3.1 Neoclassical Theory ..................................................................................... 173 
5.3.2 Alternative Theories: Job Search Theory and Segmented Labour Markets . 179 
5.4 The Model Specification .............................................................................. 181 
5.4.1 Data Description ........................................................................................... 190 
5.4.2 Potential Endogeneity ................................................................................... 196 
5.5 Empirical Findings ....................................................................................... 198 
5.5.1 Robustness Check ......................................................................................... 209 
5.6 Conclusions .................................................................................................. 209 
CHAPTER VI ................................................................................................................. 212 
CONCLUSIONS AND IMPLICATIONS ...................................................................... 212 
v 
 
6.1 Introduction ........................................................................................................... 212 
6.2 Main Findings ....................................................................................................... 215 
6.2.1 What macroeconomic factors are determining remittances? Do Policies Work?
 216 
6.2.2. Do Remittances and Other Migration Characteristics Change Household 
Expenditure Patterns? .................................................................................................. 218 
6.2.3 Are Remittances Decreasing Labour Force Participation and the Probability of 
being Employed? ......................................................................................................... 220 
6.2.4 The Combined Findings in Relation to Alternative Theories of Remittances ... 223 
6.3 Policy Implications ................................................................................................ 225 
6.3.1 Policy Implications from the Macroeconomic Findings .................................... 225 
6.3.2 Policy Implications from the Microeconomic Findings ..................................... 227 
6.4 Contributions to Knowledge ................................................................................. 230 
6.5 Limitations and suggestions for further research .................................................. 233 
References: ...................................................................................................................... 237 
APPENDICES ............................................................................................................. 258 
Appendix 1. Global Migration Trends ............................................................................ 259 
Appendix 2. Selected Macroeconomic Indicators for Kosovo ................................... 260 
Appendix 3.1. The definitions of the variables ........................................................... 261 
Appendix 3.2. Policy Initiatives Variable by Country and the List of Countries 
included in analysis ..................................................................................................... 262 
Appendix 3.3 Estimation of the Standard Model (Table 3.6) ..................................... 264 
Appendix 3.3.1 Test For CFR for Remittances/GDP ................................................. 264 
CFR for each variable ................................................................................................. 265 
Joint CFR .................................................................................................................... 266 
Appendix 3.3.2 Test For CFR for Remittances per Capita ............................................. 267 
CFR for each variable ..................................................................................................... 268 
CFR for each variable ..................................................................................................... 269 
Appendix 3.3.3 Output of AR (1) for the Specification (1) Table 3.6 ............................ 270 
Appendix 3.3.4 Output of AR (1) for the Specification (2) Table 3.6 ............................ 271 
Appendix 3.4.1 Output of AR (1) for the Specification (3) Table 3.7 ............................ 272 
a) One and Two or More Policy Variables ..................................................................... 272 
vi 
 
Appendix 3.4.2 Output of AR (1) for the Specification (4) Table 3.7 ............................ 273 
One and Two or More Policy Variables ......................................................................... 273 
Appendix 3.4.3 Output of AR (1) for the Specification (5) Table 3.8 ............................ 275 
Three types of Policy Variables ...................................................................................... 275 
Appendix 3.4.4 Output of AR (1) for the Specification (6) Table 3.8 ............................ 276 
Thrre types of Policy Variables ...................................................................................... 276 
Appendix 3.5.1 Test For CFR for Remittances to GDP ................................................. 278 
Including Governance Indicators .................................................................................... 278 
CFR for each variable ..................................................................................................... 279 
Joint CFR ........................................................................................................................ 280 
Appendix 3.6.1 Test For CFR for Remittances per capita GDP ..................................... 281 
including Governance Indicators .................................................................................... 281 
CFR for each variable ..................................................................................................... 282 
Joint CFR ........................................................................................................................ 283 
Appendix 3.6.2 Output of AR (1) for the Specification (7) Table 3.9 ............................ 284 
Dependent Variable: Remittances/GDP ......................................................................... 284 
Appendix 3.6.3 Output of AR (1) for the Specification (9) Table 3.9 ............................ 285 
Appendix 3.6.4 Output of AR (1) for the Specification (11) Table 3.9 .......................... 286 
Appendix 3.6.5 Output of AR (1) for the Specification (8) Table 3.9 ............................ 287 
Dependent Variable: Remittances per Capita ................................................................. 287 
Appendix 3.6.6 Output of AR (1) for the Specification (10) Table 3.9 .......................... 288 
Appendix 3.6.7 Output of AR (1) for the Specification (12) Table 3.9 .......................... 289 
Appendix 4.1 Definition of Variables and the Questionnaire ......................................... 290 
Appendix 4.2 The Estimation of the current consumption category .............................. 297 
Stata Output for the Specification (Ia) ............................................................................ 297 
Test for Heterosckedasticity (Ia) ..................................................................................... 297 
Stata Output for the Specification (Ia); log of expenditure ............................................. 298 
Distribution of the Residuals (Ia) .................................................................................... 299 
Skewness and Kurtosis Test on Normality (Ia) .............................................................. 299 
Inner Quartile Range (Ia) ................................................................................................ 299 
Ramsey RESET Test for Functional Form (Ia) .............................................................. 300 
vii 
 
Stata Output for the Specification (Ib); Absolute Values of expenditure and remittances
......................................................................................................................................... 300 
Ramsey RESET Test for Functional Form (Ib) .............................................................. 300 
Stata Output for the Specification (Ic); log of income .................................................... 301 
Ramsey RESET Test for Functional Form (Ic) .............................................................. 301 
Joint Significance Test .................................................................................................... 301 
Appendix 4.3 The Estimation of the Durable Goods and Education .............................. 302 
Appendix 4.3.1 Durable Goods Category ....................................................................... 302 
Conditional Marginal Effects .......................................................................................... 303 
Unconditional Marginal Effects ...................................................................................... 303 
Appendix 4.3.1 Education Category ............................................................................... 304 
Conditional Marginal Effects .......................................................................................... 305 
Unconditional Marginal Effects ...................................................................................... 305 
Appendix 4.4 Tobit Diagnostic Tests ............................................................................. 306 
Probit Coefficients for Durable Goods ........................................................................... 306 
Probit Coefficients for Educaiton ................................................................................... 307 
Appendix 4.5 Comparison of Tobit Coefficient/Standard Error of Regression with the 
Probit Coefficient ............................................................................................................ 308 
Appendix 4.5.1 Durable Goods ...................................................................................... 308 
Appendix 4.5.2 Education Category ............................................................................... 309 
Appendix 5.1 Variable Definition................................................................................... 310 
Appendix 4.5.3 Estimation of the Regressions for Remittance Recipient Households Only
......................................................................................................................................... 311 
Appendix 5.2 Stata Output for Estimated Models Using Remittances per Capita ......... 317 
Appendix 5.2.1 Probability of being Active ................................................................... 317 
Males‟ probability of being active .................................................................................. 317 
Marginal Effects.............................................................................................................. 318 
Females‟ probability of being active............................................................................... 319 
Marginal Effects.............................................................................................................. 320 
Appendix 5.2.2 Probability of being employed .............................................................. 321 
Males probability of being employed ............................................................................. 321 
Marginal Effects.............................................................................................................. 322 
viii 
 
Females probability of being employed .......................................................................... 323 
Marginal Effects.............................................................................................................. 324 
Appendix 5.3 Stata Output for Estimated Models Using Remittances Absolute Value . 325 
Appendix 5.3.1 Probability of being active .................................................................... 325 
Males probability of being active ................................................................................... 325 
Marginal Effects.............................................................................................................. 326 
Females probability of being active ................................................................................ 327 
Margnial Effects.............................................................................................................. 328 
Appendix 5.3.2 Probability of being employed .............................................................. 329 
Males probability of being employed ............................................................................. 329 
Marginal Effects.............................................................................................................. 330 
Females probability of being employed .......................................................................... 331 
Marginal Effects.............................................................................................................. 332 
 
List of Figures in Chapter II 
Figure 2.1 Major migrant recipient countries (a) and major migrant sending countries (b), 
data are as of 2010 and represent the stock of migrants in millions ................................. 15 
Figure 2.2 Remittances flows to the developing countries, compared with other resource 
flows, data are as of 2014, in billions of USD .................................................................. 18 
Figure 2.3 Remittances flows to the main recipient regions, 2013, in billions of USD ... 19 
Figure 2.4  Remittances as a share of GDP for selected developing countries, 2013 ...... 20 
Figure 2.5 Real GDP per capita in Kosovo, in EUR ........................................................ 23 
Figure 2.6 GDP per capita in Western Balkan Countries, in USD .................................. 24 
Figure 2.7 The structure of Kosovo‟s GDP, in billions of EUR ....................................... 25 
Figure 2.8 Education levels in excess/deficit in Kosovo for 2013 ................................... 29 
Figure 2.9 . Major migration waves from Kosovo, in thousands of migrants .................. 31 
Figure 2.10 Main destination countries of Kosovo‟s migrants, 2013, percent of total 
migrants............................................................................................................................. 32 
ix 
 
Figure 2.11 Remittances inflows in Kosovo, in millions of EUR .................................... 33 
Figure 2.12 Methods of transferring remittances, in percent of total ............................... 34 
Figure 2.13 Emigrants residence prior to migration, in percent, 2012 ............................. 36 
 List of Figures in Chapter III 
Figure 3.1. Sample Selection Procedure for the data set .................................................. 72 
 List of Figures in Chapter V 
Figure 5.1 Individual Labour Supply .............................................................................. 174 
Figure 5.2 Individual Labour Supply with non-wage income ........................................ 175 
 
List of Tables in Chapter II 
Table 2.1 Characteristics of Kosovo's Labour Market based on LFS for 2014 ................ 27 
List of Tables in Chapter III 
Table 3.1 Summary of the main findings in Macroeconomic Determinants of Remittances
........................................................................................................................................... 53 
Table 3.2 The expected effect of independent variables in the flow of remittances ........ 69 
Table 3.3 Descriptive Statistics of the Variables .............................................................. 75 
Table 3.4 Types and number of countries applying policies ............................................ 78 
Table 3.5 Common Factor Restrictions from FE estimation of DLRM of AR(1) ............ 86 
Table 3.6 Estimated Regression of Macroeconomic Determinants of Remittances ......... 89 
Table 3.7 Estimated Regression of Macroeconomic Determinants of Remittances by the 
number of policies............................................................................................................. 92 
Table 3.8 Estimated Regression of Macroeconomic Determinants of Remittances by type 
of policy ............................................................................................................................ 93 
Table 3.9 Estimated Regression of Macroeconomic Determinants of Remittances 
including governance indicator ......................................................................................... 95 
 
x 
 
 List of Tables in Chapter IV 
Table 4.1 Summary of Literature Findings on the impact of remittances on households‟ 
expenditure ...................................................................................................................... 103 
Table 4.2 Description of the Expenditure Categories, dependent variable ..................... 125 
Table 4.3 Expected effect of the variables on the share of expenditure for each category
......................................................................................................................................... 126 
Table 4.4 Descriptive Statistics of the Variables ............................................................ 130 
Table 4.5 Diagnostic Tests  for share of current consumption ....................................... 134 
Table 4.6 Test for Outliers .............................................................................................. 134 
Table 4.7 Descriptive Statistics of the Variables interacted with log of income ............ 137 
Table 4.8 The estimated regression on consumption as a share of total expenditure ..... 141 
Table 4.9 Tobit Unconditional Marginal Effects ............................................................ 143 
Table 4.10 The estimated regression on consumption as a share of total expenditure for 
remittance recipient households ...................................................................................... 155 
List of Tables in Chapter V 
Table 5.1 Descriptive Statistics for Female Individuals ................................................. 193 
Table 5. 2 Descriptive Statistics for Male Individuals .................................................... 195 
Table 5.3 Average Marginal Effects for LFP and Employment Determinants .............. 201 
 
List of Abbreviations 
AH  Anderson-Hiaso Method 
AME  Average Marginal Effects 
AR (1)  Unobserved Component Model AR (1) 
BOP  Balance of Payments 
CBK  Central Bank of the Republic of Kosovo 
CFR  Common Factor Restriction 
xi 
 
CNLRM  Classical Normal Linear Regression Model 
DLRM  Dynamic Linear Regression Model 
EBRD  European Bank for Reconstructing and Development 
EUR  Euro 
FDI   Foreign Direct Investment 
FE  Fixed Effect 
GBP   The Pound Sterling 
GDP  Gross Domestic Product 
IMF  International Monetary Fund 
IOM  International Organization of Migration 
KPSF  Kosovo Pension Saving Fund 
LFP  Labour Force Participation 
LFPR  Labour Force Participation Rate 
LFS  Labour Force Survey 
MEM  Marginal Effects at Mean  
MLSW Ministry of Labour and Social Welfare 
NGO  Non-Governmental Organization 
OECD  Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development 
OLS  Ordinary Least Squares 
PPP  Purchasing Power Parity 
SAK  Statistical Agency of Kosovo 
UK  United Kingdom 
UN  United Nations  
UNDP  United Nations Development Program 
US and USA United States of America 
xii 
 
USD   U.S. Dollar 
WDI  World Development Indicators 
WOE   World Economic Outlook 
  
 
 
 
  
  
1 
 
CHAPTER I 
 
INTRODUCTION 
 
1.1 Introduction ...................................................................................................... 2 
1.2 Research Questions........................................................................................... 4 
1.3 Structure of the thesis ....................................................................................... 9 
 
  
2 
 
1.1 Introduction 
The continuous growth of cross border migration, which can be viewed as an inevitable 
feature of globalization, has raised many questions in economics and other related fields 
of inquiry. The United Nations estimate that nearly three percent of the world‟s 
population lives in a different country from the country of their birth. This is particularly 
relevant for many developing countries with geographical proximity to developed 
countries, which represent the main destination for migrants. Migration is often 
considered as one of the factors which improve people‟s lives, given that many have 
earned higher wages and more importantly, find the jobs which are often lacking in many 
developing countries. Furthermore, migration is often considered as one of the factors 
which ease the labour market pressure in migrant sending countries. An integral part of 
the migration is the flow of remittances, especially since 2000, given their substantial size 
for many developing countries, which in many cases surpasses the size of foreign aid. In 
this context, the flow of remittances is considered as an important development tool given 
that, in addition to the immediate effect on individual‟s lives, it also improves 
macroeconomic indicators such as the reduction of the current account deficit, poverty, 
inequality and provides consumption smoothing.  
Remittances have often been viewed in the literature as a potential flow of income that 
can be used for development, suggesting that remittances and migrants can present an 
unexplored potential source of investment funds in the recipient country. In this context, 
the literature has proposed various policies and measures which can be applied to 
increase the flow of remittances and strengthen their effect on the economy (Carling, 
2004; Agunias 2006; Martinez et al., 2006). A substantial number of countries have 
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applied policies and to date, their empirical effect has not been fully investigated in the 
economics literature. Furthermore, the literature on the implications of remittances for the 
recipient households has been divided into three viewpoints. The first opinion suggests 
that remittances do not represent a source for development and, on the contrary, they end 
up being used for luxury goods and consumption, and in addition decrease the labour 
force participation incentives of those of working age in the home country (Chami et al., 
2005; Ratha, 2003). The second view is that remittances are often associated with 
improvements in education, durable goods ownership and home repairs and hence 
contribute the overall growth conditions (Osili, 2004). The third view is that remittances 
do not have any different effect from other sources of income (Adams et al., 2008).  
Accordingly, in this thesis, the aim is to explore the macroeconomic determinants of 
remittances for developing countries and the implications of remittances for households‟ 
expenditure and labour supply, with a special focus on Kosovo. More specifically, this 
thesis has three main objectives. The first is to estimate the impact of macroeconomic 
variables on the flow of remittances, including the impact of policy initiatives in the 
recipient country. This policy initiative evaluation makes this study the first to our 
knowledge addressing the question on whether such policies have been successful or not. 
Given the macroeconomic determinants of remittances and the effects of the policies, by 
exploring the factors affecting households‟ expenditure patterns in Kosovo, with special 
focus on remittances and migration characteristics, allows us to address the question of 
the difference, if any, of the effect of remittances from other sources of income.  This 
indirectly assesses the appropriateness of the policies. In this context, the second 
objective addresses the role of remittances on household expenditure patterns. Finally, 
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the third objective is to investigate the implication of remittances for the labour force 
participation decision and the probability of being employed, given that the theoretically 
in the neoclassical framework non-labour income decreases the labour supply.  
1.2 Research Questions 
The importance of remittances is suggested by their size relative to Gross Domestic 
Product (GDP) in many developing economies and that remittances have grown faster 
than other types of private capital flows and faster than official development assistance 
funds in recent years (see section 2.2.1). Governments of different countries have applied 
different policies and there have also been private sector schemes to attract or orient the 
end use of remittances. A World Bank Survey of 40 central banks of developing 
countries identifies that 35 percent of these countries‟ governments have introduced 
incentives to migrants when they send remittances (Martinez, 2005). A World Bank 
(2006) report suggests that there has been some progress made through policies which 
aim at attracting remittances and shifting them from the informal into the formal sector, 
notably in Mexico and Philippines. However, depending on the type of policy, the effect 
on remittances may differ. Most importantly, no study so far has empirically investigated 
the implications of such policies for the flow of remittances.  
In this context, the first objective is to investigate the macroeconomic determinants of 
remittances with special focus on the effect of policies. This research question is 
addressed in Chapter III. The macroeconomic determinants of remittances remain a 
relatively unexplored topic and to the extent that it has been explored, it was based on the 
seminal theoretical approaches of altruism and self-interest. The exploration has been 
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usually specific for a single combination of home-host countries (i.e. US-Mexico or 
Germany-Serbia flow of remittances) or for a relatively small number of countries. With 
the latter, the investigation was usually addressed solely from the viewpoint of home 
country, that is, by only being focused on the macroeconomic variables of the home 
country. This may be to some extent justified since for a wider region the inclusion of 
host country macroeconomic variables may be more problematic, in that some countries 
migrants‟ may be scattered across a considerable number of destination countries. 
However, more rigorous research of this aspect reveals that migrants from almost every 
country are oriented towards some major regions and in many cases, to predominately a 
single country. From this viewpoint, using the standard theoretical background of 
remittances, we introduce the macroeconomic variables of the main host country into the 
model.  
Furthermore, in a rigorous review of the existing sources, for the first time, we introduce 
a policy initiatives variable as a potential determinant of remittances. The introduction of 
this variable seems important since the literature has noted that many countries have 
adopted policies in order to try to increase remittances flows, but whether these policies 
are effective is not known. Thus, we introduce policy variables, which add to the 
contribution to the literature given by the investigation of the macroeconomic 
determinants of remittances for a very large group of developing countries. The policy 
initiative variable is specifically designed for this chapter and it addresses the question of 
whether government policies and private sector initiatives designed for migrants have an 
impact on the flows of remittances. The research question to be addressed in this chapter 
is:  
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What are the main macroeconomic determinants of remittances, especially the role of 
macroeconomic variables of main host countries, and how are policy initiatives affecting 
the flow of remittances towards developing economies? 
For the second and third research questions examined in this thesis, the special focus on 
Kosovo is justified by the lack of the literature for the region, but also its relatively large 
number of migrants, which is estimated to be at over 20 percent of the total population. 
At the same time Kosovo is one of the countries with the largest inflow of remittances in 
the region, which account for around 15 percent of GDP (see section 2.2.1 and 2.3.3). 
This importance is further enforced by the high unemployment rate and low labour force 
participation rate in Kosovo, especially amongst females (see section 2.3.2). However, 
how remittances are affecting household behaviour in terms of their expenditure patterns 
and labour force participation remains unknown in Kosovo.  
It is often considered that the aggregate performance of macroeconomic indicators is as a 
consequence of the behaviour of individuals within an economy. From this perspective, 
the literature is largely inconclusive in terms of the role of remittances for recipient 
economies and it is split into three possible outcomes, as discussed in section 1.1. The 
first, a negative view, is that remittances mainly finance consumption and are oriented 
towards non-productive purchases, such as luxury goods and hence, do not generate 
growth. The second, a positive view, considers remittances as means of financing home 
improvements, education and other investments. Finally, the third neutral view, considers 
remittances as having the same effects as any other source of income (see section 4.1). 
Given this, in Chapter IV we raise the question of how remittances are affecting the 
expenditure behaviour of households in Kosovo, which is the second objective of this 
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study. The investigation covers three expenditure categories, the expenditure on current 
consumption, durable goods and education. However, in addition to the effect of 
remittances on expenditure patterns, we further extend the standard Working-Leser 
model by including characteristics which have generally been neglected in the literature. 
This extension is specially focused on migration characteristics such as the role of the 
migrant in the household decision-making process and the potential for moral hazard by 
households, characteristics which may affect the household behaviour. Consequently, the 
questions addressed in this chapter are:  
 What is the effect of remittances on the household expenditure patterns for current 
consumption, durable goods and education? Is there a role from the migrant in the 
decision-making process for expenditures by the recipient households and, does the 
frequency of the visits decrease the potential for moral hazard by remittance recipient 
households?  
Another relatively unexplored aspect of migration and remittances is their effect on the 
labour force participation. Despite being discussed in the literature as a potential factor 
driving down the labour force participation for recipient individuals and countries, this 
topic has not been studied thoroughly empirically. Given this lack of empirical studies 
(see section 5.2.1),  it appears that the debate has been driven by the theoretical 
foundations of labour force participation, which in general concludes that non-labour 
income affects negatively labour force participation and search efforts as a consequence 
of increasing the reservation wage. In this context the third objective of this thesis is to 
investigate the implications of remittances for labour force participation and employment, 
presented in Chapter V. The reason for distinguishing between labour force participation 
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probability and employment relies on the relatively unclear distinction in the literature 
between labour supply and participation. This is because the widely used of hours of 
work either neglects those who are not in the labour market, or treats them in the same 
way with those who are in the labour market looking for a job. This also treats as the 
same two different types of individuals: those who supply zero hours but are looking for 
a job and those who are supplying zero hours but not looking for a job. It seems to be 
important to distinguish these cases given the structural nature of the labour market in 
Kosovo which is characterized by amongst the lowest participation rate in the region and 
beyond, but also, a high unemployment rate. So, the question aimed to be addressed in 
this chapter is:  
Are individuals who receive remittances more likely to drop out of the labour market?  
Then this question is followed by the question which aims at finding whether:  
Do remittance recipients have a higher or lower probability of being employed?  
These two questions allow addressing the participation and employment question 
directly, while in considering the employment probability, we may indirectly consider if 
remittances are increasing the reservation wage. 
In the initial stage of this research process, the investigation of labour force participation 
from the viewpoint of hours of work and the investigation of reservation wage was 
considered as another approach which could provide answers to rather unexplored 
questions. However, given the lack of data for these two variables, this alternative was 
dismissed. It appears that not only is there a lack of data for transition countries, 
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especially in the Balkans, but also the type of existing data limits the further investigation 
of this topic. These severe data limitations are hence leaving some gaps in the literature 
on the explanations for structural unemployment and low participation rates in the region.   
In this thesis, various data sources are used to address the research objectives. For 
Chapter III, the World Bank, International Monetary Fund and central banks of the 
respective countries have been used to compile the data set. The data set includes 52 
countries for periods ranging from 5 years up to 30 years of time series. Regarding the 
second and third objective, we used the survey funded by the United Nations 
Development Program (UNDP) and supported by the International Monetary Fund (IMF) 
and the Central Bank of the Republic of Kosovo (CBK). This survey was conducted with 
households in Kosovo.  
1.3 Structure of the thesis 
This thesis is organized as following. A summary of the characteristics of developing 
countries‟ migration and remittances is provided in Chapter II as a background for the 
later chapters. In second part of this chapter a more focused description of the economy 
of Kosovo is provided. It includes description of the structure of the economy, labour 
market characteristics such as labour supply, unemployment rate and gender differences. 
Aspects of the history of migration, the aggregate data on the flow of remittances and the 
characteristics of household with migrants are also presented. In Chapter III, the 
theoretical foundations for explaining remittances flows are presented, followed by a 
review of literature. Given the continuous debate, a review of the policies that were 
proposed and applied in different counties is presented. It also presents and estimates 
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models which focus on the effect of policies, but also include other macroeconomic 
factors affecting remittances flows. Chapter IV presents the literature which investigates 
the impact of remittances on household consumption. This chapter as well as presenting a 
review of the literature which focuses on the effect of remittances also goes back to the 
theoretical models used for the investigation of expenditure patterns models. This is in 
order to develop a more complete model which is then the basis if the empirical study of 
consumption, durable goods and education expenditure. The third objective investigation 
is presented in Chapter V, which reviews the literature on labour force participation in 
the presence of remittances. It also reviews the theoretical foundations while, given the 
data limitations, it uses the standard neoclassical work-leisure model to investigate the 
effect of remittances on labour supply and employment for Kosovo. Finally, Chapter VI 
concludes by presenting the main findings and policy implications of this research. It 
pays attention to the original contribution of this work for the literature of remittances, 
but also addresses the limitations and presents some suggestions for further research.  
This chapter has introduced the topic of this thesis and set the research questions.  The 
next chapter will provide important background information on migration and remittance 
flows to developing countries, and the economy of Kosovo as a basis for later chapters in 
the thesis.   
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2.1 Introduction 
Cross border migration is one of the structural features of globalization, along with 
increasing economic integration amongst nations around the world through trade and 
financial flows (IMF, 2000). The cross-border migration has been one of the most 
contentious policy issues for migrant recipient and sending countries. The topic of 
migration has gained attention in recent years due to its estimated size and the 
implications for economies that receive substantial remittances. The traditional view is 
that migration is driven by the lack of economic opportunities in home countries and the 
hopes for economic benefits in other, mostly developed, countries (Freeman, 2006). The 
World Bank (2006) notes that migration has generated enormous improvements in 
people‟s lives given that many have earned higher wages in the destination countries and 
also the sending country experienced less pressure in their labour markets. An integral 
part of the migration is considered the flow of remittances. However, the migration 
process is often associated with the movement of skilled labour from developing 
countries towards developed countries, and hence, reducing the human capital in poorer 
countries.  
Nevertheless, it is often that the skilled labour moves to other countries as a consequence 
of lacking opportunities rather than simply income differences. The benefit for the major 
migrant sending countries is the substantial amounts of remittances, which are one of the 
main economic implications of migration. This is because remittances help to narrow the 
gap of their countries‟ current account deficit, reduce poverty and inequality in both 
income and consumption, as well as many other aspects in recipient economies (World 
Bank, 2006). Such effects of remittances are also observed at the household level, given 
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that they reduce poverty and improve consumption and education in the households 
(World Bank, 2006; Petreski et al., 2013), which contributes to the overall improvement 
in living standards of the recipient households. However, the implications of remittances 
are often considered to be short-lived given that they are primarily used for consumption 
and only to a very limited extent for investment or entrepreneurship activities. In this 
context, the effect of remittances on employment generation is considered to be relatively 
moderate and is often considered as a potential discouragement for job-seekers.  
This chapter aims at presenting a general overview of migration movements from 
developing countries and the recipients of remittances in these countries. In addition, it 
also focuses specifically on the characteristics of the economy of Kosovo with a focus on 
migration, remittances and labour market characteristics. It is organized as follows: 
Section 2.2 presents some background information on migration, such as the main 
sending and recipient countries. It is then followed by a section which describes the flow 
of remittances at the global level, specifically describing the major remittance recipient 
regions. Section 2.3 is dedicated to a description of the economy of Kosovo which starts 
by providing some background information on the structure of the economy and GDP, 
followed by a detailed description of the labour market developments, migration and 
remittances and finally, section 2.4 provides the concluding remarks of this chapter.  
2.2 Trends in Migration and Remittances in Developing Countries  
Migration affects the lives of both migrants and the home country households but also the 
development of the regions affected by the process, especially the migrant sending 
countries (IOM, 2013). The main drivers to migrate are, firstly, the economic factors 
(pull factors), that is, the growing gap in wages between the sending and recipient 
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economies; secondly, governance and public services which are known as push factors 
and result from lack of good quality public services and the presence of corruption; third, 
the demographic imbalances which may be due to the changes in life expectancy and 
changes in supply and demand for labour, with host countries often attracting labour 
supply from countries that have higher unemployment rates, and finally, conflicts which 
results in displaced persons or refugees and hence, they affect the labour market of host 
countries as well (IOM, 2013).  
With the continuing growth of international migrants, the estimated stock of international 
migrants as of 2012 stood at around 215 million, or around 3 percent of world population 
(World Bank, 2014a). Furthermore, the trend is expected to continue given the growth of 
the youth population in major migrant sending countries and also the widening income 
gap within some of the emerging economies (OECD, 2011).  Figure 2.1 presents the main 
destination countries in part (a) and the part (b) of the figure presents the main migrant 
sending countries.  
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Figure 2.1 Major migrant recipient countries (a) and major migrant sending countries (b), data are 
as of 2010 and represent the stock of migrants in millions 
(a)                                                                             (b) 
 
Source: World Bank (2011a) 
As presented in part (a) of the figure, it is the group of developed countries such as 
United States (US), Germany, Canada, and the United Kingdom (UK) that receive 
substantial numbers of migrants. However, other countries also receive substantial 
number of migrants as well. As figure 2.1 suggests,
 1
 countries such as the Russian 
Federation, Saudi-Arabia and India are amongst the main migrant host countries. For 
many of the major migrant host countries (except India), the migration population 
represents a substantial part of the total population of the host country, in most of the 
cases, exceeding 15% of total population. The domination in terms of migration towards 
these countries is often explained by the level of economic development, but also much 
of the migration is often explained by gravity models which suggest the importance of 
                                                          
1
 Migration figures have been presented in absolute terms because their importance in the literature is 
frequently viewed from this perspective. If relative figures of migration are used, the list will change 
substantially given that other small countries such as United Arab Emirates or Singapore will be the top 
migrant recipient countries due to their small population. 
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geographical proximity between home and host countries (Ramos and Surniach; 2013; 
Leuth and Ruiz-Arranz, 2006). Developing countries represent the main source of 
migrants and, as presented in the part (b) of figure 2.1 such countries include Mexico, 
India, the Russian Federation and China. The movement of migrants from developing 
countries towards OECD countries, is often referred as South-North migration, while 
movements from developing towards neighbouring developing countries is known as 
South-South migration, which is the case with former soviet member countries migrants 
moving to the Russian Federation or movements from Bangladesh towards India. The 
main migration corridors are between Mexico and the US, Ukraine and Russia, 
Bangladesh and India, Turkey and Germany, China and the US, and Philippines towards 
the US.  
2.2.1 Remittances Flows to Developing Countries 
The remittances component in the 5
th
 edition of IMF Balance of Payments Manual, 
consists of current private transfers from migrant workers who are residents in a host 
country. The World Bank Remittances Factbook (2011) in their data estimates includes in 
addition to migrant transfers, the compensation of employees. The most comprehensive 
data set is considered to be the one published by the World Bank, who obtain the data 
from the IMF Balance of Payments but combine this with information from the central 
banks and national statistics agencies of respective countries, and the World Bank 
country desks. The World Bank notes that that there are three different categories of 
countries with respect to the way remittances are considered in terms of statistics. The 
first is the group of countries that do not report data on remittances to the IMF (i.e. 
Afghanistan, Cuba, Turkmenistan, Uzbekistan and Zimbabwe), although the migration 
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data suggests that remittances flows towards these countries are high. The second is the 
group of countries who only report remittances based on estimates from formal channels 
(banks, money transfer agencies, post offices etc.). The data from this group is considered 
to have a weakness because it does not consider the informal channels. The third group 
represents the countries which make substantial efforts to provide more accurate statistics 
on remittances. These are countries who, in addition to the estimates based on the formal 
channels, undertake surveys to capture information on informal transfers. Based on the 
various methodologies used to estimate remittances, Kosovo belongs to the third group 
(see figure 2.12 and the methodology presented for Kosovo).  
In this context, one of the caveats in the literature of remittances is that the quality of data 
is problematic due to differing methods of estimation of these remittances transfers, and 
most importantly the treatment of informal channels (mostly in the second group of 
countries), but also because of the handling of irregular migration and the ambiguity 
across countries in the definition of migrants. Furthermore, the methodologies are not in 
all cases made public.  
Kosovo also reports its data to the IMF, however, so far, these data have not been 
published by the World Bank. The methodology used by the Central Bank of the 
Republic of Kosovo includes information from registered sources from formal channels 
such as commercial banks, money transfer agencies and money declared to the Customs 
of Kosovo. In addition to the formal channels, Kosovo also addresses the issue of 
informal channels by including information from surveys (see section 2.3.3 and 2.12 for 
more discussion on estimation procedures for Kosovo).  
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Figure 2.2 Remittances flows to the developing countries, compared with other resource flows, 
data are as of 2014, in billions of USD 
   Source: World Bank (2014) and OECD (2014)  
An integral part of the migration is considered to be the flow of remittances. Remittances 
have attracted considerable attention in recent years as they have increased rapidly, 
especially since 2000s, surpassing the size of foreign aid in many developing countries 
(World Bank 2006; World Bank Dataset 2014). As presented in figure 2.2, in 1995, 
remittances towards developing countries amounted to around 55 billion US dollars, 
while by 2005 they had increased to 192 billion US dollars. Remittances towards 
developing countries decreased only in 2009 and since 2010 have continued to increase at 
a steady rate. In some individual developing countries, in addition to being among the 
most stable sources of financial flows, remittances surpassed even FDI (Chami and 
Fullenkamp, 2013). According to the World Bank, international migrants sent nearly 600 
billion USD in 2014, of which nearly 500 billion (Figure 2.2) were remittances towards 
developing countries (World Bank 2014). As presented in figure 2.2, remittances have 
been more stable compared to FDI in the presence of financial crisis such as the one in 
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2008-2009; while FDI dropped substantially during the crisis years. In some individual 
developing countries, in addition to being among the most stable sources of financial 
flows, remittances surpassed even FDI (Chami and Fullenkamp, 2013). 
Figure 2.3 Remittances flows to the main recipient regions, 2013, in billions of USD  
 
         
Source: World Bank (2014) 
Figure 2.3 presents the main recipient regions of remittances. The East and South East 
Asian region receives most remittances (over 100 billion US dollar in 2013), followed by 
Southern Asia with similar level of over 100 billion US dollars (mostly India with nearly 
70 billion US dollars). The Middle East and North Africa region receives around 40 
billion US dollars, while Central America receives around 37 billion US dollars (with 
Mexico itself receiving 22 billion US dollars) and Central, Eastern and Southeastern 
Europe around 38 billion US dollars.  
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Figure 2.4  Remittances as a share of GDP for selected developing countries, 2013  
          Source: World Bank (2014) 
Remittances are particularly important for countries where the level of development is 
low and there is high unemployment. This is particularly important for countries 
experiencing high poverty rates, given that remittances ease the position of unemployed 
families and reduce the poverty level. In this context, Figure 2.4 presents remittances as a 
share of GDP in less developed countries; using the World Bank income classification, 
most of these countries belong to the low-income countries group while a few belong to 
lower-middle income countries. Remittances share to GDP is higher than 10 percent in 24 
countries, while in 15 countries have a share of remittances to GDP at over 15 percent. 
Tajikistan leads at world level in this indicator with a share of remittances to GDP at over 
50 percent (Figure 2.4). However, poorer countries are generally not able to generate 
more migrants and according to Adams (2007) this could be as a result of the cost 
associated with the process of migration.  
A reason why remittances remain very important for the developing countries is their 
stability. Given that remittances are sent by the cumulated stock of migrants and not just 
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new migrants, they are expected to be persistent and to continue to flow and increase as 
long as the flow of migration is increasing. This is also likely to be the case even in the 
presence of income shocks to the migrant income given that they are usually sent in small 
amounts and compose only a fraction of the migrants‟ incomes (World Bank, 2011). 
Furthermore, as discussed in section 2.2, migration is expected to increase which will 
ensure the stability of remittances (OECD, 2011; World Bank, 2011).  
2.3 General Characteristics of Kosovo’s Economy   
 
With the fall of the command economy system, Kosovo undertook its first steps in the 
transition process. However, the transition process in Kosovo was further delayed 
because of the political instability that characterized the former Yugoslavia, of which 
Kosovo was a part until the War in 1999.
2
 The transition to a market economy for most of 
the former Yugoslavian countries was characterized with similar features, given that the 
change in the political system and emergence of new countries was accompanied by 
wars. These wars, in addition to destruction of industries and many other economic 
aspects reduced cross-country cooperation. This process was further enforced by the 
economic restructuring process and privatization, which disrupted the production process 
in the immediate years of the transition process. Hoti (2004) using the EBRD data 
illustrates how the pre-transition GDP levels for Central and Eastern European countries 
were only achieved 9 years after the transition process started. The transition process is 
mostly believed to have affected the production process and the labour market given that 
the movement from a centrally planned to market economy disrupted the production 
                                                          
2
 The War of Kosovo represents the armed conflict from February 1998 until June 1999 between Yugoslav 
Armed Forces and Kosovo Liberation Army (KLA) with the air support from North Atlantic Treaty 
Organization (NATO). 
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process and many people lost their jobs as a consequence. In addition to the labour 
market, the sudden change from centrally planned economies to market economies and 
the aforementioned disruption of production process, led to a heavily deteriorated the 
trade balance. Consequently, the major problems that most of the transition countries 
faced were a decline in GDP, a high trade deficit and most importantly, high 
unemployment rates. An outcome of such changes was the significant migration rates that 
characterized many of the transition countries, especially from South-east Europe and 
former Soviet countries.  
The situation was similar in post-war Kosovo, with dramatic changes in the economic 
system and consequently many people living in Kosovo were affected. Although pre-war 
data do not exist, estimates by Moalla-Fetini et al., (2003) suggest that Kosovo‟s real 
GDP per capita was continuously declining in the pre-war period; it reached its lowest 
level in 1998 during the war in Kosovo (Figure 2.5). There were no underlying 
methodology in their research, nor does any evidence exist in the Statistical Agency of 
Kosovo that could explain these fluctuations in the Real GDP per capita, or the later ones 
they identified. They consider that the 1981-1998 changes were caused by a continuous 
decrease in Federal Funds for Kosovo when it was part of Yugoslavia, with the sudden 
drop in 1998 a result of the war.  
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Figure 2.5 Real GDP per capita in Kosovo, in EUR 
 
          
Source: Moalla-Fetini et al., (2003*) and SAK (2013a**) * Estimates are for the period 1981-2003, 
**Author’s estimates for the period 2003-2012 based on Statistical Agency of Kosovo and IMF 
data.  
 
In the immediate post-war years, Kosovo enjoyed a relatively strong economic growth 
which was generally in line with other countries in the region. In addition to the general 
positive trends in economic growth in the region in the post-war years, the immediate 
increase of real GDP per capita is also attributed to the post-war reconstruction which 
was supported by donors. Estimates by Moalla-Fetini et al. (2003) suggest that the 
support from the donor sector for 2000-2003 was equivalent to over 40 percent of the 
GDP, while the GDP for the period was from 2.2 billion USD in 2000 and 3.3 billion 
USD in 2003. However, since 2003 Kosovo‟s growth has not been sufficient to keep pace 
with the other countries in the region and there has been a growing gap in GDP per 
capita (Figure 2.6) which is linked to an up to 20% decrease in donor funds which started 
after 2002. Furthermore, the Kosovan economy‟s unexpected strong early performance 
led to the introduction of restrictionary fiscal policies in 2001 which are likely to be a 
factor in the reduced growth. The growth rate in Kosovo was largely driven by foreign 
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aid until 2004, followed by private-sector driven growth in the 2005-2008 period. 
However, with the global financial and economic crisis since 2008 the growth in Kosovo 
has been led by the continuous growth of government expenditure (SAK, 2013a, page 3).  
Figure 2.6 GDP per capita in Western Balkan Countries, in USD 
            
Source: IMF (WOE April 2014) 
Despite the positive growth rates in the post-war period, the problem of disrupted 
production meant that high unemployment remained in place and this is still limiting the 
capacity of Kosovo‟s economy for growth. Such problems have been further enforced by 
the lack of competitiveness, resulting in a high dependence on imported goods (IMF, 
2013; CBK 2013). These structural constraints faced by Kosovo, apart from other 
development since the breakup of Former Yugoslavia, have been present and were 
reinforcing the migration pressure. Consequently, labour market problems such as low 
participation, especially for females, but also persistent unemployment, remain the main 
challenges for the economy. To some extent, these problems are considered to be 
mitigated in part by the relatively large number of migrants and the continuous inflow of 
remittances.  
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2.3.1 The Structure of Kosovo’s GDP 
 
The GDP structure is dominated by the consumption category which is over 105 percent 
of GDP (SAK, 2015a). Consumption is heavily dominated by the private sector which 
accounts for around 80-90 percent of consumption over these years. One of the important 
sources of financing the consumption component in Kosovo was the substantial flow of 
remittances.  
Figure 2.7 The structure of Kosovo’s GDP, in billions of EUR 
            
Source: SAK (2015a)  
Investments have been relatively equally divided between the public and private sectors 
with the initial years being dominated by the donor sector and with the private sector 
gaining pace after 2004 (SAK, 2013a). From 2008 until 2014 it was the public sector 
investment which kept the investment component at a ratio of 29 percent to GDP (SAK, 
2015a) and the expansion of government expenditure was enabled by previous years‟ 
accumulated surplus. Private sector investment has been partly funded by the level of 
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Foreign Direct Investment which accounted on average for 5 percent of GDP (CBK, 
2014). As presented in Figure 2.7, one of the categories where Kosovo‟s economy has 
lagged far behind countries in the region was the net exports component of the GDP 
(SAK, 2015a). This is because Kosovo in the post-war period has faced a persistent wide 
gap in trade in goods, although the trade in services has a positive balance. The trade 
deficit in goods was due to the very high level of imports of goods (nearly 50 percent of 
GDP) and the very low coverage of imports by exports (imports/exports ratio for goods 
varied from 8-15 percent). Such performance in the trade sector is generally considered to 
be as a result of a dysfunctional manufacturing sector due to the lack of investment since 
the 1990s. This is particularly important because Kosovo was considered as a country 
with potential to develop heavy industry, which was an important employer before the 
1990s. However, as a result of the 1991-1999 Yugoslav wars, since that period almost all 
of the large companies, which employed the vast majority of labour force, were closed 
down and the economy has been heavily dependent on imports (SAK, 2015a).  
2.3.2 Labour Market  
 
Kosovo‟s population is the youngest in the Europe and still growing (SAK, 2014a). As a 
result of this structure, new entrants to the labour market are estimated to be at around 
25,000 on an annual basis (CBK, 2007). Despite moderate growth rates, and stable 
financial and fiscal sectors estimates suggest that the number of jobs created annually is 
below 10,000 (MLSW, 2012). Consequently, the main challenge for the economy 
remains the high unemployment and poverty rate. With the loss of jobs as a result of 
deindustrialization, poverty levels increased in Kosovo in the post-war period. The World 
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Bank and SAK (2011) study suggests that 34 percent of population lives at the poverty 
line while 12 percent of population lives in extreme poverty. The definition used for 
poverty in this study is the World Bank‟s absolute poverty line of 1.25 US dollar per day.  
Table 2.1 Characteristics of Kosovo's Labour Market based on LFS for 2014 
  Male  Female Total 
a) Labour Force Participation Rate (% of working age population) 61.8 21.4 41.6 
b) Employment Rate (% of working age population) 41.3 12.5 26.9 
c) Unemployment Rate (% of LF) 33.1 41.6 35.3 
d) Discouraged Workers (% of working age population) 8.2 13.1 10.7 
Source: SAK (2015b)       
Table 2.1 gives details of the labour market based on official statistics from Labour Force 
Survey of Statistical Agency of Kosovo (SAK, 2015b). Although there have been some 
questions about the reliability of the labour market data in Kosovo, we will present the 
official figures. We are interested in the approximate levels and trends rather than their 
details which are suspect. This lack of reliability of the labour market data can be 
illustrated by the significant inconsistencies between the SAK (2015b) data and Kosovo 
Pension Saving Fund (KPSF) data. This comparison is possible given that contribution to 
the KPSF is mandatory for all employed individuals. However, the informal sector, 
which is considered to be relatively large (IMF 2013a) in Kosovo, is excluded as they do 
not report their income to the tax administration and hence, do not contribute to the 
pension fund. Based on LFS data, the number of employed persons in Kosovo is just over 
320 thousand of which 248 thousand are males and 75 thousands are females. However, 
based on the KPSF data, the number of employed females is higher at 87 thousand and 
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this only represents the formal employment. Given the 30 percent informal economy, the 
number of females employed should arguably be much higher than that provided by the 
SAK (2015b) LFS survey, especially given that SAK survey does not address specifically 
whether the employed are formally reporting their income to tax agencies or not.   
Regardless of the statistical problems, it is clear that the unemployment rate in Kosovo 
remains one of the highest in the South Eastern Europe (standing at 35 percent according 
to SAK). This unemployment is also persistent given that 73 percent of job-seekers have 
been unemployed for longer than 12 months (SAK, 2015b). In addition to the high 
unemployment rate another characteristic of the labour market is that the labour force 
participation rate (LFPR) is also low, but urban areas generally have a higher 
participation rate. According to the SAK (2015b), the high inactivity rate, amongst other 
reasons such as personal and seeking educating, is also caused by the lack of confidence 
that the individual will find job. Around 10 percent of those in the working age 
population belong to the discouraged workers given that they do not believe they will 
find a job and hence are out of labour market as they are not actively looking for jobs. 
There are also significant gender differences in labour force participation and this is also 
the case for unemployment, with the rate for females standing at 41 percent, while for 
males it is 33 percent. The highest unemployment rate by age cohort is for the youngest 
age group of 15 and 24 at 61 percent (SAK, 2015b).  
By education level, the unemployment rate is highest for those with no education 
obtained (over 64 percent) followed by the individuals who only completed primary 
education (nearly 46 percent unemployment). Those with secondary vocational education 
face an unemployment rate slightly over 35 percent, while those with general secondary 
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education over 41 percent. As expected those with university education face the lowest 
unemployment rate, at over 18 percent. From this viewpoint, based on a survey with 
enterprises in Kosovo, Loxha (2014) describes the structural nature of unemployment by 
presenting the jobs in surplus/deficit by the education level as reported by the firms. 
According to this survey, as presented in Figure 2.8, firms report that there is a surplus in 
many occupations related to services, but there is a shortage of workers educated with 
tertiary and vocational education.  
Figure 2.8 Education levels in excess/deficit in Kosovo for 2013 
  
Source: Loxha (2014) 
Furthermore, the number of firms reporting the inadequacy in the education of the 
workforce as a constraint in developing their business increased in 2013, reaching nearly 
25 percent compared to 10 percent in 2009; though this may be as a result of 
improvements in other aspects such as infrastructure, which may have raised the 
workforce problem up the list. Furthermore, Loxha (2014) cites the International 
Financial Corporation survey which finds that the main concern of foreign investors 
-9.30%
-5.60%
-5.00%
-1.70%
0.50%
1.60%
19.80%
-15.00% -10.00% -5.00% 0.00% 5.00% 10.00% 15.00% 20.00% 25.00%
University
High School
Vocational
Post-University
Primary
No School
Seconday General
30 
 
worldwide is the availability of skilled labour (as reported by over 85 percent of potential 
and current investors).  
In terms of working hours per week, 83 percent of individuals work over 40 hours of 
work per week, 1 percent works between 35 and 39 hours per week, while only 16 
percent work less than 34 hours a week. However, the Labour Force Survey also 
identified that of those individuals who work part time, 70 percent do so because there 
are no available jobs in the market to work longer hours. Given the lack of jobs 
availability, but also the lack of choice in terms of work and its conditions, migration is 
often perceived as a viable choice for many households in Kosovo.  
2.3.3 Migration and Remittances 
Migration has become a structural feature of Kosovo‟s economy, with the stock of 
migrants from Kosovo surpassing 30 percent of Kosovo‟s resident population. However, 
the motives behind migration were different for the different waves of migration. Before 
the 1970s, migration from Kosovo was considered as negligible. However, the 1968 a 
“Guest Worker” agreement between Germany and Yugoslavia paved the way for a more 
significant number of migrants (Oezcan, 2004). The Statistical Agency of Kosovo in its 
migration report identifies that for nearly 80 percent of the migrants until the early 1970s 
the dominant reason for migration was employment. However, in the mid-1970s this has 
started gradually to decrease with family union becoming an important driver until the 
late 1980s (SAK, 2014).  
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Figure 2.9 . Major migration waves from Kosovo, in thousands of migrants  
       Source: SAK (2014) 
The largest surge of migrants from Kosovo was in the 1997-1999 period, the years of the 
War of Kosovo (SAK, 2014). During this War almost one million inhabitants were 
deported from the country (UNHCR, 1999). A significant number of refugees from 
Kosovo have settled in Western Europe (Figure 2.9). Many of these one million refugees 
returned to the country in the post-war period, but a significant number became economic 
migrants given the large income differences between the developed countries and 
Kosovo. According to the SAK (2014) report, more than 50 percent of the migrants 
currently living abroad left in the 1990s.  
The emigration of Kosovans is still continuing, however at a lower level compared to the 
1990s wave (Figure 2.9). Migration is still a very serious option for many households in 
Kosovo. The SAK (2013b) study on remittances and migration suggests that around 15 
percent of the households in Kosovo have at least a member who is considering 
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migration. Of those willing to migrate, 80 percent are now driven by economic motives, 
while the remaining 20 percent are driven by family union and educational motives 
(similar findings are presented in UNDP 2012 survey where 15 percent of those 
interviewed, have specific migration plans because of scarce employment opportunities 
in Kosovo). These new economic migrants often use historical networks with other 
former migrants to countries such as Germany and Switzerland (Figure 2.10).  
                           
Figure 2.10 Main destination countries of Kosovo’s migrants, 2013, percent of total migrants 
               
                      Source: SAK (2014)  
 
Remittances are one of the major implications of the large migrant stock from Kosovo. 
With the exception of 2009 and 2010, remittances have continuously increased and in 
2012 and 2013 they reached over 600 million euros (Figure 2.11), which is just over 12 
percent of Kosovo‟s GDP using the World Bank calculation method which includes the 
compensation of employees (which will be used across this study), this reaches 17 
percent of GDP. 
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Figure 2.11 Remittances inflows in Kosovo, in millions of EUR 
        Source: CBK (2014) 
Around 20 percent of households in Kosovo receive remittances and for nearly 40 
percent of these households remittances are their main source of income. Various surveys 
(UNDP, 2012; SAK, 2013b) suggest that the vast majority of remittances are used to 
finance current consumption, while smaller amounts are used to purchase durable goods 
and for education financing. These surveys suggest that only around two percent of all 
remittances inflows have been used for business start-ups. However, it must be noted that 
the direct financial implications of migration are larger than just remittances for the 
Kosovo‟s economy. This is because around 100 million of euros (5 percent of GDP) of 
annual Foreign Direct Investment (FDI) comprises of capital from migrants, while the 
travel component
3
 of the balance of payments is also relatively large due to the large 
diaspora. The source of remittances to Kosovo is dominated by Germany and Switzerland 
and is very similar to the distribution of migrants across countries as presented in Figure 
2.10.  
                                                          
3
 According to the Balance of Payments Manual (5
th
 Edition), the Travel Component in the Balance of 
Payments includes goods and services which have been purchased by the non-residents in the country 
during their visits (IMF, BOPM5).  
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Figure 2.12 Methods of transferring remittances, in percent of total 
          Source: CBK (2014) 
The methods through which remittances are transferred are predominately through banks 
and money transfer agencies (Figure 2.12). However, in addition to the banks and money 
transfer agencies, remittances in Kosovo are also transferred in person and partially 
declared to the Customs of Kosovo, and the declared amounts are considered as formal 
transfers (in the figure 2.12, such transfers are in the category of Other Channels). 
Furthermore, the formal channels have been supplemented by including a model to 
estimate the cash withdrawals in local ATMs by the remittance recipients using credit 
cards provided by the migrant. This has been identified to function in the following 
manner: the migrant supplies his personal bank card to the recipient household. On a 
regular basis, the migrant deposits the amount of money they want to transfer into that 
account, hence, enabling the recipient household to withdraw them in the home country. 
In addition to this, informal channels are also estimated and such estimations are based 
on various surveys that are conducted on frequent basis with households. The informal 
channels, identified from surveys, are represented in the „Other Channels‟ category in 
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figure 2.12. Therefore, the Other Channels category in figure 2.12 includes both formal 
transfers from the above explained transferring methods as well as informal transfers 
identified from surveys.  
2.3.4 Profile of Kosovan Migrants 
This section is based on the UNDP (2012) remittances study for Kosovo. In this survey 
the replies for migrants are as reported by the relatives in Kosovo.  In considering 
households, what follows distinguishes the household in Kosovo from which the migrant 
came (home country household) and the migrant‟s household in the host country. 
Kosovan migrants, as presented in Figure 2.9, typically migrated in the 1990s, with the 
largest wave in 1998-1999 when the war broke out. A majority of migrants originally 
came from the rural areas, but this trend has changed over the years with a narrowing of 
the difference in terms of origin. As presented in figure 2.13, the pre-1989 years were 
characterized with over 70 percent of migrants from rural areas, but this dominance 
changed substantially in the 1990s when many people in the public sector lost their jobs 
and migrated (UNDP, 2012).  
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Figure 2.13 Emigrants residence prior to migration, in percent, 2012 
 
Source: UNDP (2012) 
The UNDP (2012) remittances study for Kosovo suggests that, in terms of gender of the 
migrants, the majority of migrants are men (67.5%). With regard to the age of migrant 
(that is head of the household in the host country), according to the survey, the average 
age is 40 for both men and women (UNDP, 2012).  
The average migrant (head of the household in the host country) is married and the 
average size of the household in the host country is 4 members, including the head of the 
household. Typically, the migrant is employed in the private sector in the host country. 
The education level of the majority of the migrants‟ head of the households in host 
country is secondary; 70 percent of men and 57 percent of women have attained 
secondary education.  Only 9 percent of male migrant head of the households in host 
countries have attained university or higher education level, while for women, this 
percentage is much higher at 19 percent (UNDP, 2012).  
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With regard to employment, the vast majority of the migrant head of the households in 
the host country are employed (93.8%). There is a difference in terms of employment 
with regard to men and women given that 95.4 percent of men are employed while for 
women, this is 84.4 percent. The UNDP study shows that 68 percent of the migrants are 
employed in the private sector and 19 percent are employed in public sector. However, it 
is reported in the study that, on average, one member of the household in the host country 
is a jobseeker (UNDP, 2012).  
Migrants seem to have relatively strong links to Kosovo given the frequency of their 
visits. Various surveys report that about 60-70 percent of migrants visit their home 
country relatives at least once a year (UNDP, 2010; UNDP, 2012).  
2.4 Conclusions 
The process of transition from the centrally planned to open market economy created 
structural changes in transition countries. These structural changes were in many cases 
accompanied by disruptions in the production process and privatization. With the 
privatization process, many changes were brought to these companies including new 
technologies and hence, many of the skills used in the centrally planned economy became 
obsolete. This created the problem of structural unemployment for many countries, 
including Kosovo. A consequence of such developments was the rapid increase of 
migrants from most of the countries, although migration was also driven by political 
factors.  
Migration itself is considered to have been beneficial for many countries given the 
improvements that it brought in lives of migrants but also the home country households. 
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The improvements in the lives of migrants are as a result of more opportunities in host 
countries and their jobs, while for home country households, it is the flow of remittances 
that increase the stability of financing their consumption and other economic activities. In 
fact, remittances became one of the major sources of financial flows towards the 
developing economies, surpassing official aid flows and in many cases surpassing the 
FDI. Such developments in the remittances flows have increased the awareness of 
academia and policy makers and led to an increased interest in the topic and potential 
policies towards migration and remittance flows.  
For Kosovo, the developments were slightly different from many transition countries, 
given that the War of 1998 was the major cause of migration. However, in the post-war 
period, despite the relatively sound economic growth, which was generally in line with 
other countries in the region, Kosovo is still lagging behind in terms of economic 
development and unemployment reduction. The unemployment rate in Kosovo was 
estimated to be at 31 percent in 2012 and there are further problems in the labour market 
such as very low participation rate, especially among females, long-term unemployment, 
and unemployment remains high for young jobseekers. However, it is believed that many 
of the socio-economic problems in the country are mitigated by the relatively large flow 
of remittances which have been growing in the post-war years. In 2012 and 2013 they 
reached over 600 million of euros, which is just over 12 percent of Kosovo‟s GDP, while 
adding to this the compensation of employees, this grows to 17 percent of GDP. With 
regard to migration, the patterns have changed over years given that now almost half of 
migrants are from urban areas, but migration is still dominated by men. 
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The issue of migration and remittances is important from both the macro and 
microeconomic perspectives of recipient countries. In this context, this chapter described 
the background information for developing countries in general and for Kosovo in 
particular and serves as a scene setting for the next chapters. Identifying some these 
characteristics for developing countries will allow us to have a clearer approach into 
investigating the macroeconomic determinants of remittances, including the effects of 
policies. The background information on Kosovo sets the scene for investigation of the 
implications of remittances for households‟ expenditure and their implications for the 
labour market.  
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3.1 Introduction 
Migration is considered as a pre-condition for remittances inflows to developing 
countries. However, as expectation of remittances flows is viewed as a major motive in 
the decision to migrate there is no debate on the link between the two (Carling, 2008). 
Discussion is to a large extent focused on the determinants of the variation in remittance 
flows between countries. This research question remains important in the literature and 
the debate is split between the two main theories of the determinants, that is, altruism and 
self-interest.  In spite of these distinct theoretical motives for remittances flows, a 
difficulty remains in the measurement and separation of these motives, which in turn 
have contributed to the complexity of this research question. In addition, this question has 
gained attention given the important role of remittances in the economies of developing 
countries.  
This chapter investigates the remittances flows to developing countries from the 
macroeconomic point of view, that is, the aggregate flow of remittances as a function of 
various country level indicators.
 
Although altruism and self-interest theories have been 
developed from the microeconomics viewpoint, this chapter is based on the 
macroeconomic level data and uses the assumption that macroeconomic behaviour of 
remittances, that is the aggregate flow, is an outcome of individual decisions.  In addition 
to the standard theoretical and empirical foundations, this chapter takes a wider 
perspective compared to the existing literature. Many countries have adopted policies in 
order to try to increase remittances and their impact, but little is known about the effect of 
these. Thus this chapter contributes by investigating the macroeconomic determinants of 
remittances using a relatively large group of developing countries which give a large 
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panel dataset, with special attention paid to the evaluation of such policies. For this 
reason, the policy variables are specifically designed for this chapter and as such it is a 
contribution to research in this area. Using the policy variables, this chapter investigates 
whether the government policies and private sector initiatives designed for migrants have 
an impact on the flows of remittances.  
The structure of this chapter is as follows: Section 3.2 is dedicated to a review of the 
theory of the macroeconomic determinants of remittances.  Section 3.3 reviews the 
literature on the macroeconomic determinants of remittances, followed by Section 3.4 
which considers the policy initiatives undertaken by different countries. Section 3.5 is 
dedicated to the development of the model to investigate the macroeconomic 
determinants of remittances, based on the review of the literature and including the policy 
initiatives. Section 3.6 describes the data and methods to be used for the estimation of the 
econometric model and the results are presented in section 3.7. Concluding remarks are 
drawn in Section 3.8.  
3.2 Theory on the Macroeconomic Determinants of Remittances 
The International Monetary Fund (IMF) defines remittances as international transfers 
which “may consist almost entirely of funds sent by individuals who have migrated to a 
new economy and become residents there‟ (IMF, 2009 page 75). The World Bank (2006) 
defines remittances as the sum of migrant transfers and compensation of employees to 
their home country as discussed in section 2.2.1. Furthermore, as described in the World 
Bank (2006) report, a problem with remittance data is the inconsistency between 
countries in reporting them. Before reviewing the current literature and what the theory 
suggests for the macroeconomic determinants of the remittances, it should be noted that 
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the term remittances in this chapter applies to the aggregated data, that is the amount of 
migrant transfers and compensation of employees into one country for a particular year; 
this also implies that the term remittances in this case applies only to the international 
transfers. In addition, the data on the remittances collected by many countries include 
only the amount of remittances transferred through formal channels, while only few 
countries tend to estimate the informal remittances (Martinez, 2005). In fact, the 
improvements of the data recordings in recent years have resulted in significant increases 
in recorded remittances statistics in many cases (World Bank, 2006). As a consequence 
of this data collection, in some cases the increase of remittances flow towards formal 
channels from informal may be recorded as an increase in remittances. 
In recognition of the potential role of migration in improving the welfare of migrants, 
their countries of origin and the destination countries, the World Bank (2006) points out 
two core factors related to migration and remittances. First, it is the economic factors in 
both the home and host countries that affect the migration decision, and second, it is the 
stock of migrants that determines the size of remittances to particular countries. 
Economic factors such as high unemployment and a lack of opportunities in the home 
country are often considered among main factors driving migration, and consequently, 
remittances become one of the motivations to migrate (Carling, 2008). Migration in the 
„new economics of labour migration‟ is considered either as an individual 
strategy/investment to maximize income or as a household strategy/investment to 
diversify the households‟ income risk (Gupta, 2006; Carling, 2008; Stark, 1985). 
Depending on the motivation to migrate, i.e. maximizing individual income or household 
income risk diversification, the remittance decisions may differ. If the motivation is 
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maximizing individual income, it would be expected that migration will result in a lower 
remittances towards households in the home country compared to the situation where the 
motivation is diversifying the households‟ income. However, there is no clear distinction 
between these two strategies of migration and some degree of altruism may, for instance, 
exist even if the individual is largely concerned with their own lifetime earnings and 
wealth.  
In cases when the unemployment level and wage differential between the countries of 
origin and destination is high, there is tendency for migration to increase, leading 
members of the labour force to move towards developed countries (Freeman, 2006). 
However, as a result of the restrictions on migration to developed economies, not all who 
want to will be able to migrate and hence generate income in the host countries.  
Consequently, such prospective migrants will remain in home country and are potential 
remittance recipients, while those that manage to migrate are potential remitters. In 
addition, there are persons who are not active in the labour force and therefore, are less 
likely to migrate, and hence, they also represent potential remittance recipients. 
Therefore, remittances flows depend on the stock of migrants (World Bank 2006, Gupta, 
2006 and Leuth and Ruiz-Arranz 2008). In addition, remittances may behave differently 
with the duration of stay in the host country. This is because the new migrants are 
expected to initially increase the amount of remittances with their duration of stay, but at 
some point in time start to decrease them, suggesting an inverse U shaped function over 
time (Lucas and Stark, 1985; Funkhouser, 1995).   
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The reasons why migrants send remittances to the home country are reflected in the two 
main approaches in the new economic of labour migration theory; the altruism theory, 
that is the economic support of the home country household members; and the self-
interest theory or exchange motive of the migrants who aim to accumulate savings and 
investments or hope to inherit, in the home country (Lucas and Stark, 1985; Funkhouser, 
1995; Agarwal and Horowitz, 2002; Osili, 2007; Leuth and Ruiz-Arranz, 2008; Carling, 
2008). These motives are discussed further in the sections 3.2.1 and 3.2.2. In addition to 
the standard theoretical foundations on migrants‟ decision to remit, remittances are also 
explained by other non-measurable factors, such as what Carling (2008) identifies as 
„normative settings‟. Normative settings include the moral values and the pressure from 
the home country households on the migrants to send remittances. Often migrants may 
face difficulties in integrating in the host country and this makes them to want to retain 
the links with their country of origin. It is often suggested that remittances are used as a 
way for the migrant to maintain links with the home country relatives and in the absence 
of remittances they may lose the social assets (that is the close relationship with the 
family and other relatives) in the home country (Carling, 2008; Lucas and Stark, 1985). It 
is considered that home country households perceive that they are entitled to receive 
remittances on a regular basis. Such normative settings are also related to the aim of 
migrant of achieving a higher social status in the home country. Such normative settings 
may lead to criticism of the migrant from the home country household for not helping 
them, either through remittances or to support further migration. Since such normative 
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settings are problematic to measure and could vary across different countries and 
cultures, this adds to the difficulties in establishing the determinants of remittances.  
3.2.1 Altruistic Motives 
Altruism is the behaviour of the migrants who gain utility by sending money to their 
relatives in their country of origin, believing that this will improve their relatives‟ 
welfare. This behaviour is because the migrant considers the utility (welfare) of the home 
country household as well as their own consumption (Lucas and Stark 1985, Funkhouser 
1995, Agarwal and Horowitz 2002 and Rapoport and Docquier, 2006). Funkhouser 
(1995) expressed the relationship of the altruism model using the following migrants‟ 
utility function (U) which includes also the utility of members (Uh) left in the origin 
country, hence, 
 
  
















 t
u
m
t
t
CUU
1
1
 










t
v
t
h
tt
h
th ZRNRYUV
)1(
1
}),({

_____________________3.1 
where the migrant‟s utility takes account of both their own consumption and the home 
household‟s welfare. This is separated into two components which are functions of: (a) 
their own consumption over time, 
m
tC  discounted by ))1/(1(
t
u ; and (b) the utility the 
migrant gains from the welfare of the home household, discounted at the home 
household‟s discount rate. The home household‟s utility depends on the total income of 
the household, which is the sum of any home member‟s earnings (
h
tY ), and remittances (
tR ) they receive from the migrant.  To this, is added the number of other migrants (
h
tN ) 
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from the same household and the average level of remittances the household receives per 
other migrant ( tR ). The utility gained by the migrant from sending remittances affected 
by the relationship between the migrant and the household members in the home country, 
which is represented by the vector Z..  
Altruism is often argued to be the main factor driving remittances since the flow of the 
money is usually undertaken between family members, especially in the case of migrants 
who have their close relatives in the home country household, such as their spouse, 
children or parents. The altruism motive based on the equation 3.1 is expected to be 
important in the cases where home country households have low income and hence, their 
utility (which is part of the utility function of the migrant) is considerably improved by 
remittances. In this context, altruism may be testable if remittances increase as the home 
country household income decreases, ceteris paribus. In the case where remittances flows 
are driven by the altruistic motives, the flow of remittances is expected to remain largely 
stable in developing countries ceteris paribus, given that the home economic conditions 
are unlikely to experience sudden improvements which would improve the living 
conditions of the home country households before remittances. 
The above utility function is maximised subject to the income (
m
tY ) that migrant generates 
from all sources. 
m
t
m
tt
m
t YSRC  __________________________________3.2 
The income is equal to their own consumption
m
tC , the portion of their earnings sent as 
remittances tR and the savings of the migrant in host country 
m
tS  (Rapoport and Docquier, 
2006).  
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Consequently, the altruistic motive suggests potential macroeconomic variables that will 
have an effect on remittances at country level. Vargas-Silva and Huang (2006) and 
Castillo-Ponce et al. (2011) established models which explicitly take into account the 
relationship between remittances and the macroeconomic conditions in the home and host 
countries and the models are developed using the theoretical foundations of both altruism 
and self-interest. These authors assume that a fraction of households‟ income is sensitive 
to macroeconomic conditions and suggests that improvements in the home country 
economy are positively related to improvements in the home country households‟ income 
so that a deterioration in macroeconomic conditions in the home country results in lower 
income for such households. They theorized that such a deterioration in the home country 
will result in lower income (the sensitive part of the income to macroeconomic 
conditions) and hence lower the total home country households‟ income. Using the 
altruism equation 3.1, this deterioration in the home country households‟ overall income 
would affect the utility of the households ( hU ) in home country, therefore, affecting the 
utility of the migrant (equation 3.1).  As a consequence of the macroeconomic shocks and 
lower income, the migrants‟ utility would improve if they send increased remittances to 
increase the utility of the households in home country (the implications of 
macroeconomic shocks for the self-interest motives of remittances are explained in 
section 3.2.2).  
Similar to the behaviour of the household income in the home country, the migrants‟ 
income depends on the macroeconomic conditions of the host country. This situation is 
reflected in the flow of remittances because migrants‟ income is the main determinant of 
remittances from the microeconomic view (Lucas and Stark, 1985; Funkhouser, 1995; 
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Havolli, 2010).  Modelling migrants‟ income from the macroeconomic point of view 
tends to be more difficult compared to microeconomic models; however, the host 
country‟s economic performance is in some cases in the literature used as a proxy for 
this. In cases when economic performance improves, it is hypothesised that it will 
positively affect migrants‟ income and hence improves the availability of income to be 
remitted and vice versa. Given diminishing marginal utility of income, this will lead to 
both more consumption by the migrant and increased remittances.  A similar argument 
relates to unemployment in host country, especially when economic performance 
deteriorates and unemployment increases. This is of particular importance given that 
unemployment often has its largest impact on migrants and therefore, in this case, the 
available funds to be remitted are lower (Vargas-Silva and Huang, 2006 page 12; 
Fleischmann and Dronkers, 2010 page 338).   
3.2.2 Self-Interest Motives 
Self-interest motivated remittances represent the situation when migrants send 
remittances where their utility depends only on their own discounted consumption they 
receive. Remittances driven by self-interest motives are sent for another reason rather 
than just to improve the utility of the home country household, as migrants‟ utility is not 
considered to be affected primarily by the home country household utility. They occur 
because migrant aims at benefiting from other services/capital by sending remittances. 
Remittances sent for self-interest motives serve as payment for services such as taking 
care of other family members (usually elderly and/or children), caretaking and/or 
managing the assets of the migrant in the home country, and also reflect inheritance 
aspirations of the migrant. A model to express this behaviour developed by Cox (1987) 
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assumes that remittances are sent to buy a fixed quantity of services in home country 
denoted by X . In his model, Cox (1987) defines the migrants‟ utility function (U
m
) as:  
U
m
 =f( XCm , )_________________________________________3.3 
where, U
m
 represents the utility of the migrant depending on its own consumption (C
m
) 
and the services ( X ) that the migrant receives.  
The utility of home country households is negatively affected when they provide the 
service, having in mind their effort given to provide the service and therefore they require 
some benefits in exchange for the service ( X ).  Such benefit is provided by the 
remittances sent by the migrant. The equation 3.4 implies that the utility of the home 
household (U
h
), depends on their income and the remittances they receive, and the efforts 
they make in providing services. Rapoport and Docquier (2006) suggest that a 
households in the home country would accept to provide the service ( X ) if their utility is 
higher than the situation when they do not provide the service as presented in equation 
3.4.  The equation implies that the utility of households (U
h)
, which depends on their 
income and the remittances they receive and the efforts they make in providing services. 
)0,(),( hhhh YUXRYU  ______________________________________3.4 
The reaction of these remittances to the households‟ exogenous non-remittance income is 
ambiguous (Rapoport and Docquier, 2006, page 14) which theoretically makes it 
different from the altruistic motive where remittances decrease as the income of the 
household in home country increases. 
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Similarly to the exchange of services motive, the inheritance seeking motive is expected 
to lead the migrant into sending remittances to relatives in home country. The inheritance 
seeking motive, however, is a result of mostly informal arrangements between the home 
household and the migrant. This is because migration is financed frequently by the 
household and as a result of this it is expected to generate additional income for the 
household in form of remittances. However, if these arrangements are not well defined 
but if the frequency and the amount of remittances decreases or ceases, it is expected to 
drive the household (mostly parents) into informal punishment such that the migrant may 
not inherit the household‟s assets in the home country or by signalling that the return of 
the migrant to the family home may not be encouraged, hence weakening the links 
between them. In cases when the economic conditions are good in the home country, the 
behaviour of the migrant towards home households should be in emphasizing the 
willingness to be part of the society as well as to have the right to inherit assets in country 
of origin. A desire to inherit the assets is expected to increase remittances even when the 
macroeconomic conditions are considered positive, having in mind that macroeconomic 
improvements in origin country may increase the value of such assets (Lucas and Stark, 
1985; Hoddinot, 1994; Rapoport and Docquier, 2006).  
When there are self-interest motives, various factors at the macroeconomic level affect 
migrants‟ decisions to remit and the amount of remittances. For instance, migrants 
motivated by the investment motives to send remittances are largely affected by the 
business and macroeconomic environment in the home country which may affect the 
value of their investment in the future (Leon-Ledesma and Piracha 2004, World Bank 
2006). General government policies (not directly targeting remittances) may be also an 
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important factor in driving the flows of remittances. Indicators of governance such as 
corruption, level of political stability and the implementation of rule of law could be a 
signal to the migrants about the business environment in home country. 
However, as mentioned in the introduction (section 3.1), there are difficulties in making a 
clear distinction between self-interest and altruistic motives. Although a migrant will 
most likely send remittances towards households driven primarily by one of these 
motives, it is possible that even if self-interest is the main motive, some degree of 
altruism will always be present in the relationship between migrants and the home 
country households and vice-versa.  
3.3 Literature Review on the Macroeconomic Determinants of Remittances 
 
Following the influential work of Lucas and Stark (1985) highlighting altruism and self-
interest as the two main motives of remittances, the literature evolved into identifying 
which variables belong to each of the theories and their effect. Recently, the debate has 
shifted, having taken into account the difficulties in splitting the two motives since often 
both affect remittances in the same direction. Table 3.1 presents a summary of main 
findings of several studies with regard to remittances determinants as well as to what 
theory they address for each variable.  
As it can be noticed from the Table 3.1, many potential variables that could influence 
remittances have not been included in many of the studies. For instance, as discussed in 
section 3.2, an increasing unemployment level in the host country is expected to 
negatively affect remittances, having in mind the remitting capacities of migrants. 
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Alternatively, increasing unemployment rates in the home countries are expected to result 
in higher remittances as a result of the altruistic behaviour of the migrants towards their 
households in home country.  
Table 3.1 Summary of the main findings in Macroeconomic Determinants of Remittances 
Author Title 
Positive 
Impact 
Negative 
Impact 
Insignificant 
results 
Supported 
theory 
Adams 
(2007) 
International 
Remittances 
and the 
Household: 
Analysis and 
Review of 
Global Evidence 
GDP per 
capita of 
home country 
GDP per 
capita^2 of 
home country 
  
Depends on 
level of GDP 
Gini 
Coefficient 
  
Gini 
Coefficient 
Self-Interest 
    
Poverty 
Headcount 
Rate 
Self-Interest 
    
Country 
Credit rating 
Self-Interest 
Gupta 
(2006) 
Macroeconomic 
Determinants of 
Remittances: 
Evidence from 
India 
Stock of 
migrants 
      
Earnings of 
Migrants 
    Altruism 
  
GDP Growth 
of home 
country  
  Altruism 
Leuth 
and 
Ruiz-
Arranz 
(2008) 
A Gravity Model 
of Remittances 
GDP of home 
and host 
country 
GDP per 
capita of 
home country  
  Altruism 
GDP per 
capita of host 
country 
    Mixed 
Shared 
border 
Distance   Mixed 
Common 
language 
    Mixed 
    Earthquake Non-altruism 
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Dependency 
Ratio 
  
Dependency 
Ratio 
Altruism 
Schiopu 
and 
Siegfrid 
(2006) 
Determinants of 
Workers’ 
Remittances: 
Evidence from 
European 
Neighbouring 
Region 
GDP Differential     Altruism 
    
Interest 
rate 
differential 
  
Income 
inequality  
    Altruism 
  
Informal 
Economy 
  Self-Interest 
Chami 
et. al. 
(2008) 
Macroeconomic 
Consequences 
of Remittances 
GDP Differential     Altruism 
Kumar 
and 
Teele 
(2009) 
A View from 
Above: 
Macroeconomic 
Determinants of 
Mexican 
Remittances 
GDP Growth 
Rate in host 
country 
GDP Growth 
Rate in 
home 
country  
  Altruism 
Alleyne 
et al., 
2008) 
Short-run 
macroeconomic 
determinants of 
remittances to 
Jamaica: a time 
varying 
parameter 
approach 
Host Country 
Income 
    Altruism 
Home country 
income 
    Self-Interest 
Coulibaly 
(2009) 
Macroeconomic 
Determinants of 
Migrants' 
Remittances: 
New Evidence 
from a Panel 
VAR 
GDP of host 
country  
    Altruism 
GDP of home 
country  
    Self-Interest 
Interest rate 
differential 
    Self-Interest 
Source: Author’s Creation 
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The home country‟s GDP or GDP per capita have been found in literature to affect 
remittances, and in many cases (Table 3.1), the evidence suggests that an increase of 
these affects remittances negatively. An explanation for this sign is related to the 
altruistic behaviour of migrants. In the cases where the opposite sign is found, this 
suggests self-interest motives (section 3.3.3) are prominent.  It is not clear why there are 
differences in the findings in the empirical literature.  It could be, for instance, because 
this varies between countries or over time, but also could because of the different 
specifications and estimation methods applied.   
The current empirical literature has two views on the effect of economic growth and GDP 
per capita of home country on the flows of remittances. The first suggests that positive 
growth rate has a positive impact on remittances (Vargas-Silva and Huang, 2006; Leuth 
and Ruiz-Arranz, 2008; Catrinescu et al., 2009) implying self-interest motives are 
dominant, while the second is that remittances decrease or are not affected by the rate of 
growth (Gupta, 2006; Castillo-Ponce et al., 2011; Chami et al., 2008; Giuliano and Ruiz-
Arranz, 2009), supporting the altruism theory.  
Adams (2007) empirically investigates this relationship, finding a non-linear relationship 
between per capita GDP at home and remittances. Remittances increase as per capita 
GDP of home country increases; however, this increase is at decreasing rate. This appears 
to support the view the self-interest motives lead to remittances. However, such a 
relationship is argued to exist because of various reasons, among them are that 
remittances flows are oriented towards lower-middle income countries and less towards 
lower income countries. However, from the viewpoint of motivations of sending 
remittances, it could be argued that in this paper, remittances are primarily driven by self-
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interest motives. However, the explanation by Adams (2007) is that the lower-middle 
income countries are those who can bear the cost of migration, while low income 
countries cannot afford migration. However, Adams (2007) findings suggest that the 
level of poverty does not have any effect on the flow of remittances per capita towards 
developing countries. Such results could reaffirm the interpretation that migrants 
remittances are not driven by altruism but could also indicate that poor countries cannot 
afford migration in the first place.  
Gupta (2006) finds that increases in migrants‟ earnings increase the flow of remittances, 
whereas if the home country has an improving economic performance, where the overall 
income and the standards of living continuously improve, remittances decrease. Such 
results support the view of the altruistic behaviour of migrants.  
One of the few studies that find a positive relationship between remittances and home 
country GDP is that of Coulibaly (2009). Such a result suggests that migrants are 
remitting for their own self-interest, believing that the home country has become 
attractive for future investment plans and where the assets to be inherited have a higher 
market value. 
The level of financial development has an impact on the remittances flows, suggesting 
that fewer restrictions on transactions lead to a larger flow of remittances. However, more 
important than the transferring restrictions is the financial stability of the home country to 
the migrants. Related to the financial sector development, interest rates are suggested to 
affect remittances, mostly because of self-interest (investment opportunities) motives. 
The financial sector might become an attractive investment opportunity for the migrants 
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in the case where deposit interest rates are high enough. Several authors find a positive 
effect of financial development on remittances flows (Leuth and Ruiz-Arranz, 2008; 
Gupta et al., 2009, Catrinescu et al., 2009). Mookerjee and Roberts (2011) find that 
financial sector development, measured by the bank branches per 1000km
2
 has a 
significant impact on remittances.  
Remittances are dependent on the stock of the migrants. However, the geographical 
location of the country been argued as an important pre-condition for larger number of 
migrants. In this context, countries located near developed economies (i.e. European 
Union, United States of America and Persian Gulf) are those who receive greater 
amounts of remittances, given that a closer proximity of countries could create the 
conditions for cheaper migration, easier transfers and a higher tendency of link 
maintenance to the home country.  Leuth and Ruiz-Arranz (2008) provided evidence that 
the largest variation of remittances can be explained through gravity models which take 
into account factors such as distance, border-sharing countries and language. In addition, 
as discussed in section 3.2, the duration of stay in the host country affects remittances 
since migrants who stay for longer periods will be likely to remain in country of 
migration. Moreover, migrants that are likely to remain in the host country are also likely 
to have their spouse accompany them. As a result, there may not be anyone left in the 
home country to whom to remit, or if parents remain, at some point of time, the remitting 
will cease if the parents pass away (Carling, 2005). New migrants are likely to increase 
remittances for a period as they become established in the host country, however, this is 
likely to be at a decreasing rate over time and at some point fall as ties to the home 
country loosen. In this context, the migrant‟s duration of stay gives an inverse U shaped 
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function with remittances which has been often found in the literature (Lucas and Stark, 
1985; Funkhouser, 1995; Havolli, 2010). However, studies taking into account the 
duration of migration typically use microeconomic data because the data on duration of 
stay are observable only for individuals. 
Vargas-Silva and Huang (2006) in investigating the macroeconomic determinants of 
remittances find that host country economic conditions are the most important factor for 
the flow of remittances. They suggest that when host country economic variables are 
included, the home country variables are insignificant. In their study of the USA, they 
found a positive effect on the flow of remittances of the stock of broad money in 
circulation, as a measure of income level in host country and, although not expected a 
priori, a positive relationship was also found between host country unemployment rate 
and the flow of remittances towards home country. Inflation, on the other hand, was 
found to decrease migrants‟ real income and hence, remittances.  
Many of these studies often end up proposing measures and policies in order to increase 
the flow and the use of remittances. However, to date, no study has been undertaken with 
the aim of evaluating the effects of such policies directly given that no policy variable has 
been included in the empirical models.   
3.4 Review of Policy Initiatives for Remittances 
In this section, the policy initiatives are defined as any action which has been undertaken 
by the public institutions of the home or host country, NGOs and private companies in 
order to affect the flow of remittances. This approach includes any initiative aimed at 
facilitating the methods for transferring remittances, increasing them, shifting remittances 
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into investment, as well as other policies which aim at increasing migrants‟ investments 
into the home country economy.  
Despite the continuous debate on the impact of remittances on the recipient economy, 
institutions, NGOs and private companies in many countries have launched policies and 
initiatives aimed at increasing the development impact of remittances. Agunias (2006) 
emphasizes that there are two broad trends in these policies and initiatives applied by 
institutions and companies of home countries. The first one is mostly addressed by the 
public institutions of home countries whose target is to increase the remittances flows and 
channel remittances from the informal to formal sector. Also, these involve policy 
initiatives targeting the use of remittances, in particular policies that attempt to switching 
remittances from consumption to investment and raise the attractiveness of the home 
country for migrants‟ investments (Schipou and Siegfried, 2006; Agunias 2006). The 
second, private sector led schemes, are mostly services developed especially for 
remittance recipients; such services aim at being profitable for the firms while at the same 
time beneficial for the remittance recipients. Such schemes include the presence of home 
country banks in the host country markets especially targeting migrants. Also the 
provision of services such as deposit schemes for migrants and special loans for migrant 
investment have been developed in a few major remittance recipient countries.  
Policy initiatives aiming at facilitating remittances are considered those that target the 
reduction of the cost for remittances transfers, switching remittances from the informal to 
the formal sector as well as those addressing the problems in remittance transfers such as 
the ease with which the recipient can collect the remittances. One of the main 
consensuses in the literature is that competition would improve the achievement of these 
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goals (Agunias, 2006). Moreover, analysing several cases in a survey with 40 central 
banks, Martinez et al. (2006) suggests that the legislation of recipient countries should be 
reviewed and designed in a way which would enhance competition, allow access to non-
bank financial institutions into the clearing system and hence reduce the cost that non-
bank financial institutions face while executing transfers through banks. Such a move 
would increase the role of smaller private firms in the industry.  
By allowing a more flexible financial market in terms of regulations, there would be an 
opportunity for innovative products for remittance transfers, especially given 
technological advancements. For instance, in the market of remittances transfers there 
exist many creative products such as mobile phone remittances, debit cards as well as 
many other products which offer online transfers. Most of these products are related to 
bank accounts in the recipient economy, suggesting that financial literacy should also be 
at a satisfactory level. Moreover, it is important also to ease access to banking services in 
certain regions of the recipient countries where remittances are most often sent to (Ratha, 
2003; Agunias, 2006; Martinez et al., 2005).  
In the remittances market, it is also important to shift remittances from informal ways of 
transferring into formal ones. In addition to the improvement of statistics and the 
avoidance of money laundering problems, especially in developing economies, there are 
other important reasons to target and promote the use of formal sectors in transferring 
remittances. This is because where banks are used as channels (such that remittances are 
sent but also saved by being deposited) the overall liquidity of banks is higher and hence 
the potential for credit creation in the home country is increased, thus contributing to 
economic development (Schipou and Siegfried, 2006; Siegel, 2007; Catrinescu et al., 
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2009). Several countries have undertaken policies and initiatives which target the use of 
the formal sector for remittance transfers. These policies and initiatives include bilateral 
agreements between countries to promote the use of financial instruments in both home 
and host countries. Among the most known case is the USA-Mexico agreement which 
allows all Mexican migrants (legal and illegal migrants) in the US to obtain a special 
identity card through which Mexicans working in USA can have bank accounts and 
access to financial services (World Bank, 2006; Ratha, 2003; Martinez, 2005). Moreover, 
the USA has also undertaken several policies towards other countries such as the 
Philippines and Columbia, mostly targeting remittances transfer fee reduction as well as 
access for migrants to financial services. Similarly, Germany and Canada have also 
undertaken several actions towards Turkey and India respectively, mostly dealing with 
taxation issues as well as fee reduction for remittances transfers. Interesting examples of 
channelling and increasing the liquidity of banks are the UK-India initiative and the 
Germany-Croatia one. The first offered a product to Hindu migrants to send remittances 
to India at no cost, using one local bank. However, it is mandatory for the recipients to 
maintain a minimum of 150 GBP in their accounts, thus in this way the liquidity of the 
second largest bank in India is increased. The Croatian case was developed also by a 
local bank which offered potential investors and migrants from Germany cost-free 
transfers and remittances and funds to Croatia using its accounts. This product was 
offered through the branch of this bank in Germany. What this bank did was accumulated 
funds in its branch in Germany, while funds in Croatia were used to allocate into 
recipients‟ accounts. After the accumulation reached a certain level a single transfer was 
conducted and hence instead of thousands of transfers there was only one; hence the 
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higher transfer fees were avoiding for each individual transaction (Agunias, 2006; 
Martinez et al., 2006).  
These policies contribute to the increasing range of financial instruments in the markets 
and also contribute to the reduction of transfer costs and increase the use formal 
transferring methods. Such products make it easier for migrants as well as recipients to 
conduct the transfers of remittances. However, in order to implement these products and 
services, the financial literacy of migrants should also be at a level such that the target 
groups can use these services. In order to reach this, banks need to target the problem by 
introducing user-friendly services for low income groups and migrants as well. Agunias 
(2006) suggests that there is a common agreement in the literature that a great 
contribution of the responsibility for the problem of un-banked remittances rests with the 
banks themselves. This is because banks have not shown any interest in targeting this 
group of people and as Agunias (2006) suggests that this is as a result of lack of 
incentives for the banks to conduct research and development into user-friendly products 
which would make easier for migrants, as well as the overall poorer population, to obtain 
a bank account. It has been suggested that costs of using such bank accounts needs to be 
low, in this way making them more attractive for this group of potential customers 
(Agunias, 2006). The interest rate on deposits could make such accounts an attractive 
product for migrants, as well as a way of increasing liquidity by the banks. This is 
because migrants often generate considerable amounts of savings (especially migrants 
planning to return to their home country). Therefore, a higher interest rate for migrants‟ 
deposits could bring their accumulated savings into the home country banks (Orozco and 
Lapointe, 2004; Carling, 2005; Agunias, 2006; Ratha, 2003).  
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Policy initiatives for the final use of remittances are considered as actions which aim at 
switching remittances from consumption to investment as well as raising the 
attractiveness of the home country for migrants‟ investments. However, the literature 
considers that there are great difficulties in switching remittances from consumption to 
investment. This is mainly because remittances are often funds which are transferred to 
households in order to cover costs of basic living needs, while there remain either none or 
very small amounts for other activities such as investment or savings. Several countries 
have attempted to control the flows and the use of remittances and hence through the 
controlling policies to affect directly the use of them. Nevertheless, it is argued that when 
the government attempts to control the flows of remittances it only encourages them to be 
transferred through informal systems and hence to be unrecorded. Policies attempting to 
control and affect the use of remittances have been present in Brazil and Vietnam and the 
condition in both cases was that it was mandatory for the migrant to invest for a fixed 
period of time a percentage of the remittances received into in the foreign exchange 
reserves of the country. Some other countries, such as Columbia, Ecuador, Georgia, Peru 
and Poland applied taxation policies to remittances. 
There has been a shift in such policies to an approach of promoting policies which 
encourage recipients to invest and generate self-employment and business activities, 
rather than directly controlling the use of remittances (Martinez, 2005; Agunias, 2006; 
Lucas, 2005). However, having in mind the problem that recipients often receive 
remittances which only cover the basic living needs, this approach is not without 
difficulties. The latest approach focuses more on migrants, rather than remittance 
recipients. For instance, several countries have adopted policies which aim at easing 
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procedures for doing business for migrants by creating several benefits for them in the 
case where they decide to invest in their home country. Amongst these policies, the most 
used is the import of capital goods by migrants, at limited level, customs free. For 
instance, Egypt encourages its migrants to invest through offering tax breaks for up to 10 
years, as well as allowing them to import a limited amount of capital goods without 
paying customs fees. Similarly Tunisia, Guatemala, Pakistan, Turkey and Vietnam offer 
migrants the possibility of importing once a year a limited amount of goods without 
paying the customs fees. Moreover, some countries tried to initiate an investment 
attraction for the migrants by offering them land in preferential areas either for business 
or housing investments at lower prices. Among the policies for increasing migrants‟ 
investment in the home countries, some countries have also initiated a business advisory 
services and fairs for migrants who want to invest in the home country. Through this they 
aim at orienting and avoiding the long procedures that are usually faced in the process of 
opening a business, as well as informing migrants about the potential to invest in the 
home country. Another programme that has been applied in Mexico is the Hometown 
Association. This form of organization, initiated by the government, encourages migrants 
to invest in their home country region. This is done by creating a hometown association 
for migrants in the host countries, where they contribute to infrastructure projects in their 
home region. For every dollar invested in public infrastructure by migrants, the 
government invests another two dollars in these projects (World Bank, 2006; Martinez, 
2005; Agunias, 2006; Orozco, 2004).  
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Carling (2004, page 6) provides a summary table of possible policy measures that the 
literature has proposed and could be used for various aspects of remittances. It separates 
these measures into six categories:  
1) Increasing the share of remittances for development by adopting specific 
taxation policies for migrants, reducing transaction costs et cetera.  
2) Stimulating transfers through formal channels by offering remittance bonds, 
allowing foreign currency accounts in the banking sector, offering premium 
interest rates on deposits, allowing and promoting transfers through microfinance 
institutions and improving the financial literacy.   
3) Stimulating the investment of remittances, by increasing the outreach of 
microfinance institutions, migrants service bureaus, tax breaks on imported 
capital goods, small and medium enterprises schemes and training programmes. 
4) Migrants collective community investments, such as matched funding, public-
private ventures, competitive bidding for development projects et cetera.  
5) Influencing consumption patterns of home country households that receive 
remittances, promoting the consumption of domestic goods.  
6) Securing future remittances by promoting further migration.    
Carling (2004) suggests that this summary of policies represents a tentative list of 
possible options to affect remittances. However, given that some of these proposals have 
been implemented in various countries, it is necessary to undertake a research into 
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evaluating the effects of such policies and to identify whether such policies are changing 
the remittances patterns in the home country as well as make it easier for migrants to send 
remittances.  
3.5 Model Specification 
The purpose of this model is the investigation of the determinants of remittances at a 
macroeconomic level considering home and host country variables. Among the first 
attempts to investigate the determinants of remittances at this level was Straubhaar 
(1986), and with increasing interest in more recent years it has been studied by El-Sakka 
and McNabb (1999), Gupta (2006), Vargas-Silva and Huang (2006), Ruiz-Arranz and 
Leuth (2008) and Adams (2008). A major difference between this research and most of 
above mentioned studies is that they focused on remittances flows to a single country; the 
exceptions are Leuth and Ruiz-Arranz (2008) with their gravity model on bilateral flows 
for 11 countries and Adams (2008) with its cross-country model for 62 countries. 
However, these studies did not take into account the policies applied to increase 
remittances. Another important characteristic of this investigation is the number of 
countries and the longer time span of observations for each country included, which 
makes this data set in this study larger and more inclusive than those currently in the 
literature.  
The specificity of the model developed here is that it contains variables that have not 
been previously included in the literature. In effect, this represents the first attempt in 
designing and including policy initiatives variable(s). In addition, Governance Indicators 
have also been largely neglected by the literature, though they may represent important 
determinants of remittances. 
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Considering the review of the literature on the macroeconomic determinants, the policy 
initiatives that have been undertaken, as well as other variables that have not been 
included in the current literature, the following model is proposed:  
itiitititit
it
it GPYX
GDP
R
  43210 _____________3.5 
Since model 3.5 is developed based on a panel data set, the term i represents the 
individual country while the term t represents the year.
4
  
The dependent variable
it
it
GDP
R
 represents the share of remittances in GDP of country i at 
time t. The remittances share to GDP was used in order to be able to limit the variation in 
the dependent variable since the group of countries included in the data set is relatively 
large (see section 3.6) and there is a substantial difference in terms of the size of these 
countries given that it includes countries such as China that receives nearly 50 billion 
USD of remittances, but as a share to GDP these are not quite 1 percent.  Hence, 
remittances may not be as important as in countries like Moldova or Bosnia and 
Herzegovina where remittances varied around 1-2 billion USD and their share to GDP is 
as high as 35 percent.   
The home country variables are presented by Xit and consist of home country GDP per 
capita at purchasing power parity (PPP) and its squared value, the unemployment rate. 
The host country variables are represented by Yit and are the host country GDP per capita 
at purchasing power parity (PPP) and its squared value and the unemployment rate. 
                                                          
4
 Time dummies are included and presented in respective appendices. 
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Given that migrants could be scattered across different countries, the variables were 
defined by using information on the main host country. For example, for Mexico as the 
main host country was the U.S given that the largest share of Mexican migrants is settled 
there. In order to properly identify the main host country, various reports and research 
papers have been used to define this (mostly World Bank Remittances Factbook). As an 
indicator of the overall environment of home country, the World Bank Governance 
Indicators (Git) are included in the above model, given that this may serve as a risk 
assessment of the countries by migrants. The main objective of this analysis, the effect of 
policy initiatives, is depicted by Pit. This variable is developed from research undertaken 
for all the countries on their policies and initiatives to increase the remittances (details on 
the creation of the variable are presented in section 3.6.1 and Appendix 3.2).  
Another specification, which has remittances per capita as the dependent variable, is also 
investigated, while the set of independent variables remains similar. This definition of the 
dependent variable is because in some countries the growth of nominal GDP may mean 
that remittances as a share to GDP does not increase. 
itiitititit
it
it GPYX
Population
R
  43210 _____________3.6 
Theoretically a dynamic model would seem appropriate given that the previous values of 
remittances may affect their current value (see section 3.7.1 for the intuition behind the 
dynamic model for remittances).  
The expected effect on remittances of changes in the independent variables, according to 
the discussion of the theory and literature, will be discussed next. In this context, the 
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deterioration of a home country economic variable such as unemployment or GDP per 
capita should result in higher remittances as a result of altruistic behaviour of the migrant 
towards the households, but the opposite can happen if the remittances are driven by self-
interest, so the sign is indeterminate. In case of a deteriorating economic environment in 
the host countries, and consequently the economic position of the migrant, this should 
lead to lower remittances given the lower availability of income to be remitted. If 
remittances increase as the governance indicators improve, this could be related to self-
interest motives, while if governance deteriorates and remittances increase, it could be 
related to altruism. 
Table 3.2 The expected effect of independent variables on the flow of remittances 
Variables Altruism Self-Interest 
Unemployment in Home Country + - 
Unemployment in Main Host Country - + 
GDP per capita in Home country - + 
GDP per capita in Home country-Squared -  + 
GDP per capita in Main Host Country + + 
GDP per capita in Main Host Country-Squared  ? ? 
Policy Variable n/a n/a 
Governance Indicators (World Bank) - + 
Home Country Inflation + - 
Home Country Population n/a n/a 
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Regarding the policy variable, given that it is not included in the current empirical 
models in the literature, it is not immediately apparent if it is altruism or a self-interest 
variable. However, as the literature recommends implementation of policy initiatives to 
increase the flow of remittances, the policies are in most of the cases designed to make 
the home country attractive for migrants‟ investments and addressing other aspects which 
could be of interest for migrants. Hence, the existing literature indirectly treats the policy 
options as means of increasing the remittances flows based on self-interest motives for 
the migrant. This is because they have been typically designed to attract the interest of 
migrants for investments in the home country, either in terms of durable goods and 
education, but also business investments. However, there have been government driven 
policy initiatives which aim to increase remittances in a similar manner to their behaviour 
under the altruism motivations. An example of this could be the schemes such as the 
aforementioned Home Town Associations in Mexico which aim at improving the local 
infrastructure, hence the altruism of the migrant for the area of origin (see Table 3.4 for 
the types of policies and a wider discussion of them).  
3.6 Data Description  
Many uncertainties remain in the literature on remittances and their determinants. One of 
the main reasons for this is the lack of data and especially the problem of recording the 
remittances transferred through informal channels. In recent years, by recognizing the 
importance of remittances, many countries have increased their efforts to get higher 
coverage and record the flows of remittances. Hence, it is often perceived that 
remittances have increased; however, this could be a result that the improved statistics on 
remittances in recent years (World Bank 2006). This situation gives a particular need to 
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include time dummies in the estimation. Despite the difficulties in recording, the existing 
data are an important basis to identify what determines remittances at aggregate level for 
countries over years. For this purpose, a data set of around 50 developing countries has 
been compiled with the data obtained from various sources, but mostly from World Bank, 
IMF, OECD and institutions of respective countries. Figure 3.1 shows the sample 
selection method and the criterions and constraints in including the current number of 
countries.  
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Source: Author’s Creation 
 
 
184 IMF Countries 
 
34 IMF’s Advanced 
Economies 
150 IMF’s Developing 
Economies 
25 Countries: Data not 
Available for any year 
115 Countries: Data Available 
for at least 2 years  
53 Countries: Missing Data 
on Unemployment 
62 Countries: Data Available 
8 Micro-States and 2 host 
country data missing 
10 Developing Countries: 
Negative remittances balance 
Data Availability on 
Remittances 
Independent Variables 
availability 
Host Country Data and Micro-
States 
Remittances Balance: 
Positive 
52 Countries Included in the data 
set 
1
st
 Stage 
Selection 
2
nd
 Stage 
Selection 
3
rd
 Stage 
Selection 
4
th
 Stage 
Selection 
5
th
 Stage 
Selection 
Excluded 
Excluded 
Excluded 
Excluded 
Excluded 
Included 
Included 
Included 
Included 
Included 
Figure 3.1. Sample Selection Procedure for the data set 
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The first criteria for selecting the countries to include in this research are based on the 
IMF World Economic Outlook definitions of the developed and developing countries. 
IMF defines the level of development for the world economies based on the GDP per 
capita (IMF WOE, 2010). Therefore, as the first criteria to include the countries in the 
research was the IMF and using this criterion, the advanced economies were removed 
from the analysis. Out of 187 IMF members, 33 advanced economies were removed from 
the analysis. This is because advanced economies are migrant recipient countries and 
remittances to these countries are negative. Moreover, there are several other countries 
which are not in the IMF‟s definition of advanced economy but were excluded from the 
research. This is because they are important migrant recipient countries and therefore, 
remittances from these countries are continuously negative (2nd stage in the Figure 3.1). 
In addition, several other micro-states
5
 where remittances are negligible were excluded 
from the research. The third stage of the selection results from the lack of data for some 
countries and hence represents a constraint. This is the case mostly with the African 
countries where there is a significant lack of data for many variables. Among the main 
missing variables in these countries is the unemployment rate which was the main 
constraint, applying to nearly 20 countries. Moreover, some migration destination 
countries (especially in Middle East region) also lacked unemployment data (e.g. Saudi 
Arabia) which was another constraint to including few countries in the data set. It should 
be pointed out that for many of these countries the data were missing for all years.  
 
 
                                                          
5
 The group of micro-countries is: The Bahamas, Barbados, Belize, Brunei Darussalam, Dominica, Sao 
Tome and Principe, Seychelles and Surinam. 
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The data that will be used to investigate the specified model are from various sources. 
The main source is World Bank (2011a) with its Development Indicators (WDI), while 
IMF World Economic Outlook (WEO) is another important source for variables such as 
GDP of home and host countries. The inflation rate is also from the IMF WEO. Table 3.3 
presents the descriptive statistics of each variable and the number of available 
observations. As presented in Table 3.4, the Governance Indicator lacks the number of 
observations because the World Bank compiled these indicators since 1996. 
Consequently, when this variable is included in the model, the number of observations 
will be reduced.  
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Table 3.3 Descriptive Statistics of the Variables 
  Number of 
Observati
ons 
Mean 
Standard 
Deviation 
Minimum Maximum 
Variables 
Remittances/GDP 870 4.6 5.6 0.0 34.7 
Remittances per capita 870 12.4 27.0 0.000004 375.4 
Unemployment Rate in Home Country 870 10.7 7.5 0.8 55.0 
Unemployment Rate in Main Host 
Country 870 7.7 3.2 1.4 30.4 
GDP per capita of Home Country 870 5656.7 3647.6 402.7 20961.3 
GDP per capita of Main Host Country 870 24729.2 11000.5 1058.6 47155.3 
Inflation 870 28.1 158.2 -9.5 2947.7 
Population  870 69.8 204.3 1.0 1334.7 
Any Policy Variable 870 0.19 0.39 0.00 1.00 
One Policy Variable 870 0.05 0.22 0.00 1.00 
Two or More Policy Variables 870 0.08 0.27 0.00 1.00 
Taxation Policy Variable 870 0.09 0.28 0.00 1.00 
Other Government Policy Variable 870 0.11 0.31 0.00 1.00 
Private Sector Policy Variable 870 0.08 0.28 0.00 1.00 
Government Effectiveness 610 -0.21 0.55 -1.85 1.25 
 
 
3.6.1 Policy Initiatives Variable 
A number of research articles such as Leuth and Ruiz-Arranz (2008), Adams (2007 and 
2008), Agunias (2006), Mundaca (2005), Jongwanich (2007), Gupta et al., (2009), 
Carling (2004), suggests that measures and policies should be undertaken by the 
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institutions in home countries in order to increase remittances and their effects on the 
home economies. To date, despite the conclusion by these authors that policies are 
important, no study has undertaken empirical research to investigate whether those 
policies that are recommended in the literature and, as a consequence, applied by several 
governments of developing countries, are successful. As a result, little is known about the 
size of the effect of the policy initiatives on remittances.  
To our knowledge, this is the first study which attempts to collect and categorize the 
policies that have been applied in various countries with regard to remittances. In the 
extensive process of data collection, in order to identify the policy initiatives, various 
sources were consulted and used as references such as official web-sites and publications 
of the institutions of home countries, journal articles and other publications which have 
described partially or in detail the policy initiative. For this reason, a database has been 
complied to identify these policies that have been undertaken by each country and during 
the periods they have been active. Table 3.4 provides a summary. Across a group of 
nearly 52 developing countries in the sample, 21 countries have applied at least one 
policy for the benefit of remittance senders and recipients while 11 of them applied 
multiple policies.  
Table 3.4 presents the main policies and initiatives undertaken by governments as well as 
private sector for the benefit of migrants. As presented, public institutions are those 
mostly engaged in facilitating the general environment and also providing larger benefits 
to migrants in order to increase their role into their domestic economies. The focus has 
largely been on improving the financial services which are an important means of 
transferring the remittances into the formal system as well as increasing their 
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development impact in the recipient economy. Governments, recognizing the importance 
of diaspora, have also established institutions at high level, ministries, in 13 countries. 
Special government programmes have been designed in order to allow migrants to import 
a limited amount of goods duty free, especially focusing on goods which could have 
positive impact on the overall economic conditions. Nevertheless, an important role is 
also played by private sector companies, notably commercial banks. 
Of the 52 countries in this dataset, eight of them have a presence of their own banks in 
the host countries‟ economies, mostly targeting their migrants. Furthermore, there are 
banks in home countries which have designed special loan packages for migrants willing 
to invest in their home country, as well as special deposit schemes for the migrants 
willing to save their money into the home country‟s banking sector. In this context, the 
policy initiatives are represented by qualitative variables, in three ways.  
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Table 3.4 Types and number of countries applying policies 
  
Type of the policy initiative Number of Countries Applying 
the Policy 
Government 
Policies and 
initiatives 
Legal support 4 
Invest. Policies 6 
Exchange rate policy 4 
Financial Services 20 
Import support (tax reduction) 8 
Business advisory services 6 
Fee reduction 4 
Ministry for Diaspora 13 
Other Government incentive 10 
Private 
Initiatives 
Remittances through phone 1 
Banks in Host Country 8 
Loans for investment 5 
Deposit scheme 3 
Source: Author’s creation (information as of October 2010).  
First, the policy variable consists of one dummy variable indicating whether the country 
applied any policy taking the value of 1, and the value of 0 for countries that do not apply 
any policy.  
Secondly, two dummy variables are used to indicate the number of policies applied in 
country i:  
a) a dummy taking the value 1 if the country i applied any policy, otherwise 0 
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b) a dummy taking the value 1 if the country i applies more than one policies, 
otherwise 0. 
The third way of modelling policy variables is based on the three general types of 
policies which take into account the main aim of the particular policies, with dummy 
variables as following:  
a) If the country i applies any taxation related policies=1, otherwise 0 
b) If country‟s i government applies other policies=1, otherwise 0 
c) If private sector schemes exist in country i=1, otherwise 0.   
In the third definition, the taxation policies are usually related to a reduction of taxes on 
capital goods imported by the migrants into their home country, tax breaks for several 
years for migrants‟ investment, fee reductions for transfers and other specific investment 
policies which aim at benefiting migrants‟ investments. Such policies have often been 
recommended by the literature as having more potential to increase migrant transfers. 
Given this, these policies were placed in a separate dummy variable. Other government 
policies includes programmes such as legal support, advisory services, financial services 
et cetera as presented in Table 3.4 for the types of policies. Private sector schemes are 
usually related to the banking sector products such as credit and deposit schemes with 
special conditions for the migrants et cetera. 
3.7 Estimation Method and Results 
Considering the models presented in equation 3.5 and 3.6 (section 3.5), and the data set 
which contains yearly observations over different countries, the estimation method used 
in this chapter is a panel data regression. The reason for the use of this kind of data to 
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identify the macroeconomic determinants of remittances, including the impact of policies 
on the remittances inflows to developing countries, relies on the several properties of the 
data. Firstly, given that only recently (i.e. the past two decades for many countries), the 
issue of remittances has emerged in the literature and that flows are mostly towards 
developing economies, the statistical history of these countries is not long enough for 
time series analysis. Secondly, panel data have cross-section characteristics as well as 
time series. This provides higher variation of data (i.e. across countries and over years). 
Also, using panel data estimation, one avoids some of the risk of obtaining biased results 
which may be caused by the variables which are not measurable. Such variables may 
include socio-cultural, economic and religious differences across countries which may 
affect migration and remittances and be approximately constant over time. In time-series 
and cross-section studies the heterogeneity across countries, if not taken into account, 
runs the risk of obtaining biased results (Baltagi, 2005). Panel data are characterized with 
more information on the data, more variability, less collinearity among the variables, 
more degrees of freedom and more efficiency. They also often represent a better measure 
for issues that are not detectable in cross-section or time series (Baltagi, 2005 pages 5-7) 
for example the effects of policies on macroeconomic variables.  
As presented in the figure 3.1, the data set includes 52 countries with a time series 
ranging from 6 to 30 years. This makes the data set with a relatively large number of 
countries (N) and also large number of time series (T). The characteristics of the data, in 
particular the size of the panel, influence the choice of an optimal estimator for panel data 
models (Judson and Owen, 1999).  
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The dynamic panel model will be estimated using fixed effects (FE) estimation method 
given the large number of countries (52) from different regions and large differences in 
the size of the economy. Therefore, using FE the differences across countries will be 
captured in differences in the constant term (Greene, 2003). Even though the conclusions 
drawn from the FE are restricted only to the sample, this is not the chief concern because 
the aim in this chapter is to draw conclusions within the sample, especially given that the 
data set covers a relatively large number of countries. As presented in the selection 
procedures (Figure 3.1) there are a relatively large number of countries excluded due to 
lack of data on dependent and some independent variables, mostly countries in the 
African Continent.  
The intuition behind the lagged effects for remittances models relies on generic reasons:  
the habits created in sending remittances and the expectations by the remittance recipient 
households who build their expectations based on the previous events. That is, they build 
habits and expectations of receiving remittances based on the previous flows of 
remittances and this affects their consumption patterns. Moreover, given that one of the 
variables designed in this section attempts to take into account the policies applied by the 
home country, this may be an additional argument for the dynamic nature of the model 
since the full response to the policies and also to macroeconomic changes may take 
several years (Greene, 2003; Pugh, 2011), which makes the longer time-series applied in 
this chapter important into obtaining the effect of policy variables. In static models, it is 
strictly assumed that the effects take place during the immediate time period and 
estimates of a dynamic model using static methods is misspecification and gives biased 
estimates (Greene, 2003). The literature mostly uses dynamic specifications, recognizing 
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the importance of previous years‟ flows (Vargas-Silva and Huang, 2005; El-Sakka and 
McNabb, 1999).  
When using macroeconomic data, the least squares dummy variable (LSDV) bias should 
not be dismissed as insignificant (Judson and Owen, 1999, p7). It is possible to find that 
even with a time dimension as large as 30 years the bias may be equal to as much as 20 
percent of the true value of the coefficient of interest. As an alternative, they suggest the 
Anderson-Hiaso (AH) method which is based on the instrumental variable approach. 
However, the AH, similar to estimation methods such as Arellano-Bond (1991) and 
Arellano-Bover (1995) for estimating the dynamic panel, is appropriate for data sets with 
a large cross section and short time dimension, given the number of instruments that are 
created (Roodman, 2006).  
3.7.1 Test for Common Factor Restriction 
Given the time dimension in this study, a potential estimation method is the unobserved 
component model AR (1). This is based on the expected autoregressive errors in a 
regression model, which in this case can be represented as a dynamic regression with 
non-linear common factor restrictions and uncorrelated disturbances (Arellano and Bond, 
1991). Therefore, if this method is to be used it is essential to test for the common factor 
restrictions (CFR) and the dynamic regression AR (1) should be used if, and only if, the 
common factor restrictions hold (Pugh, 2011). Using a modified form of equation 3.5,  
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Where all the variables presented are identical with those presented in equation 3.5, but 
excluding dummy variables for simplicity since they disappear in the CFR test given that 
they are not time varying, while the error term is composed of: 
                                               
Where     represents the error term containing the dynamic effect which is taken into 
account by    which lies between 0 and 1   
Introducing one lag, the model becomes: 
     
       
                                            
Solving for the lagged error term      : 
      
     
       
                                      
Equation 3.7.4 is substituted into 3.7.2, which gives: 
     (
     
       
                           )                
Substituting 3.7.5 into 3.7.1 gives the following equation:  
   
     
                       
     
       
                       
                       
Collecting the intercept terms gives: 
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As presented in 3.7.7, this equation has four coefficients (          and  ), excluding the 
constant term (   , while the dynamic linear regression model in 3.7.8 has seven 
coefficients excluding the constant term     : 
   
     
       
     
       
                                           
                
Comparing equation 3.7.7 and 3.7.8 it can be observed that:  
a) In both 3.7.7 and 3.7.8, there is one coefficient on 
     
       
 (  from equation 3.7.6 
and    from equation 3.7.7). 
b) In 3.7.7, the coefficient on       is     , which is the negative product of the 
coefficients on 
     
       
 and     
Therefore, the dynamic linear regression model (DLMR) can be transformed into 3.7.7 
only if these CFR hold. If these CFR hold, it can be assumed that there is “pure” serial 
correlation in the residuals. However, model presented in 3.7.7 must be estimated using 
non-linear models given that CFR is non-linear. This can be done using the Cochrane-
Orcutt method. Given that the model presented above may contain non-measurable or 
unobserved components (hence known as the unobserved component model), it may 
follow an AR (1) process, meaning that it is the CFR which suggest that something may 
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be missing in the specification, most likely the autoregressive structures which are typical 
for time-series data. As suggested, the first test undertaken is the CFR for the continuous 
variables individually, which is presented in Table 3.5.  
The results presented in Table 3.5 suggest there is insufficient evidence to reject CFRs 
for the FE estimation with the tests conducted for each variable. In addition, the CFRs 
hold also when jointly tested for all the continuous variables; therefore, the unobserved 
components model is estimated as the preferred one. This applies to both specifications, 
that is, remittances to GDP and remittances per capita as dependent variable (Table 3.5 
and Appendices 3.3.1, 3.3.3 and 3.5.1 and 3.6.1). The CFR tests have been conducted for 
all specifications which differ in terms of continuous variables (for specifications that 
differ only by dummy variables the same tests apply since the CFR test is on the 
differenced variables and dummy variables are not time varying).  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
86 
 
Table 3.5 Common Factor Restrictions from FE estimation of DLRM of AR(1)  
  Remittances/GDP Remittances/capita in USD 
Independent Variables Excl. Governance Incl. Governance Excl. Governance Incl. Governance 
                  
Home Country 
Unemployment 
F(1, 771) = 1.29 F(1, 526) = 0 F(1, 773) = 0.98 F(1, 528) = 0.06 
  Prob > F = 0.257 Prob > F = 0.9852 Prob > F = 0.3221 Prob > F = 0.808 
                  
Host Country Unemployment F(1, 771) = 2.59 F(1, 526) = 2.61 F(1, 773) = 1.74 F(9, 526) = 0.23 
  Prob > F = 0.108 Prob > F = 0.1066 Prob > F = 0.1879 Prob > F = 0.6313 
                  
Population F(1, 771) = 2.64 F(1, 526) = 0.29 
    
  Prob > F = 0.104 Prob > F = 0.5891 
    
                  
Inflation F(1, 771) = 0.29 F(1, 526) = 0.21 F(1, 773) = 0.05 F(1, 528) = 0.38 
  Prob > F = 0.5933 Prob > F = 0.6474 Prob > F = 0.8193 Prob > F = 0..538 
                  
Government Effectiveness     F(1, 526) = 0.68     F(1, 528) = 2.01 
      Prob > F = 0.4112     Prob > F = 0.1570 
                  
GDP per capita of home 
Country 
F(1, 771) = 1.06 F(1, 526) = 0.38 F(1, 773) = 2.23 F(1, 528) = 1.77 
  Prob > F = 0.3045 Prob > F = 0.5402 Prob > F = 0.136 Prob > F = 0.18 
                  
GDP per capita of Host 
Country 
F(1, 771) = 0.01 F(1, 526) = 0.56 F(1, 773) = 1.30 F(1, 528) = 0.07 
  Prob > F = 0.9378 Prob > F = 0.4537 Prob > F = 0.2552 Prob > F = 0.7889 
                  
GDP per capita of home 
Country^2 
F(1, 771) = 0.77 F(1, 526) = 0 F(1, 773) = 0.01 F(9, 526) = 0.01 
  Prob > F = 0.3815 Prob > F = 0.9767 Prob > F = 0.9322 Prob > F = 0.918 
                  
GDP per capita of Host 
Country^2 
F(1, 771) = 0.01 F(1, 526) = 0.2 F(1, 773) = 0.38 F(1, 528) = 0.24 
  Prob > F = 0.9379 Prob > F = 0.6574 Prob > F = 0.5354 Prob > F = 0.3225 
                  
Joint Common Factor 
Restriction 
F(8, 771) = 0.82 F(9, 526) = 0.7 F(7, 773) = 0.83 F(8, 528) = 0.66 
  Prob > F = 0.5838 Prob > F = 0.7073 Prob > F = 0.5598 Prob > F = 0.725 
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3.7.2 Results of the Estimated Model 
Given that the unobserved component model of AR (1) is the preferred estimation 
method, the results are presented in Table 3.6 (note that year dummies are included in the 
model and the full results are presented in Appendix 3.3.2). The interpretation of the 
results in this chapter is ceteris paribus. The results of the model are presented in the 
Table below with the first column representing the estimated regression of the 
specification with the dependent variable Remittances/GDP, while the second column is 
specified using Remittances per capita. Given that the data available for the governance 
variable is more limited (Table 3.3), results excluding this variable are presented first.   
In the remittances as a percentage of GDP model, GDP per capita (PPP) of the home and 
host countries are statistically significant. The squared term of the GDP per capita (PPP) 
of the home country is statistically insignificant, but for the host country is significant.  
Remittances are estimated to decrease as the GDP per capita of the home country 
increases, suggesting a countercyclical behaviour of remittances. It is often argued in the 
literature that when remittances have a countercyclical behaviour, that they are primarily 
driven by the altruistic motives given that when economic conditions in home country 
(i.e. GDP in our case) improve, the economic conditions of the households improve as 
well, and hence migrants remit less. Additionally, behaviour by remitters under the same 
circumstances could be driven by the informal contractual arrangements between the 
migrant and the household and also the decision on migration since this might be driven 
and financed by an intra-household agreement thus, resulting in higher remittances during 
the times when economic conditions worsen (income risk diversification).  
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Also, the results suggest if the GDP per capita of the home country increases by 100 
USD at PPP, this decreases the remittances/GDP by only 0.03 percentage points. This 
home country GDP variable is statistically insignificant in the column 2, where the 
dependent variable remittances per capita.
6
   
  
                                                          
6
 The results of Table 3.6 based on Stata printouts are presented in appendix 3.3.2 and 3.3.4 
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Table 3.6 Estimated Regression of Macroeconomic Determinants of Remittances 
  (1) (2) 
VARIABLES Remittances as % of GDP Remittances per capita in USD 
      
Home Country Unemployment 0.0388 -0.295 
  (0.196) 0.247 
Host Country Unemployment 0.131* 1.471** 
  (0.065) 0.016 
Inflation Rate -4.91E-05 -2.05e-05 
  (0.774) 0.991 
Population 0.00575 
 
  (0.896) 
 
GDP per capita of Home Country -0.000326** 0.000326 
  (0.022) 0.720 
GDP per capita of Home Country^2 1.12E-07 4.22e-07 
  (0.337) 0.563 
GDP per capita of Main Host Country 
0.00107*** 0.00403** 
  (0.000) 0.032 
GDP per capita of Main Host Country^2 -6.87e-09*** -3.03e-08 
  (0.008) 0.103 
Policy Variable -0.314 -0.150 
  (0.521) 0.970 
Constant term -22.72*** 214.3*** 
  (0.000) 0.000 
      
Observations 870 870 
Number of id 52 52 
P-Values in parentheses 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. Note: GDP per capita is based on Purchasing Power Parity (PPP) 
For host country GDP per capita, the squared term is significant. Remittances increase 
towards the recipient economy as the GDP per capita of the main host country (sending 
economy) increases, but at decreasing rate. The results suggest that remittances will 
increase until the GDP per capita (PPP) of the main host country reaches 73,099 US 
dollars, which is considerably above the maximum in the data of 47,155 USD. However, 
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despite being in line with expectations, the results of the GDP per capita of host country 
should be taken with caution given that there is no single country of destination for any 
migrant sending country. In this model the estimate is that an increase in the GDP per 
capita of the host country of 500 USD (by about 2 percent at the mean) will increase 
remittances per capita by approximately 2 USD. The squared variable of host country 
GDP is statistically insignificant in the column 2.  
The unemployment rate in the home country is statistically insignificant in both models. 
This could suggest that it is the GDP per capita (i.e. potentially wages which may be 
connected to the GDP) variable that is taking effect of the home country economic 
conditions. The host country unemployment rate is significant, although only at the 10% 
level in the remittances as a percentage of GDP. Although the literature suggests that 
migrants could be mostly affected by the increasing unemployment rates in host countries 
(Vargas-Silva and Huang, 2006; Gupta, 2006; World Bank, 2006), leading to lower 
remittances, in our attempt to measure such effect we obtain a positive estimate. This is 
the case in all specifications presented in this chapter. However, similar to the GDP of 
host country, such results should be taken with caution given that there is no single 
destination country for migrants, while this variable captures the unemployment rate of 
the main (single) destination country.  
Even though many of the developing countries have experienced a relatively high 
inflation rate, the effect of this variable on the share of remittances to GDP is statistically 
insignificant. The expectations are that inflation results in higher remittances if the 
altruism motive is the primary goal of remitting by the migrants or if the income risk 
diversification theory holds for migration.  
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Despite the general recommendations in the literature that policies should be undertaken 
by the home country in order to increase remittances and their effect in the recipient 
economy and despite a considerable number of countries‟ application of such policies, to 
our knowledge, this thesis is the first attempt to investigate the impact of policy 
initiatives on remittances share to GDP (or per capita). The results do not support the 
recommendation in the literature, given that the impact of policy initiative variable is 
statistically insignificant. Nevertheless, the results of this variable should be taken with 
caution because despite the efforts to compile a comprehensive data set inclusive of all 
policy initiatives, the search for them is also challenging. However, given credible 
sources have been used and data collection was based on the best available data online, 
this estimation attempted to provide a wide coverage.  The second attempt at policy 
evaluation was the specification with two dummy independent variables for the policy 
initiatives and these results are presented in Table 3.7. This specification contains one 
dummy variable for applying only one policy regarding migrants and remittances 
(Country i applies only one Policy=1) and one variable which represents the countries 
applying two or more policy initiatives for migrants (Country i applies more than one 
Policy=1). 
The results of this specification are not in line with the expectations. In the specification 
in the column labelled (3) in Table 3.7,
7
 the results suggest that the share of remittances 
to GDP decreases when a country applies one policy, while in other cases the remittance 
dummies are insignificant. For the other variables, the signs and significance are similar 
to the previous estimations in Table 3.6.  Given that the type of the policy implemented 
                                                          
7
 Stata Printouts are presented in Appendix 3.4.1 and 3.4.2 
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may matter, the third specification which includes the type of the policy has been 
specified. However, the results are also insignificant for all the policy variables in this 
specification (Table 3.8)
8
.  
Table 3.7 Estimated Regression of Macroeconomic Determinants of Remittances by the number of 
policies 
  (3) (4) 
VARIABLES 
Remittances as % of 
GDP 
Remittances per capita in USD 
Home Country Unemployment 0.0386 -0.293 
  (0.195) 0.252 
Host Country Unemployment 0.121* 1.455** 
  (0.087) 0.017 
Inflation Rate -4.97E-05 -2.96e-05 
  (0.769) 0.987 
If Country Applies One Policy -1.391** -2.242 
  (0.016) 0.650 
If Country Applies two or more Policies 0.854 -1.290 
  (0.251) 0.822 
Population 0.00442 
 
  (0.921) 
 
GDP per capita of Home Country -0.000313** 0.000349 
  (0.028) 0.701 
GDP per capita of Home Country^2 1.12E-07 4.23e-07 
  (0.335) 0.562 
GDP per capita of Main Host Country 0.00104*** 0.00400** 
  (0.000) 0.034 
GDP per capita of Main Host Country^2 -6.55e-09** -2.97e-08 
  (0.011) 0.112 
Constant term -22.28*** 214.5*** 
  (0.000) 0.000 
      
Observations 870 870 
Number of id 52 52 
P-Values in parentheses 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 Note: GDP per capita is based on Purchasing Power Parity (PPP) 
                                                          
8
 Stata Printouts are presented in Appendix 3.4.3 and 3.4.4 
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Table 3.8 Estimated Regression of Macroeconomic Determinants of Remittances by type of policy 
     (5) (6) 
VARIABLES 
Remittances as % of 
GDP 
Remittances per capita in USD 
      
Home Country Unemployment 0.038 -0.299 
  (0.205) 0.244 
Host Country Unemployment 0.130* 1.469** 
  (0.066) 0.016 
Inflation Rate -4.74E-05 -2.66e-05 
  (0.781) 0.988 
Population 0.00519 
 
  (0.905) 
 GDP per capita of Home Country -0.000326** 0.000336 
  (0.022) 0.712 
GDP per capita of Home Country^2 1.12E-07 4.24e-07 
  (0.333) 0.561 
GDP per capita of Main Host Country 0.00109*** 0.00407** 
  (0.000) 0.031 
GDP per capita of Main Host Country^2 -7.02e-09*** -3.05e-08 
  (0.007) 0.102 
Taxation Policies 0.563 0.0391 
  (0.437) (0.995) 
Other Government Policies -0.573 -1.692 
  (0.325) 0.730 
Private Sector Schemes -1.049 -1.049 
  (0.180) 0.869 
Constant term -23.07*** 213.3*** 
  (0.000) 0.000 
      
Observations 870 870 
Number of id 52 52 
P-Values in parentheses 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1, Note: GDP per capita is based on Purchasing Power Parity (PPP) 
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In addition to the policies supporting imports or investments, there are other policies 
which aim to develop transfer methods, increase the use of formal channels and reduce 
the transaction cost. Although our specifications controlled for these policies as well 
(mostly falling into the category of private sector schemes) the results again suggest that 
they are statistically insignificant.  
Given that the literature recommends the inclusion of governance quality in home 
country (Catrinescu et al., 2009), we added the World Bank Governance Indicators, 
specifically, the Government Effectiveness indicator into the specification (Table 3.9). 
However, the results for the policy variables are insignificant across all but one 
specification. That specification, in the column labelled 9, gives an unexpected effect, 
suggesting that holding other variables constant, the application of one policy by the 
country i, results in lower remittances. The results for this variable are consistent with 
that in the column labelled 3 in Table 3.7; however, such results do not make much sense. 
The inclusion of governance indicators affects the significance of other variables across 
the specifications, although not the sign. For instance, in the specification where 
Remittances to GDP is the dependent variable, the home country GDP is insignificant. 
However, it is significant in the specifications where the variable remittances per capita 
are used as dependent variable, which was not the case in the specification in columns 1-
6.   
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Table 3.9 Estimated Regression of Macroeconomic Determinants of Remittances including 
governance indicator 
  (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12) 
VARIABLES 
Remittances 
as % of GDP 
Remittances 
per capita in 
USD 
Remittances 
as % of GDP 
Remittances 
per capita in 
USD 
Remittances 
as % of GDP 
Remittances 
per capita in 
USD 
Home Country Unemployment 0.0509 0.152 0.0509 0.149 0.0499 0.141 
  (0.185) 0.368 (0.182) 0.376 (0.195) 0.405 
Host Country Unemployment 0.154* -0.377 0.144* -0.417 0.151* -0.413 
  (0.072) 0.336 (0.092) 0.288 (0.080) 0.293 
Inflation Rate 0.000576 0.000308 0.000567 0.000342 0.000587 0.000483 
  (0.523) 0.955 (0.527) 0.95 (0.516) 0.929 
If Country Applies One Policy     -1.239** -3.081     
      (0.040) 0.281     
If Country Applies two or more Policies     1.197 -1.420     
      (0.134) 0.662     
Population -0.0441 
 
-0.0539 
 
-0.0504 
   (0.677) 
 
(0.614) 
 
(0.636) 
 GDP per capita of Home Country -0.000229 0.00211*** -0.00021 0.00210*** -0.000228 0.00210*** 
  (0.164) 0.000 (0.201) 0.000 (0.167) 0.000 
GDP per capita of Home Country^2 1.19E-07 -1.94e-07 1.22E-07 -2.02e-07 1.20E-07 -2.02e-07 
  (0.381) 0.601 (0.364) 0.585 (0.375) 0.585 
GDP per capita of Main Host Country 0.00131*** 0.00261** 0.00127*** 0.00255** 0.00132*** 0.00266** 
  (0.000) 0.035 (0.000) 0.041 (0.000) 0.032 
GDP per capita of Main Host Country^2 -8.62e-09*** -1.41e-08 -8.18e-09*** -1.33e-08 -8.69e-09*** -1.45e-08 
  (0.003) 0.179 (0.004) 0.209 (0.002) (0.296) 
Policy Variable -0.35 0.370         
  (0.564) 0.893         
Taxation Policies         0.515 1.006 
          (0.578) 0.819 
Other Government Policies         -0.553 -1.934 
          (0.427) 0.575 
Private Sector Schemes         -0.891 -2.483 
          (0.285) 0.501 
Government Effectiveness -0.605 -2.499 -0.636 -2.205 -0.568 -2.053 
  (0.164) 0.257 (0.140) 0.319 (0.192) 0.356 
Constant term -24.73*** -62.78*** -23.89*** -60.98*** -24.54*** -62.91*** 
  (0.000) 0.000 (0.000) 0.000 (0.000) 0.000 
Observations 610 610 610 610 610 610 
Number of id 52 52 52 52 52 52 
P-Values in parentheses 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1, Note: GDP per capita is based on Purchasing Power Parity (PPP) 
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However, why the policies regarding the migration and remittances do not affect 
remittances to GDP or remittances per capita may be related to the nature of the 
remittances and their definition which is: 
“Remittances represent household income from foreign economies arising mainly 
from the temporary or permanent movement of people to those economies  
(IMF, 2009 page 272). 
In many developing countries remittances are mostly used for consumption purposes, 
while such policies are more likely to impact migrants‟ investments. Hence, given that 
the policies applied by the recipient countries are mainly oriented towards attraction of 
migrants‟ capital either through ensuring better investment environment or allowing 
specific items to be imported duty free (mostly capital goods), it is likely that such 
policies would affect other categories of the Balance of Payments (BOP) such as Foreign 
Direct Investments (FDI) and Imports. According to the IMF (1993) and OECD (1996) 
definition of the Foreign Direct Investments (FDI), it is understood that migrants‟ 
investments should be treated as FDI in the BOP. According to the manuals:  
“...a foreign direct investor is an individual, an incorporated or unincorporated 
public or private enterprise, a government, a group of related individuals, or a group of 
related incorporated and/or unincorporated enterprises which has a direct investment 
enterprise operating in a country other than the country or countries of residence of the 
foreign direct investor or investors…”  
97 
 
(OECD, 1996 page 7-8; IMF, 1993 page 86).       
Therefore, given that migrants are treated as non-residents, their investments would fall 
in the FDI category, not in the category of remittances. Also, policies supporting the 
import of capital goods would be reflected in the import category. The imports of capital 
goods and their potential transfer to the households as in kind remittances, are likely to 
reflect in the private investment, but not necessarily as remittances in the recording of 
data. In the context of remittances, it is important that the definitional aspects of Balance 
of Payments be considered. This is because various policies are recommended to increase 
remittances, however, many of these policies have larger implications for other Balance 
of Payments items, such as imports of goods and services, foreign direct investments or 
other categories and not necessarily in the recorded flow of remittances.  
3.8 Conclusions and Implications 
Using a wide data set for 52 countries with time series of up to 30 years it was aimed to 
identify macroeconomic determinants of remittances with a special focus on policy 
evaluation. The motive for this research question is based on the current literature 
investigating the determinants of remittances given that it widely recommends 
implementation of policies in order to attract more remittances and also to attract 
migrants‟ investments. In order to evaluate whether the policies implemented are 
affecting remittances an extensive research of the literature to identify the policies 
undertaken by each country was undertaken. Such policies include both government and 
private sector schemes. The most notable policies identified in the literature are those 
which aim to attract migrants‟ investments such as creating favourable investment 
conditions, imports of capital goods, legal support, a ministry for diaspora but also 
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policies aiming to support the transfer of remittances, fee reduction and improvement of 
payment systems. Using these policies identified in the literature dummy variables were 
created to take into account these policies. Despite the very extensive research for the 
policies employed in the different countries at different times, the results should be taken 
with caution given that there is a possibility of not covering all of them.  
Given the data set which is considered to have a moderately large cross section and also a 
moderately long time series, the estimation method was based on AR (1) using Cochrane-
Orcutt method. This is because the nature of the macro variables is suggested to be 
dynamic, while the AR (1) represented as a dynamic regression with non-linear common 
factor restrictions and uncorrelated disturbances. The crucial test of CFR holds for this 
regression and this estimation was used.  
As expected the results generally suggest that the GDP per capita of the home country (at 
purchasing power parity) affects negatively remittances, suggesting a counter-cyclical 
behaviour of remittances towards the home country. Its squared term is statistically 
insignificant. The GDP per capita of the host country estimates on the other hand, 
suggests an increasing function, but at a decreasing rate. Unexpected results were found 
regarding the unemployment rate in host country, suggesting that as unemployment 
increases, remittances to GDP and per capita increase as well. One of the main 
contributions of this chapter was the policy evaluation variable. The results do not 
support a positive effect of such policies on remittances as a percentage of GDP or 
remittances per capita. A robustness check using different measures for the policy 
variables gave similar results.  
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Thus the evidence suggests that for home countries that want to increase remittances, 
these type of policies are not effective. These results should be taken with caution given 
that it is possible that not all the policies have been covered and such policies may affect 
other items of the BOP such as FDI and imports (especially capital goods). In this 
context, further research with regard to policy evaluation is necessary, especially 
investigating whether these policies are affecting the aforementioned BOP items.  
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4.1  Introduction 
 
An important and previously under-investigated topic in the literature of migration and 
remittances is the impact of remittances on the economy of the home country, especially 
having in mind the relatively large share of remittances to GDP for many developing 
countries. The literature remains inconclusive and divided into three viewpoints on the 
effect of remittances. The first suggests that remittances do not differ from other sources 
of income (Adams et al., 2008). The second view is that remittances mainly finance 
consumption and are oriented towards non-productive purchases, such as luxury goods 
and hence, do not generate growth (Chami et al., 2005; Ratha, 2003). The third approach 
considers that remittances are used to finance human capital investments such as 
education and health and also to establish enterprises and generate employment (Osili, 
2004; Adams et al., 2008; Adams, 2010; Taylor and Mora, 2006; Castaldo and Railly, 
2007). From the macroeconomic point of view in Chapter III, the finding suggests that 
policies do not have any significant effect on the flow of remittances. However, in order 
to properly address the issue of policies with regard to remittances, it is necessary to 
identify their difference, if any, from other sources of income in terms of their effect on 
expenditure patterns of households, that is, whether remittances are spent differently from 
other income.   
Considering the above mentioned views, and the evidence in the literature, this chapter 
aims to empirically investigate the effect of remittances on household expenditure. 
Studies such as Castaldo and Reilly (2007), Adams et al., (2008) and Cattaneo (2012) 
have investigated the impact of remittances on households‟ expenditure using the Engel‟s 
Curve approach, which describes the households‟ expenditure given their level of income 
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(Chai and Moneta, 2010). This is considered as a successful approach by studies 
evaluating the effects of tax/benefit policy reforms which may affect expenditure patterns 
(Castaldo and Reilly, 2007; Muellenbauer, 1977; Leser, 1963). The Engel‟s Curve 9 
approach may be the appropriate method to investigate the impact of remittances on 
households‟ expenditure having in mind that additional sources of income often shift the 
household expenditure patterns and result in change the expenditure preferences (Blow et 
al., 2007; Adams, 2008; Castaldo and Railly, 2007).  
The reason why this particular approach is used in this study is because the primary 
interest in this chapter is the behaviour of households receiving remittances and their 
expenditure patterns. Moreover, having in mind that the literature (Adams, 2008; 
Castaldo and Railly, 2007) generally agree that remittance recipient households tend to 
change their expenditure patterns from food to non-food goods (especially education and 
durable goods), this approach allows identifying the policies which may be more 
effective. This is important since remittance policies (see Chapter III) are often oriented 
to the remittance recipient households, i.e. the policies aim to divert them from 
consumption to development projects and education.  
The structure of this chapter is organized in the following manner: section 4.2 reviews the 
theory and the literature findings on the factors affecting the consumption patterns of 
households, with special focus on the impact of remittances. Based on the literature and 
the theoretical foundations, an empirical model will be designed in this section. Section 
                                                          
9
 The Engel‟s Law suggests that consumers decrease the share of income spent on consumption goods as 
their income increases. However, according to this Law, the expenditure on consumption goods does not 
necessarily decrease, but it does not increase at the same rate as income, thus suggesting an income 
elasticity of consumption of between 0 and 1.  
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4.3 is dedicated to the description of the data and the methods that will be used to 
estimate this model. Section 4.4 presents the search for the appropriate estimation method 
and the diagnostics of the models, while the results are presented and interpreted in 
section 4.5. Concluding remarks and policy recommendations are drawn in section 4.6. 
4.2 Literature Review  
Several relevant views about the effect of remittances on households and the economy 
exist in the literature. This section attempts to describe these views and to identify the 
emerging points of remittances effects on household consumption patterns. It is important 
to start by considering why people migrate and the motivations for sending remittances 
(see Chapter III). This is because theories on migration and remittances and the use of 
remittances tend to reinforce each other (Chami et al., 2005). In the Table 4.1 are 
presented the main findings of the literature for the implications of remittances to the 
expenditure patterns on recipient households.  
Table 4.1 Summary of Literature Findings on the impact of remittances on households’ expenditure 
Author(s) Title of the Study Main Findings 
   
Adams et al., 
(2010): 
Country:  
Guatemala 
Remittances, 
Household 
Expenditure and 
Investment in 
Guatemala 
Remittance recipient households spend less 
proportionately on consumption goods compared 
to households that do not receive remittances. 
Households tend to view remittances as temporary 
streams of income; therefore they proportionately 
spend them more on housing, investment goods 
and education. 
Adams et al., 
(2008): 
Remittances, 
Investment and 
Remittances by households in Ghana are spent 
just like any other income from all sources. 
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Country: Ghana Consumption in Ghana 
Acosta et al., 
(2007): 
11 countries 
from Latin 
America 
The Impact of 
Remittances on 
Poverty and Human 
Capital: Evidence from 
Latin American 
Household Surveys 
Remittances have positive impact on health and 
education. 
Funkhouser 
(1992): 
Country: 
Nicaragua 
Migration from 
Nicaragua: Some 
Recent Evidence 
Remittances may reduce the labour supply; 
however, they have positive effect on self-
employment. 
Rodriguez and 
Tiongson (2001): 
Country: 
Philippines 
Temporary Migration 
Overseas and 
Household Labour 
Supply: Evidence from 
Urban Philippines 
Remittance recipient households use remittances 
to fund their consumption needs and choose 
leisure instead of work (hence generate lower 
earnings from local labour market).  
Castaldo and 
Railly (2007): 
Country: Albania 
Do Migrant 
Remittances Affect 
Consumption Patterns 
of Albanian 
Households 
Households that receive remittances spend, on 
average, a lower share of total income on 
consumption goods and increase the share of 
expenditure on durable goods and education. 
Cox and Ureta 
(2003): 
Country: El 
Salvador 
International Migration, 
Remittances and 
Schooling: Evidence 
from El Salvador 
Remittances increase the probability of leaving 
school, especially in rural areas. 
Mioti et al., 
(2010): 
Country: 
Migrants in 
France 
 
Determinants and 
Uses of Remittances 
to Southern and 
Eastern Mediterranean 
Countries: Insights 
from a New Survey  
Long-term migrants from North African countries 
send remittances and advise the households to 
invest them. Sub-Saharan migrations send 
remittances to finance consumption. 
Guzman et al., The Impact of Female headed households who receive internal 
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(2007): 
Country: Ghana 
Remittances and 
Gender on Household 
Expenditure: Evidence 
from Ghana 
remittances spend a higher share on health, while 
female headed households who receive 
international remittances spend a higher share on 
durable goods and health. 
Gyimah-
Brempong and 
Asiedu (2014) 
Country: Ghana 
Remittances and 
Investment in 
Education 
Remittances have a positive effect on primary and 
secondary education enrolment. The effect of 
remittances on education investment is greater for 
female-headed households compared to their 
male counterparts. 
Randazzo and 
Piracha (2014) 
Country: 
Senegal 
Remittances and 
Household 
Expenditure Behaviour 
in Senegal 
Remittances have no impact on expenditure 
patterns since they behave as any other source of 
income. 
 
Ameudo-
Dorantes and 
Pozo (2014) 
Country: Mexico 
 
When Do Remittances 
Facilitate Asset 
Accumulation? The 
Importance of 
Remittance Income 
Uncertainty 
 
 
When remittances are viewed as a non-
sustainable source of income, they have a positive 
effect on asset accumulation.  
Gounder (2014) 
Country: Fiji 
Does Remittances 
Finance Welfare 
Development? 
Evidence from South 
Pacific Island Nation of 
Fiji 
Overall positive effect of remittances on education 
attainment of children, but also on general human 
capital categories compared to durable and non-
durable goods.  
   
Source: Author’s Creation 
As explained in Section 4.1, even though there is a lack of systemic economic theory on 
the impact of remittances on households‟ expenditure behaviour, three viewpoints 
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emerge in the literature. The first view, proposed by Adams et al. (2008), considers that 
remittances behave just like any other income and the remittances recipient households 
do not change the expenditure patterns in the presence of remittances. This view suggests 
that an additional dollar from remittances will be used by the household just like an 
additional dollar from salary income or from the family farm and hence the contribution 
to the economic growth will be just like that of other sources of income (Adams et al., 
2008). The treatment of remittances as any other source of income may be particularly 
the case in low income countries and among poor households, whose income may 
entirely be used to finance consumption. This may have thus resulted in the findings that 
expenditure of remittances behaves the same as other sources of income (Adams et al., 
2008; Randazzo and Piracha, 2014). This study is focused on Ghana, which is ranked as a 
country with relatively high poverty rate (World Bank Development Indicators, 2011a). 
Therefore, the income elasticity of households in Ghana with respect to food 
consumption may be equal to 1. With this income elasticity, the increase in the 
households‟ income as a result of remittances will raise the demand for consumption 
goods proportionately with the overall income. As a result, the behaviour of remittances 
will follow similar patterns to other sources of income, financing consumption. 
Furthermore, in many cases the migrant may be sending remittances to elderly parents, to 
their spouse and their children, consequently, remittances often represent the sole source 
of income for the household in home country. Consumption is also often the primary 
reason why remittances are sent; this is consistent with the altruistic theory of why 
remittances are sent (see section 3.2.1). This view considers that remittances are sent to 
the home country mostly in cases when they are essential to maintain basic living 
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standards and therefore, they cannot easily be diverted to development projects (Chami et 
al., 2005). Such a view is also in line with the income diversification strategy of the 
household where households minimize the income risks by diversifying their labour 
capacities, including sending one or some members in other countries. However, as 
suggested by Acosta et al., (2007), even though remittances are consumed they may have 
long-term positive implications for the economy since the welfare and health conditions 
and overall human capital of the household members may improve due to better nutrition. 
The second view considers remittances as having a negative effect on the economy, 
suggesting that they have a spoiling effect on households‟ expenditure behaviour and that 
remittances mostly finance luxury „status‟ goods and consumption. This view considers 
that remittances expenditure take place under asymmetric information and economic 
uncertainty and therefore, there is a moral hazard problem since the use of remittances 
may be unobservable by the migrant (Chami et al., 2005; Naiditch and Vranceanu, 2009). 
This problem is expected to result in increased of consumption with little or no 
investment. Moreover, this view considers that remittances may also reduce the labour 
supply (Funkhouser, 1992; Rodriguez and Tingson, 2001; Amuedo-Dorantes and Pozo 
2006; Hanson, 2007; Kim, 2007; Amuedo-Dorates and Pozo, 2012).  
The third view, also considered as the most optimistic view about the impact of 
remittances on development, suggests that remittances decrease the share of households‟ 
expenditure on consumption goods. Accordingly, the share of income spent on durable 
housing goods and human capital investments such as education and health increases. 
This view also supports the hypothesis that remittances have a positive effect on growth 
since remittances are used to establish enterprises and generate employment (Osili, 2004; 
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Adams et al., 2008; Adams and Cuecuecha 2010; Taylor and Mora, 2006; Castaldo and 
Railly, 2007). In addition, remittances increase the probability of self-employment of the 
remittance recipient household (Funkhouser, 1992). This applies especially when the 
household views the remittances as a temporary stream of income. This encourages the 
household either towards savings (for future consumption) or towards investment and 
self-employment which promises future income generated from employment (Adams, 
1991). In addition, an important role in deciding the final use of remittances maybe 
played by the migrant himself (see section 4.3).  
In addition to the investigation of the effect of remittances at the household level, a 
number of papers have investigated the macroeconomic effect of remittances relating to 
the particular ways remittances may be spent. The overall macroeconomic implications 
are a result of aggregated behaviour of individuals and hence they represent an important 
indicator on how remittances are used at microeconomic level. At macroeconomic level, 
Ratha et al. (2011) finds that remittances increase the overall education level in the home 
country. This may imply that a share of remittances is used to finance education of 
recipients. Studies such as Bougha-Hagbe (2004) find that remittances increase the 
savings and investment in the home country at aggregate level. However, Chami et al. 
(2008) suggest that the increase of savings and investments as a result of remittances is 
very small. Similarly, Chami et al. (2005) also argue that remittances reduce the 
economic activity of a country and labour supply in the economy and households‟ 
consumption increases, suggesting that such behaviour is as a result of moral hazard 
problems by the recipients.  
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The IOM (2010) study “Remittances and Investment Opportunities for Egyptian 
Migrants” found several important factors which determine the impact of remittances. 
This study suggests that a significant negative role is played by government policies 
which do not provide favourable conditions for investment. Moreover, this investigation 
describes that around half of remittance recipient households are advised by the remitters 
(i.e. remittance senders) on how to use remittances. In addition, migrants often aim to 
invest in home countries and according to this study, the most desired investment 
opportunities of migrants are private businesses and real estate.  
4.3 The Theoretical Model and Expected Signs 
Following the review of the literature, a household-level model for Kosovo is developed 
to identify the effects of remittances on household expenditure behaviour. The model will 
be based on the Working-Leser model which extends Engel‟s model (Working, 1943; 
Leser, 1963) by adding variables (i.e. household characteristics) which may have an 
effect on the expenditure patterns of the households. The Engel model suggests that the 
share of income spent on consumption goods decreases as the income of household 
increases. According to this approach, the expenditure on consumption goods does not 
necessarily decrease in absolute terms, but it does not increase at the same rate as income. 
The Working-Leser specification is a widely used approach in the literature studying 
household expenditure patterns (Deaton and Muellbauer, 1980a) and has recently been 
extended by including remittances (Adams, 2010, 2008; Castaldo, 2007; Guzman et al., 
2007; Zarate-Hoyos, 2004 etc.). However, the model developed in this chapter differs in 
terms of the dependent variable from the current literature investigating the impact of 
remittances on expenditure patterns. The model designed here uses the approach of 
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seminal work in the literature developed Working (1943) and Leser (1963) and later 
extended for systems of demand equations by Deaton and Muellbauer (1980b). The 
Working-Leser model relates linearly the share of expenditures in one category (wi) to the 
logarithm of total expenditure (logxi) and various other control variables (xn) as described 
in Deaton and Muellbauer (1980a):  
                       _________4.1 
Where 
   
                         
                 
     
In the model 4.1 the wi represents the expenditure on each category as a share of the total 
household expenditure (see Table 4.2 for the categories to be estimated). The unobserved 
factors in the model are represented by the error term (     in the equation. Estimating 
equation 4.1 for all categories of consumption should satisfy the constraint Σwi=1, which 
is known as the adding-up restriction; the sum of the estimated expenditures on different 
categories being equal to total expenditures. Some of the research papers in the literature 
on the impact of remittances on household expenditure use per capita expenditure 
(Adams, 2010, 2006; Adams et al., 2008) rather than the dependent variable in 4.1, (wi), 
which is the share of expenditure in one category. Using the form used by Adams the 
adding up restriction cannot be imposed, indeed this approach in the general literature on 
consumption patterns by households is not discussed in Adams‟ paper. 
It is actually the adding-up restriction which supports the use of semi-log function against 
other functional forms because using this functional form, it will also be possible to test 
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the change in consumption patterns for luxury, necessity and inferior goods (Deaton and 
Muellbauer, 1980b). The general literature of expenditure patterns models largely uses 
the natural logarithm of expenditure (     ) as a proxy variable for income (Gujarati, 
2004). This is because income data obtained from surveys is often underestimated and/or 
not reported, and the expenditure data are likely to be more accurately reported. Also, 
Ketkar and Ketkar (1987) referring to Friedman (1957) suggest that that consumption is 
dependent on permanent income and not necessarily by the actual level of current 
income. Given that consumption may be depend on permanent level of income, the 
household consumes even if they do not have immediate income by spending their 
savings or by borrowing (Gujarati, 2004).  Thus total expenditure is arguably a better 
proxy of permanent income than current income. 
Given this, an increase in logxi, representing the total household expenditure, is expected 
to have a negative effect on the share of expenditure on current consumption while the 
shares of expenditure of other categories are expected to increase. Given that expenditure 
here is used as a proxy of income, the assumption is that households have reached a level 
of income where the elasticity of income with respect to current consumption is less than 
one, suggesting that the share of expenditure in this category is falling (however, current 
consumption may not fall in absolute terms). 
In addition to the budget, the expenditure categories are affected also by various 
household characteristics such household size, the age composition of household 
members, education level and other household characteristics (Deaton and Muellbauer, 
1980a). Household size and the age composition of household members are among the 
most discussed variables in the literature (Muellbauer, 1977; Deaton and Muellbauer, 
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1980a). This is because it is argued that larger households tend to spend on consumption 
a larger share of their budget. Stone (1954) used the Amsterdam Scale to weight 
differently the number of household members according to their age. The Amsterdam 
Scale uses the food consumption requirements by a household considering the size and 
the age composition of the members. The weights are determined by nutrition experts 
suggesting that a household with two adult members has a value of 1.90 (if one member 
is male and the other female). The children under the age 14 have a value of 0.52 (both 
for males and females) while for children over 14, the males rate is 0.98, while for 
females is 0.90. The scaled value for the household size is from adding the values of the 
individual members. However, the using the Amsterdam (or nutritional equivalence) 
scaling is problematic. It does not account for economies of scale within the household as 
it assumes that for every additional household member the food consumption increases 
pro rata. Also, and most importantly, the Amsterdam Scale was introduced for developed 
economies in 1950-60s and it is expected that consumption patterns may vary for 
developing countries and over time. In this context, according to Deaton and Muellbauer 
(1980a), the number of household members can be taken into account by adding separate 
variables which account for the number of children and for adult household members.
10
 
This approach allows for adults to consume more than young children, which is 
consistent with the Amsterdam Scale, however the numbers in each age group are used to 
estimate the consumption differences between households, rather than being imposed. 
                                                          
10
 In the model the age groups that will be used are: up to the age of 15, and from 16 and over. The reason 
why the age groupings are different (in the second category from 6 to 15, instead of 6 to 16) is based on the 
law covering the right to join the labour force in Kosovo, which is over the age of 15. Following the 
approach used by Deaton and Muellbauer (1980a) the variables taking into account household members by 
age do not differentiate by gender. (The effect of gender overall on shares of expenditure is considered later 
in this section).  
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Moreover, in selected consumption categories, a higher number of household members 
may not necessarily increase expenditure. This is especially important for certain 
categories of durable goods. Furthermore, although households with more members may 
increase the share of current consumption goods to total expenditure, however this may 
be at a decreasing rate as a result of economies of scale within the household. This is 
because, it is theorized that larger households who could decrease the cost of 
consumption by using bulk purchases and focusing on discounts, therefore, with little 
extra cost to the total (Nielson, 1988; Lazear and Micheal, 1980).  
Given the theoretical foundations and the specification, this may be expressed as 
                               
               
 
 
          
     ____________________4.2 
where (C15) represents the number of children under the age of 15, while (A) is the 
number of adult household members, and C15
2
 and A
2
 their respective squared values, 
allowing for non-linear relationships.  
Using expenditure per capita as the dependent variable (Adams, 2010; 2006; Adams et 
al., 2008) instead of the share of total expenditure ignores any variation of expenditure 
with respect to age, for example, that babies consume less than adults, and possible 
economies of scale within the household, which is another reason for using the share in 
this investigation. Given the discussion above, it is expected that both more children and 
adults increase the expenditure share on consumption, though the rate of increase is 
expected to be lower for children. The squared terms are expected to be negative given 
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economies of scale. Similarly the proportion of expenditure on education may rise with 
increased number of household members, while that on durable goods fall.  
The age variables (AGEHH and AGEHH
2
) represent the age of the head of household and 
its squared value. This relationship between age and consumption is built upon the 
hypothesis that younger individuals have a higher propensity for risk-taking behaviour, 
while at later ages, this risk propensity is likely to decrease. Consequently, with this 
hypothesis, it is assumed that at younger age, individuals attempt to accumulate capital 
for investment, hence reduce the share of expenditure on consumption (Giannetti and 
Simonov, 2004). On other categories such as education expenditure shares are also 
expected to be higher at younger ages, but also at a decreasing rate (inverse U-shaped 
function). Similarly are the expectations for durable goods, especially if they are 
considered an investment for future consumption, given that the attitude for risk taking 
changes with age. This behaviour may be expected as a result of a life-cycle behaviour 
given that individuals are more likely to invest in their education or other investments 
while younger.    
Education as an important household characteristic may be a factor affecting the 
consumption patterns. The hypothesis is that education changes the expenditure patterns 
given the change of tastes for goods, for example, educated head of households may 
spend more on the education of their children and less on current consumption than other 
households. In this context, this variable is important for households whose members are 
currently in education. A variable for education has been included in expenditure models 
in various forms, such as the number of household members currently in education, the 
education level of household members of selected age groups and the education level of 
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the head of household (Adams, 2010; 2006; Adams et al., 2008; Castaldo and Reilly, 
2007; Guzman et al., 2007). However, with few exceptions, the rationale for including 
these variables has been largely neglected in these studies. This is important, especially 
for education related expenditures of the household, having in mind that education 
expenditures may be viewed as a trade-off between the current level of household 
consumption and expected income and consumption in the future, given that earnings are 
related to education levels (Becker, 1964; Deaton and Muellbauer, 1980a). The inclusion 
of the head of household‟s education may reflect the long-term plans of the household 
(Deaton and Muellbauer, 1980a), which is expected to be as a result of improved human 
capital and due to the changes in tastes of the household and migration plans (Adams, et 
al., 2008).  It may also reflect the share of the human capital expenditure of the other 
household members. An education variable is therefore included in the model: 
                               
               
           
 
 
            _______________________4.3 
where, the variable (EDHH) is the education level of the head of household. The number 
of household members attending each level of education is not included here, given that 
primary and post-compulsory secondary education in Kosovo is public funded and that 
most children go to a local school, there are only incidental direct costs related to this 
level of education. Given that higher education (i.e. university education) incurs larger 
costs for the household and also represents a more significant human capital investment, 
this variable is often included in expenditure models. However, in the model presented in 
this chapter, it is not included as a variable because one of the five categories of 
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expenditure examined here is the share of expenditure on education and being in higher 
education is the outcome of spending decisions, which is what is being modelled.  The 
expected sign on the education variable is negative for current consumption share and 
positive for the shares of expenditure on education and durable goods, given their longer 
term positive effects for the household.   
Regarding gender of the head of household, it has been argued by several studies that if 
the head of household is female, the expenditure proportion increases for education and 
the share of the current consumption category decreases (Guzman et al., 2007). This has 
been explained as an indirect investment in children by the women, especially in societies 
where asset accumulation is controlled by men, hence, women try to ensure a smoothed 
long-term consumption through investing in children and health (Guyer, 1997; 
Quisumbing and Maluccio 2000). A similar argument for long-term investment could be 
considered for durable goods category when the head of household is female. The 
importance of the gender of the head of household has been found in empirical studies. In 
this context, a review of the literature suggests that when the household is headed by 
female, the share of expenditure on health and education increases (Haddat et al., 1997; 
Quisumbing and Maluccio, 2000; Gyimah-Brempong and Asiedu, 2014; Gounder, 2014). 
Therefore, it is considered important to include the personal characteristics of the head of 
household in the equation and adding gender (G) to the equation (with expected positive 
sign for education and durable goods expenditure share and negative for current 
consumption share) to give the following model:  
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                  _________________4.4 
The behaviour of households where the head is self-employed is theorized to be different 
from households headed by employees. The hypothesis regarding self-employed 
individuals is that they face higher income risk or higher income volatility as opposed to 
the regular employed individuals (similar to those who work in the informal sector). In 
this context, the possible variations in income that the self-employed face is likely to 
increase the savings motive for such households which is likely to decrease the share of 
expenditure on the other categories such as the expenditure on durable goods and current 
expenditure (Albarran and Carrasco, 2009). Also, the inheritance practice in Kosovo, 
which in almost all the cases is characterized by transfer of the business and real estate to 
the children, may result in self-employed head of households expending less on formal 
education for their children, being more focused on the practice of running the small 
business. In this context, we included the variable of self-employment in the model, 
denoted by (SE).  
                               
               
           
 
 
                         _______________4.5 
Even though the literature largely lacks a discussion on housing status and its 
implications for the expenditure patterns for developing countries, the model will be 
extended to include this variable. This is done so having in mind that various expenditure 
categories (i.e. durable goods) are expected to have a higher share in cases when the 
household has its own house/apartment. The importance of home ownership is that 
homeowners consider that their most valuable asset in their household‟s wealth portfolio 
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is their own home. Therefore, the overall wealth of the households is considered to be 
linked to the home ownership (Matha et al., 2014). In developed countries, home 
ownership is expected to be associated with mortgage payments for many households and 
this may lead to a decrease in expenditure shares in the other categories (Ejarque and 
Leth-Petersen, 2009). However, for many developing countries, like Kosovo, the 
mortgage market is not widespread and fully functional, which means that if a household 
indicates they own a house this does not usually imply mortgage payments are being 
made. In this context, the share of expenditure on categories such as current consumption, 
durable goods and education could be expected to increase, being a reflection of the lack 
of expenditure on rent. The home ownership (HO) is included in the model.  
                               
               
           
 
 
              +                 _________4.6 
Remittances, in the context of their effect on household expenditure patterns, are 
presented in the literature with three views (Section 4.2.1). The first considers 
remittances as any other source of income and hence, the household does not behave 
differently in terms of expenditure in the presence of remittances and this is approach 
already modelled by including the log of expenditure. In order to model the other views, 
to capture the effect of remittances, beyond the general effect of expenditure, it is 
necessary to implement interaction terms. Remittances interacted with       using the 
actual reported amounts of remittances would allow to investigate the different effect 
across different levels of remittances, however, an interaction term between remittances 
and logxi would provide results which are not interpretable. Furthermore, transforming 
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remittances into logarithmic form is not possible given that a very large number of 
households receive zero remittances. Another method of capturing the effect of 
remittances is interacting a dummy variable for receiving remittances with logxi and 
hence obtaining the effect of logxi for the households who receive remittances as 
compared to those who do not receive remittances (given that logxi includes the 
expenditure financed by remittances as well as other income sources). Although using the 
dummy variable does not capture the effect of the size of remittances, the dummy 
remittances interacted with logxi provides interpretable results. Including remittances in 
the equation, it takes the following form: 
                               
               
           
 
 
                                                  __________4.7 
where the interaction term between dummy remittances and the logarithm of expenditure 
is represented by the term                 It should be taken clearly into consideration 
that total household expenditure also includes the expenditure from remittances, 
therefore, the effect of the remittances variable is considered as a change to the general 
effect of      . The inclusion of interaction between whether the household receives 
remittances and the      expenditure variable allows investigating the differences across 
households in terms of marginal budget shares and expenditure elasticity between the 
categories of expenditure for the remittance recipient households and their counterparts 
(Castaldo and Reilly, 2007; Zarate-Hayos, 2004).  The expected sign of the interaction 
term depends on which of the three views of the effect of remittances considered in 4.2.1 
applies. 
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A significant contribution of this chapter to the literature on the impact of migration and 
remittances on expenditure patterns is the inclusion of migrant‟s characteristics in the 
model. Such characteristics are entirely neglected by the current empirical literature. The 
hypothesis and the rationale for inclusion are presented along with the variables.  
The role of the migrant in the decision-making process for the expenditure of the 
household, especially in the spending of remittances, may affect the expenditure patterns. 
Migrants may advise the household on the spending of remittances, and hence affect 
households‟ expenditure patterns. Such behaviour of the migrants might be as a result of 
their intentions to return to their own home countries. In this context, migrants may 
advise on how to spend remittances, and if that is the case, this is expected to decrease 
the share of expenditure on current consumption, while it may increase the share of 
durable goods and education expenditure. This may be related to the inheritance 
aspirations of the migrant (i.e. self-interest motives discussed in Chapter III), which is 
also recognized as one of the motivations for sending the remittances. Since the concern 
is with the effect of this variable on the expenditure of remittances, this variable on 
migrants‟ advice to the household for their expenditures will be included in the model 
interacted with remittances.  However, a similar argument applies as above (in relation 
equation 4.7) on the need to interact with expenditure. That is because migrants‟ advice is 
expected to alter how the remittance part of total expenditure (income) is spent. 
Therefore, the interaction between migrants‟ advice is implemented as a three-way 
interaction: 
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              +                                                 
       ______4.8 
where,                   represents the triple interaction term between variables 
dummy remittances (D_rem), expenditure (logxi) and whether the migrant advises (MA) 
the household on the use of remittances. It is expected to have a negative sign on the 
current consumption share and a positive signs for other categories of expenditure. 
Moral hazard in the presence of non-labour income is suggested to exist by Chetty 
(2008). Given that for households remittances represent non-labour income, moral hazard 
is discussed as a potential consequence, especially in terms of the expenditure patterns in 
the presence of remittances, but also in the effect on labour supply. This moral hazard 
behaviour by the households is considered likely given the lack of control mechanisms by 
the migrant on the household expenditure. The lack of control allows the household to 
engage in a behaviour which would result in an expenditure pattern that may increases 
the short-term welfare of the household by spending a higher share on consumption 
goods, in particular on luxury goods. This is because, in most of the cases, there is no 
control mechanism by the migrant on the expenditure of the household. The moral hazard 
arises because of the lack of control mechanism and the variable (FV), which is the 
frequency of migrants‟ visits to the home country, represents a proposed control 
mechanism towards the potential moral hazard behaviour by the household. Remittances 
sending migrants may advise the household on expenditure for certain categories and 
during the visits the migrant may verify whether their advice has been fulfilled. 
Consequently, the higher the frequency of the visits by the migrant to the home country, 
the higher may be the control over the expenditure behaviour of the household. In this 
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context, the frequency of the visits in included in the model and similar to above, it is 
included as a three-way interaction. It is expected to have a negative sign on the current 
consumption share and a positive sign for other categories of expenditure. 
                               
               
           
 
 
              +                                                 
                            ______4.9 
The risk that households face on the sustainability of remittances may also affect their 
expenditure patterns. For example, if migrants‟ legal status in the host country is not 
resolved, the household in the home country perceives the risk that they may face a 
sudden stop of remittances flows. This is because the migrant may involuntarily be 
returned to the home country.
11
 The considerations of the migrants‟ legal status, for the 
case of Kosovo, may have been more important during the 1990s when significant 
number of Kosovans migrated illegally, however, these patterns have changed 
significantly given that today many have obtained citizenships of the destination 
countries and this may not be so applicable. Another type of risk is the gradual decrease 
of remittances which exists as a result of the duration of stay of the migrant in host 
country. This is because, remittances flows towards the home country are expected to 
initially increase with the duration of stay of the migrant in host country, however, this 
increase is at decreasing rate and reaches the peak at some point of time (i.e. there is an 
inverse U-shaped function), and after this point remittances continue to decrease 
(Funkhouser, 1995; Havolli, 2010). In the theory of remittances, this approach is 
                                                          
11
 This is especially emphasized for migrants who have migrated illegally and those who use non-working 
visa permits to work in the informal markets of developed countries. 
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recognized as the link maintenance motive. This means that a migrant may have strong 
links in the first few years of migration and send more remittances, while later this may 
fade as a result of migrants‟ integration in the host country and the new social aspects 
which may characterize the migrant (e.g. marital status, children, work etc.). In 
perceiving this factor, the household may change their expenditure patterns, that is, using 
the remittances towards assets that may ensure long-term welfare such as durable goods 
and education, instead of current consumption in the early years of having a migrant who 
sends remittances (Ameudo-Dorantes and Pozo, 2014). Households expect a decrease of 
remittances after a period of time, e.g. 10 years, and as a consequence start to use them in 
a more productive way. Again years since migration (YSM) is modelled as a three-way 
interaction, including a squared term because of the expected non-linearity, with the signs 
expected to be positive for current consumption and negative for the education and 
durable goods for YSM and the opposite for the squared terms: 
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___________________4.10 
As discussed above, the literature is mostly focused on the changes in expenditure 
patterns on current expenditure, durable goods and education. These categories are also 
of importance in considering implications for economic activity in Kosovo and so are 
investigated in this study. The questionnaire (discussed further below and attached in 
Appendix 4.1) that provides the data on Kosovo for this investigation gives information 
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on the following seven sorts of expenditure: a) food, b) non-food (products such as 
alcohol and everyday household products), c) semi-durable goods (products such as 
clothes and shoes), d) durable goods (home appliances and machinery), e) housing (rent 
and public utilities), f) health (medicine and medical services) and g) education. Groups 
(a), (b) and (c) are included in current consumption, given that these products are 
consumed and used on a daily basis and differ from durable goods in their expected 
lifetime but also typically have a substantially lower price. Such expenses occur on a 
regular basis and as described in the System of National Accounts (SNA, 1993)
12
. Group 
(d) is the separate durable goods category and (g) education. It was decided, following 
the practice in similar studies, to estimate these categories (which cover nearly three 
quarters of expenditure), in addition policy changes have affected expenditure in (e) and 
(f) in recent years in Kosovo, which means that policy recommendations could not be 
made from such estimates.
 13
 Table 4.2 describes these categories.  
 
 
                                                          
12
 The System of the National Accounts is the United Nation‟s recommended manual on setting the 
international standard system to calculate national accounts, which aims to have a comprehensive method 
of providing national accounts in order to be internationally comparable.  
13
 There were structural changes in Housing Utilities (which includes public utilities) when the survey was 
undertaken. For example, the payment of energy, water supply and heating bills during the time when the 
survey was undertaken were at a very low rate and the debts to public companies had reached over 400 
million euros. However, energy distribution was privatized and the collection of bills has substantially 
improved. Furthermore, in recent years there was a debt forgiveness initiative, which from a policy 
perspective may not make the investigation of this category relevant. Similarly, there were substantial 
changes in legislation for public and private hospitals. When the survey was undertaken, the expenditure 
outside of the country could have been more prevalent given that there were not many private hospitals. 
Furthermore, since then expenditure outside of the country has decreased, given that when it is necessary to 
go outside of the country for health treatment, a public fund that covers such expenses has been established 
and covers such expenses. Also, there are other significant policy measures which may make this category 
irrelevant for the study (increased list of public medicine and increased list of services provided by public 
hospitals).  
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    Table 4.2 Description of the Expenditure Categories, dependent variable 
Categories Description of the Categories 
1. Current 
Consumption 
 
2. Durable Goods  
3. Education 
Expenditure 
The share of expenditure on food, non-food products such as 
alcohol, cigarettes, household goods such as clothes, shoes, etc. 
in total household expenditure. 
The share of expenditure on home appliances and machinery and 
similar items in total household expenditure. 
The share of educational expenditure in total household 
expenditure 
 
 Given the review of the literature and the theoretical framework on the household 
expenditure patterns, Table 4.3 presents the expected effect of the variables on the share 
of households‟ expenditure for these three categories of expenditure Table 4.2.  
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Table 4.3 Expected effect of the variables on the share of expenditure for each category 
Variable 
Current 
Consumption 
Durable 
Goods 
Education 
Total household Expenditure (llogx) - + + 
Age of the Household Head (AgeHH) - + + 
Age of the Household Head^2 (AgeHH^2) + - - 
Number of children up to 15 (C15) + - + 
Number of children up to 15) 2 (C15^2) - - + 
Number of adult household members (A) + - + 
Number of adult household members^2 (A)^2 - - + 
Years of Schooling of the Head of the Household - + + 
Gender (G=1 if Female) - + + 
Self-Employed (SE=1 if self-employed) - - - 
Housing Status (HS=1 owner of a house) + + + 
Dummy of remittances*logx (D_rem*logx) ? ? ? 
Migrants Advise on remittances*Rremit* logx  
(D_rem*MA* logx) 
- + + 
Frequency of visits*Rremit* logx (D_rem*FV* Log of Expenditurex) - + + 
Years Since Migration*Rremit* logx (D_rem*YSM* logx) + - - 
Years Since Migration*Rremit*logx (D_rem*YSM* logx)2 - + + 
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The dataset which will be used to examine the impact of remittances on household 
expenditure behaviour was obtained from the 2010 UNDP Kosovo Remittance Survey. 
This dataset was compiled using the face-to-face method of interviews and was based on 
a random selection of households for the population of Kosovo. The sample was stratified 
based on size of the regions, cities and villages. The interviews were conducted with 
4,000 households in the country and given the sample selection procedure it is considered 
to be representative of the country. This dataset contains detailed information on 
households‟ profile, such as size, housing status, education, employment, income, 
expenditure and head of household characteristics.  Moreover, this questionnaire also 
contains detailed information regarding migration and remittances, such as the 
relationship of the household to the migrant, whether the household receives remittances 
or not and the amount of remittances, perceived reasons why migrant sends remittances, 
reasons for migration, frequency of visits by the migrant and a very detailed table which 
presents the share of remittances spent on the seven different categories discussed above. 
The data presented in this chapter are not weighted given the stratification in the survey 
since the primary interest here is in investigating the variables affecting expenditure 
patterns.  
The data from this type of surveys, however, should be treated with caution having in 
mind the problems that may have occurred during the conducting of the survey. Such 
problems include the non-declaration of the households of information which they may 
consider sensitive. Such problems may arise as a result of fear of additional taxation, and 
hence this may lead to under-reporting for instance of income and remittances. However, 
it should be pointed out that there are no taxes applied in Kosovo on remittances and the 
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interviewers during the process described the interviewed as generally positive and 
cooperative with minor refusals to respond by a few interviewees.
14
 In some cases these 
refusals are on the income and expenditure data as they are missing in around 6 percent, 
or 240 observations. Furthermore, the income/expenditure balance is negative for over 35 
percent of the observations, which may indicate that there were cases when the income 
data have been under-reported.
15
 
The data structure for these expenditure categories are a consequence of the question 
used to obtain the information. The question was as follows:  
“Approximately how much did your household spend on average for the last three months 
on each of the following items:” 
The problem that arises from this type of question is that the length of the period the 
question addresses is relatively short and many types of expenditures, especially those 
related to durable goods, may not happen in high frequency over the year. The durable 
goods category is over 40 percent of total expenditure for two observations, while 76.2 
percent of total 3760 observations in this category of expenditure are zeros. This reflects 
the low frequency of durable goods purchases by households and hence for questions of 
this nature a longer time-span may be more appropriate.  A relatively large number of 
observations with zero values results in relatively low mean value for durable goods 
(2.85), while the mean value in the observations with positive values, that is, only the 
                                                          
14
 During the process of interviews, it was clearly stated that the interviewer works for a non-governmental 
organization and that the survey was financed by UNDP.  
15
 In addition to the underreporting of income, previous research suggests that any difference between 
current income and expenditure by the tendency of household to spend based on long-term income rather 
than on current levels (see section 4.4.1). 
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households who spent on durable goods, is 12.0. Table 4.4 presents the descriptive 
statistics for this and the other variables in equation 4.10. 
Over 92 percent of the households interviewed in this survey lived in their own 
house/apartment. The average age of the head of household in this sample is 49 years, 
while only 15 percent of the households are headed by females. On average, the years 
that the head of households attended education are 10.9 years. Around 90 percent of the 
families have family members under the age of 15, while the households who have 
children, the average number is 1.9. Around 13 percent of the head of households in this 
survey are self-employed.  
The figures in Table 4.4 for variables refer to the sample mean values and there are a 
large number of observations where the remittances are zero. The data discussed in this 
paragraph is the values of these variables for households who receive remittances. Over 
16 percent of households in the sample receive remittances; while the average amount of 
the remittances these households receive is 197.5 euros per month. Of the households 
receiving remittances, about 33 percent of them are advised on how to spend them. This 
means that in the total sample, just over 5 percent of households receive advice or 
migrants decide on how remittances are spent. Migrants on average visit Kosovo 1.6 
times a year. The average time since the migrants migrated is 13.7 years, which is the 
period of 1997-8, when the war of Kosovo broke out.  
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Table 4.4 Descriptive Statistics of the Variables           
  Variable Obs Mean 
Std. 
Dev. Min Max 
Dependent 
Variable: 
Expenditure 
share  
Current Consumption 3760 62.92 16.58 6.5 100.0 
Durable Goods 3760 2.85 6.05 0.0 43.9 
Education 3760 7.02 10.28 0.0 70.0 
Independent 
Variables 
Log of Expenditure (logx) 3760 2.51 0.26 1.6 3.6 
Age of the HH 3760 49.11 14.25 18.0 91.0 
Age of the HH^2 3760 2614.17 1447.56 324.0 8281.0 
Children from 6 to 15^2 3760 0.91 1.21 0.0 11.0 
Children from 6 to 15^2 3760 2.28 5.09 0.0 121.0 
Number of Adults  3760 3.89 1.72 1.0 10.0 
Number of Adult^2 3760 18.11 15.93 1.0 100.0 
Years of Schooling of the HH 3760 10.91 3.88 0.0 25.0 
Gender (1= Female)  3760 0.15 0.36 0.0 1.0 
Self-Employed 3760 0.13 0.34 0.0 1.0 
Housing Status (1= Owns House) 3760 0.92 0.27 0.0 1.0 
Remittance*logx 3760 0.42 0.96 0.0 3.2 
Migrants Advise on remittances*Rremit*logx 
(D_rem*MA*logx) 
3760 0.14 0.59 0.0 3.2 
Frequency of visits*Rremit*logx 
(D_rem*FV*logx) 
3760 0.66 1.86 0.0 15.1 
Years Since Migration*Rremit*logx 
(D_rem*YSM*logx) 
3760 5.63 15.15 0.0 120.5 
Years Since Migration*Rremit*logx 
(D_rem*YSM*logx)^2 
3760 261.11 984.04 0.0 14522.7 
Source: UNDP Kosovo Remittance Survey Dataset 2010 
 
131 
 
 
The household expenditure investigations in the literature in most cases use OLS 
estimation. This is the case also with the literature studying the impact of remittances on 
expenditure behaviour. The error term is assumed to be normally distributed and with 
equal variance according to the Classical Normal Linear Regression Model (CNLRM) 
assumptions (Gujarati, 2004). However, given that the dependent variable in the model 
4.10 is share in total expenditure, its values are defined to be between zero and 100 
percent of the total expenditure (that is possibly left and right censored at 0 and 100, 
respectively).    
For some categories of expenditure, estimating the model in 4.10 using OLS may not 
generate fully efficient estimates, though they will still be unbiased and consistent 
(Maddala, 1983; Wooldridge, 2002), because given such definition of the dependent 
variable a considerable number of observations in the expenditure categories may be at 
zero or 100 values. The consequences of estimating the model with OLS in this case is 
that the estimates will be smaller in absolute value compared to maximum likelihood 
estimates (Greene, 2003) because of the negative fitted values. On the other hand, if the 
observations at zero or one hundred are excluded from the sample, important information 
will be lost (Wooldridge, 2006; Maddala, 1988). Therefore, the appropriate method to 
estimate the model in 4.10 is the Tobit corner solution, which assumes a normal 
distribution of the errors because it expresses the observed responses in terms of a latent 
variable where the latent variable satisfies the classical linear model assumptions, it 
therefore assumes that the error term (   ) is normally distributed and homoscedastic 
(equation 4.11).  
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   __________________4.11 
Furthermore, equation (4.12) implies that the observed variable, w=w* when it is zero 
and over positive values,     (Wooldridge, 2006). 
            _______________________4.12 
There is no top/bottom coding, but instead, it is that the dependent variable (wi) has a 
number of observations is at zero and 100 (i.e. some households decide, for example, to 
spend zero percent of their total expenditure on durable goods or education or 100 
percent on current consumption). Therefore, the data are fully observable on a range from 
0 to 100.  
Given the dependent variable (Table 4.2) and its descriptive statistics (Table 4.4), it may 
be necessary to use different estimation methods for different categories of expenditure. 
For instance in this study, as discussed in section 4.3, the share of expenditure on current 
consumption category is not left censored (at zero) but it is always positive (with only 26 
or 0.6 percent of observations censored at 100). However, the data for the share of 
expenditure on durable goods is at zero for 75 percent of observations and the share of 
expenditure on education is zero in 53 percent of the total observations.   
Given the type of the data in each expenditure category, the estimation technique differs:  
1) The share of expenditure on current consumption is estimated using OLS 
because it is always over positive values and has few observations at the top limit. 
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2) The share of expenditure on durable goods is estimated by Tobit because over 
75 percent of the observations are zero.  
3) The share of expenditure on education is estimated by Tobit, given that more 
than half of the observations are zeros.  
4.4  Estimation of Expenditure Categories 
The estimation of the model given in equation 4.10 is the subject of this section. The 
appropriate method will be applied to each expenditure category as discussed in section 
4. 3: OLS will be used for category (I) the share of expenditure on current consumption; 
and Tobit estimation will be used to estimate (II) the share of expenditure on durable 
goods and (III) the share of expenditure on education. Since the estimations are of shares 
in the different categories of expenditure, if the share of one category of expenditure 
increases it decreases in at least one other, but this will not necessarily be reflected in the 
estimates here as they do not include all categories of expenditure, as noted in section 4.3. 
However, a mirroring effect is expected since the categories presented represent a large 
proportion of total household expenditure (73%), thus estimations for the three groups are 
presented together in this section. 
4.4.1 Diagnostic Tests for the Estimated Models and the Specification Search 
The estimation of the equation 4.10 for the first specification, that is, (I) expenditure on 
current consumption is carried out using OLS given that there was no observations at 0 
and few at the upper bound. The estimated model for the Working-Leser specification 
presented in section 4.3 which includes logxi, and also logxi interacted with remittances 
dummy gives diagnostic tests which are problematic. These are given in Table 4.5, in the 
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column denoted model Ia, with the regression estimates in Table 4.7 (appendix 4.2 
provides the printouts).  
Table 4.5 Diagnostic Tests  for share of current consumption     
Model  I a  I b  I c 
Diagnostic test  P-value 
Skewness-Kurtosis test for Normality 
0.000 0.000 0.000 
Breuch Pagan test for Heteroscedasticity 0.000 0.000 0.000 
Ramsey Reset Test for Functional Form  0.000 0.000 0.325 
 
Normality itself is not a major problem having in mind that the dataset used is a large 
sample (that is 3760 observations). Lack of normality may be the result of large outliers 
in the regression, but using the Inner Quartile Range test for outlier identification outside 
the lower than the 25th percentile and above the 75th percentile, it is suggested that there 
are no severe outliers in the regression. 
Table 4.6 Test for Outliers 
 
Ia 
  low High 
inner fences 47.14 78.69 
# mild outliers 37 47 
% mild outliers 0.0098 0.0125 
      
outer fences 35.31 90.53 
# severe outliers 0 0 
% severe outliers 0 0 
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Using the Breusch-Pagan test for heteroscedasticity on specification (Ia) the results reject 
the null hypothesis that error variances are equal. In order to test whether the model has 
been correctly specified, the Ramsey RESET test will be used. This test adds the squares 
of the estimated dependent variable to the regression and is designed to examine possible 
functional form problems. The test suggests that the model is miss-specified. 
Consequently, the model is re-specified by using the level of expenditure (exp) and its 
squared value and the level of remittances and the square term of remittances (using the 
actual level of income, with a squared term allows the use of remittances and squared 
term, whereas using logs this was not possible given the large number of households 
receiving no remittances). Control variables are represented with (xn). 
                 
                              
      
______4.13 
However, with this specification, normality, homoscedasticity and functional form are 
again rejected (Table 4.5, model Ib).  
Generally in consumption studies, expenditure is considered as a better measure for the 
income of the households given that income may be underreported. Moreover, 
expenditure is also suggested to be a better measure of long-term income, given that 
consumption may depend on permanent income. There are some reasons for thinking that 
this applied to our data since about 1/3 of households have a higher level of expenditure 
than income. The data set contains no information on the access to banking and other 
debt options by the households. The higher level of income compared to expenditure may 
be the outcome of income generated by informal economic activity (Dimova et al. 2006). 
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Studies suggest that the informal sector in Kosovo accounts for around 30 percent of the 
economy (Government of Kosovo, 2014), which is not so different to the share of 
households who have reported higher expenditure compared to the income.  The income 
question in the survey asks for the same span of coverage as that of the expenditure 
variable: the average for the last three months, rather than weekly or monthly. Although 
the construction of the question does not fully overcome the argument that it is long-term 
income that is important into determining overall expenditure, it goes part-way there. 
Hence, the income variable was used in place of the expenditure variable, while other 
control variables are represented by (xn). 
                                                 
   _____________4.14 
Similar problems are again identified in this estimation of a non-normal distribution of 
errors and heteroscedasticity (Table 4.5, model Ic). However, the Ramsey RESET test 
provides no evidence that the model is incorrectly specified. As a result, given the 
diagnostic tests presented above, the preferred estimate model is based on equation 4.14 
which uses income as an independent variable, estimated with robust standard errors.   
Given that the new specification, some of the independent variables, those interacted with 
income, have changed. Therefore, in Table 4.7 we presented the descriptive statistics for 
those variables that have changed, while the remaining are the same with those presented 
in Table 4.4.  
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Table 4.7 Descriptive Statistics of the Variables interacted with log of income 
  Variable Obs Mean Std. Dev. Min Max 
Independent 
Variables 
Migrants Advise on 
Remittances*Rremit*logx 
(D_rem*MA*loginc) 
3760 0.1 0.6 0.0 3.2 
Frequency of Visits*Rremit*logx 
(D_rem*FV*loginc) 
3760 0.7 1.9 0.0 15.1 
Years Since Migration*Rremit*loginc 
(D_rem*YSM*loginc) 
3760 5.6 15.1 0.0 120.5 
Years Since Migration*Rremit*logx 
(D_rem*YSM*loginc)2 
3760 261.1 984.0 0.0 14522.7 
Source: UNDP Kosovo Remittance Survey Dataset 2010 
Regarding the specifications (II) the share of expenditure on durable goods and (III) the 
share of expenditure on education, the Tobit corner solution model is used given that all 
the data are observable, but there is clustering at 0 in the dependent variable. However, 
this model does not have well-developed diagnostic tests, but a commonly suggested 
method to evaluate if Tobit is the appropriate method is dividing the estimated coefficient 
(β) with the standard error of the regression (σ) and to compare the results with the Probit 
coefficients (Wooldridge, 2002, 2009). The β/σ is expected to have a similar sign and 
size to the Probit coefficients. For the significant coefficients, in cases when the sign 
changes, this indicates a problem with the Tobit model (Wooldridge, 2002). Appendix 
4.4 and 4.5 presents the β/σ and their comparisons with the Probit coefficients. Both for 
model (II) and (III), the sign and the size of the coefficients are relatively close. There is 
therefore, no indication that this model is inappropriate. The results of the estimated 
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regressions are presented in Table 4.8. Also, in the estimated Tobit regressions of the 
specification with the income variable is used for durable goods and education to keep 
the consistency across models (see Appendix 4.3).  
Given the Tobit estimation for the categories of (II) durable goods and (III) education, 
there are four types of marginal effects which could be reported (Stata, 2011):  
a) The coefficients of the regression, which measure how the latent dependent 
variable changes with respect to the changes in the independent variables, 
b) The Conditional Marginal effects, which measure the change on the dependent 
variable, conditional on being positive, with the changes in the independent 
variables, 
c) The Unconditional Marginal effects, which measure the change in the dependent 
variable (unconditional at any given value) with respect to the changes in the 
independent variables, and 
d) The probability of being „uncensored‟. 
Out of the four different marginal effects presented above, in our case, it is the 
unconditional marginal effects of Tobit that will be emphasised. This is because the data 
set is composed of dependent variables (for durable goods and education) which for a 
non-trivial fraction of the population the value is zero, that is nothing is spent by the 
household,  but for other households the variables take on a wide range of positive values 
(i.e. a corner solution outcome). In this model the latent variable is an artificial construct 
and is not of interest and although it is often referred to a „censored‟ model in the 
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literature this terminology is not really appropriate (Wooldridge, 2002). This differs from 
the case where the variable values are censored, for instance where there is top coding, 
where the latent variable is of interest. The other 3 marginal effects (b), (c) and (d) do 
apply in this case,  but the main concern is whether any of the independent variables is 
affecting the share of expenditure overall and for this it is necessary to interpret the 
unconditional marginal effects as they consider the change in expenditure for the entire 
range. Using conditional marginal effects the interpretation would be only for the part of 
the range of responses which are over positive values, while (d) is the marginal effect 
only on those with zero expenditure.  Through the unconditional marginal effects, 
presented in Table 4.8, it will be possible to identify specifically the impact of 
independent variables on the dependent variable for any given value (the other marginal 
effects are presented in appendix 4.3 for completeness).  
4.5  Interpretation of the results  
Table 4.8 gives the results for current consumption for all three models (Ia, Ib and Ic) 
discussed above. The model presented in column (Ic) will be interpreted in detail given 
the diagnostic tests discussed in section 4.4. However, it should be noted that in most 
cases the signs and significance of the variables is the same in all three specifications (for 
the variables included in the same form in all three specifications the only difference is 
that the education of the head of the household is insignificant in the third model, though 
with the same sign). Table 4.9 gives the results (the unconditional marginal effects) for 
models II and III.
16
 
                                                          
16
 Appendix 4.2 to 4.5 presents details of the diagnostic tests and also the output of estimation 
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The interpretation will be variable by variable, across the three different models (i.e. 
interpreting the impact of each independent variable on each of the three categories). This 
makes the interpretation easier to follow, having in mind that variables are usually 
expected to have a mirroring effect from one category to the other (as discussed in 
section 4.2). All the interpretation is ceteris paribus and on average.  Given the major 
concern is with the effect of remittances the interpretation starts with the variables that 
estimate the changes in expenditure connected to receiving remittances.  
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Table 4.8 The estimated regression on consumption as a share of total expenditure 
  OLS (Ia) OLS (Ib) OLS (Ic) 
VARIABLES Consumption Consumption Consumption 
 
Log of Expenditure (logx) -4.98*** 
    (0.000)     
Expenditure   -0.0359***   
    (0.000)   
Expenditure^2   6.72e-06***   
    (0.000)   
Log of Income (loginc)     -1.062*** 
      (0.008) 
Age of the HH -0.346*** -0.348*** -0.456*** 
  (0.002) (0.001) (0.000) 
Age of the HH^2 0.003** 0.003*** 0.00365*** 
  (0.012) (0.008) (0.002) 
Number of Children 1.770*** 1.675*** 1.655*** 
  (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Number of Children^2 -0.025 -0.00708 -0.0263 
  (0.759) (0.970) (0.794) 
Number of Adults 1.063* 0.708 -0.590 
  (0.067) (0.215) (0.310) 
Number of Adults^2 0.023 0.059 0.0973 
  (0.705) (0.336) (0.113) 
Years of Schooling of the HH 0.284*** 0.248*** 0.0856 
  (0.000) (0.002) (0.325) 
Gender (1=Female) 2.480*** 2.221*** 2.610*** 
  (0.000) (0.001) (0.000) 
Housing Status (1=Owns a House) 3.968*** 3.837*** 3.545*** 
  (0.000) (0.000) (0.001) 
Self-Employed -1.498* -1.501* 0.721 
  (0.092) (0.085) (0.426) 
Advise on spending Remit*D_Remit*logx 0. 635***   
  (0.003)   
Advise on spending remit*D_Remit*Expenditure  3.098e-06***  
  (0.699)  
Advise on spending remit*D_Remit*loginc   0.602*** 
   (0.005) 
Frequency of Visits*D_Remit* logx -0.0225**   
  (0.017)   
Frequency of Visits*D_Remit*Expenditure  -3.98e-06**  
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  (0.290)  
Frequency of Visits*D_Remit*loginc   -0.281*** 
   (0.002) 
Expenditure*Remittances   0.00003**   
    (0.034)   
(Expenditure*Remittances)^2   -2.21e-11   
    (0.209)   
Years Since Migration*D_Remit* logx -0.013   
  (0.719)   
Years Since Migration*D_Remit*Expenditure  -6.33e-07  
  (0.599)  
Years Since Migration*D_Remit*loginc   -0.00586 
   (0.863) 
(Years Since Migration*D_Remit*logx)^2  0.0003   
  (0.777)   
(Years Since Migration*D_Remit*Expenditure)^2  2.52e-08  
  (0.396)  
(Years Since Migration*D_Remit*loginc)^2   -2.72e-05 
   (0.863) 
D_Remitt* logx) 0.048     
  (0.134)     
D_Remitt*loginc     0.295 
      (0.352) 
Constant 90.86*** 72.72*** 76.43*** 
  (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
  
      
Observations 3,760 3,760 3,760 
R-squared 0.175 0.175 0.035 
P-Values in parentheses   
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Table 4.9 Tobit Unconditional Marginal Effects 
Variables   Durable Goods Education 
    (II) (III) 
    (dF/dx) (dF/dx) 
Log of Income (loginc)   1.381*** 0.464*** 
    (0.000) (0.003) 
Age of the HH   0.132*** 0.211*** 
    (0.001) (0.000) 
Age of the HH^2   -0.001*** -0.003*** 
    (0.002) (0.000) 
Number of Children   -0.420** 0.331* 
    (0.017) (0.075) 
Number of Children^2   0.011 -0.043 
    (0.816) (0.314) 
Number of Adults   0.042 2.47*** 
    (0.845) (0.000) 
Number of Adults^2   -0.015 -0.167*** 
    (0.491) (0.000) 
Years of Schooling of HH   0.023 0.139*** 
    (0.413) (0.000) 
Gender (1= Females)   -1.390*** -0.381 
    (0.000) (0.235) 
Housing Status (1=Owns a Hose)   2.001*** -1.419*** 
    (0.000) (0.002) 
Self-Employed   -0.546* -2.182*** 
    (0.090) (0.000) 
D_Remitt*loginc)   0.235* -0.222 
    (0.038) (0.139) 
aFrequency of Visits*D_Remit*loginc   -0.042 0.105** 
    (0.241) (0.014) 
aAdvise on spending Remitt*D_Remit*loginc -0.071 0.054 
 
  (0.362) (0.583) 
Years Since Migration*D_Remit*loginc   -0.018 0.0116 
    (0.132) (0.485) 
(Years Since Migration*D_Remit*loginc)^2  
  
0.000 -0.0001 
  (0.100) (0.836) 
Constant   -15.6*** -38.5*** 
    (0.000) (0.000) 
Observations   3,760 3,760 
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The Estimated Effects of Remittances 
Remittances interacted with log (income) 
Remittances interacted with the log of income captures the effect of receiving remittances 
on expenditure above the general effect of an increase in a household‟s income.  
Remittances interacted with the log of income is statistically insignificant in the 
estimations for the share of expenditure on current consumption, implying that with 
regard to the share of expenditure on consumption, there is no difference between the 
expenditure of households who receive remittances and the expenditure those who do not 
receive remittances, suggesting that remittances are treated as other sources of income. 
However, at the 10% significance level there is difference for durable goods expenditure. 
With regard to expenditure on durable goods, an increase of one percent in income of the 
remittance recipient households increases the share of expenditure on durable goods by 
an additional 0.0024 percentage points compared to non-remittance holders. The results 
above suggest that remittance recipient households spend their income in the same way 
as non-remittance households with respect to consumption and education, though there 
may be a slight difference for durable goods, albeit the results show a very small effect.  
Given other things being constant, the estimates in this section are for the effect of 
becoming a remittance receiving household compared to a household not receiving 
remittances.  It assumes that there is no change in the household receiving advice, in the 
number of visits from the migrant or in the years since migration.  The effect of changes 
in these variables for remittance receiving households is in addition to the changes above 
and considered in the following three paragraphs.  
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Migrants’ Advise on Expenditure 
As explained in the theoretical section 4.3, the behaviour of the migrant towards the 
household may affect the households‟ decision-making process about the types of 
expenditure. In addition to allowing the effect of income (expenditure) on the shares to be 
moderated by receiving remittances, this was also modelled to allow different effects if 
the migrant has given advice on spending. The results provide evidence which is contrary 
to our expectations, suggesting that if the migrant advises the household on how to spend 
remittances, the effect of a one percent increase in income is an increase by 0.006 
percentage points in the share of consumption expenditure, compared to households 
receiving remittances but not getting advice. The estimated additional effect for these 
households is not significant for shares of education and durable goods.   It would have 
been expected that migrants would advise to spend on durable goods or education if they 
are driven by self-interest motives such as exchange of services, investment or 
inheritance seeking motives, but the variable is insignificant in these regressions. 
However, given that the advice is resulting in a higher share spent on consumption 
expenditure, it may be argued that altruism is the primary reason why migrants send 
remittances.  
Frequency of Visits 
The frequency of visits, which was proposed as a control mechanism variable on the 
expenditure of the households who receive remittances, does generate a significant 
positive additional effect on the share of expenditure on education. The result suggests 
that, as if a remittance sender visits once, the effect of a one percent increase in income is 
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an additional increase of 0.001 percentage points in the share of education expenditure, 
compared to households receiving remittances but not receiving visits. Such results may 
indicate that the frequency of visits may serve as control mechanism on the expenditure 
of recipient households, if we assume that spending on education is desired by the 
migrant. The frequency of visits affects also the current consumption category, 
suggesting that if remittance sender visits the country once this results in a decrease in the 
share of expenditure on current consumption by 0.0028 percentage points with an 
increase of income of by one percent. 
Years since Migration 
The years since migration variable, which was included to see if the households perceive 
the risk of decreasing remittances as a source of income and adjust their expenditure 
patterns, is statistically insignificant across all specifications. 
 
The Estimated Effects of other Variables  
Income  
The income variable is highly significant and this result suggests that one percent 
households‟ income would result in 0.011 percentage points decrease of the share of 
expenditure on consumption goods to total expenditure. The results of the variable are in 
line with the literature, as in most empirical studies an increase in income (often proxied 
by expenditure) suggests a decrease in the share of expenditure for consumer goods 
(Adams et al., 2008, Castaldo and Reilly, 2007; Guzman et al., 2007; Miotti et al., 2010; 
Taylor and Mora, 2006). A similar increase in income increases the share of expenditure 
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on durable goods and education by 0.014 and 0.0046 percentage points, respectively. 
These estimates are also highly significant however, the magnitude is relatively low. 
Given the interaction dummy between the natural logarithm of income and receiving 
remittances in the specifications, these estimates are for those not receiving remittances 
(but as discussed above the interaction variable is insignificant for consumption goods 
and education). 
Age and Age-Squared 
The estimated effect of the age of the head of household and expenditure on consumer 
goods is a non-linear relationship, such that as the age of the head of household increases, 
the expenditure on consumer goods decreases, but at decreasing rate, given by the 
positive sign of the age squared. Both the linear and squared values are highly significant 
at 1 percent level. The share of expenditure on consumption goods decreases as the age of 
the head of household increases until the age of 63
17
, then it starts to increase. Such 
relationship between age and expenditure on consumption goods could be as a result of 
entrepreneurial behaviour of the head of households while at younger age and as 
hypothesised in section 4.3. In addition, given that the share of consumption continuously 
decreases until the age of 62, this could also reflect the attitude towards savings for 
retirement given that the pension system in Kosovo was dysfunctional until 2002, with 
contributions which existed before 1999 having been transferred to Serbia during the War 
                                                          
17
 The turning point is calculated by:  
    
  
   
 
Where,    represents the absolute value of the Age coefficient and    represents the absolute value of the 
Age-Squared coefficient. 
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of Kosovo and not returned to their owners. Also, the first pillar pension system which 
exists in Kosovo is very low, and as a consequence a relatively large number of 
employees in Kosovo may aim to save on their own for retirement.
18
 Regarding durable 
goods and education, the age of the head of household is statistically significant at 1 
percent. The effect of age on the share of durable goods expenditure is an inverse U-
shaped relationship, suggesting that the share of expenditure on durable goods increases 
until approximately at the age 51, and after that starts to decrease. The results for the 
relationship between age and education expenditure share similarly suggests an inverse 
U-shaped function with it increasing until a peak at the age of 39 and then decreasing, as 
indicated by the squared term of age.   
Number of Children 
The share of expenditure on current consumption goods is also estimated to be 
significantly positively affected by the number of the children below the age of 15 in the 
household. However, the effect of the square variable is insignificant, suggesting that this 
relationship is linear. As the number of children increases by one, the share of 
expenditure on current consumption increases by 1.66 percentage points.
19
 Regarding the 
specifications for the durable goods, the results for the number of children are of 
expected sign and significance, suggesting a negative relationship between number of 
                                                          
18
 Kosovo‟s current pension system is based on three pillars, the first being the pension that government 
pays to all the individuals in Kosovo who are over the age of 65 and is approximately around 15 percent of 
the average salary in Kosovo‟s public sector which is nearly 370 Euros (SAK, 2012). A pay as you go 
system is applicable since 2002 and the contributions in the second pillar to date account for around 15 
percent of the GDP and only around ¼ of the labour force are active contributors to this fund. The third 
pillar represents the voluntary contributions.   
19
 Even though insignificant, taking into account the squared term for the number of children variable, it 
suggests a continuing positive relationship which reaches the turning point at 29 children, being far higher 
than the maximum number of children in our sample, which is 11.  
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children and the share of expenditure on durable goods. The squared term is insignificant. 
The results suggest that, on average, as the number of children increases, the share of 
current expenditure on durable goods decreases by 0.4 percentage points. Importantly, the 
number of children suggests a positive relationship towards the share of expenditure on 
education, although this is only significant at the 10% level. When keeping other 
variables constant, the number of children results in higher share of expenditure on 
education by 0.33 percentage points. The squared term of the variable for the number of 
children is statistically insignificant with a negative sign.  
Number of Adults 
The effect of the number of adult household members is statistically insignificant 
regarding the share of current consumption. For adult household members consumption 
patterns may be characterized by some returns to scale. Moreover, as Nielson (1988) 
argues, the higher number of household members may result in increasing returns in 
production, while this may add little or nothing to the cost of cooking meals. A larger 
household could also decrease the overall cost of consumption by using bulk purchases 
and focusing on discounts, therefore, with little extra cost to the total (Nielson, 1988; 
Lazear and Micheal, 1980). For the category of durable goods, the number of adult 
household members result is as expected, statistically insignificant. This result suggests 
that as the number of adult household members‟ increases, the share of durable goods 
does not change. These results make sense given that a household may not need, for 
example, more refrigerators, cars or TV-s if the number of adult household members 
increases, keeping the other variables constant. However, regarding the impact of the 
number of adult household members on the share of expenditure on education, both the 
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single (positive) and squared (negative) terms are significant. The share of expenditure on 
education is estimated to increases until the number of adults in the household reaches 
7.4.  
Education of the head of household 
The education of the head of household is statistically insignificant regarding the effect 
on the share of expenditure on current consumption and durable goods.
20
 However, 
regarding the share of expenditure on education, the results are in line with expectations. 
Keeping other variables at their mean value, the results suggest that, an additional year 
spent in education by the head of household results in an increase of 0.14 percentage 
points in the share of expenditure on education. This variable indicates that more 
educated households increase their share of expenditure on education and view it as an 
important human capital; they may consider education as a valuable expenditure category 
which may affect the long-term well-being of household members. 
 Gender of the head of household 
Gender of the head of household is also important in expenditure patterns. The results 
suggest that female headed households spend a higher share of total expenditure on the 
current consumption goods category by 2.6 percentage points (significant at 1 percent 
level). On the other hand, female headed households spend lower share on durable goods 
(by 1.4 percentage points). Regarding education expenditure, the gender of the head of 
household is statistically insignificant.  
                                                          
20
 It should be pointed out that education of the head of household was highly significant in the 
specifications when the expenditure was used as a proxy of income for the share of current consumption 
expenditure model. However, when the income variable was included in the final model, this variable is not 
significant.  
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Housing Status 
Among the most important variables in the share of expenditure across the three 
categories investigated in this chapter is the housing status of the household. If the 
households own the house/apartment they live in, their share of expenditure on current 
consumption increases by 3.5 percentage points. Owning their house/apartment increases 
the share of expenditure on durable goods by 2 percentage points. The relationship is the 
opposite when considered the share of expenditure on education. If the household owns 
the house, the share of expenditure on education decreases by 1.4 percentage points. The 
literature lacks a discussion about this variable; however, this variable appears to be of 
importance in Kosovo and this may also apply to other countries since it may shape 
expenditure patterns. For example, if the house is not owned, the household would be 
expected to pay rent, hence allowing a lower share for expenditure across other 
categories. If the household is renting the house/apartment, then it is likely that they will 
spend less on durable goods given that they may be temporarily living in the rented 
house/apartment and hence they are not willing to invest in durable goods for 
houses/apartments they do not own.  
Self-Employment of the Head of Household 
The variable taking into account if the head of household is self-employed is statistically 
insignificant for the category of expenditure on current consumption, while it is 
significant at 10 percent, with regard to durable goods. This variable indicates that self-
employed head of households spend less on durable goods by 0.5 percentage points. This 
variable is highly significant for the category of the share of expenditure on education. 
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The results suggest that the share of expenditure on education decreases by 2.2 
percentage points. Two interpretations could be applicable to this variable, first, that self-
employed face higher income risks, hence they decrease the share of expenditure on 
durable goods and education and increase their savings. Second, this could be a result of 
small business focusing on further investing in physical investment rather than household 
goods and human capital. Also, the inheritance practice in Kosovo, which in almost all 
the cases is characterized by transfer of the business and real estate to the children, may 
result in self-employed head of households expending less on formal education for the 
children, being more focused on the practice of running the small business.   
Estimations for Remittance Recipient Households 
The specification above allowed the expenditure patterns of remittance receiving 
households to be distinguished from other households. However it assumes that the 
effects of the non-remittance related variables are the same for both types of household. 
Given the prominence of the effect of remittances in the research, in order to explore as 
much as possible the implication of remittances for expenditure patterns, estimates for 
remittance recipient households only are estimated.   
Apart from the exclusion of the remittance dummy variable, the same variables were 
included and the same diagnostic tests are applied (Appendix 4.5.3). The specification 
used in (Ic), excluding the interaction term between dummy of remittances and income, 
again was supported by the Ramsey RESET test (Appendix 4.5.3). However, using the 
sub-sample of household remittance recipients (total 610 observations), many variables 
are statistically insignificant, though the sign largely remains similar to the total sample 
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estimates. Given that all households in the sample receive remittances, the interpretation 
starts from the variables of particular interest, those connected to remittances.  
Migrants’ Advise on Expenditure 
The results suggest that the role of migrant in the expenditure decision-making process of 
expenditure for households is statistically significant for the category consumption, 
results which are consistent with those presented in Table 4.8 for the total sample though 
the sign is again contrary to the expectations. The results suggest that if migrant advises 
the remittance recipient household on how to spend remittances, the effect of one percent 
increase in income, increases the share of expenditure on consumption by 0.005 
percentage points. The results are also consistent with that of the total sample with regard 
to the share of expenditure on durable goods and education, giving a statistically 
insignificant effect of income increase in the presence of advise on how to spend 
remittances.   
Frequency of Visits  
The results for the variable taking into account the frequency of visits are also consistent 
with those presented in Table 4.8. This variable suggest that an if a remittance sender 
visits the home country once, the effect of a one percent increase in income is an 
additional increase of 0.0008 percentage points in the share of education expenditure, 
compared to households receiving remittances but not receiving visits; suggesting that the 
presence of the migrant may act as a control mechanism (assuming that education 
expenditure is desired by the migrant). The frequency of visits also affects the current 
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consumption category, suggesting that if the remittance sender visits the home country, as 
income increases by one percent, current consumption drops by 0.0028 percentage points. 
Years since Migration 
The variable taking into account the duration of stay in migration, as a potential indicator 
for the risk of remittances decreasing is statistically insignificant across all specifications.  
Income 
The income variable is statistically insignificant for the share of current consumption 
category for the sub-sample of households who receive remittances. This suggests that 
the change of income level for remittance recipient households does not change the share 
of expenditure on consumption. However, the results are highly significant with regard to 
the expenditure on durable goods, suggesting that a one percent increase in income 
increases the expenditure on durable goods by 0.15 percentage points. With regard to 
education, a one percent increase in income results in an increased share of expenditure 
on education by 0.006 percentage points. The results of durable goods and education are 
consistent with those presented in Table 4.9 in terms of significance, signs and also 
magnitude.  
Age and Age-Squared 
The estimated effect of the age of the head of the household does not suggest any 
significant effect across the three specifications, while the age square is only significant 
with regard to expenditure on education suggesting negative relationship with 
expenditure on education, although the effect is relatively small.  
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Table 4.10 The estimated regression on consumption as a share of total expenditure for 
remittance recipient households 
  OLS  Tobit Tobit 
VARIABLES Consumption Durable Goods Education 
        
Log of Income (loginc) -0.653 1.15*** 0.617** 
  (0.388) (0.000) (0.011) 
Age of the HH -0.331 0.0549 0.1476 
  (0.240) (0.447) (0.219) 
Age of the HH^2 0.003 -0.0011 -0.002** 
  (0.254) (0.131) (0.025) 
Number of Children 3.353*** -0.1076 -0.5005 
  (0.000) (0.741) (0.150) 
Number of Children^2 -0.03*** -0.0591 0.0517 
  (0.001) (0.507) (0.425) 
Number of Adults 0.6998 0.8330** 1.97*** 
  (0.589) (0.025) (0.001) 
Number of Adults^2 -0.0636 -0.068** -0.14** 
  (0.611) (0.052) (0.012) 
Years of Schooling of HH -0.0982 -0.14*** -0.0834 
  (0.609) (0.003) (0.300) 
Gender (1=Female) -1.813 -1.18*** 1.1055 
  (0.306) (0.003) (0.139) 
Housing Status (1=Owns a House) 1.491 1.91*** 0.0685 
  (0.519) (0.000) (0.941) 
Self-Employed -0.070 0.2503 -2.39*** 
  (0.969) (0.615) (0.001) 
Advise on Remitt.*loginc 0.5487** -0.0784 0.0332 
  (0.013) (0.170) (0.724) 
Frequency of Visits *loginc -0.2314 -0.0226 0.08** 
  (0.015)** (0.386) (0.040) 
Years Since Migration -0.0123 -0.0098 0.0149 
  (0.735) (0.276) (0.342) 
Years Since Migration^2 -0.0001 0.0002 -0.0002 
  (0.924) (0.419) (0.647) 
Constant 72.42***     
  (0.000)     
        
Observations 610 610 610 
R-squared 0.069     
P-Values in parentheses   
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, *p<0.1   
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Number of Children 
The number of children in the household is suggested to have positive and significant 
relationship on current consumption. Also, the squared term for the variable taking into 
account the number of children squared is statistically significant, indicating a non-linear 
relationship. However, the calculated turning point of expenditure is so high that it never 
reaches it given that within our sample, the maximum number of children is 11, while the 
results suggest that the turning point is when the number of children reaches 55! With 
regard to expenditure on durable goods and education, the results are statistically 
insignificant.  
Number of Adults  
Similar to the results presented in Table 4.8, the number of adults is statistically 
insignificant with regard to the current consumption category and similar arguments as in 
the previous section could be used, either, suggesting some returns to scale or increased 
returns as a result of increased production and hence keeping the shares unchanged. 
However, contrary to the results for total sample presented in the previous section, the 
effect of the number of adults in the household on expenditure for durable goods is 
positive and with non-linear relationship as indicated by the squared term of the variable, 
suggesting that the turning point is reached when the number of adults reaches 6 persons, 
the share on durable goods expenditure starts to decrease. Similar are the results with 
regard to the expenditure on education as they indicate that the number of adults in the 
household increase the share of expenditure on education until the household reaches 7 
adult household members (for total sample, the similar result was 7.4).  
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Education of the head of household 
The effect of education on the share of consumption is statistically insignificant as found 
for the full sample. However, regarding the share of expenditure on education, the results 
are statistically insignificant. However, the education variable has statistically significant 
effect on the share of expenditure on durable goods, by decreasing them by 0.0014 
percentage points if head of households‟ education is higher by one year.  
Gender of the head of household 
Gender is statistically significant with regard to the share of expenditure on durable 
goods, decreasing the expenditure by 1.8 percentage points when the household is headed 
by female, however, for the other two categories the estimates are statistically 
insignificant.   
Housing Status 
Similar to the estimates using the full sample, this variable is important when considering 
only the remittance recipient households‟ share of expenditure on durable goods. Owning 
their house/apartment increases the share of expenditure on durable goods by 1.9 
percentage points. With regard to the other two categories, the results are statistically 
insignificant.  
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Self-Employment of the Head of Household 
Self-employment is statistically insignificant with regard to the share of current 
consumption and durable goods. While for the education category, it is statistically 
significant and negative, similar to the results presented in Table 4.9. The results estimate 
that when the head of household is self-employed the share of expenditure on education 
decreases by 2.4 percentage points.  
4.6 Conclusions 
 
In this chapter, the Working-Lesser model has been applied to estimate the impact of 
remittances on households‟ expenditure patterns in Kosovo. In order to investigate the 
expenditure patterns, we estimated the regressions for three different categories, that is, 
1) share of expenditure on current consumption, 2) share of expenditure on durable goods 
and 3) share of expenditure on education. Given the specificities in the data, that is, the 
all positive numbers in current consumption variable and the presence of a considerable 
number of zero values in the durable goods and education categories, two different 
estimation methods have been used, that is OLS and Tobit. Since it is often suggested in 
the literature, expenditure was initially used as a proxy for income. This is because 
income is often underreported, but also, expenditure often depends on long-term 
expectations for income and borrowing. However, diagnostic tests suggested that the 
model specification was not appropriate using expenditure. Consequently, income was 
used for this estimation, though the results of the model using expenditure have been 
included as a robustness check.  
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Regarding the factors affecting the expenditure patterns, the results suggested that the 
effect of the income variable is in line with Working-Lesser model and highly significant, 
suggesting that that as income in the household increases the share of expenditure in 
current consumption decreases. The effect of income is the opposite on the share of 
durable goods and education. The age-current consumption relationship is non-linear 
suggesting a U-shaped function and the lowest point being at the age of 63. The age-
durable expenditure relationship is estimated as inverse U-shaped, the age of 50 being the 
highest point. As for education expenditure, the share of expenditure on this category 
increases until age of 38, after which it decreases. The number of children below the age 
of 15 affects positively the share of expenditure on current consumption and is linear, 
while for durable goods there is a negative effect. The share of education expenditure 
increases as the number of children increases, though; in Kosovo the public education is 
free. The result is that the education of the head of the household positively effects the 
share of expenditure on education. Gender also makes a difference in terms of share to 
each category, given that female headed households spend higher share on current 
consumption and lower on durable goods. Self-employed headed households behave 
differently with regard to the share of expenditure on education with the share decreasing.  
In addition to the standard models used in the literature, in this chapter, the Working-
Leser model has been expanded with new variables which could affect the expenditure 
patterns (in equation 4.6 and further). A widely neglected variable in the literature for 
developing countries is that taking into account the home ownership. This variable is 
estimated to be one of the main factors affecting expenditure patterns. Home ownership 
increases the share of expenditure on current consumption and durable goods, while it 
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decreases the category of education, perhaps reflecting some sort of economic security 
compared to their counterparts.  
The major concern of this chapter is the effect of remittances on expenditure patterns, 
considering whether the presence of remittances gives rise to different behaviour than for 
other sources of income, but also raised hypotheses such as whether the remittances 
recipient households are driven by moral hazard behaviour and whether this could be 
reduced by remitter‟s actions. We included a variable which takes into account whether 
the migrant advises the households on how to spend remittances and considered if the 
frequency of visits of the migrant could serve as control mechanism. The estimates 
suggest that the changes in income of households who receive remittances are spent 
differently compared to non-recipients across expenditure categories.  An increase of 
income for recipient households leads to a higher change in durable goods expenditure. 
An increase in income in the households receiving remittances and getting advice on how 
to spend them, results in an increased share of consumption category, compared to 
remittance receivers who do not receive advice, but does not affect the share of the other 
categories. An increase of income to the households who receive remittances and the 
migrant visits, results in a decreased share of expenditure in current consumption and an 
increased share of expenditure in education, compared to remittance receivers who are 
not visited.   However, years since migration are not found to affect expenditure patterns. 
In order to further investigate the remittances, a separate model was estimated with the 
same definitions, but only for the remittance recipient households. The results are 
generally in line with those presented in the main model, however, with more 
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insignificant variables. For those that are significant the sign and the magnitude are 
generally in line with those for the full sample.  
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5.1 Introduction 
With the growing number of migrants worldwide, the body of the research on migration 
and remittances issues has also increased. However, for the case of Kosovo and transition 
countries, literature is relatively scarce.
21
 In this context, this chapter aims at 
investigating the impact of remittances on the labour market in Kosovo, particularly, their 
impact on the labour supply of individuals. This is because remittances are often 
discussed as one of the main factors driving down the labour force participation for the 
recipient individuals in many countries. However, despite being a frequently discussed 
topic, surprisingly, the implication of remittances on labour supply is not thoroughly 
researched empirically in the literature (Ameudo-Dorantes and Pozo, 2006). Given the 
apparent lack of research, it appears that the debate is based on anecdotal evidence. Such 
discussion seems to have been driven by the viewpoint of the standard neoclassical model 
(section 5.3.1) which posits that an increase of non-labour income decreases the labour 
supply as a result of increased reservation wage and the preference of leisure against 
work by the individuals.  
Despite being a relatively unexplored area, the investigations of labour supply in the 
literature related to migration and remittances uses the standard approach, which is the 
neoclassical labour supply model, i.e. the leisure-work trade-off model. Extending this 
model to include migrants‟ remittances appears to have two main implications. Firstly, 
the non-labour income increases, sometimes substantially, in these models under the 
presence of remittances; and secondly, the remittance recipient households change their 
behaviour in the presence of remittances. The application of the neoclassical model was 
                                                          
21
 Few studies exist for the case of Kosovo and they are mostly descriptive (such as Riinvest, 2006)  
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often perceived to be the appropriate method given that remittances are a form of non-
wage income. In this context, amongst the main studies in the area of remittances and 
labour market are Kim (2007), Ameudo-Dorantes and Pozo (2006), Rodriguez and 
Tiogson (2001), Funkhouser (1992) Acosta (2011), Mendola and Carletto (2012).  For 
Kosovo, the only study found is that of Hoti (2015).   
Alternative models exist in the economics literature, such as the search theory model, 
which is developed on the basis of the neoclassical model, but having as a distinct feature 
the reservation wage and hence the unemployment duration. However, with regard to 
remittances, search models are largely absent in the literature and it appears that the lack 
of data might have driven this outcome. Furthermore,  studies using the segmented labour 
market approach, which differentiates the so-called good jobs, often considered those 
with high salaries and other benefits, and the bad jobs, those with low salaries and often 
undesired, are also absent from the remittance literature. However, similar to the search 
theory, a lack of data seems to be a major problem for the labour markets in developing 
countries, hence, allowing only for the neoclassical model to be implemented.  
In this context of Kosovo, it is only the neoclassical approach and developments from it 
that could be investigated given the lack of data. In this chapter, in addition to the 
investigation of the impact of remittances on labour supply, we make a clear distinction 
in the neoclassical model between the probability of being active and the probability of 
being employed, which often tends to be unclear in the literature. Regarding the other 
models, their application, for example of search theory, may not be as relevant in Kosovo 
compared to the developed countries. This is because Kosovo faces substantial 
constraints in terms of job availability. In this context, many do not participate or work 
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part time because of the lack of opportunity while frictional unemployment or a search 
for better opportunities is of lesser importance.  
Although often considered as one of the most developed theories in economics, the 
labour market changes in the presence of remittances is not vastly researched. For this 
reason, this chapter is initiated with a review of the literature in section 5.2 which 
attempts to identify the approach that literature has used with regard to remittances and 
their implications for the labour market. Section 5.3 is dedicated to the theoretical 
background which describes the neoclassical theory as the standard approach followed by 
a discussion of the alternative theories; that of job search and segmented labour markets. 
Given the review of the literature and the theory, a generic model is proposed for Kosovo 
in section 5.4, which also presents the descriptive statistics and discusses the potential 
endogeneity that could arise from selected variables. Section 5.5 presents the empirical 
results and their interpretation, followed by the concluding remarks in section 5.6.  
5.2 Literature Review on the Labour Force Participation Non-Labour Income 
5.2.1 Remittances effect 
Despite the size of remittances to developing countries, the literature on the possible 
remittance effect on the labour force is not extensive, hence making this one of the less 
explored topics in the migration and remittances literature (Ameudo-Dorantes and Pozo, 
2006). Among the influential works in the topic of remittances and the labour market is 
that of Funkhouser (1992). In analysing the impact of remittances on the labour market in 
the capital city of Nicaragua, Funkhouser (1992) distinguishes between the effect on 
labour force participation and self-employment in Nicaragua. Also, in line with the 
standard models, this study conducts empirical research separately for males and females. 
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The effect of remittances is positive on self-employment, while it is negative on labour 
force participation. The results suggest that a $100 increase in remittances per month 
increases the probability of being self-employed by 1.2 percentage points for males, and 
1.1 percentage points for females. When a similar model was conducted to investigate 
labour force participation, the results suggest that receipt of remittances decreases the 
probability of joining the labour force for both men, by 2.1 percentage points, and 
women, by 5.0 percentage points.  
Rodriguez and Tiongson (2001) investigated the effects of overseas migration on home 
country households for urban areas in the Philippines using 1991 family income and 
expenditure survey data. The model used in this research paper is based on the 
neoclassical approach but with a greater focus on the influence of the family on the 
decision to work, with the consideration that the family is widely considered as a single 
decision-making unit. In this context, Rodriguez and Tiongson (2001) consider three 
influences on labour force participation: 1) the opportunity cost of leisure, 2) non-labour 
income and 3) family preferences. Given the assumption that the family is a single 
decision making unit, the findings are in line with the literature suggesting that the labour 
force participation and hours worked of home country household members decreases in 
the presence of a migrant abroad. In particular, the presence of non-labour income, that is 
remittances, affects negatively labour force participation.  
An explicit reference to neoclassical theory is presented in Ameudo-Dorantes and Pozo 
(2006). This paper is more concerned with the distinction between hours of work and the 
labour force participation, although direct reference to the neoclassical model of the 
work-leisure trade-off is only briefly mentioned in the context of defining remittances as 
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non-labour income. Using the data from the 2002 national of income and expenditure 
survey of households in Mexico, the evidence supports the generally accepted view of the 
effect of remittances on labour market behaviour, suggesting that as remittances increase 
the hours of work per month decrease for both men and women in both urban and rural 
areas. In terms of participation, unlike working hours, their results suggest that 
remittances do not decrease the probability of participating in labour market for men.  
Kim (2007), using 1995 to 2002 pooled data from the Survey of Living Conditions and 
Labour Force Survey for Jamaica finds that remittances have a statistically significant 
effect on labour market participation. The estimate suggests that the effect of remittances 
on labour force participation is negative; however, for households who receive 
remittances but remain in the workforce, the reduction in working hours is insignificant. 
Kim (2007) explains the reduction in labour force participation through changes in the 
reservation wage, suggesting that, when households receive remittances, their reservation 
wage increases, which makes them more likely to stay out of the labour force. The results 
in this study are somewhat different from other studies in terms of hours of work; 
however, no extended explanation on why remittances affect the labour force 
participation but not the hours of work is presented.  
Hanson (2007), using 1990 and 2000 data from the Mexico Census of Population,  
investigates the role of emigration and remittances on the labour force participation of 
home country household for both labour force participation decisions and the hours of 
work. However, different from other research papers, this author tests whether the labour 
supply of the household decreases once they have sent a migrant abroad. The results of 
this investigation suggest that either the presence of remittances or a migrant have similar 
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effect on the labour supply of the home country households. However, a surprising 
finding is that the effect of migration and remittances is higher for males compared to 
females. Their results suggest that males in the presence of a migrant (or remittances) are 
11 percent less likely to supply labour, while females are 2.5 percent less likely. In the 
specification which uses the hours of work, home country individuals in the household 
that have sent a migrant or received remittances supply fewer hours of work.   
Similar to Ameudo-Dorantes and Pozo (2006), the 2012 paper of Justino and Shemyakina 
also briefly mentions the theoretical basis as the neoclassical model of labour-leisure 
choice, referencing Killingsworth (1983). The data used in this study are of Post-Conflict 
Tajikistan, using the 2003 Tajik Living Standards Measurement Survey. Using this brief 
discussion, remittances are included as non-labour income which according to the model, 
should affect labour force participation and the hours worked. The dependent variable is 
the binary labour force participation variable while for investigating the hours worked a 
Tobit model is used. The findings are largely in line with the literature suggesting that the 
presence of remittances decreases the probability of participating in the labour market 
and decreases the hours of work. The results are similar for both men and women.  
Cox-Edwards and Rodriguez-Oreggia (2009), using the neoclassical model of labour 
supply, investigates whether the persistence of remittances affects the labour supply of 
home country households. This study is conducted using the data from the 2002 Mexican 
National Employment Survey. The specific approach of this paper is that it focuses on the 
persistence, rather than sporadic flow of, remittances, using the propensity score 
matching method. Their findings suggest that when individuals in remittance recipient 
households are paired with their non-recipient counterparts, the effect of remittances is 
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statistically insignificant across all specifications, except for females in urban areas who 
have a higher participation rate, given that the urban regions are commonly known to 
have lower migration and remittances levels.    
Airola (2008) investigates the response of the labour supply of the home country head of 
the household to remittances for the case of Mexico using the 2004 Household Income 
and Expenditure Data. This unitary model approach used in this case assumes that the 
head of the household represents the decision maker rather than the different individual 
preferences of household members. Their study uses only hours of work as the dependent 
variable and the results suggest that the head of the household reduces the hours of work 
in the presence of remittances, and for females, the negative effect of remittances on 
labour supply is higher.  
Acosta (2011), for El Salvador using the data from Household Survey for Multiple 
Purposes of 1998, investigates the effect of remittances on child, adult female and adult 
male labour supply. Specifically addressing the likelihood of children between the age of 
11 and 17 working, the findings suggest that the flow of remittances has a negative 
impact on child work by 2.8 percentage points, though when other variables are included 
such as household wealth, this effect is estimated to be smaller, suggesting a negative 
effect on child labour by 1.5 and 1.6 percentage points. The findings for adults suggest 
that remittances decrease the probability of participation for adult females, while the 
results are statistically insignificant for adult males.   
Considering research on the implication of remittances in the labour markets of the 
Balkan region, Dermendzheiva (2010) investigates the case of Albania. This study uses 
170 
 
the Living Standard Measurement Survey of 2005. The findings suggest that the effect of 
remittances on labour force participation is significant and negative for males and also, 
when considered separately, for males between the ages of 46 and 60, but for females the 
results are statistically insignificant.  
Furthermore, Mendola and Carletto (2012) in their study for Albania undertake extensive 
research on various specifications that investigate the implications of migration related 
characteristics to labour force participation using Living Standard Measurment Survey of 
2005. They use three different dummy variables taking into account if the household has 
migrants abroad, past experiences of the household with migration and past personal or 
individual experience with migration, and consider the effect on labour force 
participation and working hours for females and males. This study finds that, for females, 
having a household member who is a migrant (as an approximation for remittances) 
lowers the probability of working for a paid salary, but increases the probability of being 
self-employed or working in farm or non-farm activities. For males, having a family 
member who is a migrant does not have a significant effect on participation and on hours 
of work.  
The study of Hoti (2015) on the supply of labour for Kosovo indirectly addresses the 
effect of remittances by using the variable „if household has a member abroad‟ as a 
proxy. This study uses the Riinvest Household and Labour Force Survey of 2002.  The 
evidence found in this study is from two specifications. The first, having the variable of 
the presence of migrant abroad (as a proxy for remittances) suggests that there is a 
relatively small negative effect (of 0.007 percentage points), but significant, on a migrant 
abroad on the female labour supply, while for males the effect is statistically 
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insignificant. When the presence of migrants abroad from the household are interacted 
with a dummy representing urban areas, the estimated effect is significant and positive 
for males, but is insignificant for females. Additionally, other sources of non-labour 
income per capita in Kosovo do not reduce the labour supply for males and females 
across the various specifications.  
Overall the literature tends to find, particularly for females, that remittances, as a non-
wage source of income, reduce the labour supply. However, there are studies where the 
effect is insignificant and in a few cases, a positive effect is found.  
5.2.2 Other forms of non-wage income and their effects 
Remittances have often been compared and considered similar to the other forms of non-
wage income (Ameudo-Dorantes and Pozo, 2006; Cox-Edwards and Rodriguez-Oreggia, 
2009; Justino and Shemyakina, 2012; Emilsson, 2011). In light of this, a brief review of 
the literature with regard to the welfare programmes is also presented. The theoretical 
background in the studies referred to in 5.2.1 (in as much as it is specified) and that used 
in the investigation in section 5.4, is built on the basis of non-wage income effects rather 
than remittances specifically.  
With the increase of application of various welfare programmes and transfers to 
unemployed individuals and females with dependent children, the issue of such transfers 
became a topic of interest for policy-makers in order to evaluate the effect of non-wage 
income the labour supply (Moffitt, 2002). The findings in the literature reviewed by 
Moffitt (2002) with regard to the impact of welfare programs and labour supply, show 
that generally transfers decrease the labour supply. Furthermore, Moffitt (2002) presents 
172 
 
a summary of the findings of the Hoynes (1996) paper which found that guarantees 
reduces the labour supply for single mothers as does the aid to the families with 
dependent children. For food stamps, it is observed that they have small effect, but it is 
still negative for married couples (Hangstrom, 1996). Meyer and Rosenbaun (2001) 
similarly find that unemployment insurance reduces the employment probability for 
single mothers, while a decrease in taxes increases the probability of being employed.  
A similar review is also presented in Blundell and MaCurdy (1999) and they summarize 
that various authors have found a negative impact of non-wage income on labour force 
participation. Chetty (2008) findings suggest that unemployment insurance in the US 
affects search behaviour through the liquidity effect. This suggests that such measures are 
likely to increase the unemployment duration much more for liquidity constrained 
individuals compared to other unemployed individuals. Similar to the studies on 
remittances, the literature for the transition countries is scarce with regard to the effect on 
the labour force participation decision of non-wage income. Bicakova et al. (2008) 
investigate the labour supply using the Czech household income survey data of 2002. 
This study finds that non-labour income reduces labour force participation with a one 
percent increase in non-labour income decreasing the probability of being employed by 
0.4 percent for both men and women.   
5.3 Theoretical Background 
The models explaining the labour force participation (LFP) are largely based on 
neoclassical theory. The approach in the empirical literature has been that the theory has 
been extended with various factors that could affect the participation in the labour 
market. Such factors included households‟ characteristics such as investment in 
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education, gender differences and decision to have and to invest in children‟s education. 
This section starts with discussing the neoclassical approach.  It then goes on to discuss 
search theory, which developed from neoclassical analysis, recognising imperfect and 
costly knowledge about employment opportunities, and then segmented labour market 
theory.    
5.3.1 Neoclassical Theory  
Neoclassical theory, being the starting point for LFP analysis, considers leisure as a 
normal good and suggests that the utility function for individuals is dependent on the 
leisure-work trade-off. The market wage (w) gives the slope of the budget constraint and 
if the benefits of working exceed the cost in terms of lost leisure individuals will 
participate in the labour market. Given that leisure is considered as a normal good, the 
following function for the utility, subject to the budget constraint and time constraint, is 
presented: 
Max U = U(x, l | A, ɛ) subject to T=l+h and x=wh ___________5.1 
Where (U) represents the utility of the individual dependent on consumption (x) and the 
hours of leisure (l) and (A) personal observable characteristics which may indicate 
aspirations, while the unobservable characteristics such as tastes or home production is 
represented by the error term (ɛ).  (T) is the total time available, equal to leisure (l) and 
hours of work (h) and the goods consumed or income (x) subject to working hours (h) 
and the wage rate (w) (Mincer, 1962; Blundell and MaCurdy, 1999; Rodriguez and 
Tingson, 2001). 
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     Figure 5.1 Individual Labour Supply 
  
Given the budget constraint in Figure 5.1, which assumes zero non-wage income, the 
optimum solution of the individual would be the point where the indifference curve is 
tangent with the budget constraint line and as a consequence, the individual „consumes‟ 
in the case above 10 hours of leisure and 14 hours of work. The optimum point will differ 
between individuals given slope of their indifference curve but must give participation in 
the labour market (given the shape of the indifference curve and that consumption would 
be zero with no participation).  A decrease in the market wage gives a positive 
substitution effect of leisure for commodities while the increase in the market wage for an 
individual makes leisure more expensive. In cases of an increase in the wage rate, the 
individual may substitute leisure for work because of higher opportunity costs which 
would shift the budget constraint upwards giving more working hours and less leisure. 
However, such behaviour would be different in cases where the income effect is greater 
that the substitution effect. In these cases, the individual is assumed to reach a point 
where the marginal utility of leisure is higher than the marginal utility of income and if 
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the income effect outweighs the substitution effect, then it makes the labour supply curve 
backward bending.  
The outcome may change from Figure 5.1 if the individual also has non-wage income 
(from, for instance, remittances and pensions) which would change the budget constraint 
line (which now becomes x=r+wh, where r is non-wage income). The budget constraint 
is kinked at zero hours of work (24 hours of leisure) in Figure 5.2.  This Figure illustrates 
the particular outcome where the individual decides not to participate in the labour force. 
This corner solution is more likely for persons who face a low wage rate, which makes 
the slope of the budget line shallow and thus more likely to touch the highest achievable 
indifference curve at zero hours of work. It is considered that the reservation wage 
increases in such situation. Consequently, marginal changes in the real wage may not 
affect the choice of the individual whose non-wage income is substantial (Pencavel, 
1987).   
Figure 5.2 Individual Labour Supply with non-wage income 
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So far the theory considers the hours of work, including a corner solution with zero 
hours.  The models in figure 5.1 and 5.2 both assume that choice over hours of work in 
the economy is available.  However, in the case of Kosovo the majority of the part-time 
working individuals do so because of the unavailability of full-time jobs, while the great 
majority of employed have full-time contracts (see section 2.3.2).  
Several theoretical models have been developed and the mainly differ by the unit of 
analysis: the household or the individual. The standard unitary model treats the household 
as a single decision making body (Blundell and MaCurdy, 1999). Given the assumption 
that the individual utility can be also represented at household level, for example as a 
result of income pooling, a common approach in the literature is to consider that the same 
principles can be assumed for household level analysis as for the individual (Mincer, 
1962). The main assumption in this context is that the household members maximize a 
joint utility function and through this, the household is considered as a single headed 
nucleus, with choices and preferences being collective (Rodriguez and Tingson, 2001). 
However, an alternative theoretical framework, known as the collective model, is 
oriented towards the identification of the effect of individual preferences on collective 
choices (Alderman et al. 1995). The collective utility and budget constraint models are in 
many respects similar to the unitary models, with the difference being in most of the 
cases only in the decision-making rules (Mattila-Wiro, 1999). In this context, there are 
two widely discussed models of intra-household behaviour models, namely, the efficient 
cooperative models and the bargaining models. The efficient cooperative models view 
household decisions as efficient, however, where a gain of one household member over 
the cost to the other member is based on agreed sharing rule.  
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The bargaining models are those developed in the manner of the game theoretic 
approach. In these models individuals within the household cooperate in order to improve 
the position compared to the situation where these individuals do not cooperate. It must 
be noted that both the efficient cooperation and bargaining models allow for individual 
utility functions and individual budget constraints. However, in most of the cases and 
especially for developing countries, the application of such models in applied work is not 
possible given the lack of detailed data on the decision-making process and the intra-
household behaviour (Mattila-Wiro, 1999). Consequently, the collective view models are 
identical to the unitary models, with the only difference being on the assumption that 
different decision making rules are implemented in the collective view. In the collective 
model it is assumed that the household is run by a benevolent dictator and aims for a 
maximization of a joint utility function subject to the budget constraint in the household 
(Killingsworth and Heckman, 1986; Mattila-Wiro, 1999).  
In the literature it is often labour supply participation that is analysed (the decision to 
work taking the value of 1 for positive working hours and 0 for not participating in the 
labour market) instead of the hours of work. Although neoclassical theory is built on the 
supply of labour measured by hours of work, the same thematic principles are used when 
investigating the participation decision (Funkhouser, 1992; Rodriguez and Tiogson, 
2001; Acosta, 2011; Bicakova et al., 2008; Nicodemo and Waldaman, 2009; 
Dermendzheiva, 2010). The implications of such an approach are that the same 
independent variables are important for the decision to work, though the effect of the 
variables may be of different magnitudes compared to their effect on hours of work.  The 
use of the participation decision instead of hours of work, in most of the cases, is because 
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of the lack of data for the hours of work, especially in developing economies. 
Consequently, the use of dummy dependent variable, accounting for participation 
decision, is used.  
The economics literature has focused to a large extent on gender differences in labour 
supply. There are various explanations provided for this distinction, such as the 
difference in tastes between men and women. In the seminal work of Becker (1985), it is 
suggested that the availability of gender-specific time-allocation options for females is 
one of the factors which strongly affects their labour supply. Those options for females 
are often related to the child rearing but also goods and services produced at home by 
females, or the so-called household work, which is an extension to the classical family 
utility model. Furthermore, the distinct analysis in terms of gender is often related to the 
discrimination in terms of employment but also wage differences between males and 
females, the latter being lower on average. Males in most of the countries have a higher 
participation rate in either the paid labour market or self-employment (World Bank 
Dataset, 2014). Being subject to discrimination, which has been emphasized in developed 
countries (Wright and Ermisch, 1991; Ainger and Cain, 1977), makes females‟ decision 
to not participate more frequent, known as the discouraged worker effect, given the 
increased likelihood of lack of success in finding a job or as a result of low returns from 
work.
22
 This could be more important in developing countries which are often 
characterized with very low participation rates, particularly for women, which may be a 
                                                          
22
 Gender discrimination appears to have reduced gradually as presented by various studies such as Eberts 
and Stone (1985), Powell and Butterfield (1994) for U.S.A. Recent studies using field experiment methods 
(Booth and Leight, 2010) for Australia find that there is positive discrimination in female-dominated 
occupations (i.e. females have greater chances), while in other non-dominated occupations the results were 
insignificant. Further studies such as Acosta (2006) and Ransom and Oaxaca (2005) find that 
discrimination may exist in U.S in terms of promotions and salaries.  
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consequence of the discouraged worker effect, resulting from high unemployment rates 
(see chapter II, section 2.3.2 for the case of Kosovo).  
5.3.2 Alternative Theories: Job Search Theory and Segmented Labour 
Markets 
Search theory evolved from the viewpoint that in the economy most individuals search 
for a job if they want to improve their labour market position. However, according to the 
search theory, this process involves costs, mostly considered in terms of the time spent 
searching for a job (Gorter and Gorter, 1993; Mortensen, 1987). The essential concept in 
the job search theory has become the reservation wage, which is the minimum wage that 
an unemployed worker would accept to work (Burdett and Vishawanath, 1988). The 
concept of the reservation wage became an important research question having in mind 
the additionally introduced aspects that could affect it. Such aspects include 
unemployment duration, human capital and wealth depreciation over time and 
social/unemployment benefits. Additionally, further personal and household 
characteristics were constantly added to the search models given that wealth and 
household composition plays a role in these models (Burdett and Vishawanath, 1988).  
Apart from the neoclassical assumption that the labour markets function well and it is the 
personal characteristics of the individuals that affect the labour supply, recently, attention 
has been paid also to the segmented labour market. Two conventional segments are 
identified in the labour market: the primary, often referred to as „good jobs‟ with 
predominantly high salaries and other benefits; and the secondary, considered as the „bad 
jobs‟ or often referred to as the involuntary jobs with lower salaries, and especially in 
transition economies, in many cases insecure jobs and those in the informal sector of the 
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economy (Lehmann and Pignatti, 2007; Dekker et al., 2002). The segmented labour 
market has not been extensively researched for transition countries due to the lack of the 
data (Lehmann and Pignatti, 2007). Nevertheless, it is likely that this approach, although 
less emphasized, is likely to be important in developing countries which are experiencing 
high unemployment rates. This is because in countries like Kosovo, where 
unemployment rate stands at over 35 percent (see Chapter II, section 2.3.2), there is little 
choice of jobs. However, at present little is known of the informal labour market in 
Kosovo and also to investigate the topic using the segmented labour market approach 
requires investigation from the earnings perspective, for which data is not readily 
available. Furthermore, the unemployment duration is for about 90 percent of job-seekers 
considered long term. In this context, an important aspect of the job market remains on 
whether the so called push factors or the immediate necessity is driving the individuals to 
join the labour market and find a job, or is it the pull factors, the good opportunities in the 
market that are attracting individuals to join the labour market.  Furthermore, in the 
literature on the impact of remittances on the labour market, models explicitly using 
search theory are absent, and in most of the cases, this is because of the lack of the data. 
As presented in section 5.2, most of the remittances related studies conduct the research 
based on neoclassical theory leisure-work trade off and the conclusions of lower 
participation of remittance recipients on average are often drawn from the increase of 
reservation wage and leisure, although it is not clear the assumption of a smoothly 
functioning equilibrating market, which is the basis of this approach, is appropriate given 
the above discussion.   
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5.4  The Model Specification 
Given the discussion in the theoretical section 5.3, a generic model will be developed for 
Kosovo in order to investigate the implication of remittances for labour force 
participation. In line with the literature, the research question will be investigated 
separately for females and males. In addition to the female and male distinction, in the 
model that will be presented, we will also clearly define the probability of being active 
and the probability of being employed. This distinction has often not been treated 
carefully in the literature: those inactive are often simply treated as unemployed. This 
unclear use of terms in the literature results from the use of hours of work as a measure of 
labour force participation which could have conceptual implications. First, the use of 
hours of work either neglects those who are not in the labour market, or treats them in the 
same way with those who are in the labour market looking for a job. Simply put, in the 
zero hours used in the literature we may have two types of individuals, those who supply 
zero hours but are looking for a job (active in the labour market) and those who are 
supplying zero hours but not looking for a job (inactive in the labour market, hence not 
part of the labour force).   
Before developing the model, several factors must be taken into account. These factors 
include the structure of the survey, which was designed with the aim obtaining household 
characteristics hence it targets the head of household. The structure of this survey makes 
it tempting to use the head of household as the unit of analysis for the dependent variable.  
However, given the data in the total sample, a problem that may arise from this approach 
is that 15.8 percent of the head of households were 65 or older, which essentially makes 
them retired (and 97 percent of these are inactive). In addition to the data problem, the 
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social norms in Kosovo may indicate that the head of household may not be the best 
choice. This is because the social norms consider that the head of household is usually the 
oldest person, regardless of their labour market and economic status within the 
household. In addition to that, the use of household, or the unitary model, has been 
criticized from the theoretical point of view since the individual represents the decision 
maker rather than the entire household, given that the individual preferences cannot be 
represented in an aggregated model (Chiapporri, 1992; Fortini and Lavroix, 1997).  
Glewwe (1990) suggest that the potential highest earner could be used as the subject of 
analysis. The highest potential earner is defined as the person within the household with 
the highest educational level between the ages of 18 and older. However, there is a 
serious endogeneity issue with this approach given that within the family it can be 
regarded as a choice of who works and who continues education. Furthermore, through 
the data set, it is possible to define the dependent variable using each individual in the 
household. Using this approach, it may not be possible to estimate the model using some 
of the characteristics given that many of these are reported only for the head of the 
household and do not necessarily apply to the individual; however, it is more inclusive in 
terms of individuals. 
In evaluating the impact of remittances and other factors on the labour force participation, 
the data set allows us to investigate, using the neoclassical approach, the individuals‟ 
decisions to participate in the labour force. This is because the data set contains 
information on the individual characteristics such as age, gender, education and 
employment for adult household members (see section 5.4.1 which describes the data).  
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The neoclassical model suggests that the labour force supply is dependent among others, 
on the labour income of other members of the household (Wi). However the neoclassical 
model has been extended with various other household characteristics (Xn), represented in 
equation 5.2 and which will be described throughout this section. The unobservable 
characteristics are included in the error term (ɛ). 
    
                  ___________5.2 
In the equation 5.2     
  represents the labour force participation. However there are two 
possibilities for the definition of the dependent variable. First, it represents the probability 
of being active in the labour market for the individual i, and second, it represents the 
probability of being employed for the individual i.  
This equation is estimated separately for females and for males as denoted by superscript 
(G). This separation in terms of gender is a general practice in the literature which is 
often believed to be as a result differing tastes but also as a consequence of gender 
discrimination in terms of employment opportunities and the wage rate.  
The earnings of other members (Wi), are not available in this dataset (see section 5.4.2 for 
more details). Instead as a proxy for the other sources of income we have used the 
maximum years spent in education by another household member (this variable is 
continued to be symbolised by Wi throughout the equations in this section), as this is 
expected to reflect earnings capacity. Given that this schooling was achieved in the past, 
this variable is not considered to be endogenous (although current income from other 
household members, if this data were available, would be expected to be).  
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Other personal characteristics of the individual, such as age and its square term (Age and 
Age
2
), are also included and discussed in the context of neoclassical model. Age is 
considered as an important aspect in the life-time budget constraint in terms of long-term 
utility maximization and consequently, an important determinant of participation given 
that it reflects in many cases the experience in the labour market. Becker (1964) and 
Mincer (1974) consider experience and on-the-job training as essential components of 
human capital, thus giving higher earning power to individuals. The view on the effect of 
age in studies in this area is similar to Mincer‟s earning function which suggest that the 
relationship between age and earnings is an inverted U-shape function, that is, increasing 
at a decreasing rate until it reaches a peak after which, earnings decrease (Mincer, 1974). 
In terms of participation, similar to the earning function, age is used as a proxy for 
experience. The theory suggests that the probability of participation increases at 
decreasing rate until it reaches a peak and then declines; as found by Pencavel (1987), the 
decreasing point was in mid-fifties. This variable is presented in equation 5.3. 
    
                       
    ___________5.3 
Education (Ed) of the individual is included given its importance as an indicator of the 
chances of getting a job and as an indicator of earning power. Education is usually 
associated with higher earning power and returns, given that education comprises one of 
the most important attributes of the human capital; the effect is well-documented in 
empirical work (e.g. Becker, 1964; Mincer, 1974; Laplagne et al., 2007). In this context, 
the more educated would have a higher opportunity cost of leisure; therefore, resulting in 
an increased likelihood of labour force participation. The education variable is expected 
to increase the labour force participation as a result of increased potential wage.  
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          ______5.4 
Pencavel (1987) identifies a few studies that included price measures for different regions 
or cities. However, it is difficult to find the price differences across regions, especially for 
developing countries. Under the circumstances of no price information, Pencavel (1987) 
suggests that dummy variables for regions and cities are often used in order to take into 
account any variations including in terms of prices. A location variable is included as a 
set of dummy variables, representing the five regions of Kosovo, the benchmark category 
being Prishtina, the others being Mitrovica, Prizren, Peja and Gjilan. These variables are 
represented by (L) which denotes location.  
    
                       
               ______5.5 
In addition to the region or location differentiation, rural and urban variables are 
included. However, often these are done in order to distinguish the labour market 
differences and the availability of jobs, especially since urban areas are often associated 
with more variation in jobs. The variable denoting the location being rural/urban is 
interacted with whether rural households possess productive assets. This gives three types 
of household: rural with productive assets, rural without productive assets, with the base 
category being households from an urban area. These are denoted as Ur in equation 5.6. 
The inclusion of productive assets is important because the presence of assets such as 
land, tractors or livestock may contribute directly or indirectly to household income 
(Glewwe, 1990) but also goods and services which are not accounted for either income or 
non-labour income. The current decision on investing in productive assets will be 
endogenous with the labour supply decision, but many of the productive assets owned by 
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these households are likely to have been from past decisions, including some that may 
have been inherited.  
    
                       
                     ______5.6 
Home Ownership has been related with higher unemployment rates and lower 
participation rates at the macroeconomic level (Blanchflower and Oswald, 2013; Green 
and Hendershott, 2001). This, however, has been justified by the individual motivations, 
since it is considered that home ownership, denoting whether the individual owns a house 
or not, decreases the labour mobility and results in fewer businesses created and greater 
commuting times. However, an alternative explanation, which may be more plausible for 
the case of Kosovo, is that home ownership is actually an approximation of accumulated 
wealth (Goodstein, 2007). This is especially the case, given the relatively small distance 
between the cities and also the small size of Kosovo‟s territory, which makes the mobility 
and commuting time hypothesis less likely, especially for males. However, given that 
household production is emphasized for females in Kosovo, with a low participation in 
labour market, it could be argued that mobility as well as asset accumulation may be 
more applicable to the female decision.
23
  
    
                       
                         
  ______5.7 
The number of the children below the age of 7 (Ch7) but also children between 7 and 17 
in the household (Ch17) is also included given its theoretical implication for the labour 
                                                          
23
 As explained in Chapter II, the participation rate of females in the labour market in Kosovo is relatively 
low at only 21 percent compared to 60 percent participation rate for males.  
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force participation, as discussed in the theoretical section 5.3. The division of children 
into these groups is related to the need for care and school attendance of children.  
    
                       
                          
                  ______5.8 
Similar to the presence of the children is the interpretation of the presence of seniors in 
the households (that is household members 65 years old and over). In some cases, it has 
been suggested that, especially for women, labour force participation may be affected by 
the presence of elderly household members given the need to care for them (Jaumotte, 
2003). Such expectations are also associated with the social norms in developing 
countries, such as Kosovo, where most of the household work, including the care of 
children and the elderly, is expected to be done by the females.  
    
                       
                          
                         ______5.9 
An important aspect developed with regard to the labour force participation, both in terms 
of activity and employment, is the discouraged worker effect. In this model it is proposed 
that the discouraged worker effect is tested through the variable which takes into account 
the number of unemployed adults in that household (UnAd).
24
 Two opposing hypotheses 
exist in terms of the added or discouraged worker effect within the household. These 
hypotheses imply that when countries or regions face high unemployment rate it reflects 
                                                          
24
 We use the number of unemployed adults instead of the proportion because knowing that more family 
members are unemployed may indicate the difficulties involved in searching for a job. An alternative 
specification would be the proportion of unemployed adults in the family, however, this approach is not 
pursued here.  
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on participation. The first, added worker effect suggests that the participation probability 
of other family members increases when the unemployment rate is high as an attempt to 
counter the liquidity constraints which may be as a result of risk of or loss of the job of 
the main breadwinner. Alternatively, the discouraged worker effect suggests that as a 
result of the high unemployment rate and consequently the low probability of finding a 
job, household members might be discouraged from searching for a job. This may be 
particularly important in the case of Kosovo given the high unemployment and 
discouraged job-seekers, who because of the long-term unemployment rate, do not 
actively look for a job because they do not believe they will find one (chapter II, section 
2.3.2). Given these possible effects, the regional unemployment rate has been suggested 
for inclusion in the model as a measure of market conditions or labour market tightness 
(Ameudo-Dorantes and Pozo, 2006; Bhalotra and Umana-Aponte, 2010). However, in 
Kosovo, regional information is not available, while it is also most likely that individuals 
build their expectations based on the family or a narrower group of people rather than the 
regional level. For this reason, we propose including the number of unemployed adults 
(UnAd) in the household as a variable aiming to test the added or discouraged worker 
effect.  
    
                       
                          
                                  ______5.10 
Non-wage income from the social and pension (NWIS) assistance of government is 
represented in the model separately from the remittances (NWIR). As presented in chapter 
II, remittances are one of the important sources of non-labour income for households in 
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Kosovo and therefore will be represented in the model by (NWIR), while other non-
labour income such as social assistance will be represented by (NWIS). Although 
theoretically, remittances and other non-labour income should have the same effect, in 
terms of sign and magnitude, as assumed in section 5.3, it might be more appropriate to 
test for the two with different variables. This is because in many cases, the non-labour 
income is represented by government social assistance which is of permanent nature if an 
individual does not find a job, while remittances might be of temporary nature. The 
separate inclusion is also justifiable given that the focus of this chapter is the implication 
of remittances on the labour market. In this context, remittances and other non-wage 
income may lead to a corner solution, with withdrawal from the labour market, as 
discussed in section 5.3.  In this situation the market would need to increase wage rates in 
order to induce the individual back into the labour market. Alternatively, if not a corner 
solution the additional income from remittances is likely to reduce the supply of hours of 
work.  
    
                       
                          
                                                   ______5.11 
It must be noted that marital status of the individual, a variable that has been extensively 
included in the literature, is not included in our model. This would have been an 
important variable given its effects on male and female household members. For instance, 
it is suggested that married men are more likely to participate in the labour market 
compared to their non-married counterparts (Pencavel, 1987; Jacobsen, 1999). Paaps 
(2006) argues this as a result of specialization of married men given that the wives 
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perform many of the tasks within the household. For females, the effect of marriage is 
considered often to be the opposite. Mincer (1962) describes this as the presence of more 
options for time allocation for females. This is the case especially if young children are 
present, but also in many cases related to the social norms of different countries. Women 
may be more affected, especially in developing countries, given they are responsible for 
providing the majority of childcare services, which is also related to Becker‟s home 
production hypothesis (Gangadharan et al., 1996; Becker, 1964). However, this variable 
could not be included in our model given that we are using every adult individual in the 
household, while the information on marital status is available only for the head of 
household.  
5.4.1 Data Description 
The dataset used in this chapter is the same as in the Chapter IV, UNDP 2010, a survey 
conducted with 4,000 households with a stratified sampling procedure based on regional 
distribution of households. Similar to the consumption profile of the household, this 
survey contains information on the labour force participation and employment of the 
individuals. Furthermore, this survey is also relatively wide in terms of the area it covers 
with regard to household characteristics migration profile of the household, including the 
presence of remittances. The survey allows the inclusion of all adult households in the 
model given the question it contained on the composition of the household. The question 
was:  
“Please list the members of your family, age, gender, education and employment. Please 
begin with head of household.” 
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In order to obtain more detailed information on the employment and activity, the survey 
listed the options applicable for each individual. For each individual in the household, the 
employment status was required to be reported in the following form:  
The individual is:  
a) Employed 
b) Not employed (looking for work) 
c) Not employed (not looking for work) 
d) Not applicable 
This question allows the distinction to be made between being active in the labour market 
(those who reported option a) and b) and being inactive in the labour market, that is, 
option c) the d) not applicable, category was usually assigned to persons below the age of 
18 and above the age of 64. The specification, which aimed at investigating the 
probability to be employed, used only the observations that were reported option a) 
employed, and b) not employed but looking for work, given that these categories 
represent the active labour force from this survey.  
From the sample of 4,000 households, we were able to obtain information on 6,175 
females labour force activity. As presented in Table 5.1, with regard to activity, about 40 
percent are active in the labour market. The mean age level of females in this survey was 
36.8 and half had completed secondary education. Only 8 percent of females had 
completed university education. The regional distribution of labour force activity shows a 
higher concentration in Prishtina (about 23 percent) while the other regions are 
represented with around 20 percent, except Mitrovica with 16 percent. Rural households 
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represent nearly 48 percent, of which 20 percent have reported productive assets in their 
household. Home ownership is an important characteristic of Kosovo given that 92 
percent of individuals live in their own house. The average number of children below the 
age of 7 per household is 0.32 while average number between the ages 7 and 17 is one 
per household. The mean number of seniors is nearly 0.3 per household. One of the most 
interesting numbers in this data set is that the average number of unemployed adults per 
household is relatively high at 2.6. Regarding the non-labour income from pension and 
social assistance, the mean value is 5.3 euros per capita a month for the total sample.  
However, it is 21 euros on average for the households that receive them. Remittances are 
higher compared to social and pension income, given that for the total sample they 
average around ten euros per household, while for the households receiving them, the 
mean is around 50 euros per capita a month.    
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Table 5.1 Descriptive Statistics for Female Individuals 
  Prob. Of being Active (Females) Prob. Of being Employed (Females) 
  Obs Mean Std. Dev. Min Max Obs Mean Std. Dev. Min Max 
Active 6175 0.40 0.49 0 1.0           
Employed Females           2474 0.45 0.50 0.00 1 
Age 6175 36.83 13.00 18 64.00 2474 34.35 11.27 18.00 64.00 
Age-Squared 6175 1525.43 1011.55 324.00 4096.00 2474 1306.89 841.12 324.00 4096.00 
Secondary Education 6175 0.51 0.50 0 1 2474 0.63 0.48 0.00 1 
University Education 6175 0.08 0.27 0 1 2474 0.16 0.37 0.00 1 
Mitrovica 6175 0.16 0.36 0 1 2474 0.13 0.34 0.00 1 
Prizren 6175 0.20 0.40 0 1 2474 0.13 0.34 0.00 1 
Peja 6175 0.20 0.40 0 1 2474 0.27 0.45 0.00 1 
Gjilan 6175 0.21 0.40 0 1 2474 0.25 0.43 0.00 1 
Rural with Productive Assets 6175 0.20 0.40 0 1 2474 0.15 0.36 0.00 1 
Rural without Productive Assets 6175 0.28 0.45 0 1 2474 0.27 0.45 0.00 1 
Home Ownership 6175 0.92 0.27 0 1 2474 0.90 0.30 0.00 1 
Children under age of 7 6175 0.32 0.66 0 4 2474 0.32 0.65 0.00 4 
Children from 7 to 17 6175 1.03 1.17 0 6 2474 0.97 1.13 0.00 6 
Seniors 6175 0.28 0.56 0 5 2474 0.27 0.57 0.00 5 
Unemployed Adults 6175 2.61 1.57 0 8 2474 2.23 1.61 0.00 8 
Pension and Social assistance Income 6175 5.35 18.92 0 525.0 2474 4.61 16.93 0.00 525.0 
Remittances 6175 9.90 56.96 0 2516.67 2474 9.24 74.45 0.00 2516.67 
Maximum Education of second 
Household Member 6175 12.77 2.98 0 28.0 2474 12.94 3.03 0.00 28.00 
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These reported statistics do not change substantially for the females that are employed, hence, 
only substantial variations will be discussed. In total, the number of females that are active in 
the labour market is 2,474. Employed females are on average around 2.4 years younger than 
the total sample. The major difference between the employment and activity data sets is that 
in the former 37 percent of females have completed university education (compared with less 
than 10 percent in activity data set).  
With regard to males, we obtained 6,888 observations with the probability of being active. 
Males are active in the labour market at a considerably larger level than females, at around 78 
percent. In terms of age, there is no substantial difference from females, given that average 
age of male individuals is nearly 36. However, males have more education, given that of the 
total males between the age of 18 and 64, 65 percent completed secondary education and 16 
percent completed university education. With regard to other variables, there are only slight 
differences from the female figures, notably a lower average level of pension and social 
assistance income at 4.5 euros per month, which, when measured only for the pension and 
social income recipients, t is higher at 22 euros per month per capita. With regard to 
remittances, the average amount in the sample is slightly higher than 10 euros and for the 
recipient households this is at 55 euros per month. For the males that are active in the labour 
market, we were able to obtain 5387 observations for which the employment is at 70 percent, 
which is considerably higher than females (Table 5.1 and Table 5.2). However, the difference 
in terms of education between the total sample and those being active is not large as in the 
females‟ data set. The other reported statistics, as presented in Table 5.2, are relatively 
consistent through the two measures of participation. 
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Table 5. 2 Descriptive Statistics for Male Individuals 
  Prob. Of being Active (Males) Prob. Of being Employed (Males) 
  Obs Mean Std. Dev. Min Max Obs Mean Std. Dev. Min Max 
Active 6888 0.78 0.49 0 1           
Employed Males           5387 0.70 0.46 0 1 
Age 6888 35.70 13.26 18 64 5387 36.36 12.15 18 64 
Age-Squared 6888 1450.31 1029.30 324 4096 5387 1469.21 941.20 324 4096 
Secondary Education 6888 0.65 0.48 0 1 5387 0.65 0.48 0 1 
University Education 6888 0.16 0.37 0 1 5387 0.18 0.39 0 1 
Mitrovica 6888 0.16 0.37 0 1 5387 0.16 0.37 0 1 
Prizren 6888 0.23 0.42 0 1 5387 0.23 0.42 0 1 
Peja 6888 0.19 0.39 0 1 5387 0.19 0.39 0 1 
Gjilan 6888 0.19 0.39 0 1 5387 0.20 0.40 0 1 
Productive Assets 6888 0.22 0.42 0 1 5387 0.23 0.42 0 1 
No Productive Assets 6888 0.29 0.46 0 1 5387 0.29 0.45 0 1 
Home Ownership 6888 0.93 0.26 0 1 5387 0.93 0.26 0 1 
Children under age of 7 6888 0.28 0.63 0 4 5387 0.30 0.64 0 4 
Children from 7 to 17 6888 0.93 1.14 0 6 5387 0.94 1.15 0 6 
Seniors 6888 0.27 0.57 0 6 5387 0.27 0.58 0 6 
Unemployed Adults 6888 2.64 1.58 0 10 5387 2.47 1.57 0 10 
Pension and Social assistance 
Income 6888 4.54 15.83 0 525 5387 4.01 14.60 0 525 
Remittances 6888 10.50 50.99 0 2166.67 5387 11.05 54.81 0 2166.67 
Maximum Education of second 
Household Member 6888 13.11 2.66 0 22 5387 13.13 2.58 0 22 
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It must be noted that data on activity and employment are not comparable with the national 
labour market data given the very strict definition of labour force activity in the labour force 
surveys. For instance, the question in the survey used here does not specify the period length 
of job-search activity in order to classify according to the labour force survey standards. 
While the labour force survey in Kosovo, for those who seek a job is followed by another two 
criteria which could invalidate the activity of the individual. For instance the labour force 
survey in Kosovo asks to state the following:  
The individual is looking for a job: 
a) The individual searched for a job actively during the last four weeks  
b) The individual could have started to work within two weeks if he/she found a job.  
If the individuals would reply no to any of these two questions, then according to the labour 
force survey standards, this individual is not considered to active in the labour market.  
5.4.2 Potential Endogeneity  
 
One of the issues in estimating the model presented in the previous section is the endogeneity 
problem with some of the variables. It may be argued that variables such as family size, 
composition, education and remittances are endogenous. This could be as a result of the so 
called old-age hypothesis which is particularly important for developing countries. This 
hypothesis suggests that parents are not sure if they can support themselves during old-age 
and as a result they rear children to ensure support (Willis, 1979). Remittances are often 
discussed to be endogenous to the presence of the migrant from the household. This is 
because, under the income risk diversification strategy of the household, it is often discussed 
that it is households‟ decision to send a migrant abroad in order to receive remittances. This 
is also thought to be more likely for larger households, given their higher potential to send a 
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migrant. Also, it is likely that poorer households send a migrant in order to receive 
remittances (Glewwe, 1990; Adams and Page, 2003).  
The model presented in equation 5.11 includes the variable of remittances and income per 
capita in the household from other family members. In the data set that we use, the questions 
that were asked do not cover any area that could provide a potential instrumental variable for 
remittances. The relevant literature often uses the presence of money transfer agencies as an 
instrument for remittances; however, in the case of Kosovo such data are not available for 
rural areas given that most of the money transfer agencies are located in bank branches across 
the country. At the same time, bank branches are only located in cities and towns, which does 
not represent the flow of remittances into rural areas. Consequently, the assumption of pre-
determination of migration is used, hence the effect of remittances is considered conditional 
on a previous decision of the household to send a member in migration, rather than a current 
decision. Given the profile of migration from Kosovo, which largely was initially caused by 
political motives (see section 2.3.3), but then many remained in developed countries given 
the income difference and employment opportunities, this is arguably a reasonable 
assumption in this estimation. Total income in the household from other household members 
may be simultaneous with the labour force participation of a particular member as the 
decision can be viewed as part of the household‟s choices. In the estimation here, however, 
income is proxied by the maximum years spent in education by another family member (for 
which we continued to use the symbol (W) in the equations from 5.2 to 5.11), as the 
questionnaire has only information on total household income and the individual income of 
the head of household, so that the income from other household members could not be 
calculated. The reason why we consider the maximum years spent in education by a member 
as a valid proxy is that this variable is expected to be correlated with household income, 
given that it reflects the earnings capacity of the other household member. Given that the 
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education levels of adult members of the family are from past, not current, decisions, the 
variable is not is not treated as endogenous. Indeed, many of the household characteristics 
such as assets, migration, size and similar although not exogenous, are predetermined on the 
past choices as a plan to maximize the household utility (Glewwe, 1990). Consequently, the 
estimation of the equation (5.11) is conditioned on past decisions.      
5.5  Empirical Findings 
 
This section presents the findings of the model on the determinants of labour force 
participation and determinants of employment. The results are presented for males and 
females in the household separately. The different specifications in terms of dependent 
variable (probability of being active and probability of being employed) and in terms of 
gender are based on theoretical and empirical considerations as discussed in sections 5.3 and 
5.4. The initial model developed included non-labour income such as social assistance and 
pension income and remittances and additionally accounts for the income of other household 
members (proxied by maximum education of another household member).  
The full results of the estimation of the model using probit is presented in appendix 5.2.
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Table 5.3 presents the Average Marginal Effects (AME) as opposed to the Marginal Effects 
at Mean (MEM). The former takes the values of the variables for each observation in the 
sample and gives the marginal effect averaged across the observations in the sample. The 
latter takes the average of each individual variable in calculating the overall marginal effect. 
The choice of presenting Average Marginal Effects (AME) rather than Marginal Effects at 
the Mean (MEM) for the model given in equation 5.11 is because it contains variables which 
are mathematical transformations of another variable and the presence of dummy variables. 
                                                          
25
 Clustering the standard errors by household may be appropriate in this model, however, at the time of this 
investigation, this option was not available in STATA for the procedures used.  
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Bartus (2005) identifies that the literature is generally inconclusive as to which marginal 
effects are preferred. MEMs have often been presented in the literature as the calculations of 
these have been more readily available through econometric programmes. However, recently, 
in STATA with the development of the margins command, AMEs is almost as easily 
obtainable as MEMs. Long (1997) and Greene (2003) suggest that the main reason why AME 
are preferred against MEM is in the specific values set to the variables with MEM, the usual 
being means, which for dummy variables often represents non-existent observations. The 
standard MEMs reported in STATA for a dummy variable consider the change for 0 to 1 for 
that variable, but in doing that all other variables, including other dummy variables, are put at 
their mean value. In the models that we have estimated, there are nine dummy variables and, 
for example, in the calculation of the MEM of household members over 65 (the variable Sen 
in equation 5.11), the variable secondary education is given its mean value, of 0.51, in the 
probability of being active for females, when the variable can only in practice take the value 
0 or 1. Thus the MEM is not the marginal effect of any possible observation, Although the 
software does allow for imposing particular values in calculation a MEM, it is unclear what 
particular values to impose to give a representative estimation, given the large range of 
possibilities when multiple dummy variables are involved. Although often the literature 
considers MEMs as generally a good approximation of AMEs, Bartus (2005) suggests that 
the dummy variable problem is more fundamental when the regression model contains more 
dummies which indicate different categories of a single dummy variable. In model specified 
in section 5.4 there are four sets of dummy variables, three of which have more than two 
categories (Education, Region and Rural households with and without productive assets 
against urban ones); hence using MEM is problematic from this viewpoint since the standard 
MEM command in STATA, mfx, takes the mean of each variable separately, not recognising 
that these are alternatives. The issue with non-linear functions is also that the values taken for 
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an observation are not independent, but this is not recognised in the standard calculation of 
MEMs. In the estimation here, given the age of a person, age squared is given.  The standard 
MEM, by using the mean values of each variable separately, does not use the square of the 
value of the single term in the calculation. The AME, by taking the values by each individual 
observation does. (Recent advancements in programmes such as STATA do include more 
complicated procedures that allow the imposition of particular values to circumvent this 
problem if using MEMs), Given the potential complications presented and the preference of 
AME over MEM by Greene (2003) and Long (1997), in estimating model specified in section 
5.4, we will use the AME. The results of the AME are presented in Table 5.3. The results are 
presented for females and males separately while the dependent variables represent the 
probability of being active and probability of being employed. The interpretation is on 
average throughout this section.  
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Table 5.3 Average Marginal Effects for LFP and Employment Determinants 
  Males Females 
  Pr_Active Pr_Employed Pr_Active Pr_Employed 
Age (combined effect) 0.0099*** 0.0103*** -0.0003 0.0065*** 
  (0.000) (0.000) (0.472) (0.000) 
Education Base Level Preliminary         
Secondary Education 0.119*** 0.0672*** 0.2487*** 0.15941*** 
  (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
University Education 0.203*** 0.140*** 0.5315*** 0.44297*** 
  (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Region Base Level Prishtina         
Mitrovica 0.048*** 0.0335* -0.0392** -0.1307** 
  (0.002) (0.048) (0.026) (0.026) 
Prizren 0.088*** 0.0746*** -0.0169 -0.0099 
  (0.000) (0.000) (0.320) (0.731) 
Peja 0.080*** -0.068*** 0.2127*** -0.0376 
  (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.112) 
Gjilan 0.073*** 0.001 0.0885*** -0.0804*** 
  (0.000) (0.967) (0.000) (0.001) 
Urban Households Base          
Rural Household with Productive Assets 0.053*** 0.0439*** -0.0864*** -0.0354 
  (0.000) (0.001) (0.000) (0.141) 
Rural Household without Productive Assets 0.008 -0.028** -0.0059 -0.1046*** 
  (0.415) (0.028) (0.646) (0.000) 
House Ownership (1=Yes) 0.018 0.114*** -0.042** 0.07834*** 
  (0.309) (0.000) (0.043) (0.003) 
Children under 7 0.016** 0.013 0.0038 -0.0405*** 
  (0.032) (0.131) (0.657) (0.003) 
Children from 7 to 17 -0.016*** -0.0067 -0.0221*** -0.0413*** 
  (0.000) (0.177) (0.000) (0.000) 
Seniors -0.022*** -0.001 -0.0082 0.00117 
  (0.007) (0.932) (0.429) (0.941) 
Unemployed Adults -0.035*** -0.097*** -0.0341*** -0.1264*** 
  (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Pension and Social Income per capita -0.00013*** -0.003*** -0.0003 -0.0011** 
  (0.000) (0.000) (0.337) (0.051) 
Remittances per capita 0.00004 0.0001 -0.00002 -0.00001 
  (0.710) (0.406) (0.814) (0.553) 
Maximum Education apart from observation -0.009*** 0.011*** -0.008*** 0.0011 
  (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.720) 
Number of Observations 6888 5387 6178 2474 
P-Value in Parenthesis with ***. ** and * denoting 1, 5 and 10%  level of significance 
 
202 
 
The interpretation will be variable by variable, across the four different specifications (i.e. 
interpreting the impact of each independent variable on each of the four specifications). As 
the main aim of this chapter was to identify the impact of remittances we will begin by 
interpreting its results, followed by the impact of other non-labour income on the labour 
supply. 
Remittances 
Monthly remittances per capita do not have a statistically significant effect in any 
specification. Such results may be due to the possible temporary nature of the remittances 
flows, which suggests that households do not make decisions on the labour supply (both 
activity and employment) on temporary sources of non-labour income. As elaborated in 
section Chapter III, sections 3.2 and 3.3, remittances are often characterized with inverse U 
shape behaviour over time, suggesting that after some years in migration, migrants could 
send less as a result of their establishment in the host country. Such results are found often in 
the literature (Lucas and Stark, 1985; Funkhouser, 1995) and they have also been found for 
the case of Kosovo (Havolli, 2010). In addition, the relatively young population in Kosovo 
could also be a factor which makes the impact of remittances absent on the labour supply, 
given that it is important to build labour market experience, regardless of income levels. 
However, we have further investigated the robustness of these results with other 
specifications, but these additional estimations provided results in line with this interpretation 
(see section 5.5.1).  
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Non-Labour Income 
The non-labour income variables, that is the monthly pension and social income and 
remittances per capita, were treated separately due to the nature of these two variables. It 
may be argued that pension and social income is of permanent nature and there is no risk that 
households would lose this source of income, while for the remittances, it is often argued that 
it is a temporary source of income. Results suggest that pension and social income is 
statistically significant in decreasing the probability of being active for males and decreasing 
the probability of both males and females of being employed. An increase of 10 euros per 
month in pension and social income per capita decreases the probability for male individuals 
of being active by 1.2 percentage points and by 3 percentage points of being employed. For 
females, in terms of finding a job, a 10 euro increase in social and pension income per capita 
decreases the probability by 1.1 percentage points.  
Education 
The effect of education, as one of the main characteristics of human capital, is in line with 
expectations, suggesting that higher educated individuals are more likely to be active and 
employed, compared to those with preliminary education, which is the benchmark category. 
The estimates are highly significant across all specifications. Male individuals with secondary 
education are 10.6 percentage points more likely to be active in the labour market compared 
to the counterparts with preliminary education. However, the effect of secondary education is 
lower in terms of increasing the average probability of becoming employed, with an increase 
of 6.8 percentage points. Regarding university education the effect, as expected, is larger 
compared with other levels of education. In the specification for males, the university 
education increases the probability of being active by 17.9 percentage points when compared 
to the base category of males with preliminary education. Furthermore, university education 
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increases the probability of becoming employed by 15.2 percentage points, compared to the 
base category of preliminary educated males. Education is estimated to have considerably 
higher effects for females than for males.  The effect of secondary education on females 
suggests that those with secondary level education have 24.9 percentage points higher 
probability than preliminary educated females in being active. The probability of female 
individuals to become employed increases by 15.9 percentage points if they completed 
secondary education. University education increases substantially the probability of being 
active for females by 53 percentage points. Similarly, the effect of university education on the 
probability to become employed for females is much higher compared to males given that it 
increases the probability by 44.3 percentage points.   
Regions 
In terms of regions, the results suggest that being from a region other than Prishtina 
significantly increases the probability of being active for males.  In detail, for the probability 
of being active the estimates are by 4.7 percentage points in Mitrovica, by 8.5 percentage 
points in Prizren, by 7.8 percentage points in Peja and by 7.2 percentage points in Gjilan. In 
terms of employment, the results are similar, with a higher probability of being employed 
than Prishtina, for individuals from Mitrovica (3.3 percentage points – though only 
significant at the 10% level) and Prizren region (7.6 percentage points). However, men from 
Peja have a reduced probability of being employed (by 6.5 percentage points) while the effect 
in Gjilan is statistically insignificant. For females, the results are different. In Mitrovica, 
females have a lower probability of being active and becoming employed against Prishtina by 
3.9 and 13.1 percentage points respectively. However, females from Peja and Gjilan have a 
higher probability of being active by 21.2 percentage points and 8.9 percentage points 
respectively. However, in terms of employment, being from Gjilan is significant but with 
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reduction in the probability by 8.0 percentage points compared to Prishtina, while the effect is 
insignificant in Peja.  
The results of these variables is problematic given that labour mobility is not considered a 
major issue in Kosovo, having in mind the close distance between major cities of these 
regions (the most distant being around 80 kilometres). However, in explaining the higher 
employment probability, we must have in mind that for many of the individuals we do not 
know their place of employment and it might easily be that because of higher unemployment 
rates in these regions, they might work in and commute to Prishtina. For females the 
reduction in probabilities of being active may be explained by the social norms that exist in 
Mitrovica region and similarly, the positive effect for Gjilani and Peja regions. These social 
norms are built on the historical distribution of industries across Kosovo since the end of 
World War Two. For instance, the Mitrovica region has always been characterized by heavy 
industry in mining and processing of metals and minerals, which may be considered mostly 
as jobs for males. Hence, the female labour force participation may have been lower 
traditionally as a result of the industry distribution. Elsewhere, the Gjilan region was 
characterized by developed tobacco and textile industries, the first usually being run by small 
family farms which may have included females as well as males and the second, the textile 
industry is traditionally female orientated and this is also found in the Peja region. These light 
industries that existed in may have created the tradition that females participate in the labour 
market. However, it must be taken into account that most of these industries today are rather 
less important or non-functional, first, given the lack of investment and second, the 
privatization process which left them idle for relatively long time. Consequently, the higher 
probability of employment for females in Prishtina compared to Gjilan and Mitrovica, may be 
explained by the lack of industrial development but also due to the larger presence of public 
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institutions in the Prishtina region which strictly enforce equal employment rights for public 
sector jobs.  
Rural with and without productive assets against urban 
In terms of being active, the estimates suggest differences between households in rural and 
urban areas depend on the presence of productive assets. The results suggest that male 
individuals who possess productive assets in rural areas have a 5.2 percentage point higher 
probability of being active and a 4.3 percentage point higher probability of being employed 
compared to those in urban areas. Females on the other hand are 8.6 percentage points less 
likely to be active when the rural households possess productive assets. This may be as a 
result of household work conducted by females given that the productive assets in the 
questionnaire represent the possession of land, tractors, cows and other livestock in the 
household. Moreover, males from rural households without productive assets have a 2.7 
percentage points lower probability of being employed compared to urban individuals.  There 
is no significant difference in the probability of being active between urban and rural without 
productive assets between males and females. However, in terms of being employed, female 
individuals from rural areas without productive assets are less likely to be employed by 10.4 
percentage points compared to their counterparts in urban areas. This may indicate the lack of 
jobs in rural areas. 
Home Ownership 
Regarding home ownership, it is statistically insignificant for the probability of being active 
for male households but significant in terms of being employed with an increase of 11.3 
percentage points. For females, the effect is negative in terms of being active, but similar to 
males, positive in terms of being employed. Given that Kosovo is relatively small country, 
home ownership does not necessarily decrease labour mobility in the country and the 
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commuting times are relatively short. Consequently the home ownership might be viewed as 
an economic asset which affects the decision to be inactive for females (estimated reduction 
of 4.2 percentage points), but for those who participate, the estimate suggests an increases the 
probability of being employed by 7.8 percentage points.   
Care for the Children and Seniors  
The presence of children under the age of 7 is statistically insignificant for male employment 
and female activity. However, for females the probability of being employed decreases by 4.1 
percentage points when the number of children under the age of 7 increases. Regarding 
males, it is significant towards being active, suggesting that as the number of children 
increases, the probability of becoming active increases by 1.6 percentage points. The 
presence of children from 7 to 17 has a negative effect for both males and females on the 
probabilities; however, the effect is very low for males given that it decreases the probability 
of being active by 1.6 percentage points and the effect on being employed is statistically 
insignificant. For females the result is significant and slightly higher suggesting that as the 
number of children from 7 to 17 increases, the probability of being active decreases by 2.2 
percentage points and of being employed decreases by 4.1 percentage points. The number of 
seniors (of the age 65 and over) in the household is statistically insignificant with the 
exception of being active by males, who have a lower probability by 2.2 percentage points. 
This result may be as a consequence of some unobservable characteristic of households such 
as the local customs that the elderly parents live with the youngest son. Under these 
circumstances, there may be unobserved transfers from other relatives to this particular 
household, hence decreasing the probability of the individual participating in the labour 
market.   
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Unemployed Adults  
Another finding is that as the number of unemployed adults in the household increases,
26
 the 
probability of individuals being active and employed decreases for both males and females. 
The probability of being active in the labour market for both males and females decreases by 
3.4 percentage points. In terms of the probability of being employed, the results differ slightly 
between males and females, with the reduction for males being a little lower, at 9.9 
percentage points, compared to females at 12.6 percentage points. These findings are 
consistent with the view that members of households with a higher number of unemployed 
are discouraged, as their perception that the probability of finding a job is low is increased. It 
appears that the discouraged worker effect is pronounced when the unemployment data are 
viewed at household level. In Kosovo there is a lack of regional statistics on unemployment, 
which may support why this is the case. Reviewing the unemployment data at country level 
nearly 15 percent of working age population are not looking for a job and are treated as 
discouraged workers (SAK, 2013).  
Maximum years of education of another member  
Given that we did not have individual income of other household members separately but 
only total household income, we used the maximum years of education of the other 
household members as a proxy for other members‟ income. The results are somewhat mixed 
when the theoretical expectation is considered. This is because, in terms of being active, the 
results are in line with what is expected and suggest that as other members‟ income increases 
the probability of the member under investigation being active decreases, for both males and 
females, although the effects are relatively small. However, for employment probability the 
results suggest that as income of the other members increases the probability of being 
                                                          
26
 The number of unemployed adults does not include the individual for that particular observation.  
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employed for males increases as well (although only by a little over 1 percentage point), 
while for females it is statistically insignificant. The social norms that exist in the country, 
where males are traditionally considered those who work for the entire household as the 
breadwinners could explain the lack of effect with an increase in  income from other 
members, though not a positive effect.    
5.5.1 Robustness Check 
 
Given that remittances are the variable of the interest for this chapter, other specifications 
have been undertaken to see if the effects changes under other circumstances. Their 
significance changes when remittances are specified in absolute value but the effect is 
extremely small. Defining the remittances variable as the absolute value in the household 
rather than remittances per capita gives an estimate that is statistically significant and 
increases the probability for males to be active by 0.4 percentage points and on becoming 
employed by one percentage point if remittances increase by 1000 euros in the household 
(Appendix 5.3.2), a result contrary to prior expectations. However, whilst significant, this 
effect is not of a size to be regarded as economically important as an increase of 1000 euro is 
a very large increase in the Kosovo context in this period. On the specifications for females, 
the results are statistically insignificant. In the data set the mean of remittances is only 60 
euros monthly for the entire sample and around 300 euros for remittance recipient 
households.  
5.6  Conclusions 
In this chapter, the neoclassical model of labour supply has been used to investigate the 
labour force participation and the probability of being employed for the case of Kosovo. To 
our knowledge, this represents one of the first detailed studies of labour force participation 
for Kosovo and one of the few that exist for transition countries. Given that the working 
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hours have not been available, we used these two definitions, where the second one, might 
have to some extent give an indication of the reservation wage. Furthermore, the use of 
alternatives to the working hours avoids the issue of whether, when the working hours when 
at zero, this reflects inactivity or those actively looking for a job. The models have been 
estimated using Probit estimation method, separately for males and females.  
The findings suggest that remittances, as an important source of non-labour income, do not 
affect the labour force participation in any of the originally specified models. This might 
reflect the perceptions of the home country household members that remittances are of a 
temporary nature, with the risk of not being a permanent flow of income. In the robustness 
check, an unexpected positive effect was found for males, but the size of this effect was very 
small. Permanent non-labour income measured by the pension and social income suggests 
that the results are in line with the theoretical framework of labour-leisure model. This 
variable indicates that as non-labour income increases the probability of being active 
decreases for males, while for females it is statistically insignificant. In terms of probability 
of being employed, the results are negative for both males and females though the effect is 
small.  
Apart from the two variables of interest, the other variables mostly strongly support the 
theoretical expectations. Among the most important are the education variables which are 
highly significant and positive with regard to probability of being active and employed. The 
effect of this variable is much stronger for females. Regional variables on the other hand, 
may to reflect the prevailing social norms that exist in Kosovo as a result of the past 
distribution of industries across the country, suggesting that employment and participation for 
females may be as a result of an inactivity tradition in heavy industrialized regions. 
Regarding the individuals who own a house, results are positive in terms of employment for 
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males and females. However, this may to reflect more on the wealth of the household rather 
than the often postulated labour immobility of home owners. One of the main findings of this 
chapter is that as the number of unemployed adults increases this decreases both the 
probability of being active and employed for males and females. This result could be 
interpreted as the discouraged worker effect.  
Conclusively, the findings of this chapter are largely in line with the theoretical framework 
and the literature with the exception of the remittances flow. Further research may be 
required to investigate the impact of remittances. For Kosovo, in such future research it may 
not be as important to investigate this from the viewpoint of hours of work as much as to 
have individual data with detailed income from both labour and non-labour sources.  
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6.1 Introduction 
The aim of this thesis has been to investigate remittances from the viewpoint of the home 
country considering, in particular, three aspects. Firstly, the macroeconomic determinants of 
remittances, with special reference to the effect of policies applied to increase and redirect 
these. The second and third aspects have been examining the micro-foundations of the effects 
of remittances on household expenditure and labour force participation, applied to the case of 
Kosovo.  
The existing studies on the macroeconomic determinants of remittances have been limited in 
terms of their cross-section and time-series dimension. Furthermore, the evidence is scarce in 
terms of the impact of host country economic factors on the flow of remittances (with a few 
studies addressing this from the viewpoint of a home and host country). With regard to the 
impact of home country policies, to our knowledge, this is the first study that attempts to 
evaluate policies to increase remittances. In this context, with regard to developing countries, 
Chapter III focused on the following issues: a) the role of policies in attracting remittances, b) 
the effect of host countries‟ economic factors on the flow of remittances. The standard 
theoretical approaches of altruism and self-interest were used for the explanation of the 
macroeconomic factors impact on remittances. These approaches have been built on 
individual or household microeconomic foundations, however, on the assumption that the 
macroeconomic developments are the consequences of aggregated individual decisions, these 
theories have been adopted for the macroeconomic level studies.  
With regard to Chapter IV, we explicitly draw on the Working-Leser model to investigate the 
role of remittances for household expenditure patterns, a model which is based on Engel‟s 
law suggesting that poor households spend a higher share on consumption. With regard to 
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remittances, there are three main viewpoints of their impact. The first view considers that 
remittances have a problematic effect on the household expenditure patterns. This hypothesis 
is based on the notion that remittances distort the expenditure behaviour and that remittances 
mostly finance luxury „status‟ goods and consumption; consequently, according to this view, 
remittances recipient household spend a higher share on consumption. This view considers 
that remittances expenditure towards luxury goods is as a result of asymmetric information 
and economic uncertainty. As a result, there is a moral hazard problem since the use of 
remittances may be unobservable by the migrant. The second view hypothesizes that the 
remittances decrease the share of households‟ expenditure on consumption goods. 
Accordingly, the share of income spent on durable goods and human capital investments such 
as education is expected to increase. Typically this may be the case when remittances are 
viewed as a temporary source of income. The third view considers that remittances behave 
just like any other income and that remittance recipient households do not have different 
expenditure patterns from other similar households. Given these competing views, Chapter 
IV aimed at addressing the following questions: a) does the presence of remittances affect the 
household expenditure patterns, b) is there a role played by the migrant in the expenditure 
patterns, and finally c) does the households‟ behaviour change with increased frequency of 
visits by migrants.  
The implications of remittances for the labour market are investigated from the viewpoint of 
neoclassical theory, which is usually the starting point for labour force participation analysis. 
This view considers leisure as a normal good and the utility function for individuals being 
dependent on the leisure-work trade-off. The investigation of labour force participation using 
neoclassical theory is particularly important given that the theoretical models address the 
presence of non-labour income; which for the case of Kosovo is particularly important given 
the relatively large amounts of remittances flows. In line with the standard empirical 
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approach and theoretical base, the models have been designed separately for males and 
females. However, it appears that the literature does not make a clear distinction between 
participation and the probability of finding a job, given the widely used working hours as 
dependent variable. Without properly clarification of active and inactive individuals, this 
approach treats the individuals who are not active as being the same as those who are actively 
looking for jobs. In this context, our model has been developed for two different dependent 
variables, the probability of being active in the labour force and the probability of being 
employed. Therefore, the objectives of Chapter V were to: a) find the factors affecting the 
probability of being active and b) find the factors which affect the probability of being 
employed.  
The structure of this chapter is as following: section 6.2 presents the main empirical findings 
of the models used to investigate the research questions. Policy implications are presented in 
section 6.3. The contribution to knowledge of this thesis is presented in section 6.4, followed 
by the limitations and suggestions for further research in section 6.5.  
6.2 Main Findings 
The remittances debate was initiated in early 1980s given that the data suggested that they 
were an importance source of financing for many developing countries. Nevertheless, with 
the improvement of data collection for many countries, the surge in remittances especially in 
post 2000 revealed the importance for further research. Initially the literature was focused on 
determinants of remittances and then developed into examining the implications of 
remittances for recipient economies.  
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6.2.1 What macroeconomic factors are determining remittances? Do Policies 
Work? 
Realizing that remittances for many countries represented a substantial source of financing 
but also a source of hard-currency, many countries have initiated policy initiatives to increase 
the flow of remittances, which have not so far been evaluated in the literature. In our 
research, we used a panel of 52 countries for which remittances are an important source of 
financing.  
This panel data has been used to investigate the macroeconomic determinants of remittances 
in Chapter III. Special attention has been paid to the policy initiatives variables which were 
specially designed for this thesis by reviewing all policies that these 52 countries have 
applied (to our knowledge). The data for these countries were available in the range from six 
to 30 years per country. The composition of the data set and the size of the panel affected the 
choice of which estimation method to use. Many of the estimation methods such as 
Anderson-Hiaso, Arellano-Bond and Arellano-Bover, which are generally used to estimate a 
dynamic panel model were considered, but they are specially designed for a large cross-
section and short time series. In our case, as mentioned above, the cross-section is not large 
and with many countries having as many as 30 years of data, the time series is relatively 
large. Given that we also included a policy variable, it was in the interest of the study to keep 
as long as possible time-series dimension, since this will allow the policies to take effect; 
these are often considered in the literature as slowly acting and moving variables. The 
estimation method used in our case has been the unobserved component model AR(1), which 
is based on the expected autoregressive errors in a regression model, which in this case can 
be represented as a dynamic regression with non-linear common factor restrictions and 
uncorrelated disturbances. For AR (1) to be an appropriate method is necessary that the 
Common Factor Restriction (CFRs) hold, which was the case in our estimation. 
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In specifying the model for macroeconomic determinants of remittances, two dependent 
variables have been used, namely, remittances/GDP and remittances per capita. The set of 
independent variables which may affect the flow of remittances is in line with the literature 
but also includes a policy initiative variable. Various specifications have been tested given 
the complexity of the policy variable: a simple dummy variable whether the country applies 
any policy or not; whether a country applies only one or more policies; and finally, the type 
of policies applied by the country, whether they are supportive policies in terms of taxation, 
private sector schemes or other government policies which generally include improvements 
of payment systems, fee reductions, whether a country has a Ministry for Diaspora, legal 
advice on investment specially for migrants and similar.  
With regard to the policy variable, it was insignificant across all but one specification, where 
it suggests that applying only one policy results in negative effect on the share of remittances 
to GDP compared to the countries that do not apply any policy. The model was also 
estimated including governance indicators, as these may be correlated with remittance 
policies, which, however, decreased the number of observations. The results did not change 
with this wider specification; the policy initiative variable was insignificant. Based on the 
results, the main determinant of remittances/GDP is the GDP of home country, such that as 
the real GDP per capita of home country increases, remittances to GDP decrease. Previous 
studies consider that remittances have a countercyclical behaviour and are theorized to be 
driven by the altruistic motives. In this case, when economic conditions in the home country 
improve, the economic conditions of the households improve as well, and hence migrants 
remit less. It also hypothesized that remittances are the result of informal household 
arrangements suggesting that it is a strategy of income risk diversification, that is, in 
worsening economic conditions, remittances increase and vice versa. Such an effect is not 
observed when remittances per capita are used as the dependent variable, given the 
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statistically insignificant result of the home country GDP per capita. The real GDP per capita 
of main host country has a positive effect on remittances in both formulations, suggesting that 
as the relative living standards in host country improve the remittances to the home country 
increase. The effect is stronger in the remittances per capita formulation compared to the 
remittances to GDP. Notwithstanding, the effect on real GDP per capita of host country is 
estimated to be increasing at decreasing rate. Unemployment in the host country is 
statistically significant and with relatively large estimated effect for both remittances to GDP 
and remittances per capita. However, this variable appears with a contrary sign to the usual 
expectations. The results suggest that as unemployment increases in the host country, the 
share of remittances to GDP increases as well. This might be an indication of the temporary 
nature of migration in that in worsening labour market conditions migrants send more 
remittances and they may be signalling their intentions to return in the home country, which 
may also be considered as closely related with the income maximization hypothesis. This is 
especially important when considering the cost of living in developed countries compared 
with those in developing countries.  
6.2.2. Do Remittances and Other Migration Characteristics Change Household 
Expenditure Patterns? 
The next objective of the thesis was to investigate, at household level, the impact of 
remittances on expenditure patterns and the role of migrants in decision making within the 
households. Furthermore, it addresses whether the frequency of visits decreases the potential 
for moral hazard. Three main expenditure categories have been used to examine the effects; 
the share of current consumption, durable goods and education expenditure to total 
expenditure of the household. The model was estimated using Ordinary Least Squares for the 
current consumption, and the Tobit model for the durable goods and education expenditure.  
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The main concern in Chapter IV was to investigate the impact of remittances on expenditure 
patterns. This variable has been interacted with log of income to consider if receiving 
remittances effects expenditure differently from households‟ income from other sources. The 
results are statistically insignificant with regard to expenditure on current consumption and 
education; however, there is a positive effect with regard to durable goods, though the effect 
is very small. Thus overall the results suggest that spending of remittances is similar to 
spending other sources of income in the household and there is no reason to consider them 
differently from the policy perspective. In addition to the standard approach in the literature, 
we have also included in the model if the migrant advises the households on spending 
remittances and results suggest that an increase in income for the households receiving advice 
results in an increased share of expenditure on current consumption, while for the other 
categories of expenditure investigated the effect is insignificant. The effect of the migrant on 
expenditure was further expanded by including also the frequency of the visits, to investigate 
if some sort of control mechanism exists from the migrants‟ point of view. Results suggest 
that an increase in income, for the households who receive visits from migrants and receive 
remittances, decreases the share of expenditure on current consumption and increases the 
share on education. However, the effect of the presence of advice and visits variables is very 
small, which makes them economically unimportant.  
The estimates of the effects of the standard variables identifying household characteristics 
employed in the model are largely consistent with the literature‟s findings. An increase of 
income results in a lower share of expenditure on current consumption. As the age of the 
head of the household goes up, the share of expenditure on current consumption decreases, 
but at a decreasing rate. However, the effect of age is reversed with regard to the expenditure 
on durable goods and education, suggesting that they increase but at a decreasing rate. The 
number of children is: statistically insignificant with regard to consumption; significant and 
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negative with regard to durable goods; and positive and significant with regard to the share of 
expenditure on education. The number of adults in the household is significant only with 
regard to expenditure on education, increasing at a decreasing rate. Education of the head of 
household is significant also only in regard to the share of expenditure on education 
expenditure, having a positive effect as expected. The gender of the head of household is 
significant with regard to the consumption goods category, suggesting that female headed 
households spend more, other things being equal, with a lower share being spent on durable 
goods. If the household own their house has a positive impact on the share of expenditure on 
consumption and durable goods. However, the relationship is negative when the share of 
expenditure on education is considered. Whether the head of the household is self-employed 
has no statistically significant effect on the expenditure on current consumption and durable 
goods, however, it is highly significant with a negative effect on the share of expenditure on 
education.  
6.2.3 Are Remittances Decreasing Labour Force Participation and the 
Probability of being Employed? 
The final objective of the thesis was to investigate the implication of remittances for the 
labour market in Kosovo. However, distinctive to the migration/remittances literature, two 
definitions have been used in our case, first, the probability of being economically active and, 
second, the probability of being employed. This distinction was argued as important in this 
thesis given the characteristics in Kosovo‟s labour market but also similar characteristics in 
many major remittance recipient countries, which are usually characterized with very high 
unemployment and low participation rates, especially for females (see Section 2.3.2). The 
models have been based on the neoclassical theory of labour force participation which among 
other personal and household characteristics considers also the impact of non-labour income 
on labour force participation and employment probability. We used Probit estimation and 
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reported the average marginal effect (AME) as opposed to the marginal effects at mean 
(MEM). This was because of concerns of the literature about the application MEM when 
models include dummy variables, particularly of more than two categories and squared terms, 
which was the case in our models.  
The main objective of Chapter V was the investigation of the effect of non-labour income, in 
particular remittances, on the probability of being active and employed. In investigating this 
aspect, we obtained results which are either statistically insignificant or significant but with a 
very small effect. For instance, pension and social income is significant in decreasing the 
probability of being active only for males, but the effect is very small. Considering the 
probability of being employed, the estimated effect is negative for males and females, which 
may be the result of an increase in the reservation wage. Although part of non-labour income, 
remittances do not have a significant effect across all specifications.  
In the estimated models, education appears to be one of the important variables, higher 
educated individuals are more likely to be active and employed, compared to those with only 
preliminary education; the estimates are highly significant across all specifications. However, 
the magnitude is always larger in the model specified for females. Regional variables are also 
significant in most of the models suggesting that being from a region other than Prishtina, on 
average, significantly increases the probability of being active for males. In terms of 
employment, the results are similar for most regions, with a higher probability of being 
employed against Prishtina. Results are more mixed in models specified for females. The 
difference between households in rural and urban areas in the presence of productive assets 
has also been taken into account. The results suggest that male individuals who possess 
productive assets in rural areas have a higher probability of being active and being employed 
compared to male individuals in urban areas. The lack of productive assets in rural 
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households makes it less likely for both males and females to be employed while it is 
insignificant for the probability of being active, compared to individuals in urban areas. 
Home ownership is significant and positive for males and females for the probability of being 
employed, while for females, however, it decreases the probability of being active. Given the 
mixed results and small size of the country, the effect of home ownership cannot be explained 
through the immobility of labour hypothesis but it could be viewed as an economic asset 
which affects the decision to be inactive for females.  
It is theorized that amongst the important variables affecting labour force participation and 
employment probability is also the presence of children in the household, especially for 
female members. However, the results do not support this for Kosovo, given the relatively 
small effect in the cases when significant. As well as young children the model also included 
children from 7 up to 17 years, which did result in a negative effect across three out of four 
specifications.  For male individuals the effect was a relatively small decrease in the 
probability of being active, while for females the effect was somewhat higher in both the 
probability of being active and probability of being employed. The number of seniors in the 
household is statistically insignificant in three out of four specifications and thus do not 
support the theory.  
One of the important contributions of this thesis was the inclusion of the unemployed adults 
within the household in order to investigate discouraged worker/added worker effects. The 
results are highly significant across all specifications suggesting that a discouraged worker 
effect takes place when the number of unemployed adult household members increases. The 
effects are similar between males and females in terms of the probability of being active in 
the labour market, while in terms of the probability of being employed, a higher number of 
unemployed adults appears to discourage females more than males. Other household 
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members‟ income, (proxied by the maximum years of education of any other individual in the 
household in this estimation), is in line with expectations given that it decreases the 
probability of being active for both males and females. However, it increases the probability 
of being employed for males. 
6.2.4 The Combined Findings in Relation to Alternative Theories of Remittances 
The combined findings of the three empirical chapters with regard to whether altruism or the 
self-interest is the dominant motive behind sending remittances are summarized in this 
section.  However, it needs to be borne in mind, as considered in section 3.3, that there are 
difficulties in making a clear distinction between these two possible motives. 
In the altruism approach remittances are expected to be countercyclical, that is 
remittances/GDP decreases as the GDP per capita of home country increases, while in the 
self-interest case remittances are expected to be procyclical. The findings are of a 
countercyclical behaviour and thus, at macroeconomic level this provides support for 
altruism. Given that many policies are oriented towards making the home country more 
attractive, either in terms of taxation, private sector schemes or other government policies for 
migrants, the lack of significance of the policy initiatives variables in this thesis also arguably 
suggests that self-interest is not the prime motive.  
With regard to the effect of remittances on household expenditure patterns, it is difficult to 
interpret whether the results clearly support altruism or self-interest. If concerned with 
altruism, the migrant may well want the home household to spend more on current 
consumption, especially if they would otherwise be in poverty (and for a sizeable minority of 
households in Kosovo remittances are their main source of income – see section 2.3.3).   
Given this motive, however, if the home household is in a slightly better financial position, 
encouraging expenditure to raise the long-run fortunes of the family would be appropriate, for 
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instance expenditure on education (but could also arguably be expenditure on particular 
durable goods given some family‟s situations). If self-interest is the main concern then the 
migrant may want to encourage wealth creation, rather than current consumption, but given 
the need under this view to maintain strong family ties it does not exclude use of remittances 
on current consumption. The finding are that the effect of income increase in the presence of 
advice on spending remittances from the migrant increases the current consumption, is 
arguably more in line with the altruism approach. The estimates also suggest that the 
frequency of visits of the migrant decreases the share of current consumption category and 
increases the share expenditure on education.  This does not offer clear support for either 
view.    
-Finally, with regard to the impact of remittances on labour force participation, what would 
be expected under the two approaches has not been fully developed in the literature. If the 
motive for remittances is altruism, a reduction in labour force participation with the presence 
of remittances may be seen as a minor side effect, whereas in the self-interest approach such 
a reduction in participation may be regarded more negatively by the remittance provider. 
The evidence in this thesis is that remittances do not negatively affect labour force 
participation.  However, the study did not investigate whether this may be because home 
country households wish to maintain in favour with remittance providers or for other reasons 
(such as regarding remittances as a short-run income source, as discussed in section 5.5), thus 
it is unclear how this empirical result bears on the altruism/self-interest debate.   
In conclusion, the empirical results presented across chapters provide some limited evidence 
that altruism may be the primary factor why remittances are sent, but this debate is far from 
settled.  
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6.3 Policy Implications 
The empirical investigation of specific aspects of remittances, including the span of the 
countries and years from a macroeconomic and microeconomic perspective provides 
evidence on which to base policy recommendations. Also, this may help consider the 
implications of remittances in recipient economies which may help government forecasting 
and planning.  
6.3.1 Policy Implications from the Macroeconomic Findings 
The overall findings of the macroeconomic determinants of remittances are that the behaviour 
of remittances flows towards home country is determined by the economic factors in both the 
home and the host countries, reflected by the effect of real GDP per capita. However, most 
importantly, the findings suggest that there is no evidence that policies applied to increase 
remittances have done so.  
For the macroeconomic determinants of remittances and policy initiatives, the aim of the 
analysis was towards policy evaluation rather than new policy recommendations. However, 
some recommendations could be provided with regard to remittances. In this context, one of 
the main recommendations is that:  
First, policies to encourage migrants to send more remittances do not seem to work.  Thus the 
recommendation is that these should not be implemented – or at least any policy with 
anything more than minimal costs. There is no evidence that these are likely to be cost 
effective in bringing in more remittances. In this context, in application of policies, it is 
important to review the costs of implementing policies since these might be high. Such 
evaluation of the cost of policies should be carried out for specific countries against the 
magnitude of the benefit. For example, a policy such as having a Ministry for Diaspora may 
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have negligible costs for large countries; however, for small countries this may significantly 
affect the public expenditure of particular ministries. Another example could be the presence 
of tax breaks for imported goods up to some amounts or for some goods categories. This is 
because the increase of imports as a policy to increase remittances may not be cost effective 
since the loss on customs duty from the imported goods may be higher than the increased 
amount of remittances received. This is because literature often recognizes that countries 
where the duty free imports exists for migrants and specific amounts are usually implemented 
to categories of goods not being produced in the country, but often include luxury products. 
Other policies such as consultancy provided via telephone for potential investors and the 
presentation of investment opportunities, are usually easily implemented; hence they do not 
present a substantial burden in terms of cost of implementing, even if their effects are 
possibly limited. 
Second, it should also be taken into consideration by the relevant institutions that some of the 
policies might not ensure equal treatment within the country given that they often target 
specific groups (in this case the specific group are migrants). In this context, policies that 
ensure equal competition and treatment for migrants and local residents should be followed. 
Selective policies may also in some cases conflict with the legal system of some countries.  
The findings also revealed that remittances are sensitive to the change of income level in both 
home and host countries. In this context, governments of home countries should recognise 
this factor especially that some studies such as World Bank (2006) and Petreski et al., (2013) 
find that remittances reduce poverty in developing countries, including Kosovo.  
Finally, some aspects that are not directly related to the empirical findings of this chapter but 
are usually considered cost-effective could be recommended from the general literature. One 
of them is that some countries have previously applied taxes on remittances. Such policies are 
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likely to fail to generate as much additional revenue as forecast, as remittances shift towards 
informal channel transfers and hence increase the risks on transfers and other problems 
related to the monitoring of money laundering.  
Some policies that could be cost effective and are not implemented could result from the 
private sector initiatives, specifically the banking sector. For instance, recently bankers in 
Kosovo have been discussing whether the overall conditions of households who receive 
remittances could be eased for loan applications under the guarantee of the migrant. Such 
proposals include cash-covered loans, which mean that the deposit of the migrant in a bank 
account in their home country may serve as a guarantee for the credit provided to the home 
country household. This serves as a potential source to finance investment and self-
employment and most importantly, generating jobs and income. Once these are generated it 
may reduce the need for the migrant to send remittances. However, if the household fails to 
repay the loan, the deposits of the migrant would be used to repay the remaining amounts.  
6.3.2 Policy Implications from the Microeconomic Findings 
Based on the findings of the Chapter IV and the results obtained in the microeconomic effects 
of remittances with respect to household expenditure patterns, some implications and 
recommendations can be drawn here. The implications of the findings in Chapter IV and 
Chapter V are of relevance for Kosovo given that the data are for Kosovo but could also be 
applicable for countries with similar economic and social profiles to Kosovo.  
However, importantly, the main results of the analysis with regard to the expenditure 
behaviour suggest that that the expenditure of remittances does not largely give rise to 
different behaviour than other sources of income and this need to be borne in mind in 
considering the policy options for remittances.  Consequently, the views that remittances 
could be a particularly beneficial source of development with respect to consumption and 
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investment are not supported by the evidence in this thesis given that the evidence is that they 
typically behave as other sources of income. However, possible indirect effects such as 
through stable nutrition and health effects are not observable here. The results on the other 
hand suggest that remittances affect positively the share of expenditure on durable household 
goods but it must be noted that these goods in most of the cases include household domestic 
appliances and most of all, the effect is rather small. Also the import share of consumption 
expenditure, a potentially negative effect of remittances on the home country raised in 
previous studies, has not been investigated in this thesis.   
However, among the important findings of the expenditure pattern models is that there is 
little evidence that remittances change the share of expenditure on education, which may be 
considered an important source of development for households and at the country level. The 
only case where remittances were found to affect positively the share of expenditure on 
education is when the frequency of visits by the migrant in home country increases, which 
has been proposed in this model to serve as a control mechanism in household expenditure 
patterns; though even then the effect was very small (however, it is possible that the 
frequency of visits is connected to the migrants‟ children residing in home country or not; 
this could not be established from our data). Based on the findings, the following is proposed: 
- A review of current policies on remittances may be appropriate given that they do not 
change the consumption patterns in the home country; 
- Education programs may work, however, it must be noted that the share of 
expenditure on education increases only when the frequency of visits by the migrant 
increases, suggesting that control mechanisms work, but their effect is very low. 
A concern for governments has been that remittances may increase the reservation wage of 
remittance recipients.  However, the findings from this investigation are that remittances have 
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no impact on the probability of being active in the labour market and probability of being 
employed, for both males and females. Therefore, it could be suggested that there is no 
evidence that remittances are a factor which may have caused the high unemployment rate in 
the country.  
In this context, it appears that there is no need for policies to aid specifically the function of 
the labour market in this regard. This is because the results suggest that the level of 
remittances do not negatively affect the probability of being employed; nor to be active in the 
labour market. Hence, in terms of labour force participation and employment, it seems that 
other aspects affect them and often they are related to the domestic factors rather than the 
presence of remittances. These domestic factors are widely related to the education, region, 
presence of productive assets, and presence of children but most importantly, it is the 
discouraged worker effect that seems to be of particular importance.  
Given these findings, it may be recommended that labour market policies should be oriented 
towards reforms from a nationwide perspective with a focus on the domestic economy given 
that domestic factors are those setting to largest extent the participation rate and also the 
probability to be employed. More specifically, as presented in Chapter II, but also in line with 
the findings in Chapter V, it is the education profile of the individual which defines the 
labour participation and employment. Although not covered in the empirical work in this 
thesis, through the descriptive data presented in Figure 2.8, it appears that the economy faces 
a shortage of skilled workers and an excessive number of unqualified job-seekers. In this 
context, there is an argument that the demand for skilled labour should be addressed and that 
education/skills training is the key determinant for participation and employment.   
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6.4 Contributions to Knowledge 
This thesis contributed to the ongoing debate and empirical evidence for developing countries 
with regard to the macroeconomic determinants of remittances, the microeconomic 
implications of remittances with respect to expenditure patterns and also the effect of 
remittances on the probability of labour force participation and employment. 
The contribution Chapter III can be summarized as following:  
- It is the first study which identifies the policy initiatives that each country applies with 
regard to remittances and migrants; 
- A range of variables have been created to include the policy initiatives in the model; 
- The policy initiative variables are statistically insignificant, and hence, in the thesis it 
is recommended that the policies to increase remittances should not be undertaken, 
particularly if they have significant costs for implementation for the country.  
- This is the only study that includes all the developing countries for which the data is 
available; it uses a very large data set and is amongst the most inclusive.  
- It is amongst the few studies which include the economic conditions of the main host 
countries, such as unemployment and real GDP per capita.  
The contribution to the literature and empirical evidence of Chapter III is that findings are in 
line with the literature, supporting the altruism and income diversification risk hypothesis 
given the significant effect of the real GDP per capita of home country. However, consistent 
with the literature, it may be very hard to clearly identify which or whether both altruism and 
self-interest motives affect the flow of remittances to GDP and per capita. In this context, 
when the real GDP per capita of host country is taken into consideration, the evidence in this 
thesis is that it affects the flow of remittances to GDP and per capita at a decreasing rate. 
This may indicate that initially, remittances may be sent for altruistic purposes, however, the 
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self-interest motives or income maximization could be important as well given that migrants 
are slowing the growth of remittances flows as the host country GDP increases (though there 
is no evidence that they ever decrease).  
The suggestion that remittances may be driven from self-interest motives and individual 
income maximization strategy it is to some extent also suggested by the findings on the effect 
of host country unemployment. In turn, this suggests that as host country unemployment 
increases, the flow of remittances increases as well, which may indicate that return migration 
is being considered. In this context, this may be viewed as an attempt by the migrants to 
enforce the links and signal that they are part of the home country society. This is particularly 
important given the living cost differences between home and host countries, implying that as 
unemployed, migrants would prefer living in the home country environment due to lower 
costs compared to in the host countries.  
Regarding Chapter IV, the contribution to the literature can be summarized as following:  
- It introduces two new variables in the literature, that is, whether the migrant advises 
the household on expenditure and the frequency of the visits to the home country by 
the migrant. These variables have been interacted with remittances in order to obtain 
the effect only for remittance recipient households.  
- It comparison to most of the research in the literature, this thesis draws more 
explicitly on the well-established theoretical models such as Working-Lesser model in 
order to investigate the expenditure patterns. 
In addition to the above listed, the study contributes in investigating a relatively unexplored 
issue for Kosovo but also one that may be applicable in many developing countries with 
similar profile to that of Kosovo. The thesis also contributes to the literature with its findings, 
especially in context of their implications for expenditure patterns. In this context, it finds 
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that income changes do not affect expenditure patterns differently between remittance 
recipients and non-recipients households. Though remittances are valuable as a source of 
income that may help alleviate poverty, and may, for instance,  ensure on average higher 
nutrition and consequently, improved health, which represents an important part of human 
capital, there is no extra (or indeed less) effect than that of other sources of income shown in 
this study.  Furthermore, the dataset used in this study is also exceptional in terms of the 
information that it contains and it was specially designed for remittances research, while 
many other studies use datasets which are usually designed for other purposes and do not 
cover so extensively the remittances and migration aspects. 
Similar to the previous chapter, Chapter V has also some general contributions in terms of 
investigating an unexplored topic for Kosovo. This also is an explored topic that has been 
rarely explored for other developing countries, especially in the region. The particular 
contributions of Chapter V are summarized below:  
- The separate treatment of labour force participation and the probability to be 
employed. In the literature these two variables have not been clearly separated, given 
that working hours were used in most of the cases, but it is arguably important to treat 
them separately, especially for developing countries facing high unemployment rate 
with possibly high rates of discouraged workers.  
- The use of theoretical models in investigating the impact of remittances on labour 
force participation and probability to be employed, which is not presented in the 
migration/remittances literature.   
- The non-labour income treatment presents a contribution to the literature. 
Remittances, and pension and social income are treated separately. They both 
represent non-labour income; however, given their different nature, i.e. remittances 
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may be of a temporary nature, while pension and social income may be considered 
more of a permanent nature, it is argued as necessary to treat them separately.  
- Theoretically it can be argued that the receipt of remittances may be expected to raise 
the reservation wage, and if this is the case, a decreases the probability of being 
employed is expected. In the case of Kosovo, the empirical results did not provide 
evidence that receipt of remittances decreases the probability of being employed.   
6.5 Limitations and suggestions for further research 
In the process of conducting this thesis, some limitations have been faced and some new 
questions have been raised based on the empirical findings presented in the chapters. 
Consequently, some suggestions for further research will be also presented with regard to 
remittances for developing countries in general, but at microeconomic level for Kosovo or 
other countries in the region in particular.  
For the macroeconomic determinants of remittances, a few limitations in the data have been 
encountered. Additionally, there are some areas that could not be addressed given that they 
are beyond the scope of this thesis. These limitations are presented as following:   
- The data for many developing countries were not available, especially for African 
countries;  
- A continuous problem in recording remittances is present in the statistical offices of 
many countries, consequently, we used World Bank estimates which at least use a 
standard methodology for calculating remittances; 
- Given the findings that it is also the host country economic activity and 
unemployment rate that plays a role on remittances, we recommend that further 
research is conducted in this area. Some limited research exists with regard to USA-
Mexico flow of remittances. This could be further expanded for Western Europe 
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towards Eastern and South-eastern Europe, Gulf-Countries towards India and Middle-
East.   
- No comprehensive list of economic policies undertaken by countries exists, creating 
further problems to researchers given that policy evaluation studies face a challenge 
of collecting the data in this variable. To the best of our knowledge, we attempted to 
create a data set of policies which is as comprehensive as possible, however, given the 
time limit, but also the lack of information systems in many developing countries, it is 
difficult to guarantee that all the policies have been covered.  
- Time-series analysis for individual countries could not have been conducted given the 
relatively short span of the data; 
- Although a contribution of this thesis is the lack of evidence that policy initiatives 
increase remittances, it does not investigate whether these policies are ineffective with 
regard to other economic indicators such as the level of foreign direct investment, 
imports of capital goods, deposit growth etc. This is particularly important to be 
researched in future given that, at least for the case of Kosovo, a significant part of the 
foreign direct investment represents investment conducted by migrants. This might 
well be the case for many other countries, including those who undertake policy 
initiatives and the effect could be transmitted in foreign direct investment rather than 
remittances.  
- Given the lack of information on the policy variable, we had to group them in three 
general categories and could not use the individual definitions of what the policy was 
designed for. Further amalgamations into different policy variable groups may be a 
further useful investigation.   
Regarding the Chapter IV on the impact of remittances on expenditure patterns, no significant 
challenges have been faced in the context of the cross-section data (although some issues of 
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breath and quality are raised below); however, some recommendations for further research 
might be necessary, such as:  
- The investigation of the remittances impact on expenditure patterns using household 
level panel data, which may allow identifying the difference in expenditure patterns 
before and after receiving remittances. 
One of the most important and debated issues in the literature of remittances remains the 
impact of remittances on labour supply. Therefore, some aspects that could be addressed are 
the following:  
- In this thesis we raised the question from the viewpoint of participation that is, being 
active, or not in the labour market and also from the probability of being employed. 
Although these two distinctions were viewed as necessary and contributing to the 
literature, further and in depth research might be useful directly from the viewpoint of 
job-search theory and the reservation wage.   
It is perceived that literature often uses various definitions of remittances in investigating the 
issue. Also, throughout the research, various research questionnaires have been encountered 
which do not fully comply with the IMF‟s definition of remittances flows. Such definition 
problems include the non-reporting of in-kind remittances, uses of very general definitions in 
the specific remittance questions and also the treatment of many other components of balance 
of payments in the same manner as remittances. Furthermore, many income questions did not 
require the respondent to exclude the income from remittances. Therefore, the final research 
area could be oriented towards the improvement of definitional aspects of remittances for 
questionnaires. While at the macroeconomic level, it appears that this is more properly 
standardized with IMF definitions and recommendations on calculating the flow of 
remittances.  
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Finally, research on remittances should be expanded having in mind their relatively large size 
to many developing economies. However, based on the combined findings across the 
empirical chapters and also on the review of the literature, it could be implied that the issue of 
migration and remittances should be addressed from another perspective given there is no 
evidence that the flow of remittances is affected by policies and in addition to that, from 
microeconomic perspective, the evidence in this thesis is that they do not affect behaviour 
differently from other sources of income and do not deter labour force participation. However 
such findings do not necessarily imply that there are no options for leveraging the diaspora of 
migrant sending countries for economic development. In this context, instead of focusing on 
policies towards shifting remittances for investment, the research could be oriented towards 
migration theories and towards extending the literature on attracting migrants‟ direct 
investments. This is because a large stock of migrants could represent significant potential 
investors, especially if migrants are running their own business in their host countries. For 
many developing countries, the transfer of knowledge, technology and experience from 
developed countries, along with financial and investment capacities of migrants could be seen 
as an alternative approach and the research could be re-oriented into this area. It could be 
hypothesised that such an approach may induce economic development because in addition to 
the direct effect of investment and know-how transfer, the presence of migrant investors may 
be a good signal and promoter of other foreign investments. Furthermore, migrants could also 
serve as a market for the products of the home country, especially if they are concentrated in 
specific countries. In this context, entrepreneurship, foreign investment, knowledge and 
advanced technology transfers but also trade research and theories may be useful to 
understand the implication of migration for stronger development.  
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    Appendix 1. Global Migration Trends 
 
Major Destinations for Migrants 
International migrant stock at mid-year (both sexes) 
1990 2000 2010 2013 
WORLD 
 154 161 
984 
 174 515 
733 
 220 729 
300 
 231 522 
215 
More developed regions  82 306 645 
 103 388 
690 
 129 737 
280 
 135 583 
436 
Less developed regions  71 855 339  71 127 043  90 992 020  95 938 779 
Least developed countries  10 922 472  10 240 044  10 181 518  10 958 217 
Less developed regions excluding least 
developed countries  60 932 867  60 886 999  80 810 502  84 980 562 
  International migrant stock at mid-year (male) 
  1990 2000 2010 2013 
WORLD  78 856 267  88 790 217 
 114 581 
437 
 120 328 
254 
More developed regions  40 188 828  50 444 059  62 969 343  65 625 395 
Less developed regions  38 667 439  38 346 158  51 612 094  54 702 859 
Least developed countries  5 771 023  5 380 465  5 539 446  5 996 330 
Less developed regions excluding least 
developed countries  32 896 416  32 965 693  46 072 648  48 706 529 
  International migrant stock at mid-year (female) 
  1990 2000 2010 2013 
WORLD  75 305 717  85 725 516 
 106 147 
863 
 111 193 
961 
More developed regions  42 117 817  52 944 631  66 767 937  69 958 041 
Less developed regions  33 187 900  32 780 885  39 379 926  41 235 920 
Least developed countries  5 151 449  4 859 579  4 642 072  4 961 887 
Less developed regions excluding least 
developed countries  28 036 451  27 921 306  34 737 854  36 274 033 
        Source: United Nations 
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Appendix 2. Selected Macroeconomic Indicators for Kosovo 
 
  2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 
                    
Real GDP Growth (in percent) 4% 3% 8% 7% 3% 3% 4% 3% 3% 
Nominal GDP (in Billion USD) 3.741 3.918 4.743 5.799 5.582 5.694 6.637 6.323 6.827 
Inflation, average consumer prices -1.4% 0.6% 4.4% 9.4% -2.4% 3.5% 7.3% 2.5% 1.9% 
                    
Exports of Goods 79.36 84.99 168.73 260.62 302.02 235.20 423.55 417.68 381.06 
Exports of Services 307.06 332.37 439.35 544.12 547.20 686.99 795.73 795.13 843.46 
Imports of Goods  
-
1302.536 
-
1437.674 
-
1784.688 
-
2250.486 
-
2602.714 
-
2427.302 
-
2856.831 
-
3064.783 
-
3134.057 
Imports of Services -329.932 
-
342.9865 
-
399.3849 
-
381.5214 
-
335.8335 
-
378.6261 
-
536.1356 
-
453.5135 
-
383.6208 
                    
Compensation of Employees 177.87 183.01 202.87 228.88 245.73 225.17 244.59 284.35 292.06 
Remittances (in million USD) 444.17 524.27 643.50 758.37 848.92 777.31 811.50 751.83 804.35 
                    
Current Account (percent of GDP) -8.2% -7.2% -10.2% -16.0% -9.4% -12.0% -13.8% -7.7% -6.8% 
                    
Credit Growth  37.5% 23.9% 40.1% 32.7% 8.9% 13.2% 16.4% 3.8% 2.4% 
Deposit Growth 35.1% 20.5% 10.5% 23.7% 26.3% 20.8% 11.0% 8.6% 8.3% 
  Source: Statistical Office of Kosovo (2014) and Central Bank of the Republic of Kosovo (2014). 
261 
 
Appendix 3.1. The definitions of the variables  
 
Variables Description Source: 
Remittances/GDP 
Remittances in Billions of USD as a 
share to the GDP of the country i 
World Bank 
and IMF  
Remittances per Capita 
Remittances in Billions divided by the 
population of the country i World Bank  
Unemployment Rate in Home Country Unemployment rate country i World Bank  
Unemployment Rate in Host Country 
Unemployment rate in the main host 
country of migrants from country i  World Bank  
GDP per Capita of Home country (PPP) 
GDP per Capita of Home country at 
purchasing power parity IMF 
GDP Per Capita of Host Country 
GDP Per Capita of the main Host 
Country of migrants from country i IMF 
Inflation Inflation Rate in country i IMF 
Population  Estimate of the population   World Bank 
Any Policy Variable 
A dummy variable taking into account 
if country i applies any policy  
Author’s 
Creation 
One Policy Variable 
A dummy variable taking into account 
if country i applies one policy  
Author’s 
Creation 
Two or More Policy Variables 
A dummy variable taking into account 
if country i applies two or more 
policies 
Author’s 
Creation 
Taxation Policy Variable 
A dummy variable taking into account 
if country i applies taxation policies in 
favour of migrants  
Author’s 
Creation 
Other Government Policy Variable 
A dummy variable taking into account 
if country i applies other policies 
related to facilitation of migrants 
economic interest 
Author’s 
Creation 
Private Sector Policy Variable 
A dummy variable taking into account 
if firms (mostly banks) in country i 
applies any policy for migrants 
Author’s 
Creation 
Government Effectiveness 
World Bank index to present the 
Government Effectiveness  World Bank 
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Appendix 3.2. Policy Initiatives Variable by Country and the List 
of Countries included in analysis 
 
Policies Government Policies and initiatives 
Private Sector 
Inititatives 
1 2 3 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 
Country 
L
e
g
a
l 
s
u
p
p
o
rt
 
In
v
e
s
tm
e
n
t 
P
o
lic
ie
s
 
E
x
c
h
a
n
g
e
 r
a
te
 
p
o
lic
y
 
Im
p
o
rt
 s
u
p
p
o
rt
 
B
u
s
in
e
s
s
 
a
d
v
is
o
ry
 
s
e
rv
ic
e
s
 
F
e
e
 r
e
d
u
c
ti
o
n
 
M
in
is
tr
y
 f
o
r 
D
ia
s
p
o
ra
 
O
th
e
r 
G
v
t 
in
c
e
n
ti
v
e
 
L
o
c
a
l 
B
a
n
k
 i
n
 
H
o
s
t 
C
o
u
n
tr
y
 
L
o
a
n
s
 f
o
r 
m
ig
ra
n
t 
in
v
e
s
tm
e
n
t 
D
e
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it
 
s
c
h
e
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e
s
 f
o
r 
m
ig
ra
n
ts
 
Albania 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Algeria 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Armenia 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 1 1 0 
Azerbaijan 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Belarus 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Bosnia & Herz. 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Bulgaria 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
China 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Colombia 1 0 0 1 1 0 0 0 0 1 0 
Costa Rica 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Croatia 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 
Dominican R. 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Ecuador 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 
Egypt 0 1 0 1 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 
El Salvador 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 
Estonia 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Georgia 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 
Guatemala 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Honduras 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Indonesia 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Iran 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Jamaica 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Jordan 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Kenya 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 
Kosovo 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Kyrgyzstan 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Latvia 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Lithuania 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 
FYR Macedonia 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Mexico 1 1 0 0 1 0 0 1 1 1 0 
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Continued                       
Policies Government Policies and initiatives 
Private Sector 
Inititatives 
1 2 3 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 
Country 
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Moldova 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Mongolia 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Morocco 1 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 1 0 0 
Myanmar 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Nicaragua 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Pakistan 0 0 0 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Panama 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Paraguay 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Peru 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 
Philippines 0 1 1 0 1 0 0 1 0 0 0 
Poland 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Romania 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Serbia 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 1 0 0 0 
Sri Lanka 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 1 0 1 0 
Swaziland 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Syria 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 
Thailand 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Tunisia 0 0 0 1 1 0 1 0 0 0 1 
Turkey 1 1 1 1 0 1 0 1 1 0 0 
Ukraine 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Uruguay 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Vietnam 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
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Appendix 3.3 Estimation of the Standard Model (Table 3.6) 
Appendix 3.3.1 Test For CFR for Remittances/GDP 
 
xtreg  remitgdp  unempl  hcunempl inflation  policyv popul gdpipc gdpi2 gdpjpc  gdpj2  y1981 
y1982 y1983 y1984 y1985 y1986 y1987 y1988 y1989 y1990 y1991 y1992 y1993 y1994 y1995 y1996 
y1997 y1998 y1999 y2000 y2001 y2002 y2003 y2004 y2005 y2006 y2007 y2008 y2009   lag_remitgdp 
lag_unempl lag_hcunempl lag_inflation lag_popul lag_gdpipc lag_gdpi2 lag_gdpjpc lag_gdpj2, fe 
 
Fixed-effects (within) regression               Number of obs      =       870 
Group variable: id                              Number of groups   =        52 
 
R-sq:  within  = 0.8421                         Obs per group: min =         4 
       between = 0.9292                                        avg =      16.7 
       overall = 0.8990                                        max =        29 
 
                                                F(47,771)          =     87.50 
corr(u_i, Xb)  = 0.1580                         Prob > F           =    0.0000 
 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
     remitgdp |      Coef.   Std. Err.      t    P>|t|     [95% Conf. Interval] 
--------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
       unempl |    .031871   .0308733     1.03   0.302    -.0287348    .0924767 
     hcunempl |   .0980467   .0835527     1.17   0.241     -.065971    .2620644 
    inflation |   .0001373   .0003192     0.43   0.667    -.0004893    .0007639 
      policyv |   -.153749   .2441754    -0.63   0.529    -.6330765    .3255784 
        popul |  -.0824847   .1031254    -0.80   0.424    -.2849247    .1199552 
       gdpipc |  -.0003608   .0001509    -2.39   0.017    -.0006569   -.0000646 
        gdpi2 |   1.06e-07   2.23e-07     0.48   0.634    -3.32e-07    5.44e-07 
       gdpjpc |   .0010386   .0002949     3.52   0.000     .0004597    .0016175 
        gdpj2 |  -7.60e-09   3.30e-09    -2.30   0.021    -1.41e-08   -1.13e-09 
        y1981 |   3.138519   2.642475     1.19   0.235     -2.04878    8.325817 
        y1982 |   3.627748   2.386527     1.52   0.129    -1.057113     8.31261 
        y1983 |   3.340792   2.289269     1.46   0.145    -1.153147    7.834731 
        y1984 |   3.329556   2.184255     1.52   0.128    -.9582355    7.617347 
        y1985 |   3.548186   2.115454     1.68   0.094    -.6045466    7.700919 
        y1986 |   3.104758   2.041117     1.52   0.129    -.9020481    7.111564 
        y1987 |   3.152438   1.983332     1.59   0.112    -.7409329    7.045809 
        y1988 |    2.62787   1.925099     1.37   0.173    -1.151187    6.406927 
        y1989 |   2.640198    1.85968     1.42   0.156    -1.010438    6.290835 
        y1990 |   2.470856   1.800102     1.37   0.170    -1.062827    6.004539 
        y1991 |   2.783882   1.765636     1.58   0.115     -.682142    6.249907 
        y1992 |   2.951051   1.714118     1.72   0.086    -.4138413    6.315942 
        y1993 |   2.891846    1.65663     1.75   0.081    -.3601941    6.143885 
        y1994 |   2.140829   1.618567     1.32   0.186    -1.036492    5.318151 
        y1995 |   2.507635   1.571102     1.60   0.111    -.5765092     5.59178 
        y1996 |   2.074409   1.530866     1.36   0.176    -.9307506    5.079569 
        y1997 |   1.970362   1.495364     1.32   0.188     -.965106    4.905829 
        y1998 |   2.069321   1.464155     1.41   0.158    -.8048823    4.943523 
        y1999 |    1.81049   1.435075     1.26   0.207    -1.006629    4.627609 
        y2000 |   1.828925   1.404768     1.30   0.193    -.9286988     4.58655 
        y2001 |   1.995454   1.375014     1.45   0.147    -.7037615     4.69467 
        y2002 |   2.280597   1.357551     1.68   0.093    -.3843379    4.945531 
        y2003 |   2.037337   1.340404     1.52   0.129     -.593938    4.668612 
        y2004 |   2.035174   1.328472     1.53   0.126    -.5726777    4.643025 
        y2005 |    1.79891   1.311235     1.37   0.170    -.7751052    4.372924 
        y2006 |   1.531573   1.299672     1.18   0.239    -1.019742    4.082889 
        y2007 |   1.249839   1.286112     0.97   0.331    -1.274858    3.774536 
        y2008 |   .9497716   1.276384     0.74   0.457    -1.555828    3.455371 
        y2009 |    1.32265   1.314653     1.01   0.315    -1.258075    3.903374 
265 
 
 lag_remitgdp |   .8647408    .016868    51.27   0.000     .8316281    .8978535 
   lag_unempl |  -.0438588   .0299497    -1.46   0.143    -.1026515    .0149338 
 lag_hcunempl |  -.1592602   .0789051    -2.02   0.044    -.3141546   -.0043659 
lag_inflation |   .0000672   .0001565     0.43   0.668    -.0002401    .0003744 
    lag_popul |   .0845306   .1001938     0.84   0.399    -.1121544    .2812156 
   lag_gdpipc |   .0003074   .0001495     2.06   0.040     .0000139    .0006009 
    lag_gdpi2 |  -8.27e-08   3.03e-07    -0.27   0.785    -6.77e-07    5.12e-07 
   lag_gdpjpc |  -.0008561   .0002965    -2.89   0.004    -.0014381   -.0002741 
    lag_gdpj2 |   6.31e-09   3.18e-09     1.98   0.048     6.29e-11    1.26e-08 
        _cons |  -4.420123    3.51158    -1.26   0.209    -11.31351    2.473268 
--------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
      sigma_u |  1.4661834 
      sigma_e |  1.1918444 
          rho |   .6021236   (fraction of variance due to u_i) 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
F test that all u_i=0:     F(51, 771) =     2.72             Prob > F = 0.0000 
. testnl _b[lag_remitgdp]*_b[unempl]=-_b[lag_unempl] 
 
 
 
  
 
CFR for each variable 
. testnl _b[lag_remitgdp]*_b[gdpj2]=-_b[lag_gdpj2] 
. testnl _b[lag_remitgdp]*_b[gdpi2]=-_b[lag_gdpi2] 
. testnl _b[lag_remitgdp]*_b[gdpjpc]=-_b[lag_gdpjpc] 
. testnl _b[lag_remitgdp]*_b[gdpipc]=-_b[lag_gdpipc] 
. testnl _b[lag_remitgdp]*_b[popul]=-_b[lag_ popul] 
. testnl _b[lag_remitgdp]*_b[inflation]=-_b[lag_inflation] 
. testnl _b[lag_remitgdp]*_b[hcunempl]=-_b[lag_hcunempl] 
 
 
 (1)  _b[lag_remitgdp]*_b[unempl] = -_b[lag_unempl] 
 
 
 (1)  _b[lag_remitgdp]*_b[unempl] = -_b[lag_unempl] 
 
             F(1, 771) =        0.82 
              Prob > F =        0.3650 
 
 
. testnl _b[lag_remitgdp]*_b[hcunempl]=-_b[lag_hcunempl] 
 
  (1)  _b[lag_remitgdp]*_b[hcunempl] = -_b[lag_hcunempl] 
 
             F(1, 771) =        2.81 
              Prob > F =        0.0939 
 
 
. testnl _b[lag_remitgdp]*_b[inflation]=-_b[lag_inflation] 
 
  (1)  _b[lag_remitgdp]*_b[inflation] = -_b[lag_inflation] 
 
             F(1, 771) =        0.47 
              Prob > F =        0.4935 
 
 
. testnl _b[lag_remitgdp]*_b[popul]=-_b[lag_ popul] 
 
  (1)  _b[lag_remitgdp]*_b[popul] = -_b[lag_ popul] 
 
             F(1, 771) =        1.16 
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              Prob > F =        0.2814 
 
 
. testnl _b[lag_remitgdp]*_b[gdpipc]=-_b[lag_gdpipc] 
 
  (1)  _b[lag_remitgdp]*_b[gdpipc] = -_b[lag_gdpipc] 
 
             F(1, 771) =        0.01 
              Prob > F =        0.9156 
 
 
. testnl _b[lag_remitgdp]*_b[gdpjpc]=-_b[lag_gdpjpc] 
 
  (1)  _b[lag_remitgdp]*_b[gdpjpc] = -_b[lag_gdpjpc] 
 
             F(1, 771) =        0.10 
              Prob > F =        0.7477 
 
 
. testnl _b[lag_remitgdp]*_b[gdpi2]=-_b[lag_gdpi2] 
 
  (1)  _b[lag_remitgdp]*_b[gdpi2] = -_b[lag_gdpi2] 
 
             F(1, 771) =        0.01 
              Prob > F =        0.9404 
 
. testnl _b[lag_remitgdp]*_b[gdpj2]=-_b[lag_gdpj2] 
 
  (1)  _b[lag_remitgdp]*_b[gdpj2] = -_b[lag_gdpj2] 
 
             F(1, 771) =        0.05 
              Prob > F =        0.8303 
 
Joint CFR  
 
testnl (_b[lag_remitgdp]*_b[unempl]=-_b[lag_unempl]) (_b[lag_remitgdp]*_b[hcunempl]=-
_b[lag_hcunempl]) (_b[lag_remitgdp]*_b[inflation]=-_b[lag_inflation]) (_b[lag_remitgdp]* 
_b[popul]=-_b[lag_popul]) (_b[lag_remitgdp]*_b[gdpipc]=-_b[lag_gdpipc]) 
_b[lag_remitgdp]*_b[gdpjpc]=-_b[lag_gdpjpc]) (_b[lag_remitgdp]*_b[gdpi2]=-_b[lag_gdpi2]) 
(_b[lag_remitgdp]*_b[gdpj2]=-_b[lag_gdpj2]) 
 
  (1)  _b[lag_remitgdp]*_b[unempl] = -_b[lag_unempl] 
  (2)  _b[lag_remitgdp]*_b[hcunempl] = -_b[lag_hcunempl] 
  (3)  _b[lag_remitgdp]*_b[inflation] = -_b[lag_inflation] 
  (4)  _b[lag_remitgdp]*_b[popul] = -_b[lag_popul] 
  (5)  _b[lag_remitgdp]*_b[gdpipc] = -_b[lag_gdpipc] 
  (6)  _b[lag_remitgdp]*_b[gdpjpc] = -_b[lag_gdpjpc] 
  (7)  _b[lag_remitgdp]*_b[gdpi2] = -_b[lag_gdpi2] 
  (8)  _b[lag_remitgdp]*_b[gdpj2] = -_b[lag_gdpj2] 
 
             F(8, 771) =        0.82 
              Prob > F =        0.5838 
  
267 
 
Appendix 3.3.2 Test For CFR for Remittances per Capita 
 
. xtreg remitcapita  unempl  hcunempl inflation policyv gdpipc gdpi2 gdpjpc  gdpj2  y1981 
y1982 y1983 y1984 y1985 y1986 y1987 y1988 y1989 y1990 y1991 y1992 y1993 y1994 y1995 y 
> 1996 y1997 y1998 y1999 y2000 y2001 y2002 y2003 y2004 y2005 y2006 y2007 y2008 y2009 
lag_remitcapita lag_unempl lag_hcunempl lag_inflation lag_gdpipc lag_gdpi2 lag_gdpjpc lag_ 
> gdpj2, fe 
 
Fixed-effects (within) regression               Number of obs      =       870 
Group variable: id                              Number of groups   =        52 
 
R-sq:  within  = 0.6051                         Obs per group: min =         4 
       between = 0.9650                                        avg =      16.7 
       overall = 0.8200                                        max =        29 
 
                                                F(45,773)          =     26.32 
corr(u_i, Xb)  = 0.5899                         Prob > F           =    0.0000 
 
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
    remitcapita |      Coef.   Std. Err.      t    P>|t|     [95% Conf. Interval] 
----------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
         unempl |  -.3424426   .2673851    -1.28   0.201    -.8673297    .1824444 
       hcunempl |   1.913796   .7125835     2.69   0.007     .5149675    3.312624 
      inflation |   .0002834   .0027499     0.10   0.918    -.0051148    .0056815 
        policyv |   .0127764   2.075096     0.01   0.995    -4.060715    4.086268 
         gdpipc |  -.0011611   .0013014    -0.89   0.373    -.0037159    .0013936 
          gdpi2 |   8.05e-08   1.93e-06     0.04   0.967    -3.70e-06    3.86e-06 
         gdpjpc |   .0049749   .0024876     2.00   0.046     .0000916    .0098582 
          gdpj2 |  -2.38e-08   2.73e-08    -0.87   0.383    -7.74e-08    2.98e-08 
          y1981 |  -301.9683   20.35518   -14.83   0.000    -341.9263   -262.0103 
          y1982 |  -300.6006   17.40404   -17.27   0.000    -334.7654   -266.4358 
          y1983 |  -300.0956    16.9061   -17.75   0.000     -333.283   -266.9083 
          y1984 |  -298.4188   16.43033   -18.16   0.000    -330.6722   -266.1654 
          y1985 |  -299.1408   15.85926   -18.86   0.000    -330.2731   -268.0084 
          y1986 |  -299.4954   15.44716   -19.39   0.000    -329.8187    -269.172 
          y1987 |  -298.7973   15.22183   -19.63   0.000    -328.6784   -268.9163 
          y1988 |  -300.2835   15.00558   -20.01   0.000      -329.74    -270.827 
          y1989 |  -300.8345   14.70635   -20.46   0.000    -329.7037   -271.9654 
          y1990 |  -301.0713   14.41939   -20.88   0.000    -329.3771   -272.7655 
          y1991 |  -301.2438   14.20389   -21.21   0.000    -329.1266    -273.361 
          y1992 |  -301.6098   13.94718   -21.63   0.000    -328.9887    -274.231 
          y1993 |  -300.0073   13.72174   -21.86   0.000    -326.9435    -273.071 
          y1994 |   -301.152   13.56902   -22.19   0.000    -327.7885   -274.5155 
          y1995 |  -300.6146   13.35902   -22.50   0.000    -326.8389   -274.3904 
          y1996 |  -302.0035    13.1859   -22.90   0.000    -327.8879   -276.1191 
          y1997 |  -302.7951   13.02527   -23.25   0.000    -328.3642    -277.226 
          y1998 |  -301.8801   12.88332   -23.43   0.000    -327.1706   -276.5897 
          y1999 |  -302.5656   12.77195   -23.69   0.000    -327.6374   -277.4938 
          y2000 |   -302.582   12.67917   -23.86   0.000    -327.4717   -277.6923 
          y2001 |  -302.1978   12.51319   -24.15   0.000    -326.7616   -277.6339 
          y2002 |  -301.4032   12.41135   -24.28   0.000    -325.7671   -277.0393 
          y2003 |  -301.3249    12.3542   -24.39   0.000    -325.5766   -277.0731 
          y2004 |   -300.802   12.33524   -24.39   0.000    -325.0165   -276.5874 
          y2005 |  -300.5423   12.29141   -24.45   0.000    -324.6708   -276.4138 
          y2006 |  -300.1045   12.28406   -24.43   0.000    -324.2185   -275.9904 
          y2007 |  -304.6807   12.23821   -24.90   0.000    -328.7048   -280.6566 
          y2008 |  -301.0295   12.11653   -24.84   0.000    -324.8147   -277.2443 
          y2009 |  -304.6967   12.40582   -24.56   0.000    -329.0498   -280.3436 
lag_remitcapita |   .6799459   .0312293    21.77   0.000     .6186416    .7412502 
     lag_unempl |   .0801754   .2586109     0.31   0.757    -.4274875    .5878383 
   lag_hcunempl |  -1.803977   .6629591    -2.72   0.007     -3.10539   -.5025631 
  lag_inflation |   .0002494   .0013546     0.18   0.854    -.0024097    .0029085 
     lag_gdpipc |   .0015567   .0013017     1.20   0.232    -.0009985    .0041119 
      lag_gdpi2 |   6.18e-08   2.62e-06     0.02   0.981    -5.08e-06    5.20e-06 
     lag_gdpjpc |  -.0047016   .0025635    -1.83   0.067    -.0097338    .0003307 
      lag_gdpj2 |   2.35e-08   2.74e-08     0.86   0.391    -3.03e-08    7.73e-08 
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          _cons |   296.3643   23.95624    12.37   0.000     249.3373    343.3913 
----------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
        sigma_u |  9.2804269 
        sigma_e |  10.315604 
            rho |  .44732113   (fraction of variance due to u_i) 
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
F test that all u_i=0:     F(51, 773) =     1.33             Prob > F = 0.0666 
 
 
 
 
CFR for each variable 
 
. testnl _b[lag_remitcapita]*_b[gdpj2]=-_b[lag_gdpj2] 
. testnl _b[lag_remitcapita]*_b[gdpi2]=-_b[lag_gdpi2] 
. testnl _b[lag_remitcapita]*_b[gdpjpc]=-_b[lag_gdpjpc] 
. testnl _b[lag_remitcapita]*_b[gdpipc]=-_b[lag_gdpipc] 
. testnl _b[lag_remitcapita]*_b[inflation]=-_b[lag_inflation] 
. testnl _b[lag_remitcapita]*_b[hcunempl]=-_b[lag_hcunempl] 
. testnl _b[lag_remitcapita]*_b[unempl]=-_b[lag_unempl] 
 
 
. . testnl _b[lag_remitcapita]*_b[unempl]=-_b[lag_unempl] 
 
  (1)  _b[lag_remitcapita]*_b[unempl] = -_b[lag_unempl] 
 
             F(1, 773) =        0.98 
              Prob > F =        0.3221 
 
.  
. . testnl _b[lag_remitcapita]*_b[hcunempl]=-_b[lag_hcunempl] 
 
  (1)  _b[lag_remitcapita]*_b[hcunempl] = -_b[lag_hcunempl] 
 
             F(1, 773) =        1.74 
              Prob > F =        0.1879 
 
.  
. . testnl _b[lag_remitcapita]*_b[inflation]=-_b[lag_inflation] 
 
  (1)  _b[lag_remitcapita]*_b[inflation] = -_b[lag_inflation] 
 
             F(1, 773) =        0.05 
              Prob > F =        0.8193 
 
.  
. . testnl _b[lag_remitcapita]*_b[gdpipc]=-_b[lag_gdpipc] 
 
  (1)  _b[lag_remitcapita]*_b[gdpipc] = -_b[lag_gdpipc] 
 
             F(1, 773) =        2.23 
              Prob > F =        0.1360 
 
.  
. . testnl _b[lag_remitcapita]*_b[gdpjpc]=-_b[lag_gdpjpc] 
 
  (1)  _b[lag_remitcapita]*_b[gdpjpc] = -_b[lag_gdpjpc] 
 
             F(1, 773) =        1.30 
              Prob > F =        0.2552 
 
.  
. . testnl _b[lag_remitcapita]*_b[gdpi2]=-_b[lag_gdpi2] 
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  (1)  _b[lag_remitcapita]*_b[gdpi2] = -_b[lag_gdpi2] 
 
             F(1, 773) =        0.01 
              Prob > F =        0.9322 
 
.  
. . testnl _b[lag_remitcapita]*_b[gdpj2]=-_b[lag_gdpj2] 
 
  (1)  _b[lag_remitcapita]*_b[gdpj2] = -_b[lag_gdpj2] 
 
             F(1, 773) =        0.38 
              Prob > F =        0.5354 
 
 
 
CFR for each variable 
 
 
 
testnl (_b[lag_remitcapita]*_b[unempl]=-_b[lag_unempl]) (_b[lag_remitcapita]*_b[hcunempl]=-
_b[lag_hcunempl]) (_b[lag_remitcapita]*_b[inflation]=-_b[lag_inflation]) (_b[lag 
> _remitcapita]*_b[gdpipc]=-_b[lag_gdpipc]) (_b[lag_remitcapita]*_b[gdpjpc]=-_b[lag_gdpjpc]) 
(_b[lag_remitcapita]*_b[gdpi2]=-_b[lag_ gdpi2]) (_b[lag_remitcapita]*_b[gdpj2]=-_b 
> [lag_gdpj2]) 
 
  (1)  _b[lag_remitcapita]*_b[unempl] = -_b[lag_unempl] 
  (2)  _b[lag_remitcapita]*_b[hcunempl] = -_b[lag_hcunempl] 
  (3)  _b[lag_remitcapita]*_b[inflation] = -_b[lag_inflation] 
  (4)  _b[lag_remitcapita]*_b[gdpipc] = -_b[lag_gdpipc] 
  (5)  _b[lag_remitcapita]*_b[gdpjpc] = -_b[lag_gdpjpc] 
  (6)  _b[lag_remitcapita]*_b[gdpi2] = -_b[lag_ gdpi2] 
  (7)  _b[lag_remitcapita]*_b[gdpj2] = -_b[lag_gdpj2] 
 
             F(7, 773) =        0.83 
              Prob > F =        0.5598 
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Appendix 3.3.3 Output of AR (1) for the Specification (1) Table 
3.6  
              
. xtregar remitgdp unempl hcunempl inflation  policyv popul gdpipc gdpi2 gdpjpc gdpj2  y1981 
y1982 y1983 y1984 y1985 y1986 y1987 y1988 y1989 y1990 y1991 y1992 y1993 y1994 y1995 y1996 
y1997 y1998 y1999 y2000 y2001 y2002 y2003 y2004 y2005 y2006 y2007 y2008 y2009, fe 
 
FE (within) regression with AR(1) disturbances  Number of obs      =       870 
Group variable: id                              Number of groups   =        52 
 
R-sq:  within  = 0.0903                         Obs per group: min =         4 
       between = 0.0285                                        avg =      16.7 
       overall = 0.0506                                        max =        29 
 
                                                F(38,780)          =      2.04 
corr(u_i, Xb)  = -0.6353                        Prob > F           =    0.0003 
 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
    remitgdp |      Coef.   Std. Err.      t    P>|t|     [95% Conf. Interval] 
-------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
      unempl |   .0387523   .0299277     1.29   0.196    -.0199961    .0975008 
    hcunempl |   .1306577     .07074     1.85   0.065    -.0082056    .2695209 
   inflation |  -.0000491   .0001705    -0.29   0.774    -.0003838    .0002856 
     policyv |  -.3137156   .4887493    -0.64   0.521    -1.273135    .6457042 
       popul |   .0057531   .0440063     0.13   0.896    -.0806317    .0921379 
      gdpipc |  -.0003257   .0001422    -2.29   0.022    -.0006048   -.0000466 
       gdpi2 |   1.12e-07   1.16e-07     0.96   0.337    -1.16e-07    3.40e-07 
      gdpjpc |   .0010661   .0002725     3.91   0.000     .0005311    .0016011 
       gdpj2 |  -6.87e-09   2.58e-09    -2.66   0.008    -1.19e-08   -1.80e-09 
       y1981 |   1.071068   1.268511     0.84   0.399    -1.419032    3.561167 
       y1982 |   2.150989   1.439118     1.49   0.135    -.6740134    4.975991 
       y1983 |   2.719842   1.642686     1.66   0.098    -.5047671    5-.944452 
       y1984 |   3.265369   1.814128     1.80   0.072     -.295782     6.82652 
       y1985 |   4.137739   2.011312     2.06   0.040     .1895128    8.085965 
       y1986 |   4.512969   2.191221     2.06   0.040     .2115802    8.814357 
       y1987 |   4.932435   2.332868     2.11   0.035     .3529928    9.511878 
       y1988 |   4.870558   2.409898     2.02   0.044     .1399053    9.601211 
       y1989 |   4.936119   2.446134     2.02   0.044     .1343326    9.737905 
       y1990 |   4.919508   2.490255     1.98   0.049     .0311137    9.807903 
       y1991 |   5.239855   2.557935     2.05   0.041     .2186029    10.26111 
       y1992 |   5.613735   2.546999     2.20   0.028     .6139506    10.61352 
       y1993 |   5.907882   2.558975     2.31   0.021     .8845886    10.93118 
       y1994 |   5.434662   2.502517     2.17   0.030     .5221967    10.34713 
       y1995 |   5.461486    2.45484     2.22   0.026     .6426101    10.28036 
       y1996 |   5.119699    2.37777     2.15   0.032     .4521121    9.787286 
       y1997 |   4.718128   2.276738     2.07   0.039     .2488687    9.187387 
       y1998 |   4.479528   2.193563     2.04   0.041     .1735407    8.785515 
       y1999 |   4.020924   2.090113     1.92   0.055    -.0819881    8.123836 
       y2000 |   3.682273   1.953282     1.89   0.060    -.1520387    7.516585 
       y2001 |   3.645655   1.868306     1.95   0.051    -.0218484    7.313158 
       y2002 |   3.895514   1.785694     2.18   0.029     .3901784     7.40085 
       y2003 |   3.825819   1.679072     2.28   0.023      .529784    7.121854 
       y2004 |   3.741775    1.54358     2.42   0.016     .7117117    6.771839 
       y2005 |   3.451324   1.424615     2.42   0.016     .6547915    6.247857 
       y2006 |   2.966035   1.328995     2.23   0.026     .3572045    5.574866 
       y2007 |   2.348434   1.283339     1.83   0.068    -.1707743    4.867642 
       y2008 |   1.641214   1.269848     1.29   0.197    -.8515106    4.133939 
       y2009 |   1.477503   1.264423     1.17   0.243    -1.004572    3.959577 
       _cons |  -22.71686   .9855219   -23.05   0.000    -24.65145   -20.78227 
-------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
      rho_ar |  .88813071 
     sigma_u |  7.6373231 
     sigma_e |  1.1907505 
     rho_fov |  .97626832   (fraction of variance because of u_i) 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
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F test that all u_i=0:     F(51,780) =     4.22              Prob > F = 0.0000 
 
Appendix 3.3.4 Output of AR (1) for the Specification (2) Table 
3.6 
 
. xtregar remitcapita unempl hcunempl inflation  policyv gdpipc gdpi2 gdpjpc gdpj2  y1981 
y1982 y1983 y1984 y1985 y1986 y1987 y1988 y1989 y1990 y1991 y1992 y1993 y1994 y1995 
>  y1996 y1997 y1998 y1999 y2000 y2001 y2002 y2003 y2004 y2005 y2006 y2007 y2008 y2009, fe 
 
FE (within) regression with AR(1) disturbances  Number of obs      =       870 
Group variable: id                              Number of groups   =        52 
 
R-sq:  within  = 0.5169                         Obs per group: min =         4 
       between = 0.0122                                        avg =      16.7 
       overall = 0.0265                                        max =        29 
 
                                                F(37,781)          =     22.59 
corr(u_i, Xb)  = -0.6006                        Prob > F           =    0.0000 
 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
 remitcapita |      Coef.   Std. Err.      t    P>|t|     [95% Conf. Interval] 
-------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
      unempl |  -.2954742   .2551661    -1.16   0.247    -.7963667    .2054183 
    hcunempl |   1.471116   .6074613     2.42   0.016      .278666    2.663566 
   inflation |  -.0000205   .0017902    -0.01   0.991    -.0035346    .0034936 
     policyv |  -.1503567   4.001275    -0.04   0.970    -8.004884     7.70417 
      gdpipc |   .0003264   .0009086     0.36   0.720    -.0014572    .0021101 
       gdpi2 |   4.22e-07   7.29e-07     0.58   0.563    -1.01e-06    1.85e-06 
      gdpjpc |   .0040286   .0018762     2.15   0.032     .0003456    .0077116 
       gdpj2 |  -3.03e-08   1.86e-08    -1.63   0.103    -6.67e-08    6.18e-09 
       y1981 |   -78.2155   13.15483    -5.95   0.000    -104.0385   -52.39248 
       y1982 |  -134.2574   16.24763    -8.26   0.000    -166.1516   -102.3632 
       y1983 |  -173.8476   19.05529    -9.12   0.000    -211.2533    -136.442 
       y1984 |  -200.9022   20.75163    -9.68   0.000    -241.6378   -160.1666 
       y1985 |  -220.8956   21.70807   -10.18   0.000    -263.5087   -178.2825 
       y1986 |   -235.728   22.18943   -10.62   0.000     -279.286     -192.17 
       y1987 |   -245.919   22.30939   -11.02   0.000    -289.7125   -202.1256 
       y1988 |  -254.3168   21.92171   -11.60   0.000    -297.3492   -211.2843 
       y1989 |  -261.1458    21.3486   -12.23   0.000    -303.0532   -219.2384 
       y1990 |  -266.6633   20.83314   -12.80   0.000    -307.5588   -225.7677 
       y1991 |  -271.1329    20.4752   -13.24   0.000    -311.3259     -230.94 
       y1992 |  -274.9165   19.76501   -13.91   0.000    -313.7154   -236.1177 
       y1993 |  -277.1189   19.28205   -14.37   0.000    -314.9697   -239.2681 
       y1994 |  -279.5965   18.50103   -15.11   0.000    -315.9142   -243.2789 
       y1995 |  -281.4957    17.8523   -15.77   0.000    -316.5399   -246.4515 
       y1996 |  -284.3244   17.10205   -16.63   0.000    -317.8958   -250.7529 
       y1997 |  -287.3884   16.31824   -17.61   0.000    -319.4212   -255.3556 
       y1998 |  -289.1027   15.72156   -18.39   0.000    -319.9643   -258.2412 
       y1999 |  -291.1983   15.07718   -19.31   0.000    -320.7949   -261.6017 
       y2000 |  -293.0253   14.31129   -20.48   0.000    -321.1184   -264.9321 
       y2001 |  -294.4929    13.8174   -21.31   0.000    -321.6165   -267.3693 
       y2002 |  -294.9786   13.33797   -22.12   0.000    -321.1611   -268.7961 
       y2003 |  -295.5315   12.80295   -23.08   0.000    -320.6638   -270.3993 
       y2004 |  -295.4582   12.21084   -24.20   0.000    -319.4281   -271.4883 
       y2005 |  -295.5377   11.71785   -25.22   0.000    -318.5399   -272.5355 
       y2006 |  -295.5784    11.3319   -26.08   0.000     -317.823   -273.3338 
       y2007 |  -300.6881   11.13217   -27.01   0.000    -322.5406   -278.8356 
       y2008 |  -301.0262   11.03086   -27.29   0.000    -322.6798   -279.3725 
       y2009 |  -305.5583   10.97327   -27.85   0.000    -327.0989   -284.0177 
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       _cons |   214.3301   13.87789    15.44   0.000     187.0877    241.5724 
-------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
      rho_ar |  .69648388 
     sigma_u |  36.075486 
     sigma_e |  10.303117 
     rho_fov |  .92458468   (fraction of variance because of u_i) 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
F test that all u_i=0:     F(51,781) =     3.63              Prob > F = 0.0000  
 
Appendix 3.4.1 Output of AR (1) for the Specification (3) Table 
3.7  
a) One and Two or More Policy Variables 
 
xtregar remitgdp unempl hcunempl inflation   pv_1 pv1 popul gdpipc gdpi2 gdpjpc gdpj2  y1981 
y1982 y1983 y1984 y1985 y1986 y1987 y1988 y1989 y1990 y1991 y1992 y1993 y1994 y1995 y1996 
y1997 y1998 y1999 y2000 y2001 y2002 y2003 y2004 y2005 y2006 y2007 y2008 y2009, fe 
 
FE (within) regression with AR(1) disturbances  Number of obs      =       870 
Group variable: id                              Number of groups   =        52 
 
R-sq:  within  = 0.1000                         Obs per group: min =         4 
       between = 0.0296                                        avg =      16.7 
       overall = 0.0521                                        max =        29 
 
                                                F(39,779)          =      2.22 
corr(u_i, Xb)  = -0.6321                        Prob > F           =    0.0000 
 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
    remitgdp |      Coef.   Std. Err.      t    P>|t|     [95% Conf. Interval] 
-------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
      unempl |   .0385996   .0297752     1.30   0.195    -.0198495    .0970487 
    hcunempl |   .1206719   .0704074     1.71   0.087    -.0175388    .2588826 
   inflation |  -.0000497   .0001695    -0.29   0.769    -.0003824     .000283 
        pv_1 |  -1.390505    .577066    -2.41   0.016    -2.523293   -.2577161 
         pv1 |   .8541992   .7433119     1.15   0.251    -.6049325    2.313331 
       popul |   .0044199   .0443529     0.10   0.921    -.0826455    .0914853 
      gdpipc |  -.0003129   .0001417    -2.21   0.028    -.0005911   -.0000347 
       gdpi2 |   1.12e-07   1.16e-07     0.96   0.335    -1.16e-07    3.39e-07 
      gdpjpc |   .0010401   .0002714     3.83   0.000     .0005074    .0015728 
       gdpj2 |  -6.55e-09   2.57e-09    -2.55   0.011    -1.16e-08   -1.50e-09 
       y1981 |   1.053122   1.260665     0.84   0.404     -1.42158    3.527825 
       y1982 |   2.130913    1.42711     1.49   0.136    -.6705231    4.932349 
       y1983 |   2.695068   1.626238     1.66   0.098    -.4972594    5.887396 
       y1984 |   3.229503   1.794087     1.80   0.072    -.2923147     6.75132 
       y1985 |   4.097841   1.988192     2.06   0.040     .1949926    8.000689 
       y1986 |   4.473732   2.165765     2.07   0.039     .2223061    8.725158 
       y1987 |   4.892067    2.30589     2.12   0.034     .3655741    9.418561 
       y1988 |   4.835486   2.382381     2.03   0.043      .158838    9.512134 
       y1989 |   4.886779   2.419614     2.02   0.044     .1370443    9.636514 
       y1990 |   4.877409    2.46407     1.98   0.048      .040405    9.714413 
       y1991 |   5.209437   2.532108     2.06   0.040     .2388737       10.18 
       y1992 |   5.580463   2.522619     2.21   0.027     .6285258     10.5324 
       y1993 |   5.877396   2.535552     2.32   0.021     .9000722    10.85472 
       y1994 |   5.412335   2.480474     2.18   0.029     .5431295    10.28154 
       y1995 |   5.445458   2.434131     2.24   0.026     .6672251    10.22369 
       y1996 |    5.11637   2.358451     2.17   0.030     .4866981    9.746042 
       y1997 |   4.754322   2.259242     2.10   0.036     .3193984    9.189246 
       y1998 |   4.523693   2.177348     2.08   0.038     .2495285    8.797857 
       y1999 |   4.072124    2.07523     1.96   0.050    -.0015813    8.145829 
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       y2000 |   3.759629   1.940183     1.94   0.053    -.0489769    7.568235 
       y2001 |   3.672539   1.856341     1.98   0.048     .0285161    7.316563 
       y2002 |   3.929595   1.774738     2.21   0.027     .4457594    7.413431 
       y2003 |   3.865674   1.669149     2.32   0.021     .5891113    7.142236 
       y2004 |    3.73888   1.535023     2.44   0.015     .7256084    6.752152 
       y2005 |   3.449436   1.416863     2.43   0.015     .6681145    6.230757 
       y2006 |   2.960193   1.321933     2.24   0.025     .3652202    5.555165 
       y2007 |   2.335411   1.276775     1.83   0.068    -.1709167    4.841739 
       y2008 |   1.629793   1.263566     1.29   0.197    -.8506042    4.110191 
       y2009 |     1.4888   1.258251     1.18   0.237    -.9811635    3.958763 
       _cons |  -22.27876    .972397   -22.91   0.000    -24.18759   -20.36993 
-------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
      rho_ar |  .88943809 
     sigma_u |  7.5805916 
     sigma_e |  1.1850822 
     rho_fov |  .97614362   (fraction of variance because of u_i) 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
F test that all u_i=0:     F(51,779) =     4.18              Prob > F = 0.0000 
 
Appendix 3.4.2 Output of AR (1) for the Specification (4) Table 
3.7  
One and Two or More Policy Variables  
  
xtregar remitcapita unempl hcunempl inflation   pv_1 pv1  gdpipc gdpi2 gdpjpc gdpj2  y1981 
y1982 y1983 y1984 y1985 y1986 y1987 y1988 y1989 y1990 y1991 y1992 y1993 y1994 y199 
> 5 y1996 y1997 y1998 y1999 y2000 y2001 y2002 y2003 y2004 y2005 y2006 y2007 y2008 y2009, fe 
 
FE (within) regression with AR(1) disturbances  Number of obs      =       870 
Group variable: id                              Number of groups   =        52 
 
R-sq:  within  = 0.5170                         Obs per group: min =         4 
       between = 0.0126                                        avg =      16.7 
       overall = 0.0270                                        max =        29 
 
                                                F(38,780)          =     21.97 
corr(u_i, Xb)  = -0.6010                        Prob > F           =    0.0000 
 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
 remitcapita |      Coef.   Std. Err.      t    P>|t|     [95% Conf. Interval] 
-------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
      unempl |  -.2926561   .2554142    -1.15   0.252    -.7940368    .2087245 
    hcunempl |   1.455432   .6076269     2.40   0.017     .2626547     2.64821 
   inflation |  -.0000296   .0017922    -0.02   0.987    -.0035476    .0034885 
        pv_1 |  -2.242193   4.934817    -0.45   0.650    -11.92929    7.444902 
         pv1 |  -1.289909   5.733297    -0.22   0.822    -12.54443    9.964611 
      gdpipc |   .0003491   .0009088     0.38   0.701    -.0014347     .002133 
       gdpi2 |   4.23e-07   7.29e-07     0.58   0.562    -1.01e-06    1.85e-06 
      gdpjpc |   .0040018    .001879     2.13   0.034     .0003134    .0076903 
       gdpj2 |  -2.97e-08   1.86e-08    -1.59   0.112    -6.62e-08    6.90e-09 
       y1981 |  -78.27952   13.17427    -5.94   0.000    -104.1407    -52.4183 
       y1982 |  -134.3387   16.27455    -8.25   0.000    -166.2858   -102.3916 
       y1983 |  -173.9237   19.08588    -9.11   0.000    -211.3895   -136.4579 
       y1984 |  -200.9608   20.78607    -9.67   0.000    -241.7641   -160.1576 
       y1985 |   -220.919   21.74139   -10.16   0.000    -263.5976   -178.2404 
       y1986 |  -235.7085   22.22118   -10.61   0.000    -279.3289   -192.0881 
       y1987 |  -245.8721   22.33872   -11.01   0.000    -289.7232    -202.021 
       y1988 |  -254.2473   21.94747   -11.58   0.000    -297.3304   -211.1642 
       y1989 |  -261.0563   21.37132   -12.22   0.000    -303.0084   -219.1041 
       y1990 |  -266.5472   20.85376   -12.78   0.000    -307.4834   -225.6111 
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       y1991 |  -270.9836   20.49373   -13.22   0.000     -311.213   -230.7542 
       y1992 |  -274.7474   19.77812   -13.89   0.000     -313.572   -235.9227 
       y1993 |  -276.9404   19.29405   -14.35   0.000    -314.8148    -239.066 
       y1994 |  -279.4139   18.51249   -15.09   0.000    -315.7541   -243.0737 
       y1995 |    -281.31   17.86315   -15.75   0.000    -316.3755   -246.2445 
       y1996 |   -284.148   17.11169   -16.61   0.000    -317.7384   -250.5576 
       y1997 |  -287.1633   16.32587   -17.59   0.000    -319.2112   -255.1155 
       y1998 |  -288.8884   15.72838   -18.37   0.000    -319.7633   -258.0134 
       y1999 |  -290.9986   15.08323   -19.29   0.000    -320.6071     -261.39 
       y2000 |  -292.8033   14.31681   -20.45   0.000    -320.9073   -264.6992 
       y2001 |  -294.3033   13.82362   -21.29   0.000    -321.4392   -267.1674 
       y2002 |  -294.7909   13.34352   -22.09   0.000    -320.9843   -268.5974 
       y2003 |  -295.3534     12.808   -23.06   0.000    -320.4956   -270.2112 
       y2004 |  -295.2607   12.21864   -24.16   0.000     -319.246   -271.2753 
       y2005 |  -295.3716    11.7245   -25.19   0.000     -318.387   -272.3563 
       y2006 |  -295.4571   11.33773   -26.06   0.000    -317.7132    -273.201 
       y2007 |  -300.6137    11.1376   -26.99   0.000    -322.4769   -278.7504 
       y2008 |  -300.9655   11.03624   -27.27   0.000    -322.6298   -279.3013 
       y2009 |  -305.4425   10.97852   -27.82   0.000    -326.9935   -283.8916 
       _cons |   214.5074   13.92246    15.41   0.000     187.1775    241.8373 
-------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
      rho_ar |  .69593963 
     sigma_u |   36.07781 
     sigma_e |  10.308193 
     rho_fov |  .92452495   (fraction of variance because of u_i) 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
F test that all u_i=0:     F(51,780) =     3.61              Prob > F = 0.0000 
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Appendix 3.4.3 Output of AR (1) for the Specification (5) Table 
3.8  
Three types of Policy Variables  
 
xtregar remitgdp unempl hcunempl inflation  pol_tax pol_govt pol_private popul gdpipc gdpi2 
gdpjpc gdpj2  y1981 y1982 y1983 y1984 y1985 y1986 y1987 y1988 y1989 y1990 y1991  y1992 y1993 
y1994 y1995 y1996 y1997 y1998 y1999 y2000 y2001 y2002 y2003 y2004 y2005 y2006 y2007 y2008 
y2009, fe 
 
FE (within) regression with AR(1) disturbances  Number of obs      =       870 
Group variable: id                              Number of groups   =        52 
 
R-sq:  within  = 0.0939                         Obs per group: min =         4 
       between = 0.0287                                        avg =      16.7 
       overall = 0.0502                                        max =        29 
 
                                                F(40,778)          =      2.02 
corr(u_i, Xb)  = -0.6493                        Prob > F           =    0.0003 
 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
    remitgdp |      Coef.   Std. Err.      t    P>|t|     [95% Conf. Interval] 
-------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
      unempl |   .0380058   .0299451     1.27   0.205     -.020777    .0967886 
    hcunempl |   .1301179   .0706921     1.84   0.066     -.008652    .2688877 
   inflation |  -.0000474   .0001707    -0.28   0.781    -.0003824    .0002876 
     pol_tax |   .5625332   .7230655     0.78   0.437    -.8568573    1.981924 
    pol_govt |  -.5734758   .5828769    -0.98   0.325    -1.717674     .570722 
 pol_private |  -1.049482   .7821754    -1.34   0.180    -2.584906    .4859422 
       popul |   .0051887   .0434406     0.12   0.905     -.080086    .0904635 
      gdpipc |  -.0003262   .0001419    -2.30   0.022    -.0006047   -.0000477 
       gdpi2 |   1.12e-07   1.16e-07     0.97   0.333    -1.15e-07    3.40e-07 
      gdpjpc |   .0010868   .0002733     3.98   0.000     .0005503    .0016234 
       gdpj2 |  -7.02e-09   2.58e-09    -2.72   0.007    -1.21e-08   -1.95e-09 
       y1981 |   1.109567   1.269797     0.87   0.382    -1.383068    3.602202 
       y1982 |   2.230327   1.444319     1.54   0.123    -.6048961    5.065551 
       y1983 |   2.824176   1.651689     1.71   0.088    -.4181183     6.06647 
       y1984 |   3.394916   1.826034     1.86   0.063    -.1896208    6.979453 
       y1985 |   4.288349   2.025398     2.12   0.035     .3124555    8.264242 
       y1986 |   4.677583   2.206426     2.12   0.034     .3463302    9.008836 
       y1987 |   5.105132   2.348375     2.17   0.030     .4952304    9.715033 
       y1988 |   5.043812   2.424836     2.08   0.038     .2838161    9.803807 
       y1989 |   5.051529   2.459964     2.05   0.040     .2225754    9.880484 
       y1990 |   5.033363   2.503277     2.01   0.045     .1193852    9.947341 
       y1991 |   5.358568   2.570277     2.08   0.037     .3130687    10.40407 
       y1992 |   5.743705   2.559912     2.24   0.025     .7185525    10.76886 
       y1993 |   6.036665   2.570896     2.35   0.019     .9899496    11.08338 
       y1994 |   5.552222   2.513124     2.21   0.027     .6189152    10.48553 
       y1995 |   5.571312   2.464339     2.26   0.024     .7337704    10.40885 
       y1996 |   5.217002   2.386074     2.19   0.029     .5330966    9.900907 
       y1997 |   4.807441   2.284886     2.10   0.036     .3221686    9.292714 
       y1998 |   4.557107   2.200682     2.07   0.039     .2371295    8.877085 
       y1999 |   4.084935   2.096147     1.95   0.052    -.0298386    8.199708 
       y2000 |   3.746089   1.957769     1.91   0.056    -.0970465    7.589224 
       y2001 |   3.680892   1.871753     1.97   0.050     .0066077    7.355177 
       y2002 |   3.934824   1.788829     2.20   0.028     .4233211    7.446328 
       y2003 |   3.853939    1.68138     2.29   0.022     .5533604    7.154518 
       y2004 |   3.783184   1.544812     2.45   0.015     .7506903    6.815678 
       y2005 |   3.476481    1.42515     2.44   0.015     .6788861    6.274076 
       y2006 |   2.973042   1.328984     2.24   0.026     .3642237    5.581861 
       y2007 |   2.338893   1.283012     1.82   0.069    -.1796827    4.857468 
       y2008 |   1.635191   1.269321     1.29   0.198    -.8565078    4.126891 
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       y2009 |   1.482341   1.263837     1.17   0.241    -.9985948    3.963276 
       _cons |  -23.06716   .9950156   -23.18   0.000     -25.0204   -21.11393 
-------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
      rho_ar |  .88684028 
     sigma_u |  7.7684699 
     sigma_e |  1.1900382 
     rho_fov |  .97707142   (fraction of variance because of u_i) 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
F test that all u_i=0:     F(51,778) =     4.26              Prob > F = 0.0000 
 
Appendix 3.4.4 Output of AR (1) for the Specification (6) Table 
3.8  
Thrre types of Policy Variables  
 
xtregar remitcapita unempl hcunempl inflation    pol_tax pol_govt pol_private gdpipc gdpi2 
gdpjpc gdpj2  y1981 y1982 y1983 y1984 y1985 y1986 y1987 y1988 y1989 y1990 y1991 y1 
> 992 y1993 y1994 y1995 y1996 y1997 y1998 y1999 y2000 y2001 y2002 y2003 y2004 y2005 y2006 
y2007 y2008 y2009, fe 
 
FE (within) regression with AR(1) disturbances  Number of obs      =       870 
Group variable: id                              Number of groups   =        52 
 
R-sq:  within  = 0.5168                         Obs per group: min =         4 
       between = 0.0123                                        avg =      16.7 
       overall = 0.0267                                        max =        29 
 
                                                F(39,779)          =     21.37 
corr(u_i, Xb)  = -0.6060                        Prob > F           =    0.0000 
 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
 remitcapita |      Coef.   Std. Err.      t    P>|t|     [95% Conf. Interval] 
-------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
      unempl |  -.2986362   .2559895    -1.17   0.244    -.8011471    .2038747 
    hcunempl |   1.468643     .60786     2.42   0.016     .2754053    2.661881 
   inflation |  -.0000266    .001795    -0.01   0.988    -.0035502    .0034971 
     pol_tax |   .0390963   5.992125     0.01   0.995    -11.72353    11.80172 
    pol_govt |  -1.691899   4.902705    -0.35   0.730    -11.31598    7.932179 
 pol_private |  -1.049074   6.379281    -0.16   0.869    -13.57169    11.47354 
      gdpipc |    .000336   .0009086     0.37   0.712    -.0014475    .0021195 
       gdpi2 |   4.24e-07   7.29e-07     0.58   0.561    -1.01e-06    1.85e-06 
      gdpjpc |   .0040712   .0018821     2.16   0.031     .0003766    .0077658 
       gdpj2 |  -3.05e-08   1.86e-08    -1.64   0.102    -6.71e-08    6.10e-09 
       y1981 |  -78.27285   13.19261    -5.93   0.000    -104.1701   -52.37558 
       y1982 |  -134.2735   16.30318    -8.24   0.000    -166.2769   -102.2701 
       y1983 |  -173.7975   19.11851    -9.09   0.000    -211.3273   -136.2676 
       y1984 |   -200.773   20.82299    -9.64   0.000    -241.6489   -159.8972 
       y1985 |  -220.6895   21.77781   -10.13   0.000    -263.4396   -177.9393 
       y1986 |  -235.4783   22.24862   -10.58   0.000    -279.1527    -191.804 
       y1987 |  -245.6374   22.35936   -10.99   0.000    -289.5292   -201.7457 
       y1988 |  -254.0206   21.96263   -11.57   0.000    -297.1336   -210.9076 
       y1989 |  -260.8407   21.37133   -12.21   0.000    -302.7929   -218.8884 
       y1990 |  -266.3415   20.85044   -12.77   0.000    -307.2712   -225.4118 
       y1991 |  -270.7845   20.48777   -13.22   0.000    -311.0023   -230.5668 
       y1992 |  -274.4953   19.78024   -13.88   0.000    -313.3242   -235.6665 
       y1993 |  -276.7005   19.29481   -14.34   0.000    -314.5765   -238.8245 
       y1994 |  -279.2049   18.51208   -15.08   0.000    -315.5444   -242.8655 
       y1995 |  -281.1138    17.8627   -15.74   0.000    -316.1785    -246.049 
       y1996 |  -283.9646   17.11249   -16.59   0.000    -317.5566   -250.3725 
       y1997 |   -286.974   16.33498   -17.57   0.000    -319.0398   -254.9082 
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       y1998 |  -288.7101   15.73794   -18.34   0.000    -319.6039   -257.8163 
       y1999 |   -290.833   15.09312   -19.27   0.000     -320.461    -261.205 
       y2000 |  -292.6787   14.32363   -20.43   0.000    -320.7962   -264.5612 
       y2001 |  -294.1719   13.82688   -21.28   0.000    -321.3142   -267.0295 
       y2002 |  -294.6392   13.35018   -22.07   0.000    -320.8458   -268.4326 
       y2003 |  -295.2207   12.81459   -23.04   0.000    -320.3759   -270.0654 
       y2004 |  -295.1249   12.22063   -24.15   0.000    -319.1141   -271.1356 
       y2005 |   -295.254   11.72824   -25.17   0.000    -318.2767   -272.2313 
       y2006 |  -295.3533   11.34332   -26.04   0.000    -317.6204   -273.0862 
       y2007 |  -300.5187    11.1444   -26.97   0.000    -322.3953   -278.6421 
       y2008 |  -300.8482   11.04328   -27.24   0.000    -322.5263   -279.1701 
       y2009 |  -305.3387   10.98573   -27.79   0.000    -326.9038   -283.7735 
       _cons |   213.2987   13.96081    15.28   0.000     185.8934    240.7039 
-------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
      rho_ar |  .69528142 
     sigma_u |  36.262096 
     sigma_e |   10.31486 
     rho_fov |  .92514343   (fraction of variance because of u_i) 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
F test that all u_i=0:     F(51,779) =     3.58              Prob > F = 0.0000 
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Appendix 3.5.1 Test For CFR for Remittances to GDP 
Including Governance Indicators 
 
xtreg  remitgdp  unempl  hcunempl inflation  popul goveffect policyv gdpipc gdpi2 gdpjpc  
gdpj2  y1997 y1998 y1999 y2000 y2001 y2002 y2003 y2004 y2005 y2006 y2007 y2008 lag_remitgdp 
lag_unempl lag_hcunempl lag_inflation lag_popul lag_goveffect lag_gdpipc lag_gdpi2 lag_gdpjpc 
lag_gdpj2, fe 
Fixed-effects (within) regression               Number of obs      =       610 
Group variable: id                              Number of groups   =        52 
 
R-sq:  within  = 0.8167                         Obs per group: min =         3 
       between = 0.7999                                        avg =      11.7 
       overall = 0.7930                                        max =        13 
 
                                                F(32,526)          =     73.26 
corr(u_i, Xb)  = -0.1524                        Prob > F           =    0.0000 
 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
    remitgdp |      Coef.   Std. Err.      t    P>|t|     [95% Conf. Interval] 
-------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
      unempl |   .0453045   .0394757     1.15   0.252    -.0322448    .1228538 
    hcunempl |   .1028658   .1085385     0.95   0.344    -.1103564     .316088 
   inflation |   .0001609   .0011854     0.14   0.892    -.0021677    .0024895 
       popul |  -.0465143   .1568596    -0.30   0.767    -.3546625    .2616338 
   goveffect |  -.7482451   .4695354    -1.59   0.112     -1.67064    .1741499 
     policyv |   .1464995   .3846428     0.38   0.703    -.6091252    .9021243 
      gdpipc |  -.0002764   .0001724    -1.60   0.109    -.0006149    .0000622 
       gdpi2 |   1.71e-07   2.39e-07     0.71   0.476    -3.00e-07    6.41e-07 
      gdpjpc |   .0012824   .0003537     3.63   0.000     .0005875    .0019773 
       gdpj2 |  -9.86e-09   3.87e-09    -2.55   0.011    -1.75e-08   -2.27e-09 
       y1997 |   1.965952   1.401444     1.40   0.161    -.7871631    4.719066 
       y1998 |   1.983649   1.286946     1.54   0.124    -.5445372    4.511835 
       y1999 |   1.561461   1.195616     1.31   0.192    -.7873078    3.910229 
       y2000 |   1.391957   1.093066     1.27   0.203    -.7553534    3.539268 
       y2001 |    1.46658   .9615855     1.53   0.128    -.4224392      3.3556 
       y2002 |   1.662486   .8923568     1.86   0.063    -.0905353    3.415506 
       y2003 |   1.396365   .8341077     1.67   0.095    -.2422267    3.034956 
       y2004 |   1.198749   .7866604     1.52   0.128    -.3466326    2.744131 
       y2005 |   .7712183   .6994288     1.10   0.271    -.6027987    2.145235 
       y2006 |   .3655893   .6431533     0.57   0.570    -.8978753    1.629054 
       y2007 |  -.0793235   .5752616    -0.14   0.890    -1.209416    1.050769 
       y2008 |  -.4664055   .4296846    -1.09   0.278    -1.310514    .3777031 
lag_remitgdp |   .8380756   .0219904    38.11   0.000     .7948758    .8812753 
  lag_unempl |  -.0374952    .039447    -0.95   0.342    -.1149883    .0399978 
lag_hcunempl |  -.1910517   .1006964    -1.90   0.058    -.3888682    .0067647 
lag_inflat~n |  -.0008214   .0011687    -0.70   0.483    -.0031173    .0014746 
   lag_popul |   .0526711   .1517851     0.35   0.729    -.2455084    .3508506 
lag_goveff~t |   .3695265   .4323194     0.85   0.393    -.4797582    1.218811 
  lag_gdpipc |    .000265   .0001669     1.59   0.113    -.0000629    .0005928 
   lag_gdpi2 |  -1.47e-07   3.13e-07    -0.47   0.639    -7.62e-07    4.68e-07 
  lag_gdpjpc |   -.000941   .0003403    -2.77   0.006    -.0016094   -.0002725 
   lag_gdpj2 |   7.60e-09   3.60e-09     2.11   0.035     5.30e-10    1.47e-08 
       _cons |  -7.444783   4.889355    -1.52   0.128    -17.04984    2.160278 
-------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
     sigma_u |  2.5901486 
     sigma_e |  1.2054356 
         rho |  .82196951   (fraction of variance due to u_i) 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
F test that all u_i=0:     F(51, 526) =     2.36             Prob > F = 0.0000 
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CFR for each variable 
 
testnl _b[lag_remitgdp]*_b[unempl]=-_b[lag_unempl] 
testnl _b[lag_remitgdp]*_b[hcunempl]=-_b[lag_hcunempl] 
testnl _b[lag_remitgdp]*_b[inflation]=-_b[lag_inflation] 
testnl _b[lag_remitgdp]*_b[popul]=-_b[lag_ popul] 
testnl _b[lag_remitgdp]*_b[goveffect]=-_b[lag_goveffect] 
testnl _b[lag_remitgdp]*_b[gdpipc]=-_b[lag_gdpipc] 
testnl _b[lag_remitgdp]*_b[gdpjpc]=-_b[lag_gdpjpc] 
testnl _b[lag_remitgdp]*_b[gdpi2]=-_b[lag_gdpi2] 
testnl _b[lag_remitgdp]*_b[gdpj2]=-_b[lag_gdpj2] 
testnl _b[lag_remitgdp]*_b[unempl]=-_b[lag_unempl] 
 
 
 
(1)  _b[lag_remitgdp]*_b[unempl] = -_b[lag_unempl] 
 
             F(1, 526) =        0.00 
              Prob > F =        0.9852 
 
.  
. testnl _b[lag_remitgdp]*_b[hcunempl]=-_b[lag_hcunempl] 
 
  (1)  _b[lag_remitgdp]*_b[hcunempl] = -_b[lag_hcunempl] 
 
             F(1, 526) =        2.61 
              Prob > F =        0.1066 
 
.  
. testnl _b[lag_remitgdp]*_b[inflation]=-_b[lag_inflation] 
 
  (1)  _b[lag_remitgdp]*_b[inflation] = -_b[lag_inflation] 
 
             F(1, 526) =        0.21 
              Prob > F =        0.6474 
 
.  
. testnl _b[lag_remitgdp]*_b[popul]=-_b[lag_ popul] 
 
  (1)  _b[lag_remitgdp]*_b[popul] = -_b[lag_ popul] 
 
             F(1, 526) =        0.29 
              Prob > F =        0.5891 
 
.  
. testnl _b[lag_remitgdp]*_b[goveffect]=-_b[lag_goveffect] 
 
  (1)  _b[lag_remitgdp]*_b[goveffect] = -_b[lag_goveffect] 
 
             F(1, 526) =        0.68 
              Prob > F =        0.4112 
 
.  
. testnl _b[lag_remitgdp]*_b[gdpipc]=-_b[lag_gdpipc] 
 
  (1)  _b[lag_remitgdp]*_b[gdpipc] = -_b[lag_gdpipc] 
 
             F(1, 526) =        0.38 
              Prob > F =        0.5402 
 
.  
. testnl _b[lag_remitgdp]*_b[gdpjpc]=-_b[lag_gdpjpc] 
 
  (1)  _b[lag_remitgdp]*_b[gdpjpc] = -_b[lag_gdpjpc] 
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             F(1, 526) =        0.56 
              Prob > F =        0.4537 
 
.  
. testnl _b[lag_remitgdp]*_b[gdpi2]=-_b[lag_gdpi2] 
 
  (1)  _b[lag_remitgdp]*_b[gdpi2] = -_b[lag_gdpi2] 
 
             F(1, 526) =        0.00 
              Prob > F =        0.9767 
 
.  
. testnl _b[lag_remitgdp]*_b[gdpj2]=-_b[lag_gdpj2] 
 
  (1)  _b[lag_remitgdp]*_b[gdpj2] = -_b[lag_gdpj2] 
 
             F(1, 526) =        0.20 
              Prob > F =        0.6574 
 
 
Joint CFR  
 
testnl (_b[lag_remitgdp]*_b[unempl]=-_b[lag_unempl]) (_b[lag_remitgdp]*_b[hcunempl]=-
_b[lag_hcunempl]) (_b[lag_remitgdp]*_b[inflation]=-_b[lag_inflation]) 
(_b[lag_remitgdp]*_b[popul]=-_b[lag_popul]) (_b[lag_remitgdp]*_b[goveffect]=-
_b[lag_goveffect]) (_b[lag_remitgdp]*_b[gdpipc]=-_b[lag_gdpipc]) 
(_b[lag_remitgdp]*_b[gdpjpc]=-_b[lag_gdpjpc]) (_b[lag_remitgdp]*_b[gdpi2]=-_b[lag_gdpi2]) 
(_b[lag_remitgdp]*_b[gdpj2]=-_b[lag_gdpj2]) 
  (1)  _b[lag_remitgdp]*_b[unempl] = -_b[lag_unempl] 
  (2)  _b[lag_remitgdp]*_b[hcunempl] = -_b[lag_hcunempl] 
  (3)  _b[lag_remitgdp]*_b[inflation] = -_b[lag_inflation] 
  (4)  _b[lag_remitgdp]*_b[popul] = -_b[lag_popul] 
  (5)  _b[lag_remitgdp]*_b[goveffect] = -_b[lag_goveffect] 
  (6)  _b[lag_remitgdp]*_b[gdpipc] = -_b[lag_gdpipc] 
  (7)  _b[lag_remitgdp]*_b[gdpjpc] = -_b[lag_gdpjpc] 
  (8)  _b[lag_remitgdp]*_b[gdpi2] = -_b[lag_gdpi2] 
  (9)  _b[lag_remitgdp]*_b[gdpj2] = -_b[lag_gdpj2] 
 
             F(9, 526) =        0.70 
              Prob > F =        0.7073 
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Appendix 3.6.1 Test For CFR for Remittances per capita GDP 
including Governance Indicators 
 
xtreg  remitcapita  unempl  hcunempl inflation goveffect policyv gdpipc gdpi2 gdpjpc  gdpj2  
y1997 y1998 y1999 y2000 y2001 y2002 y2003 y2004 y2005 y2006 y2007 y2008 lag_re 
> mitcapita lag_inflation   lag_unempl lag_hcunempl lag_goveffect lag_gdpipc lag_gdpi2 
lag_gdpjpc lag_gdpj2, fe 
 
Fixed-effects (within) regression               Number of obs      =       610 
Group variable: id                              Number of groups   =        52 
 
R-sq:  within  = 0.6563                         Obs per group: min =         3 
       between = 0.1173                                        avg =      11.7 
       overall = 0.1745                                        max =        13 
 
                                                F(30,528)          =     33.61 
corr(u_i, Xb)  = -0.7233                        Prob > F           =    0.0000 
 
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
    remitcapita |      Coef.   Std. Err.      t    P>|t|     [95% Conf. Interval] 
----------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
         unempl |  -.0679475   .1755964    -0.39   0.699    -.4129009    .2770059 
       hcunempl |  -.0017155   .4655533    -0.00   0.997    -.9162796    .9128486 
      inflation |  -.0011841   .0052584    -0.23   0.822     -.011514    .0091458 
      goveffect |  -1.861454   2.062632    -0.90   0.367    -5.913426    2.190517 
        policyv |   1.197276   1.670415     0.72   0.474    -2.084199     4.47875 
         gdpipc |    .000696   .0007629     0.91   0.362    -.0008027    .0021946 
          gdpi2 |  -2.45e-07   1.04e-06    -0.24   0.814    -2.29e-06    1.80e-06 
         gdpjpc |    .002631   .0015479     1.70   0.090    -.0004099    .0056719 
          gdpj2 |  -1.27e-08   1.68e-08    -0.76   0.450    -4.56e-08    2.03e-08 
          y1997 |   10.93501    5.64181     1.94   0.053    -.1481388    22.01816 
          y1998 |   9.932564   5.199766     1.91   0.057    -.2822045    20.14733 
          y1999 |   7.927156   4.863997     1.63   0.104    -1.628006    17.48232 
          y2000 |   6.114116   4.512067     1.36   0.176    -2.749692    14.97792 
          y2001 |   5.086845   3.970006     1.28   0.201    -2.712101    12.88579 
          y2002 |   4.813041   3.680104     1.31   0.191    -2.416402    12.04248 
          y2003 |   4.321369   3.461281     1.25   0.212    -2.478203    11.12094 
          y2004 |   3.804193   3.322618     1.14   0.253    -2.722981    10.33137 
          y2005 |   2.730688   3.001631     0.91   0.363    -3.165917    8.627294 
          y2006 |   1.724986   2.811721     0.61   0.540    -3.798546    7.248519 
          y2007 |   .7155533   2.543281     0.28   0.779    -4.280639    5.711746 
          y2008 |   1.993663   1.895397     1.05   0.293    -1.729782    5.717108 
lag_remitcapita |   .1984357   .0199522     9.95   0.000     .1592402    .2376312 
  lag_inflation |  -.0029971   .0051972    -0.58   0.564    -.0132068    .0072125 
     lag_unempl |   .0495357    .174315     0.28   0.776    -.2929005    .3919718 
   lag_hcunempl |   .1814684   .4446774     0.41   0.683    -.6920857    1.055022 
  lag_goveffect |   2.706631   1.915969     1.41   0.158    -1.057227    6.470489 
     lag_gdpipc |   .0006653    .000748     0.89   0.374     -.000804    .0021347 
      lag_gdpi2 |   1.71e-07   1.39e-06     0.12   0.902    -2.56e-06    2.90e-06 
     lag_gdpjpc |  -.0001858     .00151    -0.12   0.902    -.0031522    .0027806 
      lag_gdpj2 |  -3.83e-09   1.58e-08    -0.24   0.809    -3.50e-08    2.73e-08 
          _cons |  -55.64447    19.1149    -2.91   0.004    -93.19507   -18.09387 
----------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
        sigma_u |  20.373116 
        sigma_e |  5.3609989 
            rho |  .93524101   (fraction of variance due to u_i) 
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
F test that all u_i=0:     F(51, 528) =    26.44             Prob > F = 0.0000 
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CFR for each variable 
testnl _b[lag_remitcapita]*_b[unempl]=-_b[lag_unempl] 
testnl _b[lag_remitcapita]*_b[hcunempl]=-_b[lag_hcunempl] 
testnl _b[lag_remitcapita]*_b[inflation]=-_b[lag_inflation] 
testnl _b[lag_remitcapita]*_b[goveffect]=-_b[lag_goveffect] 
testnl _b[lag_remitcapita]*_b[gdpipc]=-_b[lag_gdpipc] 
testnl _b[lag_remitcapita]*_b[gdpjpc]=-_b[lag_gdpjpc] 
testnl _b[lag_remitcapita]*_b[gdpi2]=-_b[lag_gdpi2] 
testnl _b[lag_remitcapita]*_b[gdpj2]=-_b[lag_gdpj2] 
 
 
 
testnl _b[lag_remitcapita]*_b[unempl]=-_b[lag_unempl] 
 
  (1)  _b[lag_remitcapita]*_b[unempl] = -_b[lag_unempl] 
 
             F(1, 528) =        0.06 
              Prob > F =        0.8089 
 
.  
. . testnl _b[lag_remitcapita]*_b[hcunempl]=-_b[lag_hcunempl] 
 
  (1)  _b[lag_remitcapita]*_b[hcunempl] = -_b[lag_hcunempl] 
 
             F(1, 528) =        0.23 
              Prob > F =        0.6313 
 
.  
. . testnl _b[lag_remitcapita]*_b[inflation]=-_b[lag_inflation] 
 
  (1)  _b[lag_remitcapita]*_b[inflation] = -_b[lag_inflation] 
 
             F(1, 528) =        0.38 
              Prob > F =        0.5386 
 
.  
. . testnl _b[lag_remitcapita]*_b[goveffect]=-_b[lag_goveffect] 
 
  (1)  _b[lag_remitcapita]*_b[goveffect] = -_b[lag_goveffect] 
 
             F(1, 528) =        2.01 
              Prob > F =        0.1570 
 
.  
. . testnl _b[lag_remitcapita]*_b[gdpipc]=-_b[lag_gdpipc] 
 
  (1)  _b[lag_remitcapita]*_b[gdpipc] = -_b[lag_gdpipc] 
 
             F(1, 528) =        1.77 
              Prob > F =        0.1838 
 
.  
. . testnl _b[lag_remitcapita]*_b[gdpjpc]=-_b[lag_gdpjpc] 
 
  (1)  _b[lag_remitcapita]*_b[gdpjpc] = -_b[lag_gdpjpc] 
 
             F(1, 528) =        0.07 
              Prob > F =        0.7889 
 
.  
. . testnl _b[lag_remitcapita]*_b[gdpi2]=-_b[lag_gdpi2] 
 
  (1)  _b[lag_remitcapita]*_b[gdpi2] = -_b[lag_gdpi2] 
 
             F(1, 528) =        0.01 
              Prob > F =        0.9182 
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.  
. . testnl _b[lag_remitcapita]*_b[gdpj2]=-_b[lag_gdpj2] 
 
  (1)  _b[lag_remitcapita]*_b[gdpj2] = -_b[lag_gdpj2] 
 
             F(1, 528) =        0.24 
              Prob > F =        0.6225 
 
 
Joint CFR  
 
testnl (_b[lag_remitcapita]*_b[unempl]=-_b[lag_unempl]) (_b[lag_remitcapita]*_b[hcunempl]=-
_b[lag_hcunempl]) (_b[lag_remitcapita]*_b[inflation]=-_b[lag_inflation]) (_b[lag 
> _remitcapita]*_b[goveffect]=-_b[lag_goveffect]) (_b[lag_remitcapita]*_b[gdpipc]=-
_b[lag_gdpipc]) (_b[lag_remitcapita]*_b[gdpjpc]=-_b[lag_gdpjpc]) (_b[lag_remitcapita]*_b[gdp 
> i2]=-_b[lag_gdpi2]) (_b[lag_remitcapita]*_b[gdpj2]=-_b[lag_gdpj2]) 
 
  (1)  _b[lag_remitcapita]*_b[unempl] = -_b[lag_unempl] 
  (2)  _b[lag_remitcapita]*_b[hcunempl] = -_b[lag_hcunempl] 
  (3)  _b[lag_remitcapita]*_b[inflation] = -_b[lag_inflation] 
  (4)  _b[lag_remitcapita]*_b[goveffect] = -_b[lag_goveffect] 
  (5)  _b[lag_remitcapita]*_b[gdpipc] = -_b[lag_gdpipc] 
  (6)  _b[lag_remitcapita]*_b[gdpjpc] = -_b[lag_gdpjpc] 
  (7)  _b[lag_remitcapita]*_b[gdpi2] = -_b[lag_gdpi2] 
  (8)  _b[lag_remitcapita]*_b[gdpj2] = -_b[lag_gdpj2] 
 
             F(8, 528) =        0.66 
              Prob > F =        0.7250 
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Appendix 3.6.2 Output of AR (1) for the Specification (7) Table 
3.9  
Dependent Variable: Remittances/GDP 
 
xtregar remitgdp unempl hcunempl inflation goveffect policyv popul gdpipc gdpi2 gdpjpc gdpj2 
y1997 y1998 y1999 y2000 y2001 y2002 y2003 y2004 y2005 y2006 y2007 y2008, fe 
FE (within) regression with AR(1) disturbances  Number of obs      =       610 
Group variable: id                              Number of groups   =        52 
 
R-sq:  within  = 0.1005                         Obs per group: min =         3 
       between = 0.0485                                        avg =      11.7 
       overall = 0.0523                                        max =        13 
 
                                                F(22,536)          =      2.72 
corr(u_i, Xb)  = -0.9081                        Prob > F           =    0.0000 
 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
    remitgdp |      Coef.   Std. Err.      t    P>|t|     [95% Conf. Interval] 
-------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
      unempl |   .0509364   .0383898     1.33   0.185    -.0244765    .1263494 
    hcunempl |   .1543919   .0857947     1.80   0.072    -.0141433     .322927 
   inflation |   .0005763   .0009026     0.64   0.523    -.0011967    .0023494 
   goveffect |  -.6048614    .434143    -1.39   0.164    -1.457692    .2479691 
     policyv |  -.3504468   .6077919    -0.58   0.564    -1.544393    .8434994 
       popul |   -.044073   .1057373    -0.42   0.677    -.2517832    .1636373 
      gdpipc |  -.0002292   .0001644    -1.39   0.164    -.0005521    .0000937 
       gdpi2 |   1.19e-07   1.35e-07     0.88   0.381    -1.47e-07    3.84e-07 
      gdpjpc |   .0013057   .0003105     4.21   0.000     .0006958    .0019155 
       gdpj2 |  -8.62e-09   2.85e-09    -3.03   0.003    -1.42e-08   -3.03e-09 
       y1997 |   .2972052   .3071139     0.97   0.334    -.3060893    .9004996 
       y1998 |    .717814   .5017995     1.43   0.153    -.2679207    1.703549 
       y1999 |   .7660206   .6239725     1.23   0.220    -.4597108    1.991752 
       y2000 |    .806414   .6603208     1.22   0.223      -.49072    2.103548 
       y2001 |   1.153942   .7206701     1.60   0.110    -.2617422    2.569626 
       y2002 |   1.710013    .750684     2.28   0.023     .2353691    3.184656 
       y2003 |    1.91077   .7135678     2.68   0.008     .5090381    3.312503 
       y2004 |   1.936703   .5901186     3.28   0.001     .7774742    3.095932 
       y2005 |   1.665144   .4524796     3.68   0.000     .7762935    2.553995 
       y2006 |   1.184305   .3345947     3.54   0.000     .5270274    1.841583 
       y2007 |    .560761   .3362588     1.67   0.096    -.0997858    1.221308 
       y2008 |  -.0800824    .318101    -0.25   0.801    -.7049599    .5447952 
       _cons |  -24.72905   1.458933   -16.95   0.000    -27.59498   -21.86312 
-------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
      rho_ar |  .86930884 
     sigma_u |   13.81682 
     sigma_e |  1.2025968 
     rho_fov |  .99248124   (fraction of variance because of u_i) 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
F test that all u_i=0:     F(51,536) =     4.74              Prob > F = 0.0000 
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Appendix 3.6.3 Output of AR (1) for the Specification (9) Table 
3.9 
 
. xtregar remitgdp unempl hcunempl inflation goveffect  pv_1 pv1 popul gdpipc gdpi2 gdpjpc 
gdpj2 y1997 y1998 y1999 y2000 y2001 y2002 y2003 y2004 y2005 y2006 y2007 y2008, fe 
 
FE (within) regression with AR(1) disturbances  Number of obs      =       610 
Group variable: id                              Number of groups   =        52 
 
R-sq:  within  = 0.1146                         Obs per group: min =         3 
       between = 0.0481                                        avg =      11.7 
       overall = 0.0511                                        max =        13 
 
                                                F(23,535)          =      3.01 
corr(u_i, Xb)  = -0.9236                        Prob > F           =    0.0000 
 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
    remitgdp |      Coef.   Std. Err.      t    P>|t|     [95% Conf. Interval] 
-------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
      unempl |   .0509132   .0381137     1.34   0.182    -.0239576     .125784 
    hcunempl |   .1438939   .0853415     1.69   0.092    -.0237515    .3115394 
   inflation |   .0005673   .0008951     0.63   0.527    -.0011911    .0023256 
   goveffect |  -.6362683   .4308982    -1.48   0.140    -1.482728    .2101916 
        pv_1 |  -1.238687   .6006065    -2.06   0.040    -2.418523   -.0588507 
         pv1 |   1.197213   .7976222     1.50   0.134     -.369642    2.764069 
       popul |  -.0539018   .1067028    -0.51   0.614    -.2635096     .155706 
      gdpipc |  -.0002095   .0001636    -1.28   0.201     -.000531    .0001119 
       gdpi2 |   1.22e-07   1.34e-07     0.91   0.364    -1.42e-07    3.86e-07 
      gdpjpc |   .0012739   .0003081     4.13   0.000     .0006686    .0018792 
       gdpj2 |  -8.18e-09   2.84e-09    -2.88   0.004    -1.37e-08   -2.61e-09 
       y1997 |   .3257325    .301095     1.08   0.280    -.2657409    .9172059 
       y1998 |   .7505392   .4906627     1.53   0.127    -.2133226    1.714401 
       y1999 |    .803944   .6099884     1.32   0.188    -.3943221     2.00221 
       y2000 |   .8635384   .6462682     1.34   0.182    -.4059961    2.133073 
       y2001 |   1.157377    .705821     1.64   0.102    -.2291434    2.543897 
       y2002 |   1.723987   .7357943     2.34   0.019     .2785864    3.169387 
       y2003 |   1.934499    .699949     2.76   0.006     .5595134    3.309484 
       y2004 |   1.902857   .5792025     3.29   0.001     .7650667    3.040647 
       y2005 |   1.631676   .4447616     3.67   0.000     .7579832     2.50537 
       y2006 |   1.147634   .3311404     3.47   0.001     .4971388    1.798128 
       y2007 |   .5167934    .335305     1.54   0.124    -.1418825    1.175469 
       y2008 |  -.1177321   .3169747    -0.37   0.710    -.7403997    .5049356 
       _cons |  -23.89032   1.427243   -16.74   0.000    -26.69401   -21.08663 
-------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
      rho_ar |  .87215792 
     sigma_u |  15.084542 
     sigma_e |  1.1942709 
     rho_fov |  .99377087   (fraction of variance because of u_i) 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
F test that all u_i=0:     F(51,535) =     4.67              Prob > F = 0.0000 
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Appendix 3.6.4 Output of AR (1) for the Specification (11) Table 
3.9  
 
. xtregar remitgdp unempl hcunempl inflation goveffect   pol_tax pol_govt pol_private popul 
gdpipc gdpi2 gdpjpc gdpj2 y1997 y1998 y1999 y2000 y2001 y2002 y2003 y2004 y2005 y20 
> 06 y2007 y2008, fe 
 
FE (within) regression with AR(1) disturbances  Number of obs      =       610 
Group variable: id                              Number of groups   =        52 
 
R-sq:  within  = 0.1032                         Obs per group: min =         3 
       between = 0.0485                                        avg =      11.7 
       overall = 0.0517                                        max =        13 
 
                                                F(24,534)          =      2.56 
corr(u_i, Xb)  = -0.9198                        Prob > F           =    0.0001 
 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
    remitgdp |      Coef.   Std. Err.      t    P>|t|     [95% Conf. Interval] 
-------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
      unempl |    .049925   .0384355     1.30   0.195    -.0255783    .1254284 
    hcunempl |   .1507214   .0859153     1.75   0.080     -.018052    .3194949 
   inflation |    .000587   .0009028     0.65   0.516    -.0011864    .0023604 
   goveffect |   -.568333   .4351342    -1.31   0.192    -1.423118    .2864517 
     pol_tax |   .5150877   .9263771     0.56   0.578    -1.304703    2.334878 
    pol_govt |  -.5528938   .6951651    -0.80   0.427    -1.918488    .8126999 
 pol_private |  -.8909731   .8317286    -1.07   0.285    -2.524834    .7428881 
       popul |  -.0503722    .106397    -0.47   0.636    -.2593802    .1586359 
      gdpipc |   -.000228   .0001646    -1.39   0.167    -.0005513    .0000953 
       gdpi2 |   1.20e-07   1.35e-07     0.89   0.375    -1.46e-07    3.86e-07 
      gdpjpc |   .0013171   .0003115     4.23   0.000     .0007051     .001929 
       gdpj2 |  -8.69e-09   2.86e-09    -3.04   0.002    -1.43e-08   -3.08e-09 
       y1997 |   .2940515   .3082565     0.95   0.341    -.3114927    .8995956 
       y1998 |   .7095908     .50157     1.41   0.158    -.2757016    1.694883 
       y1999 |    .752391   .6230016     1.21   0.228    -.4714434    1.976225 
       y2000 |   .7955653   .6585326     1.21   0.228     -.498067    2.089198 
       y2001 |    1.12201   .7194259     1.56   0.119    -.2912421    2.535262 
       y2002 |   1.690482   .7496052     2.26   0.025     .2179451    3.163019 
       y2003 |   1.888299   .7125378     2.65   0.008     .4885777     3.28802 
       y2004 |   1.930851   .5890683     3.28   0.001     .7736762    3.088027 
       y2005 |   1.653583   .4517688     3.66   0.000     .7661205    2.541045 
       y2006 |   1.161716   .3349819     3.47   0.001     .5036721     1.81976 
       y2007 |   .5290529   .3378215     1.57   0.118    -.1345693    1.192675 
       y2008 |  -.1014854   .3188545    -0.32   0.750    -.7278485    .5248776 
       _cons |  -24.54254   1.454159   -16.88   0.000    -27.39911   -21.68596 
-------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
      rho_ar |  .86997757 
     sigma_u |  14.737112 
     sigma_e |  1.2030156 
     rho_fov |  .99338038   (fraction of variance because of u_i) 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
F test that all u_i=0:     F(51,534) =     4.66              Prob > F = 0.0000 
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Appendix 3.6.5 Output of AR (1) for the Specification (8) Table 
3.9 
Dependent Variable: Remittances per Capita 
 
xtregar remitcapita unempl hcunempl inflation goveffect  policyv gdpipc gdpi2 gdpjpc gdpj2 
y1997 y1998 y1999 y2000 y2001 y2002 y2003 y2004 y2005 y2006 y2007 y2008, fe 
 
FE (within) regression with AR(1) disturbances  Number of obs      =       610 
Group variable: id                              Number of groups   =        52 
 
R-sq:  within  = 0.3160                         Obs per group: min =         3 
       between = 0.0508                                        avg =      11.7 
       overall = 0.0922                                        max =        13 
 
                                                F(21,537)          =     11.81 
corr(u_i, Xb)  = -0.7925                        Prob > F           =    0.0000 
 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
 remitcapita |      Coef.   Std. Err.      t    P>|t|     [95% Conf. Interval] 
-------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
      unempl |   .1520743   .1687519     0.90   0.368    -.1794204     .483569 
    hcunempl |  -.3774612   .3916615    -0.96   0.336    -1.146838    .3919153 
   inflation |   .0003084   .0054485     0.06   0.955    -.0103945    .0110113 
   goveffect |  -2.499265    2.20072    -1.14   0.257    -6.822339     1.82381 
     policyv |   .3701097   2.762757     0.13   0.893    -5.057027    5.797246 
      gdpipc |   .0021101   .0004403     4.79   0.000     .0012451    .0029751 
       gdpi2 |  -1.94e-07   3.70e-07    -0.52   0.601    -9.21e-07    5.33e-07 
      gdpjpc |   .0026065    .001236     2.11   0.035     .0001784    .0050346 
       gdpj2 |  -1.41e-08   1.05e-08    -1.34   0.179    -3.47e-08    6.50e-09 
       y1997 |    6.23212   4.276446     1.46   0.146    -2.168494    14.63273 
       y1998 |   8.552696   5.847327     1.46   0.144    -2.933742    20.03913 
       y1999 |   8.057237   6.126508     1.32   0.189    -3.977623     20.0921 
       y2000 |   6.059636   5.701083     1.06   0.288    -5.139522    17.25879 
       y2001 |   4.992669   5.337347     0.94   0.350     -5.49197    15.47731 
       y2002 |   4.663866    4.89912     0.95   0.342    -4.959924    14.28766 
       y2003 |   4.249813   4.261745     1.00   0.319    -4.121923    12.62155 
       y2004 |   3.665325   3.407042     1.08   0.282     -3.02744    10.35809 
       y2005 |   2.379608   2.580294     0.92   0.357      -2.6891    7.448315 
       y2006 |   .7299183   1.847162     0.40   0.693     -2.89863    4.358467 
       y2007 |  -1.864194   1.577458    -1.18   0.238    -4.962938     1.23455 
       y2008 |  -.0789415    1.40627    -0.06   0.955    -2.841405    2.683522 
       _cons |  -62.77875   16.15898    -3.89   0.000    -94.52131   -31.03619 
-------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
      rho_ar |  .45207921 
     sigma_u |  24.747055 
     sigma_e |  6.0812562 
     rho_fov |  .94305241   (fraction of variance because of u_i) 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
F test that all u_i=0:     F(51,537) =    19.66              Prob > F = 0.0000 
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Appendix 3.6.6 Output of AR (1) for the Specification (10) Table 
3.9  
 
xtregar remitcapita unempl hcunempl inflation goveffect pv_1 pv1 gdpipc gdpi2 gdpjpc gdpj2 
y1997 y1998 y1999 y2000 y2001 y2002 y2003 y2004 y2005 y2006 y2007 y2008,fe 
 
FE (within) regression with AR(1) disturbances  Number of obs      =       610 
Group variable: id                              Number of groups   =        52 
 
R-sq:  within  = 0.3182                         Obs per group: min =         3 
       between = 0.0519                                        avg =      11.7 
       overall = 0.0937                                        max =        13 
 
                                                F(22,536)          =     11.37 
corr(u_i, Xb)  = -0.7916                        Prob > F           =    0.0000 
 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
 remitcapita |      Coef.   Std. Err.      t    P>|t|     [95% Conf. Interval] 
-------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
      unempl |   .1492213   .1683824     0.89   0.376    -.1815491    .4799918 
    hcunempl |  -.4169252    .391618    -1.06   0.288    -1.186219     .352369 
   inflation |   .0003425    .005445     0.06   0.950    -.0103537    .0110387 
   goveffect |  -2.204772   2.211753    -1.00   0.319    -6.549539    2.139994 
        pv_1 |  -3.081262   2.858185    -1.08   0.281    -8.695879    2.533356 
         pv1 |  -1.419829   3.246273    -0.44   0.662    -7.796808    4.957149 
      gdpipc |   .0021023   .0004399     4.78   0.000     .0012382    .0029663 
       gdpi2 |  -2.02e-07   3.70e-07    -0.55   0.585    -9.29e-07    5.24e-07 
      gdpjpc |   .0025486   .0012423     2.05   0.041     .0001083    .0049889 
       gdpj2 |  -1.33e-08   1.05e-08    -1.26   0.209    -3.40e-08    7.46e-09 
       y1997 |   6.151454     4.2892     1.43   0.152    -2.274249    14.57716 
       y1998 |   8.384335   5.862168     1.43   0.153    -3.131305    19.89998 
       y1999 |   7.848524   6.138665     1.28   0.202    -4.210267    19.90732 
       y2000 |   5.902483   5.708046     1.03   0.302    -5.310401    17.11537 
       y2001 |   4.806269   5.349047     0.90   0.369    -5.701397    15.31394 
       y2002 |   4.500133   4.908352     0.92   0.360    -5.141832     14.1421 
       y2003 |   4.096419    4.26745     0.96   0.338    -4.286558     12.4794 
       y2004 |   3.591243   3.417709     1.05   0.294    -3.122504    10.30499 
       y2005 |   2.316822   2.586998     0.90   0.371    -2.765077     7.39872 
       y2006 |   .6430929   1.848724     0.35   0.728     -2.98854    4.274726 
       y2007 |  -1.968107   1.576289    -1.25   0.212    -5.064568    1.128355 
       y2008 |  -.1723701   1.405499    -0.12   0.902    -2.933333    2.588593 
       _cons |  -60.97556   16.25169    -3.75   0.000    -92.90037   -29.05076 
-------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
      rho_ar |  .45129412 
     sigma_u |  24.684764 
     sigma_e |  6.0758687 
     rho_fov |  .94287665   (fraction of variance because of u_i) 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
F test that all u_i=0:     F(51,536) =    19.51              Prob > F = 0.0000 
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Appendix 3.6.7 Output of AR (1) for the Specification (12) Table 
3.9 
 
xtregar remitcapita unempl hcunempl inflation goveffect   pol_tax pol_govt pol_private gdpipc 
gdpi2 gdpjpc gdpj2 y1997 y1998 y1999 y2000 y2001 y2002 y2003 y2004 y2005 y2006  
> y2007 y2008, fe 
 
FE (within) regression with AR(1) disturbances  Number of obs      =       610 
Group variable: id                              Number of groups   =        52 
 
R-sq:  within  = 0.3180                         Obs per group: min =         3 
       between = 0.0495                                        avg =      11.7 
       overall = 0.0898                                        max =        13 
 
                                                F(23,535)          =     10.85 
corr(u_i, Xb)  = -0.8003                        Prob > F           =    0.0000 
 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
 remitcapita |      Coef.   Std. Err.      t    P>|t|     [95% Conf. Interval] 
-------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
      unempl |   .1410751    .169398     0.83   0.405    -.1916918    .4738419 
    hcunempl |   -.413036    .392612    -1.05   0.293    -1.184286     .358214 
   inflation |    .000483   .0054538     0.09   0.929    -.0102306    .0111966 
   goveffect |  -2.053225    2.22404    -0.92   0.356    -6.422148    2.315698 
     pol_tax |   1.005862   4.393705     0.23   0.819    -7.625168    9.636892 
    pol_govt |  -1.933933   3.449098    -0.56   0.575    -8.709368    4.841502 
 pol_private |  -2.482571    3.68297    -0.67   0.501    -9.717427    4.752284 
      gdpipc |   .0021009   .0004442     4.73   0.000     .0012282    .0029735 
       gdpi2 |  -2.02e-07   3.70e-07    -0.55   0.585    -9.30e-07    5.25e-07 
      gdpjpc |   .0026626   .0012381     2.15   0.032     .0002304    .0050948 
       gdpj2 |  -1.45e-08   1.05e-08    -1.38   0.169    -3.52e-08    6.21e-09 
       y1997 |   6.287114   4.286208     1.47   0.143    -2.132748    14.70698 
       y1998 |   8.580367   5.853603     1.47   0.143    -2.918497    20.07923 
       y1999 |   8.049466   6.129475     1.31   0.190    -3.991323    20.09026 
       y2000 |   6.060195   5.701985     1.06   0.288     -5.14083    17.26122 
       y2001 |      4.952   5.342038     0.93   0.354    -5.541943    15.44594 
       y2002 |   4.659383   4.902424     0.95   0.342    -4.970978    14.28974 
       y2003 |   4.210009   4.264276     0.99   0.324    -4.166768    12.58679 
       y2004 |   3.715775   3.411635     1.09   0.277    -2.986068    10.41762 
       y2005 |   2.393702    2.58417     0.93   0.355    -2.682663    7.470067 
       y2006 |   .6571778    1.85117     0.36   0.723    -2.979276    4.293631 
       y2007 |  -2.004174   1.582451    -1.27   0.206    -5.112753    1.104406 
       y2008 |  -.2002742   1.407967    -0.14   0.887    -2.966096    2.565548 
       _cons |  -62.91359   16.17712    -3.89   0.000    -94.69206   -31.13513 
-------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
      rho_ar |  .45136566 
     sigma_u |  25.241274 
     sigma_e |  6.0824659 
     rho_fov |  .94511885   (fraction of variance because of u_i) 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
F test that all u_i=0:     F(51,535) =    18.73              Prob > F = 0.0000 
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Appendix 4.1 Definition of Variables and the Questionnaire 
 
Abbreviation of the 
Variable 
Description 
Type of 
the 
Variable 
Dependent Variables 
Consumption 
 
Wi The share of expenditure on Current 
Consumption 
 
Continuou
s 
Durable Goods Wi The share of expenditure on Durable 
Goods 
Continuou
s 
Education Wi 
The share of Expenditure on Education 
Continuou
s 
Total household 
Expenditure (logx) 
logxi 
Total Household Expenditure 
Continuou
s 
Dependent Variables  
 
Description 
Type of 
Variable 
Age of the HH  AGEHH 
Age of the Head of household 
Continuou
s 
Age of the Household 
Head^2 (AgeHH^2) 
AGEHH^2 
Square term of the Age of the Head of 
household 
Continuou
s 
Number of Children C15 Number of Children below the age of 
15 
Continuou
s 
Number of children^2  C15^2 Square term of the Number of Children 
below the age of 15 
Continuou
s 
Number of Adults A Number of adult Household members, 
above the age of 15 
Continuou
s 
Number of adults^2 A^2 
Inflation Rate in country i 
Continuou
s 
Education of the HH EDHH Years the head of household spent in 
education  
Continuou
s 
Gender of the HH G 
Gender of the Head of household 
Dummy 
1 if Female 
Self-Employed  
SE 
If the Head of household is Self-
Employed 
Dummy,  
1 if self-
employed 
Housing Status (HS=1 
owner of a house) 
HO 
If the Household lives in its own house 
Dummy,  
1 if owning 
a house 
Dummy of 
remittances*logx 
(D_rem*logx) 
(D_rem*logxi) The interaction term between dummy 
of remittances and log of expenditure 
(Ia and Ib) 
Interaction term between dummy of 
remittances and log of income (Ic, and 
II and III) 
Interaction 
and 
continuous 
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Migrants Advise on 
remittances*Rremit*log
x (D_rem*MA*logx) 
 
 
(D_rem*logxi*MA) 
The interaction term between dummy 
of remittances and log of expenditure 
and if the Household receives advise 
on spending (Ia and Ib) 
Interaction term between dummy of 
remittances and log of income and if 
the Household receives advise on 
spending (Ic, and II and III) 
Interaction 
and 
continuous 
Frequency of 
visits*Rremit*logxs 
(D_rem*FV*logx) 
 
(D_rem*logxi*FV) 
The interaction term between dummy 
of remittances and log of expenditure 
and frequency of visits (Ia and Ib) 
Interaction term between dummy of 
remittances and log of income and 
frequency of visits (Ic, and II and III) 
Interaction 
and 
continuous 
Years Since 
Migration*Rremit*logxs 
(D_rem*YSM*logx) 
 
(D_rem*logxi*YSM) 
The interaction term between dummy 
of remittances and log of expenditure 
and years since migration (Ia and Ib) 
Interaction term between dummy of 
remittances and years since migration 
(Ic, and II and III) 
Interaction 
and 
continuous 
Years Since 
Migration*Rremit*logxs 
(D_rem*YSM*logx)2 
 
(D_rem*logxi*YSM)^
2 
The interaction term between dummy 
of remittances and log of expenditure 
and years since migration (squared) (Ia 
and Ib) 
Interaction term between dummy of 
remittances and years since migration 
(squared) (Ic, and II and III) 
Interaction 
and 
continuous 
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Management Information  
 
M-1. Respondent Identification Number _________ ___ 
 
M-2. Sampling Point:  _________    
 
M-3. Month of Interview  
 
        12.  December /2009 1.  January/2010 
 
M-4. Date of Interview:  ______  
 
M-5. Region 
 
1. Prishtinë/Pristina               4.  Gjakovë/Djakovica 
2. Mitrovicë/Mitrovica   5. Gjilan/Gnjilane 
3.  Prizren                              6.  Pejë/Pec 
7. Ferizaj/Urosevac 
M-6. Residence  
 
1.  Rural area   
2.  Village 
3.  Town/City 
 
M-7. Code Municipality 
 
1.  Prishtinë/Pristina             21.  Ferizaj/Urosevac     
2.  Mitrovicë/Mitrovica 22.  Kaçanik/Kacanik 
3.  Gjilan/Gnjilan 23.  Fushë Kosovë/ 
4.  Peje/Pec                  24.  Obiliq/Obilic 
5.  Prizren                   25.  Novobërdë/Novo Brdo 
6.  Gjakove/Djakovica  26.  Zubin Potok 
7.  Podujeve/Podujevo               27.  Shtërpcë/Strpce 
8.  Vushtrri/Vucitrn                   28.  Zveçan/Zvecan 
9.  Skenderaj/Srbica                   29.  Gllogovc/Glogovac 
10. Leposaviq/Leposac              30.  Malishevë/Malisevo 
11.  Klinë/Klina 31. Junik/Junik 
12.  Istog/Istok 
13.  Deçan/Decani 
14.  Dragash/Dragash 
15.  Suharekë/Suva Reka 
16.  Rahovec/Orahovac  
17.  Viti/Vitina 
18.  Kamenicë/Kamenica 
19.  Lipjan/Lipljan 
20.  Shtime/Stimlje 
 
 
 
M-8. Day of the Week Interview Completed 
 
1.  Sunday 2.  Monday  3.  Tuesday  4.  Wednesday 
 
5.  Thursday 6.  Friday  7.  Saturday 
 
 
 
 
 
 
M-9. Interviewer Code:  ___ ___ ___ ___ 
 
M-10. Interview Completed on the ... 
 
M-10. Interview Completed on the ...  
 
1.  first visit to that house?    
2.  second (return) visit to that house? or   
3.  third visit to that house?   
 
M-11. Supervisor Code:  ___ ___ ___ ___ 
 
M-12. Record Time (using 24 hour clock) Interview 
Began:  __ __ : __ __  
 
M-13. Record Time (using 24 hour clock) Interview 
was Completed:  __ __ : __ __  
(Fill in all four data positions) 
 
M-14. Record Length of Interview in Minutes: ___  _ 
(Record times greater than 99 minutes as 99) 
 
M-15. Key-puncher Code: ___ ___ 
 
 
Begin Sampling Procedure Here 
 
1. After selecting a house or apartment using 
the random route technique,  
 
2. Introduce yourself:  "Good 
morning/afternoon/evening.  My name is 
_______________. 
I am working for UBO Consulting, We are 
conducting a survey of public opinion 
throughout Kosovo and want to interview the 
head of your household.  Answers to the 
survey will be strictly confidential, according 
to international research standards." 
 
3. If the designated respondent is at home and 
refuses the interview or another family 
member blocks the interview, politely leave 
the house and to the next appropriate house 
or apartment on that route. 
 
4. If the designated respondent is not at home, 
attempt to schedule an interview for later that 
day (in rural areas) or at any other time in the 
fieldwork period (in urban areas).  Record 
the date and time of that appointment:  Date: 
__________  Time:  __________ 
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Q1. How many people are in your family (including 
yourself)?______________  
 
Q2.  Which is your housing status? 
 
1. Private apartment/ house 
2. Rented apartment/house 
3. Apartment/house without paying (rent) 
4. Temporary shelter (collective shelter, tent, etc.) 
5. Other, please specify ____________ 
6. Don’t know 
 
Q3. Please list the members of your family, age, 
gender, education and employment.Please begin with 
head of household. 
 
 
Nr. Initials Gender Age Years of 
education 
Employment 
status * 
1      
2      
3      
4      
5      
6      
7      
8      
9      
10      
*  1 – employed  
    2 – not employed (actively looking for work) 
    3-  not employed (not looking for work) 
    4-  not applicable 
 
   
Q4. How do you evaluate the present social-economic 
situation of your family (Please rank them by order 
from 1 “being very good” to 4 “Very difficult”)? 
 
  Very 
good  
Good 
(suitable) 
Difficul
t  
Very 
difficult 
N/A 
1 Nourishm
ent/Food 
1 2 3 4 9 
2 Housing 1 2 3 4 9 
3 Clothes 1 2 3 4 9 
4 Health  1 2 3 4 9 
5 Educatio
n  
1 2 3 4 9 
6 Leisure 1 2 3 4 9 
7 Productiv
e Assets* 
1 2 3 4 9 
8 Other 
(specify) 
1 2 3 4 9 
* Land, Tractors, Sheep, Cows, etc. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Q5. Approximately how much did your household 
spend in average per month on each of the 
following items… 
 Items  Amount 
(EUR) 
Q5.1 Food   
Q5.2 Non food  (Alcohol, cigarettes, everyday 
household goods, e.g. hygienic products, 
detergents) 
 
Q5.3 Semi durable goods (clothes, shoes, 
 furniture) 
 
Q5.4 Durable goods (home appliances,  
machinery, etc.) 
 
Q5.5 Housing (rent and assessed rent,  public 
 utilities – phone, water, electricity) 
 
Q5.6 Health  (medicines and medical services)  
Q5.7 Education   
Q5.8 Total household expenditure in last month  
 
 
 
 
 
  Q6. Currently are you…….. 
1. Married  
2. Not married  
3. Divorced 
4. Widow  
5. Free cohabitation  
6. NA 
 
  Q7. What is your ethnicity/what group do you belong to? 
 
1. Albanian                        6.  Roma  
2. Serb                                7. Ashkali 
3. Bosnian                          8. Egyptian 
4. Goran                             9. Other, please specify_____ 
5. Turk                               10. Don’t know  
 
  Q8. Could you tell us how much did you earn monthly (in 
average) during 2009? 
1. I did not earn at all 
2. Specify ______________ 
3. Don’t know 
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Q9. Currently, you are... 
 
9.1 Unemployed 
1a. Not receiving social assistance 
1b. Receiving social assistance 
9.2 Permanently employed [go to Q12] 
2a. In Public Sector 
2b. In Private Sector 
 2b.1 Employee 
 2b.2 Employer  
 2b.3 Self-employed   
 
9.3 Seasonally/Non-Permanent Employment (go to 
Q12) 
9.4 Pensioner 
9.5 Housewife  
9.6 Student 
9.7 Other. Please specify? ____________________ 
9.8 DK/NA 
 
Q10.If you are unemployed, are you actively  
looking for a job? 
 
1. Yes  
2. No 
 
Q10a. If yes, are you registered at the local Unemployment 
 Centre? 
 
1. Yes 
2. No 
 
Q11. What is the minimum level of monthly wage for 
which you would accept to work? 
 
 
1. 0 – 50 €                    7.  301 – 350 € 
2. 51 – 100 €               8.   351 – 400 € 
3. 101 – 150 €             9.   401 – 450 € 
4. 151 – 200 €           10.  Above 451 € 
5. 201 – 250€           11.  Don’t know/Ref. 
6. 251 – 300 € 
 
Q12. Do you have specific plans to migrate in the near 
future ( during 2010)? 
 
1. Yes; Where ____________________ 
2. No 
 
Q13. At what level of monthly income  would you be 
willing to migrate? 
 
1. Less than 500 €                6.  2501 – 3000 € 
2. 501 – 1000 €                    7.   More than 3000 € 
3. 1001 – 1500 €                 8.   Don’t know/Ref. 
4. 1501 – 2000 € 
5. 2001 – 2500 € 
 
Q14. What is your total household monthly income, 
from all sources of revenues of all members (without 
including remittances from abroad)? 
 
1. 0 – 100 € 
2. 101 – 200 € 
3. 201 – 400€  
4. 401 – 600€ 
5. 601 – 800 € 
6. 801€ and above 
7. Don’t know/Ref. 
 
Q15. Can you please specify your monthly average 
incomes from all your sources (Average of last three 
months)? 
 
 
Q16. On the last occasion you needed to see a doctor 
or medical specialist, to what extent did each of the 
following factors make it difficult for you to do so?  
 
 
 
Very 
difficult 
Fairly 
difficult 
Average 
Fairly 
easy 
Very 
easy 
1 Cost of 
seeing the 
doctor 
1 2 3 4 5 
2 Cost of 
buying 
medicines 
1 2 3 4 5 
 
Q17.  For the members of your family who attend 
formal education, to what extent each of the following 
factors make it difficult for them to attend regularly?  
 
 
 
 
Very 
difficult 
Fairly 
difficult 
Average 
Fairly 
easy 
Very 
easy 
1 Cost of 
travelling to 
education 
facility  
1 2 3 4 5 
2 Cost of 
buying 
books 
1 2 3 4 5 
3 Cost of 
paying the 
tutition fees 
1 2 3 4 5 
 
Q18. How many family members live outside of 
Kosovo? ____________________ 
No Monthly average income  No of 
persons  
Total Monthly 
Income 
1 Permanent Employment (Contract)   
2 Non-permanent Employment    
3 Income from permanent self-
employment  
  
4 Pension   
5 Social Assistance   
6 Housewife   
7 Student   
8 Other specify   
9 Total   
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Q19.  Do you receive money or goods from anyone 
living as migrant as outside Kosovo? 
1. Yes 
2. No ( THIS SURVEY ENDS HERE, WE THANK YOU 
FOR YOUR COOPERATION ) 
 
 
 
Q20. What is your relation to remittent(s)? 
(more than one answer) 
1. Mothe                  8.   Daughter 
2. Father9.   Uncle 
3. Husband10.  Aunt 
4. Wife                    11.  Cousin 
5. Brother 12.  Friend 
6. Sister                   13. Other (please specify)_________ 
7. Son  
 
Q21. Could you please provide some more detailed 
information related to remittent?  
 
21a. Year of migration: ______________________ 
21b. Country of migration ___________________ 
 
 
Q22. Employment /occupation of the remittent: 
 
22.1 Unemployed 
1a. Not receiving social assistance 
1b. Receiving social assistance 
22.2 Permanently employed  
 
2a. In Public Sector 
2b. In Private Sector 
 2b.1 Employee 
 2b.2 Employer  
 2b.3 Self-employed   
 
22.3 Seasonally/Non-Permanent Employment  
22.4 Pensioner 
22.5 Housewife  
22.6 Student 
22.7 Other. Please specify? ___________________ 
22.8 DK/NA 
 
Q23. What were the key reasons for your family 
member(s) to migrate?  (Select and paste from the list 
provided below)  
 
1. Most Important  ……………………… [     ]                 
2. Second most important ………….. [     ] 
3. Third most important  …………….. [     ] 
 
Reasons list  
1. Economic Reasons 
2. Political Reasons 
3. Education 
4. Marriage /Family reunion  
5. War/Refugee 
Other specify: __________________ 
7.    DK/NA 
 
Q24. What is the legal status of a remittent? 
1. with visa;  
2. with residence permit;  
3. with citizenship; or  
4. illegal;  
5.    other ____________ 
6.    DK/NA 
 
 
 
Q25. When did you start receiving money from abroad? 
_______ (Year) 
Q26. Based on your best estimate, was that amount  
more, less or at the same level as in 2008? 
 
1. More  
2. Less 
3. At the same level 
4. I don’t know 
5. Refusal 
 
Q27. Do you expect your HH to receive more or less  
money in 2010, when compared to 2009? 
 
1. More  
2. Less 
3. At the same level 
4. I don’t know 
5. Refusal 
 
Q28. Who is the decision-maker regarding spending 
money received? (Individuals’ position within your 
household) 
 
1. Sender                    8. Son 
2. Mother                   9. Daughter 
3. Father                   10. Uncle 
4. Husband               11. Aunt 
5. Wife                      12. Cousin  
6. Brother                 13. Friend 
7. Sister                     14. Other(please specify)________ 
 
Q29.In your opinion, what are the most important 
purposes/reasons for your family member transferring 
money to Kosovo?  
 
1. Most Important  ……………………… [     ]                 
2. Second most important ………….. [     ] 
3. Third most important  …………….. [     ] 
 
Reasons list  
1. Support family 
2. Saving in bank (Savings of the remittent) 
3.Buying property  
4.Invest in a business  
5.Lend to friends and family 
6.Other specify 
7. DK/NA 
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Q30. On average how often does the remittent living 
abroad visit Kosovo on annual basis?  
 
1. Less than once a year  
2. Once a year 
3. Twice a year 
4. Three to four times a years 
5. Several times during the year 
6. Other ____________________ 
 
Q31. How frequently has your family member or 
relative sent you money over the last 12 
months? 
1. Weekly     3. Four times a year     5. Once a year 
2. Monthly    4.Two times a year      6. Other____(please specify) 
 
Q32. Could you please assess the total value of cash in 
 Euros received during 2009? €__________ 
 
Q33. Of these Euros received during 2009, would you 
tell us about the amounts in each period? 
 
Period Amount Percent 
January - March   
April - June   
July - September   
October - 
December 
  
Total  100% 
Q34. Of the money received in total during 2009, 
please specify the channels and respective 
shares through which you have received the 
money from. 
Means Percent 
Bank Transfers  
Credit/Debit cards *  
Money transfer agencies  
Post office  
Personally- by a migrated 
member of the HH 
 
Personally by a migrated friend  
Total 100% 
* issued abroad 
Q35. What is the average cost (in percentage of 
remitted funds) of remitting through the 
channels specified below?  
 Means Average 
cost in (%) 
Don’t know 
Bank Transfers     
Credit/Debit cards *     
Money transfer agencies     
Post office     
Personally- by a migrated 
member of the HH 
    
Personally by a migrated 
friend 
    
Q 36. Did you receive remittances in-kind during the 
last 12 months?  
1. Yes  
2. No [Skip Q36.a] 
 
Q36.a. If yes, please specify: 
1. Land/Home 
2. Vehicle 
3. Home Appliances/Furniture 
4. Machinery (tractor, combine, etc) 
5. None 
6. Other____________________________ 
 
Q37. What is the estimated value of these in-kind 
 remittances?_________________________ 
 
Q38. How many people in your household have 
benefited from remittances during the last 12 months? 
1.    1                  4.  5-6 
2.   2-3               5.  More than 6, please specify 
3.   4-5               6.  Don’t know/Ref. 
 
Q39. Can you please tell us the contribution of the 
remittance for the following expenditure in average for one 
month? 
 Items  In % 
Q39.1 Food   
Q39.2 Non food  (Alcohol, cigarettes, everyday 
household goods, e.g. hygienic products, 
detergents) 
 
Q39.3 Semi durable goods (clothes, shoes, 
furniture) 
 
Q39.4 Durable goods (home appliances, machinery, 
etc.) 
 
Q39.5 Housing (rent and assessed rent,  public 
utilities – phone, water, electricity) 
 
Q39.6 Health  (medicines and medical services)  
Q39.7 Education   
Q39.8 Total household expenditure in last month  
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Appendix 4.2 The Estimation of the current consumption 
category  
Stata Output for the Specification (Ia) 
 
reg currentconsumption  lnx agehh agehh2  numberofchildren nchild2 numberofadults nad2 edu_hh 
gender housingstatus selfemployed  adv_r_logx freq_r_logx dremlogx  ysm_r_logx  ysm_r_logx2 
 
      Source |       SS       df       MS              Number of obs =    3760 
-------------+------------------------------           F( 16,  3743) =   44.61 
       Model |  165498.473    16  10343.6546           Prob > F      =  0.0000 
    Residual |  867961.393  3743  231.889231           R-squared     =  0.1601 
-------------+------------------------------           Adj R-squared =  0.1566 
       Total |  1033459.87  3759  274.929467           Root MSE      =  15.228 
 
---------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
currentconsump~n |      Coef.   Std. Err.      t    P>|t|     [95% Conf. Interval] 
-----------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
            lnx2 |  -4.979117   .2097978   -23.73   0.000    -5.390446   -4.567788 
           agehh |   -.346474   .1085062    -3.19   0.001     -.559211    -.133737 
          agehh2 |   .0028232   .0011071     2.55   0.011     .0006526    .0049938 
numberofchildren |   1.769686   .4283275     4.13   0.000     .9299077    2.609464 
         nchild2 |  -.0254232    .100654    -0.25   0.801    -.2227651    .1719188 
  numberofadults |   1.062803    .582238     1.83   0.068    -.0787315    2.204338 
            nad2 |   .0232023   .0620287     0.37   0.708     -.098411    .1448156 
          edu_hh |   .2844362   .0738429     3.85   0.000       .13966    .4292125 
          gender |    2.47969   .7138024     3.47   0.001      1.08021    3.879169 
   housingstatus |    3.96786   .9338682     4.25   0.000      2.13692      5.7988 
    selfemployed |   -1.49768   .9013544    -1.66   0.097    -3.264874    .2695136 
      adv_r_logx |   .6350509   .2224905     2.85   0.004     .1988365    1.071265 
     freq_r_logx |  -.2254387   .1003271    -2.25   0.025    -.4221398   -.0287376 
        dremlogx |   .4768056   .3502476     1.36   0.173    -.2098891      1.1635 
      ysm_r_logx |  -.0128326    .038543    -0.33   0.739       -.0884    .0627347 
     ysm_r_logx2 |   .0002972   .0010716     0.28   0.782    -.0018038    .0023982 
           _cons |   90.86041   2.969478    30.60   0.000     85.03846    96.68236 
---------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
 
Test for Heterosckedasticity (Ia) 
 
estat hettest 
 
Breusch-Pagan / Cook-Weisberg test for heteroskedasticity  
         Ho: Constant variance 
         Variables: fitted values of currentconsumption 
 
         chi2(1)      =    68.34 
         Prob > chi2  =   0.0000 
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Stata Output for the Specification (Ia); log of expenditure 
 
. reg currentconsumption  lnx agehh agehh2  numberofchildren nchild2 numberofadults nad2 
edu_hh gender housingstatus selfemployed  adv_r_logx freq_r_logx dremlogx  ysm_r_logx  
ysm_r_logx2, robust 
 
Linear regression                                      Number of obs =    3760 
                                                       F( 16,  3743) =   36.77 
                                                       Prob > F      =  0.0000 
                                                       R-squared     =  0.1601 
                                                       Root MSE      =  15.228 
 
---------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
                 |               Robust 
currentconsump~n |      Coef.   Std. Err.      t    P>|t|     [95% Conf. Interval] 
-----------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
            lnx  |  -4.979117   .2397882   -20.76   0.000    -5.449245   -4.508989 
           agehh |   -.346474   .1094652    -3.17   0.002    -.5610912   -.1318569 
          agehh2 |   .0028232   .0011248     2.51   0.012     .0006179    .0050285 
numberofchildren |   1.769686   .3927592     4.51   0.000     .9996429    2.539729 
         nchild2 |  -.0254232   .0827014    -0.31   0.759    -.1875674     .136721 
  numberofadults |   1.062803   .5791849     1.83   0.067    -.0727456    2.198352 
            nad2 |   .0232023   .0613906     0.38   0.705    -.0971601    .1435646 
          edu_hh |   .2844362   .0803284     3.54   0.000     .1269446    .4419279 
          gender |    2.47969   .6869304     3.61   0.000     1.132896    3.826484 
   housingstatus |    3.96786   1.051481     3.77   0.000     1.906329    6.029392 
    selfemployed |   -1.49768   .8883943    -1.69   0.092    -3.239464     .244104 
      adv_r_logx |   .6350509   .2101412     3.02   0.003     .2230485    1.047053 
     freq_r_logx |  -.2254387   .0945254    -2.38   0.017    -.4107649   -.0401125 
        dremlogx |   .4768056   .3182643     1.50   0.134    -.1471826    1.100794 
      ysm_r_logx |  -.0128326    .035686    -0.36   0.719    -.0827985    .0571332 
     ysm_r_logx2 |   .0002972   .0010496     0.28   0.777    -.0017606     .002355 
           _cons |   90.86041   3.145933    28.88   0.000      84.6925    97.02832 
---------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
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Distribution of the Residuals (Ia) 
 
 
 
Skewness and Kurtosis Test on Normality (Ia) 
 
sktest residuals 
 
                    Skewness/Kurtosis tests for Normality 
                                                         ------- joint ------ 
    Variable |    Obs   Pr(Skewness)   Pr(Kurtosis)  adj chi2(2)    Prob>chi2 
-------------+--------------------------------------------------------------- 
   residuals |   3.8e+03   0.0000         0.0000            .         0.0000 
 
 
Inner Quartile Range (Ia) 
 
iqr residuals 
 
   mean=  62.92           std.dev.=  6.635          (n= 3760) 
 median=  63.57    pseudo std.dev.=   5.96        (IQR=  8.039) 
10 trim=  63.13 
                                               low         high 
                                               ------------------- 
                                inner fences    46.96       79.12 
                           # mild outliers     45          30 
                           % mild outliers     1.20%       0.80% 
 
                                outer fences     34.9       91.18 
                           # severe outliers   4           0 
                           % severe outliers   0.11%       0.00% 
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Ramsey RESET Test for Functional Form (Ia) 
 
ovtest 
 
Ramsey RESET test using powers of the fitted values of currentconsumption 
       Ho:  model has no omitted variables 
                F(3, 3740) =     27.38 
                  Prob > F =      0.0000 
 
Stata Output for the Specification (Ib); Absolute Values of 
expenditure and remittances 
 
. reg currentconsumption  totalexpenditure exp2 agehh agehh2  numberofchildren nchild2 
numberofadults nad2 edu_hh gender housingstatus selfem 
> ployed  advrexp freqrexp exprem exprem2  ysmrexp  ysmrexp2, robust 
 
Linear regression                                      Number of obs =    3760 
                                                       F( 17,  3741) =       . 
                                                       Prob > F      =       . 
                                                       R-squared     =  0.1754 
                                                       Root MSE      =  15.093 
 
---------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
                 |               Robust 
currentconsump~n |      Coef.   Std. Err.      t    P>|t|     [95% Conf. Interval] 
-----------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
totalexpenditure |  -.0359366   .0023146   -15.53   0.000    -.0404747   -.0313986 
            exp2 |   6.72e-06   1.26e-06     5.35   0.000     4.26e-06    9.18e-06 
           agehh |  -.3489365   .1077692    -3.24   0.001    -.5602285   -.1376444 
          agehh2 |    .002934   .0011045     2.66   0.008     .0007685    .0050994 
numberofchildren |   1.675568   .3904019     4.29   0.000     .9101463    2.440989 
         nchild2 |   .0031366   .0823624     0.04   0.970     -.158343    .1646162 
  numberofadults |   .7081879   .5711553     1.24   0.215    -.4116182    1.827994 
            nad2 |   .0587366   .0610393     0.96   0.336    -.0609369    .1784101 
          edu_hh |   .2486573   .0793423     3.13   0.002     .0930989    .4042158 
          gender |   2.221613   .6767134     3.28   0.001     .8948496    3.548376 
   housingstatus |   3.837439   1.049173     3.66   0.000     1.780432    5.894446 
    selfemployed |  -1.501585   .8719166    -1.72   0.085    -3.211064    .2078929 
         advrexp |   3.05e-06   7.90e-06     0.39   0.699    -.0000124    .0000185 
        freqrexp |  -3.98e-06   3.76e-06    -1.06   0.290    -.0000113    3.39e-06 
          exprem |   .0000281   .0000132     2.13   0.034     2.18e-06     .000054 
         exprem2 |  -2.21e-11   1.76e-11    -1.26   0.209    -5.67e-11    1.24e-11 
         ysmrexp |  -6.33e-07   1.20e-06    -0.53   0.599    -2.99e-06    1.73e-06 
        ysmrexp2 |   2.52e-08   2.97e-08     0.85   0.396    -3.30e-08    8.35e-08 
           _cons |   72.72473   2.977413    24.43   0.000     66.88722    78.56224 
---------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
 
Ramsey RESET Test for Functional Form (Ib) 
 
ovtest 
 
Ramsey RESET test using powers of the fitted values of currentconsumption 
       Ho:  model has no omitted variables 
                F(3, 3739) =     16.58 
                  Prob > F =      0.0000 
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Stata Output for the Specification (Ic); log of income  
 
. reg currentconsumption   logxi  agehh agehh2  numberofchildren nchild2 numberofadults nad2 
edu_hh gender housingstatus selfemployed      ad 
> vrinc freqrinc dremlogxi ysmricn ysminc2, robust 
 
Linear regression                                      Number of obs =    3760 
                                                       F( 16,  3743) =    9.36 
                                                       Prob > F      =  0.0000 
                                                       R-squared     =  0.0356 
                                                       Root MSE      =  16.318 
 
---------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
                 |               Robust 
currentconsump~n |      Coef.   Std. Err.      t    P>|t|     [95% Conf. Interval] 
-----------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
           logxi |  -1.069412   .3934331    -2.72   0.007    -1.840776   -.2980476 
           agehh |   -.456109   .1152542    -3.96   0.000    -.6820761   -.2301419 
          agehh2 |   .0036435   .0011825     3.08   0.002     .0013251    .0059619 
numberofchildren |    1.65485   .4438765     3.73   0.000     .7845868    2.525114 
         nchild2 |  -.0264426   .1007079    -0.26   0.793    -.2238903     .171005 
  numberofadults |  -.5887553   .5810957    -1.01   0.311     -1.72805    .5505399 
            nad2 |    .097107   .0613163     1.58   0.113    -.0231096    .2173235 
          edu_hh |   .0859541   .0869555     0.99   0.323    -.0845308     .256439 
          gender |   2.610598   .7242948     3.60   0.000     1.190547    4.030649 
   housingstatus |   3.546114   1.047126     3.39   0.001      1.49312    5.599107 
    selfemployed |   .7217201   .9054145     0.80   0.425    -1.053434    2.496874 
         advrinc |   .6008632    .213829     2.81   0.005     .1816305    1.020096 
        freqrinc |  -.2810079   .0926834    -3.03   0.002    -.4627228   -.0992931 
       dremlogxi |   .2845014   .3252086     0.87   0.382     -.353102    .9221047 
         ysmricn |  -.0040017   .0359683    -0.11   0.911     -.074521    .0665177 
         ysminc2 |  -.0002211   .0010385    -0.21   0.831    -.0022573     .001815 
           _cons |   76.46328   3.787605    20.19   0.000     69.03731    83.88925 
---------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
 
Ramsey RESET Test for Functional Form (Ic) 
 
ovtest 
 
Ramsey RESET test using powers of the fitted values of currentconsumption 
       Ho:  model has no omitted variables 
                F(3, 3740) =      1.12 
                  Prob > F =      0.3377 
Joint Significance Test 
 
 
test adv_r_loginc   freq_r_loginc ysm_r_loginc  ysm_r_loginc2 
 
 ( 1)  adv_r_loginc = 0 
 ( 2)  freq_r_loginc = 0 
 ( 3)  ysm_r_loginc = 0 
 ( 4)  ysm_r_loginc2 = 0 
 
       F(  4,  3743) =    4.15 
            Prob > F =    0.0023 
 
. test adv_r_loginc   freq_r_loginc dremilninc  ysm_r_loginc  ysm_r_loginc2 
 
 ( 1)  adv_r_loginc = 0 
 ( 2)  freq_r_loginc = 0 
 ( 3)  dremilninc = 0 
 ( 4)  ysm_r_loginc = 0 
 ( 5)  ysm_r_loginc2 = 0 
 
       F(  5,  3743) =    3.44 
            Prob > F =    0.0042 
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Appendix 4.3 The Estimation of the Durable Goods and 
Education 
Appendix 4.3.1 Durable Goods Category 
 
Tobit durablegoods lninc agehh agehh2  numberofchildren nchild2 numberofadults nad2 edu_hh 
gender housingstatus selfemployed     adv_r_loginc freq_r_loginc   dremilninc  ysm_r_loginc 
ysm_r_loginc2, ll 
Tobit regression                                  Number of obs   =       3760 
                                                  LR chi2(16)     =     278.24 
                                                  Prob > chi2     =     0.0000 
Log likelihood = -4951.3657                       Pseudo R2       =     0.0273 
 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
durablegoods |      Coef.   Std. Err.      t    P>|t|     [95% Conf. Interval] 
-------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
       lninc |    5.97191   .5937067    10.06   0.000      4.80789     7.13593 
       agehh |   .5694754    .176509     3.23   0.001     .2234122    .9155386 
      agehh2 |   -.005711   .0018234    -3.13   0.002    -.0092859    -.002136 
numberofch~n |  -1.817703   .7617259    -2.39   0.017    -3.311141   -.3242644 
     nchild2 |   .0467212     .20133     0.23   0.817    -.3480058    .4414483 
numberofad~s |   .1801346    .921342     0.20   0.845    -1.626246    1.986516 
        nad2 |  -.0669877   .0973269    -0.69   0.491    -.2578067    .1238312 
      edu_hh |   .0990567   .1210338     0.82   0.413     -.138242    .3363554 
      gender |  -6.489356    1.24936    -5.19   0.000    -8.938847   -4.039864 
housingsta~s |   9.912523   1.821006     5.44   0.000     6.342261    13.48278 
selfemployed |  -2.431991   1.477467    -1.65   0.100     -5.32871     .464727 
adv_r_loginc |  -.3079575   .3377334    -0.91   0.362    -.9701169     .354202 
freq_r_log~c |  -.1820669   .1554041    -1.17   0.241    -.4867518     .122618 
  dremilninc |   1.018241   .4912508     2.07   0.038     .0550953    1.981386 
ysm_r_loginc |  -.0775996   .0515545    -1.51   0.132    -.1786772    .0234779 
ysm_r_logi~2 |   .0003804   .0002316     1.64   0.101    -.0000737    .0008344 
       _cons |  -67.91292   5.874642   -11.56   0.000    -79.43073   -56.39511 
-------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
      /sigma |   17.59413   .4976941                      16.61835    18.56991 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
  Obs. summary:       2867  left-censored observations at durablegoods<=0 
                       893     uncensored observations 
                         0 right-censored observations 
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Conditional Marginal Effects 
 
. mfx compute, predict(pr(0,.)) 
 
Marginal effects after Tobit 
      y  = Pr(durablegoods>0) (predict, pr(0,.)) 
         =  .22723407 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
variable |      dy/dx    Std. Err.     z    P>|z|  [    95% C.I.   ]      X 
---------+-------------------------------------------------------------------- 
   lninc |   .1023682      .00981   10.43   0.000    .08314  .121597   5.82133 
   agehh |   .0097617      .00302    3.24   0.001    .00385  .015673   49.1051 
  agehh2 |  -.0000979      .00003   -3.14   0.002  -.000159 -.000037   2614.17 
number~n |  -.0311584      .01305   -2.39   0.017  -.056729 -.005588   .910372 
 nchild2 |   .0008009      .00345    0.23   0.817  -.005964  .007565   2.28378 
number~s |   .0030878      .01579    0.20   0.845  -.027862  .034038   3.89229 
    nad2 |  -.0011483      .00167   -0.69   0.491  -.004417  .002121   18.1146 
  edu_hh |    .001698      .00207    0.82   0.413  -.002368  .005764   10.9138 
  gender*|  -.1001058      .01691   -5.92   0.000  -.133239 -.066972   .152394 
housin~s*|   .1382587      .01934    7.15   0.000   .100349  .176168   .921277 
selfem~d*|  -.0400728      .02332   -1.72   0.086  -.085778  .005633   .132979 
adv_r_~c |  -.0052789      .00579   -0.91   0.362  -.016623  .006065   .320276 
freq_r~c |  -.0031209      .00266   -1.17   0.241  -.008338  .002097   1.51207 
dremil~c |   .0174543       .0084    2.08   0.038   .000981  .033927   .948945 
ysm_r_~c |  -.0013302      .00088   -1.51   0.132  -.003061  .000401    12.674 
ysm_r~c2 |   6.52e-06      .00000    1.64   0.100  -1.3e-06  .000014   1325.77 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
(*) dy/dx is for discrete change of dummy variable from 0 to 1 
 
 
Unconditional Marginal Effects 
 
 
 
. mfx compute, predict(e(0,.)) 
 
Marginal effects after Tobit 
      y  = E(durablegoods|durablegoods>0) (predict, e(0,.)) 
         =  10.191279 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
variable |      dy/dx    Std. Err.     z    P>|z|  [    95% C.I.   ]      X 
---------+-------------------------------------------------------------------- 
   lninc |   1.380772      .13411   10.30   0.000   1.11792  1.64362   5.82133 
   agehh |   .1316691      .04073    3.23   0.001   .051849   .21149   49.1051 
  agehh2 |  -.0013204      .00042   -3.14   0.002  -.002145 -.000496   2614.17 
number~n |  -.4202731      .17599   -2.39   0.017    -.7652 -.075346   .910372 
 nchild2 |   .0108025      .04655    0.23   0.816  -.080437  .102042   2.28378 
number~s |   .0416491      .21302    0.20   0.845  -.375854  .459152   3.89229 
    nad2 |  -.0154883       .0225   -0.69   0.491  -.059586   .02861   18.1146 
  edu_hh |    .022903      .02798    0.82   0.413  -.031932  .077738   10.9138 
  gender*|  -1.393133      .24748   -5.63   0.000  -1.87819 -.908079   .152394 
housin~s*|   2.001122      .31754    6.30   0.000   1.37876  2.62349   .921277 
selfem~d*|  -.5456784      .32144   -1.70   0.090   -1.1757  .084342   .132979 
adv_r_~c |  -.0712032      .07808   -0.91   0.362  -.224231  .081825   .320276 
freq_r~c |  -.0420959      .03592   -1.17   0.241  -.112492    .0283   1.51207 
dremil~c |   .2354285      .11348    2.07   0.038   .013005  .457852   .948945 
ysm_r_~c |  -.0179419      .01192   -1.51   0.132  -.041297  .005413    12.674 
ysm_r~c2 |    .000088      .00005    1.64   0.100  -.000017  .000193   1325.77 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
(*) dy/dx is for discrete change of dummy variable from 0 to 1 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
304 
 
Appendix 4.3.1 Education Category 
 
. Tobit education logxi agehh agehh2  numberofchildren nchild2 numberofadults nad2 edu_hh 
gender housingstatus selfemployed      advrinc  freqrinc   dremlogxi ysminc2 ysmricn, ll 
 
Tobit regression                                  Number of obs   =       3760 
                                                  LR chi2(16)     =     496.03 
                                                  Prob > chi2     =     0.0000 
Log likelihood = -8720.9723                       Pseudo R2       =     0.0277 
 
---------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
       education |      Coef.   Std. Err.      t    P>|t|     [95% Conf. Interval] 
-----------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
           logxi |   1.348761   .4746186     2.84   0.005     .4182244    2.279297 
           agehh |   .6157609    .144563     4.26   0.000     .3323309    .8991909 
          agehh2 |  -.0080144   .0014935    -5.37   0.000    -.0109425   -.0050863 
numberofchildren |   .9634236   .5422311     1.78   0.076    -.0996735    2.026521 
         nchild2 |  -.1252548   .1244272    -1.01   0.314    -.3692064    .1186968 
  numberofadults |   7.175494   .8008886     8.96   0.000     5.605274    8.745715 
            nad2 |  -.4871115   .0833423    -5.84   0.000    -.6505122   -.3237109 
          edu_hh |   .4060273   .1011207     4.02   0.000     .2077703    .6042843 
          gender |  -1.125031   .9598673    -1.17   0.241    -3.006945    .7568826 
   housingstatus |  -3.894995   1.208417    -3.22   0.001    -6.264215   -1.525774 
    selfemployed |  -6.914165    1.29187    -5.35   0.000    -9.447003   -4.381327 
         advrinc |   .1558246   .2839411     0.55   0.583    -.4008696    .7125188 
        freqrinc |   .3064942   .1249209     2.45   0.014     .0615746    .5514138 
       dremlogxi |  -.6453433   .4362858    -1.48   0.139    -1.500724    .2100377 
         ysminc2 |  -.0002846   .0013722    -0.21   0.836     -.002975    .0024057 
         ysmricn |   .0339193   .0486272     0.70   0.486    -.0614191    .1292578 
           _cons |  -38.43818   4.574478    -8.40   0.000    -47.40689   -29.46947 
-----------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
          /sigma |   17.43608   .3287561                      16.79152    18.08064 
---------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
  Obs. summary:       2005  left-censored observations at education<=0 
                      1755     uncensored observations 
                         0 right-censored observations 
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Conditional Marginal Effects 
. mfx compute, predict(pr(0,.)) 
 
Marginal effects after Tobit 
      y  = Pr(education>0) (predict, pr(0,.)) 
         =  .46378275 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
variable |      dy/dx    Std. Err.     z    P>|z|  [    95% C.I.   ]      X 
---------+-------------------------------------------------------------------- 
   logxi |   .0307328      .01081    2.84   0.004   .009547  .051918   5.82133 
   agehh |   .0140307      .00329    4.26   0.000   .007578  .020484   49.1051 
  agehh2 |  -.0001826      .00003   -5.37   0.000  -.000249 -.000116   2614.17 
number~n |   .0219525      .01234    1.78   0.075  -.002233  .046138   .910372 
 nchild2 |   -.002854      .00283   -1.01   0.314  -.008409  .002701   2.28378 
number~s |   .1635003      .01818    8.99   0.000   .127872  .199128   3.89229 
    nad2 |  -.0110993       .0019   -5.85   0.000  -.014815 -.007384   18.1146 
  edu_hh |   .0092517       .0023    4.02   0.000   .004742  .013761   10.9138 
  gender*|  -.0255718      .02175   -1.18   0.240  -.068197  .017054   .152394 
housin~s*|  -.0889331       .0275   -3.23   0.001  -.142838 -.035028   .921277 
selfem~d*|  -.1528907      .02713   -5.64   0.000  -.206058 -.099723   .132979 
 advrinc |   .0035506      .00647    0.55   0.583  -.009131  .016232   .320276 
freqrinc |   .0069838      .00285    2.45   0.014   .001403  .012565   1.51207 
dremlo~i |  -.0147047      .00994   -1.48   0.139  -.034196  .004786   .948945 
 ysminc2 |  -6.49e-06      .00003   -0.21   0.836  -.000068  .000055   223.068 
 ysmricn |   .0007729      .00111    0.70   0.485  -.001399  .002945    12.674 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
(*) dy/dx is for discrete change of dummy variable from 0 to 1 
Unconditional Marginal Effects 
 
. mfx compute, predict(e(0,.)) 
 
Marginal effects after Tobit 
      y  = E(education|education>0) (predict, e(0,.)) 
         =  13.351447 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
variable |      dy/dx    Std. Err.     z    P>|z|  [    95% C.I.   ]      X 
---------+-------------------------------------------------------------------- 
   logxi |   .4640214      .16312    2.84   0.004   .144303  .783739   5.82133 
   agehh |   .2118435      .04966    4.27   0.000   .114521  .309166   49.1051 
  agehh2 |  -.0027572      .00051   -5.38   0.000  -.003762 -.001753   2614.17 
number~n |   .3314518      .18636    1.78   0.075  -.033804  .696707   .910372 
 nchild2 |  -.0430921       .0428   -1.01   0.314  -.126973  .040788   2.28378 
number~s |   2.468624      .27326    9.03   0.000   1.93305   3.0042   3.89229 
    nad2 |  -.1675836      .02856   -5.87   0.000  -.223565 -.111602   18.1146 
  edu_hh |   .1396878      .03474    4.02   0.000   .071591  .207785   10.9138 
  gender*|  -.3818674      .32135   -1.19   0.235  -1.01171  .247976   .152394 
housin~s*|  -1.419012       .4657   -3.05   0.002  -2.33177 -.506253   .921277 
selfem~d*|  -2.183248      .37195   -5.87   0.000  -2.91225 -1.45424   .132979 
 advrinc |   .0536092      .09769    0.55   0.583  -.137859  .245077   .320276 
freqrinc |   .1054448      .04298    2.45   0.014   .021214  .189676   1.51207 
dremlo~i |  -.2220209      .15011   -1.48   0.139  -.516238  .072196   .948945 
 ysmricn |   .0116694      .01673    0.70   0.485  -.021119  .044458    12.674 
 ysminc2 |  -.0000979      .00047   -0.21   0.836  -.001023  .000827   223.068 
 ------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
(*) dy/dx is for discrete change of dummy variable from 0 to 1 
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Appendix 4.4 Tobit Diagnostic Tests  
A suggested method to evaluate the if Tobit is the appropriate method is dividing the 
estimated coefficient (β) with the standard error of the regression (σ) and to compare the 
results with the Probit coefficients  
Probit Coefficients for Durable Goods 
 
probit   dudurablegoods logxi agehh agehh2  numberofchildren nchild2 numberofadults nad2 
edu_hh gender housingstatus selfemployed      advrinc  freqrinc   dremlogxi ysminc2  
> ysmricn 
 
Iteration 0:   log likelihood = -2061.1608   
Iteration 1:   log likelihood = -1900.2669   
Iteration 2:   log likelihood = -1898.6639   
Iteration 3:   log likelihood = -1898.6625   
Iteration 4:   log likelihood = -1898.6625   
 
Probit regression                                 Number of obs   =       3760 
                                                  LR chi2(16)     =     325.00 
                                                  Prob > chi2     =     0.0000 
Log likelihood = -1898.6625                       Pseudo R2       =     0.0788 
 
---------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
  dudurablegoods |      Coef.   Std. Err.      z    P>|z|     [95% Conf. Interval] 
-----------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
           logxi |   .4136682   .0357124    11.58   0.000     .3436731    .4836633 
           agehh |   .0385059   .0106897     3.60   0.000     .0175544    .0594574 
          agehh2 |  -.0003932   .0001106    -3.56   0.000    -.0006099   -.0001766 
numberofchildren |  -.1033023   .0450257    -2.29   0.022    -.1915511   -.0150535 
         nchild2 |   .0024267   .0116704     0.21   0.835    -.0204468    .0253003 
  numberofadults |   .0438728   .0559641     0.78   0.433    -.0658148    .1535604 
            nad2 |  -.0046208   .0058976    -0.78   0.433    -.0161799    .0069383 
          edu_hh |  -.0002097   .0072879    -0.03   0.977    -.0144938    .0140744 
          gender |  -.4190591   .0748073    -5.60   0.000    -.5656786   -.2724396 
   housingstatus |   .5663264   .1079192     5.25   0.000     .3548088    .7778441 
    selfemployed |  -.1235431    .089964    -1.37   0.170    -.2998693     .052783 
         advrinc |  -.0266084   .0206041    -1.29   0.197    -.0669916    .0137749 
        freqrinc |  -.0117565   .0094193    -1.25   0.212    -.0302181     .006705 
       dremlogxi |   .0848537   .0309046     2.75   0.006     .0242819    .1454255 
         ysminc2 |   .0001387   .0000969     1.43   0.152    -.0000513    .0003287 
         ysmricn |  -.0047565   .0034265    -1.39   0.165    -.0114722    .0019593 
           _cons |  -4.516722   .3429829   -13.17   0.000    -5.188956   -3.844488 
---------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
307 
 
 
Probit Coefficients for Educaiton  
 
. probit  dueducation logxi agehh agehh2  numberofchildren nchild2 numberofadults nad2 edu_hh 
gender housingstatus selfemployed      advrinc  freqrinc   dremlogxi ysminc2 ysmr 
> icn 
 
Iteration 0:   log likelihood = -2597.9161   
Iteration 1:   log likelihood =  -2347.193   
Iteration 2:   log likelihood = -2345.1401   
Iteration 3:   log likelihood =  -2345.138   
Iteration 4:   log likelihood =  -2345.138   
 
Probit regression                                 Number of obs   =       3760 
                                                  LR chi2(16)     =     505.56 
                                                  Prob > chi2     =     0.0000 
Log likelihood =  -2345.138                       Pseudo R2       =     0.0973 
 
---------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
     dueducation |      Coef.   Std. Err.      z    P>|z|     [95% Conf. Interval] 
-----------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
           logxi |    .086465   .0313111     2.76   0.006     .0250965    .1478336 
           agehh |   .0333147   .0094447     3.53   0.000     .0148034     .051826 
          agehh2 |    -.00044   .0000972    -4.53   0.000    -.0006305   -.0002495 
numberofchildren |   .1436404   .0361446     3.97   0.000     .0727984    .2144825 
         nchild2 |  -.0147644   .0083949    -1.76   0.079     -.031218    .0016892 
  numberofadults |   .4125372   .0520154     7.93   0.000     .3105888    .5144855 
            nad2 |  -.0270518   .0054704    -4.95   0.000    -.0377735   -.0163301 
          edu_hh |    .033166   .0065566     5.06   0.000     .0203152    .0460167 
          gender |  -.1231511   .0622675    -1.98   0.048    -.2451932    -.001109 
   housingstatus |  -.0543654   .0807337    -0.67   0.501    -.2126006    .1038698 
    selfemployed |  -.4445233   .0812512    -5.47   0.000    -.6037729   -.2852738 
         advrinc |   .0050982   .0195139     0.26   0.794    -.0331483    .0433448 
        freqrinc |   .0122245   .0087001     1.41   0.160    -.0048273    .0292764 
       dremlogxi |  -.0053908    .029623    -0.18   0.856    -.0634509    .0526692 
         ysminc2 |   .0000206   .0000948     0.22   0.828    -.0001653    .0002064 
         ysmricn |    .001411   .0033315     0.42   0.672    -.0051186    .0079406 
           _cons |  -2.587893   .2969004    -8.72   0.000    -3.169807   -2.005979 
---------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
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Appendix 4.5 Comparison of Tobit Coefficient/Standard Error of 
Regression with the Probit Coefficient  
Appendix 4.5.1 Durable Goods  
  Tobit SE/B Probit  
VARIABLES 
Durable 
Goods   
Durable 
Goods 
        
Log(Income) 5.98*** 0.340 0.414*** 
  (0.000)   (0.000) 
Age of the HH 0.569*** 0.032 0.039*** 
  (0.001)   (0.000) 
Age of the HH^2 -0.0057*** -0.0003 -0.0004*** 
  (0.002)   (0.000) 
Number of Children -1.818** -0.103 -0.103*** 
  (0.017)   (0.000) 
Number of Children^2 0.047 0.003 0.002 
  (0.817)   (0.835) 
Number of Adults 0.180 0.01 0.044 
  (0.845)   (0.433) 
Number of Adults^2 -0.06699 -0.004 -0.005 
  (0.491)   (0.433) 
Education of the HH 0.0991 0.006 0.000 
  (0.413)   (0.977) 
Gender of the HH -6.489*** -0.369 -0.419*** 
  (0.000)   (0.000) 
Housing Status 9.913*** 0.564 0.566*** 
  (0.000)   (0.000) 
Self-Employed -2.432 -0.138 -0.124 
  (0.100)   (0.170) 
Migrants Advise on 
remittances*Rremit*logx  -0.308 -0.018 -0.027 
  (0.362)   (0.197) 
Frequency of visits*Rremit*logx -0.1821 -0.010 -0.012 
  (0.241)   (0.212) 
D_Remitt*log(income) 1.02** 0.058 0.085*** 
  (0.038)   (0.006) 
Years Since Migration*Rremit*logx  -0.0776 -0.004 -0.005 
  (0.132)   (0.152) 
(Years Since Migration*Rremit*logx )^2 0.0004 0.00002 0.0001 
  (0.101)   (0.165) 
Constant -67.92*** -3.861 -4.517*** 
  (0.000)   (0.000) 
Sigma 17.59     
  (0.498)     
Observations 3,760   3,760 
Standard errors in parentheses: *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
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Appendix 4.5.2 Education Category  
 
  Tobit SE/B Probit  
VARIABLES Education   Education 
        
Log(Income) 1.348*** 0.077 0.086*** 
  (0.005)   (0.006) 
Age of the HH 0.6158*** 0.035 0.033*** 
  (0.000)   (0.000) 
Age of the HH^2 -0.008*** 0.000 0.000*** 
  (0.000)   (0.000) 
Number of Children 0.963* 0.055 0.144*** 
  (0.076)   (0.000) 
Number of Children^2 -0.125 -0.007 -0.015* 
  (0.314)   (0.079) 
Number of Adults 7.17*** 0.411 0.413*** 
  (0.000)   (0.000) 
Number of Adults^2 -0.487*** -0.028 -0.027*** 
  (0.000)   (0.000) 
Education of the HH 0.406*** 0.023 0.033*** 
  (0.000)   (0.000) 
Gender of the HH -1.125 -0.065 -0.12** 
  (0.241)   (0.048) 
Housing Status -3.89*** -0.223 -0.054 
  (0.001)   (0.501) 
Self-Employed -6.91*** -0.396 -0.445*** 
  (0.000)   (0.000) 
Migrants Advise on 
remittances*Rremit*logx  0.1558246 0.009 0.005 
  (0.583)   (0.749) 
Frequency of visits*Rremit*logx 0.3065** 0.018 0.012 
  (0.014)   (0.160) 
D_Remitt*log(income) -0.6453433 -0.037 -0.005 
  (0.139)   (0.856) 
Years Since Migration*Rremit*logx  0.0339193 0.002 0.001 
  (0.836)   (0.828) 
(Years Since Migration*Rremit*logx )^2 -0.0002846 0.000 0.000 
  (0.486)   (0.872) 
Constant -38.43*** -2.204 -2.58*** 
  (0.000)   (0.000) 
Sigma 17.44     
  (0.329)     
Observations 3,760   3,760 
Standard errors in parentheses: *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
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Appendix 5.1 Variable Definition 
Variables 
 
Description 
Abbreviations 
Pr_Active 
LFP The variable taking into account whether the 
individual is active in the labour market or not  
Pr_Employed 
LFP The variable taking into account whether the 
individual is employed or not 
Age  
Age and 
Age^2 
Variable taking into account the age of the 
individual and its square term (hence the 
combined age effect) 
Education Level 
Ed A dummy variable in three levels: 
1) Preliminary education (base 
category) 
2) Secondary education 
3) University Education 
Region 
L A dummy variable taking into account the 
regions: 
1) Prishtina (base category) 
2) Mitrovica 
3) Prizren 
4) Peja 
5) Gjilan 
Rural Households 
Ur A dummy variable taking into account 
whether the household is:  
1) Urban (base) 
2) Rural with Productive Assets 
3) Rural without productive assets 
House Ownership 
HO A dummy variable taking into account 
whether the individuals owns a house 
Children under 7 Ch7 The number of children up to the age of 7. 
Children from 7 to 17 
Ch17 The number of children between the age of 7 
and 17 
Seniors Sen The number of seniors in the household 
Unemployed Adults 
UnAd The number of adults in the household who 
are unemployed 
Pension and Social Income per 
capita 
NWIS The monthly amount of pension and social 
income that the individual’s household 
receives, per capita 
Remittances per capita 
NWIR The amount of monthly remittances the 
individual’s household receives, per capita  
Maximum education apart from 
observation 
Wi The maximum years spent in education by 
another household member apart from the 
individual on the observation 
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Appendix 4.5.3 Estimation of the Regressions for Remittance 
Recipient Households Only 
 
Estimation of the first specification (Log of Expenditure) 
 
 
 
. reg currentconsumption  lnx agehh agehh2  numberofchildren nchild2 numberofadults nad2 
edu_hh gender housingstatus selfe 
> mployed  adv_r_logx freq_r_logx dremlogx  ysm_r_logx  ysm_r_logx2 
 
      Source |       SS       df       MS              Number of obs =     610 
-------------+------------------------------           F( 16,   593) =    8.30 
       Model |  26401.4841    16  1650.09276           Prob > F      =  0.0000 
    Residual |  117957.826   593  198.917076           R-squared     =  0.1829 
-------------+------------------------------           Adj R-squared =  0.1608 
       Total |   144359.31   609  237.043202           Root MSE      =  14.104 
 
---------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
currentconsump~n |      Coef.   Std. Err.      t    P>|t|     [95% Conf. Interval] 
-----------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
            lnx  |  -35.65616   8.361484    -4.26   0.000    -52.07788   -19.23443 
           agehh |  -.1918323   .2685492    -0.71   0.475    -.7192555    .3355909 
          agehh2 |   .0021788     .00266     0.82   0.413    -.0030454    .0074029 
numberofchildren |   3.023555   .8049912     3.76   0.000     1.442575    4.604536 
         nchild2 |  -.1891217   .1577152    -1.20   0.231      -.49887    .1206265 
  numberofadults |    1.10231   1.282235     0.86   0.390    -1.415964    3.620584 
            nad2 |  -.0138787    .126541    -0.11   0.913    -.2624018    .2346444 
          edu_hh |    .116135   .1780219     0.65   0.514     -.233495    .4657651 
          gender |  -1.206327   1.587869    -0.76   0.448    -4.324858    1.912203 
   housingstatus |    1.33431   2.092981     0.64   0.524    -2.776247    5.444867 
    selfemployed |  -1.001251    1.75439    -0.57   0.568    -4.446824    2.444322 
      adv_r_logx |   .5817183   .2139757     2.72   0.007      .161476    1.001961 
     freq_r_logx |  -.1621215   .0945165    -1.72   0.087    -.3477492    .0235063 
        dremlogx |    70.0394   18.67722     3.75   0.000     33.35785    106.7209 
      ysm_r_logx |   -.028018   .0363085    -0.77   0.441    -.0993269    .0432909 
     ysm_r_logx2 |   .0006178    .001007     0.61   0.540      -.00136    .0025956 
           _cons |  -117.9917   55.68846    -2.12   0.035    -227.3623   -8.621119 
---------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
 
 
 
 
Ramsey RESET Test 
 
. ovtest 
 
Ramsey RESET test using powers of the fitted values of currentconsumption 
       Ho:  model has no omitted variables 
                 F(3, 590) =      4.74 
                  Prob > F =      0.0028 
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Estimation of the first specification (Absolute Value of Expenditure) 
 
 
reg currentconsumption  totalexpenditure exp2 agehh agehh2  numberofchildren nchild2 
numberofadults nad2 edu_hh gender h 
> ousingstatus selfemployed  advrexp freqrexp exprem exprem2  ysmrexp  ysmrexp2, robust 
 
Linear regression                                      Number of obs =     610 
                                                       F( 17,   591) =       . 
                                                       Prob > F      =       . 
                                                       R-squared     =  0.1719 
                                                       Root MSE      =  14.222 
 
---------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
                 |               Robust 
currentconsump~n |      Coef.   Std. Err.      t    P>|t|     [95% Conf. Interval] 
-----------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
totalexpenditure |  -.0353873   .0092321    -3.83   0.000    -.0535191   -.0172555 
            exp2 |   6.75e-06   7.35e-06     0.92   0.359    -7.68e-06    .0000212 
           agehh |  -.2041339   .2555913    -0.80   0.425    -.7061116    .2978439 
          agehh2 |    .002234   .0025127     0.89   0.374    -.0027008    .0071689 
numberofchildren |   3.304714   .7144865     4.63   0.000     1.901472    4.707955 
         nchild2 |  -.2280378   .0980541    -2.33   0.020    -.4206147    -.035461 
  numberofadults |   1.788573   1.316586     1.36   0.175    -.7971834     4.37433 
            nad2 |  -.0916047   .1245611    -0.74   0.462     -.336241    .1530316 
          edu_hh |   .0579419   .1772492     0.33   0.744     -.290173    .4060569 
          gender |  -1.764879   1.595485    -1.11   0.269    -4.898389    1.368632 
   housingstatus |   1.424999   2.145383     0.66   0.507    -2.788503      5.6385 
    selfemployed |  -1.200153   1.745072    -0.69   0.492    -4.627449    2.227143 
         advrexp |   2.35e-06   7.86e-06     0.30   0.765    -.0000131    .0000178 
        freqrexp |  -1.74e-06   3.72e-06    -0.47   0.640    -9.06e-06    5.58e-06 
          exprem |   .0000331   .0000157     2.11   0.036     2.23e-06     .000064 
         exprem2 |  -3.34e-11   2.02e-11    -1.65   0.099    -7.31e-11    6.34e-12 
         ysmrexp |  -6.88e-07   1.20e-06    -0.57   0.568    -3.05e-06    1.67e-06 
        ysmrexp2 |   2.41e-08   2.94e-08     0.82   0.411    -3.36e-08    8.19e-08 
           _cons |   68.93259    7.39052     9.33   0.000     54.41771    83.44747 
---------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
 
Ramsey RESET Test 
 
. ovtest 
 
Ramsey RESET test using powers of the fitted values of currentconsumption 
       Ho:  model has no omitted variables 
                 F(3, 588) =      7.61 
                  Prob > F =      0.0001 
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Estimation of the first specification (Log of Income) 
 
reg currentconsumption   loginc  agehh agehh2  numberofchildren nchild2 numberofadults nad2 
edu_hh gender housingstatus s 
> elfemployed      advrinc freqrinc dremlogxi ysmricn ysminc2, robust 
note: dremlogxi omitted because of collinearity 
 
Linear regression                                      Number of obs =     610 
                                                       F( 15,   594) =    3.25 
                                                       Prob > F      =  0.0000 
                                                       R-squared     =  0.0690 
                                                       Root MSE      =  15.042 
 
---------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
                 |               Robust 
currentconsump~n |      Coef.   Std. Err.      t    P>|t|     [95% Conf. Interval] 
-----------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
          Loginc |  -.6534403   .7567764    -0.86   0.388    -2.139723    .8328427 
           agehh |  -.3306918   .2808844    -1.18   0.240    -.8823393    .2209556 
          agehh2 |   .0031725   .0027778     1.14   0.254    -.0022831    .0086281 
numberofchildren |   3.353118   .7301558     4.59   0.000     1.919117    4.787119 
         nchild2 |  -.3184745   .0935868    -3.40   0.001    -.5022757   -.1346733 
  numberofadults |   .6998233   1.294928     0.54   0.589    -1.843371    3.243018 
            nad2 |  -.0635685   .1247687    -0.51   0.611      -.30861    .1814729 
          edu_hh |  -.0982386   .1920554    -0.51   0.609    -.4754289    .2789516 
          gender |   -1.81264   1.769047    -1.02   0.306    -5.286988    1.661708 
   housingstatus |   1.491459   2.312299     0.65   0.519    -3.049817    6.032734 
    selfemployed |  -.0696895   1.812971    -0.04   0.969    -3.630302    3.490923 
         advrinc |    .548656   .2197638     2.50   0.013     .1170474    .9802647 
        freqrinc |  -.2313872   .0952319    -2.43   0.015    -.4184193    -.044355 
         ysmricn |  -.0122871   .0362497    -0.34   0.735    -.0834802    .0589061 
         ysminc2 |  -.0000964   .0010142    -0.10   0.924    -.0020883    .0018955 
           _cons |    72.4293   8.720805     8.31   0.000     55.30193    89.55666 
---------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
 
 
Ramsey RESET Test 
 
. ovtest 
 
 
 
Ramsey RESET test using powers of the fitted values of currentconsumption 
       Ho:  model has no omitted variables 
                 F(3, 591) =      1.53 
                  Prob > F =      0.2063 
  
314 
 
Tobit Estimation for Durable Goods 
 
 
. tobit durablegoods  lnx agehh agehh2  numberofchildren nchild2 numberofadults nad2 edu_hh 
gender housingstatus selfemplo 
> yed  adv_r_logx freq_r_logx ysm_r_logx  ysm_r_logx2, ll 
 
Tobit regression                                  Number of obs   =        610 
                                                  LR chi2(15)     =     117.87 
                                                  Prob > chi2     =     0.0000 
Log likelihood = -807.47494                       Pseudo R2       =     0.0680 
 
---------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
    durablegoods |      Coef.   Std. Err.      t    P>|t|     [95% Conf. Interval] 
-----------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
            lnx2 |   4.975718   .7346864     6.77   0.000     3.532824    6.418612 
           agehh |   .2363563   .3110526     0.76   0.448    -.3745383     .847251 
          agehh2 |  -.0047136   .0031254    -1.51   0.132    -.0108517    .0014246 
numberofchildren |  -.4631788   1.399832    -0.33   0.741    -3.212392    2.286034 
         nchild2 |  -.2543819   .3839995    -0.66   0.508    -1.008541    .4997774 
  numberofadults |    3.58524   1.616827     2.22   0.027     .4098573    6.760622 
            nad2 |   -.296555   .1537825    -1.93   0.054    -.5985776    .0054676 
          edu_hh |  -.6150256   .2127419    -2.89   0.004    -1.032842   -.1972092 
          gender |  -5.530517   2.018625    -2.74   0.006    -9.495015    -1.56602 
   housingstatus |   9.924233   3.199179     3.10   0.002     3.641176    16.20729 
    selfemployed |   1.059655    2.07442     0.51   0.610     -3.01442     5.13373 
      adv_r_logx |  -.3374481   .2463782    -1.37   0.171    -.8213247    .1464285 
     freq_r_logx |  -.0973341   .1124357    -0.87   0.387    -.3181532    .1234849 
      ysm_r_logx |  -.0423785   .0389253    -1.09   0.277    -.1188261    .0340692 
     ysm_r_logx2 |   .0008712    .001079     0.81   0.420     -.001248    .0029904 
           _cons |  -46.71233   10.12206    -4.61   0.000    -66.59165   -26.83301 
-----------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
          /sigma |   12.22356   .7906908                      10.67067    13.77644 
---------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
  Obs. summary:        446  left-censored observations at durablegoods<=0 
                       164     uncensored observations 
                         0 right-censored observations 
 
. mfx compute, predict(pr(0,.)) 
 
Marginal effects after tobit 
      y  = Pr(durablegoods>0) (predict, pr(0,.)) 
         =  .22969477 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
variable |      dy/dx    Std. Err.     z    P>|z|  [    95% C.I.   ]      X 
---------+-------------------------------------------------------------------- 
    lnx2 |    .123511      .01643    7.52   0.000   .091312   .15571   6.70143 
   agehh |    .005867      .00772    0.76   0.447  -.009271  .021005   52.5574 
  agehh2 |   -.000117      .00008   -1.51   0.131  -.000269  .000035   2963.68 
number~n |  -.0114974      .03478   -0.33   0.741   -.07966  .056665   1.04098 
 nchild2 |  -.0063145       .0095   -0.66   0.506  -.024941  .012312   2.83443 
number~s |   .0889955      .03976    2.24   0.025   .011069  .166922   4.34098 
    nad2 |  -.0073613       .0038   -1.94   0.052    -.0148  .000077   22.4262 
  edu_hh |  -.0152666      .00521   -2.93   0.003  -.025474 -.005059   10.3508 
  gender*|  -.1219951      .03835   -3.18   0.001  -.197164 -.046826   .183607 
housin~s*|   .1818784       .0384    4.74   0.000   .106608  .257149   .916393 
selfem~d*|   .0268313      .05352    0.50   0.616  -.078064  .131726   .181967 
adv_r_~x |  -.0083764       .0061   -1.37   0.170  -.020341  .003589   2.00067 
freq_r~x |  -.0024161      .00278   -0.87   0.385  -.007869  .003037   9.38685 
ysm_r_~x |  -.0010519      .00096   -1.09   0.275  -.002942  .000838   79.9154 
ysm_r_~2 |   .0000216      .00003    0.81   0.419  -.000031  .000074   1413.62 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
(*) dy/dx is for discrete change of dummy variable from 0 to 1 
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. mfx compute, predict(e(0,.)) 
 
Marginal effects after tobit 
      y  = E(durablegoods|durablegoods>0) (predict, e(0,.)) 
         =  7.1034586 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
variable |      dy/dx    Std. Err.     z    P>|z|  [    95% C.I.   ]      X 
---------+-------------------------------------------------------------------- 
    lnx2 |    1.15606      .15913    7.26   0.000   .844163  1.46796   6.70143 
   agehh |   .0549151      .07226    0.76   0.447  -.086714  .196545   52.5574 
  agehh2 |  -.0010952      .00072   -1.51   0.131  -.002516  .000325   2963.68 
number~n |  -.1076151      .32546   -0.33   0.741  -.745506  .530276   1.04098 
 nchild2 |  -.0591032        .089   -0.66   0.507  -.233536  .115329   2.83443 
number~s |   .8329958      .37239    2.24   0.025   .103126  1.56287   4.34098 
    nad2 |  -.0689017       .0355   -1.94   0.052  -.138475  .000671   22.4262 
  edu_hh |  -.1428952       .0489   -2.92   0.003  -.238731  -.04706   10.3508 
  gender*|  -1.183849      .39468   -3.00   0.003  -1.95741 -.410291   .183607 
housin~s*|   1.908397      .49996    3.82   0.000   .928494   2.8883   .916393 
selfem~d*|   .2503352      .49824    0.50   0.615  -.726206  1.22688   .181967 
adv_r_~x |  -.0784028      .05715   -1.37   0.170  -.190423  .033617   2.00067 
freq_r~x |  -.0226146      .02608   -0.87   0.386  -.073723  .028494   9.38685 
ysm_r_~x |  -.0098462      .00903   -1.09   0.276  -.027551  .007859   79.9154 
ysm_r_~2 |   .0002024      .00025    0.81   0.419  -.000289  .000694   1413.62 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
(*) dy/dx is for discrete change of dummy variable from 0 to 1 
 
Tobit Estimation for Educaiton  
 
. tobit education  lnx agehh agehh2  numberofchildren nchild2 numberofadults nad2 edu_hh 
gender housingstatus selfemployed 
>   adv_r_logx freq_r_logx ysm_r_logx  ysm_r_logx2, ll 
 
Tobit regression                                  Number of obs   =        610 
                                                  LR chi2(15)     =     115.10 
                                                  Prob > chi2     =     0.0000 
Log likelihood = -1513.8018                       Pseudo R2       =     0.0366 
 
---------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
       education |      Coef.   Std. Err.      t    P>|t|     [95% Conf. Interval] 
-----------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
            lnx2 |   1.630079   .6424077     2.54   0.011     .3684168    2.891741 
           agehh |    .389874   .3172831     1.23   0.220    -.2332569    1.013005 
          agehh2 |  -.0071211   .0031902    -2.23   0.026    -.0133865   -.0008556 
numberofchildren |  -1.322325   .9156958    -1.44   0.149    -3.120714    .4760641 
         nchild2 |   .1366018   .1710871     0.80   0.425    -.1994062    .4726098 
  numberofadults |   5.218814   1.556306     3.35   0.001     2.162293    8.275334 
            nad2 |   -.382448   .1516363    -2.52   0.012    -.6802556   -.0846405 
          edu_hh |  -.2203397   .2127373    -1.04   0.301     -.638147    .1974677 
          gender |   2.817067   1.837902     1.53   0.126    -.7924968    6.426631 
   housingstatus |   .1815006   2.444851     0.07   0.941    -4.620087    4.983088 
    selfemployed |  -6.903948   2.259023    -3.06   0.002    -11.34058    -2.46732 
      adv_r_logx |   .0878111   .2482576     0.35   0.724    -.3997567     .575379 
     freq_r_logx |   .2241621   .1088517     2.06   0.040     .0103818    .4379424 
      ysm_r_logx |   .0394654   .0415252     0.95   0.342    -.0420883    .1210191 
     ysm_r_logx2 |  -.0005242   .0011431    -0.46   0.647    -.0027693    .0017208 
           _cons |   -24.2302   9.556235    -2.54   0.011    -42.99826    -5.46215 
-----------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
          /sigma |   14.81599   .6390888                      13.56084    16.07113 
---------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
  Obs. summary:        286  left-censored observations at education<=0 
                       324     uncensored observations 
                         0 right-censored observations 
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mfx compute, predict(pr(0,.)) 
 
Marginal effects after tobit 
      y  = Pr(education>0) (predict, pr(0,.)) 
         =  .52711155 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
variable |      dy/dx    Std. Err.     z    P>|z|  [    95% C.I.   ]      X 
---------+-------------------------------------------------------------------- 
    lnx2 |   .0437909       .0172    2.55   0.011   .010075  .077507   6.70143 
   agehh |   .0104737      .00853    1.23   0.219  -.006236  .027183   52.5574 
  agehh2 |  -.0001913      .00009   -2.23   0.026  -.000359 -.000023   2963.68 
number~n |  -.0355233      .02467   -1.44   0.150  -.083874  .012828   1.04098 
 nchild2 |   .0036697       .0046    0.80   0.425  -.005344  .012683   2.83443 
number~s |   .1401996       .0418    3.35   0.001   .058275  .222124   4.34098 
    nad2 |  -.0102742      .00408   -2.52   0.012  -.018262 -.002287   22.4262 
  edu_hh |  -.0059193      .00572   -1.04   0.301  -.017126  .005287   10.3508 
  gender*|   .0751219      .04855    1.55   0.122  -.020038  .170281   .183607 
housin~s*|   .0048775      .06572    0.07   0.941  -.123929  .133684   .916393 
selfem~d*|    -.18365       .0579   -3.17   0.002  -.297132 -.070168   .181967 
adv_r_~x |    .002359      .00667    0.35   0.724  -.010715  .015433   2.00067 
freq_r~x |    .006022      .00293    2.06   0.040    .00028  .011764   9.38685 
ysm_r_~x |   .0010602      .00112    0.95   0.342  -.001127  .003247   79.9154 
ysm_r_~2 |  -.0000141      .00003   -0.46   0.647  -.000074  .000046   1413.62 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
(*) dy/dx is for discrete change of dummy variable from 0 to 1 
 
 
 
. mfx compute, predict(e(0,.)) 
 
Marginal effects after tobit 
      y  = E(education|education>0) (predict, e(0,.)) 
         =  12.195167 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
variable |      dy/dx    Std. Err.     z    P>|z|  [    95% C.I.   ]      X 
---------+-------------------------------------------------------------------- 
    lnx2 |   .6169403       .2421    2.55   0.011   .142425  1.09146   6.70143 
   agehh |   .1475566      .11997    1.23   0.219  -.087582  .382695   52.5574 
  agehh2 |  -.0026951       .0012   -2.24   0.025  -.005056 -.000334   2963.68 
number~n |  -.5004638      .34723   -1.44   0.150  -1.18103  .180099   1.04098 
 nchild2 |      .0517      .06478    0.80   0.425  -.075269  .178669   2.83443 
number~s |   1.975178      .58662    3.37   0.001   .825426  3.12493   4.34098 
    nad2 |  -.1447461      .05728   -2.53   0.012   -.25701 -.032482   22.4262 
  edu_hh |  -.0833925      .08048   -1.04   0.300  -.241122  .074337   10.3508 
  gender*|   1.105507      .74793    1.48   0.139  -.360417  2.57143   .183607 
housin~s*|   .0684844      .91967    0.07   0.941  -1.73404  1.87101   .916393 
selfem~d*|  -2.397754      .71242   -3.37   0.001  -3.79407 -1.00144   .181967 
adv_r_~x |   .0332341      .09398    0.35   0.724  -.150954  .217422   2.00067 
freq_r~x |   .0848392      .04122    2.06   0.040   .004053  .165626   9.38685 
ysm_r_~x |   .0149366      .01572    0.95   0.342  -.015868  .045741   79.9154 
ysm_r_~2 |  -.0001984      .00043   -0.46   0.647  -.001046   .00065   1413.62 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
(*) dy/dx is for discrete change of dummy variable from 0 to 1 
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Appendix 5.2 Stata Output for Estimated Models Using 
Remittances per Capita 
Appendix 5.2.1 Probability of being Active 
Males’ probability of being active 
 
probit _dactive1 c.age c.age##c.age i.educ i.region   i.urban i.ownshouse ch_under7 from7to17 
seniors unempladults pensionandsocialpercapita remittancespercapita maxedu 
 
note: age omitted because of collinearity 
Iteration 0:   log likelihood = -3611.0796   
Iteration 1:   log likelihood = -2847.8325   
Iteration 2:   log likelihood = -2833.6384   
Iteration 3:   log likelihood = -2833.5869   
Iteration 4:   log likelihood = -2833.5869   
 
Probit regression                                 Number of obs   =       6888 
                                                  LR chi2(18)     =    1554.99 
                                                  Prob > chi2     =     0.0000 
Log likelihood = -2833.5869                       Pseudo R2       =     0.2153 
 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
                _dactive1 |      Coef.   Std. Err.      z    P>|z|     [95% Conf. Interval] 
--------------------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
                      age |   .2910758   .0101353    28.72   0.000     .2712111    .3109406 
                      age |          0  (omitted) 
                          | 
              c.age#c.age |  -.0036407   .0001299   -28.02   0.000    -.0038954   -.0033861 
                          | 
                     educ | 
                       1  |          0  (base) 
                       2  |   .4514108   .0529509     8.53   0.000     .3476289    .5551926 
                       3  |   .8791686   .0831154    10.58   0.000     .7162655    1.042072 
                          | 
                   region | 
                       1  |          0  (base) 
                       2  |   .1912731    .061757     3.10   0.002     .0702316    .3123146 
                       3  |   .3697468   .0561498     6.59   0.000     .2596952    .4797984 
                       4  |   .3340002   .0580866     5.75   0.000     .2201526    .4478478 
                       5  |   .3038278   .0593018     5.12   0.000     .1875983    .4200572 
                          | 
                    urban | 
                       1  |          0  (base) 
                       2  |   .2405352   .0505184     4.76   0.000     .1415211    .3395494 
                       3  |   .0358489   .0441393     0.81   0.417    -.0506626    .1223604 
                          | 
                ownshouse | 
                       0  |          0  (base) 
                       1  |   .0768017   .0740409     1.04   0.300    -.0683158    .2219192 
                          | 
                ch_under7 |   .0714693   .0332753     2.15   0.032     .0062508    .1366878 
                from7to17 |  -.0716087   .0181912    -3.94   0.000    -.1072627   -.0359547 
                  seniors |   -.095982   .0355166    -2.70   0.007    -.1655932   -.0263707 
             unempladults |  -.1506501   .0124712   -12.08   0.000    -.1750933    -.126207 
pensionandsocialpercapita |  -.0054667   .0010819    -5.05   0.000    -.0075872   -.0033462 
     remittancespercapita |   .0001753   .0004713     0.37   0.710    -.0007484    .0010991 
                   maxedu |  -.0371919   .0084852    -4.38   0.000    -.0538227   -.0205612 
                    _cons |  -3.963967   .2229102   -17.78   0.000    -4.400863   -3.527071 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
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Marginal Effects 
. margins, dydx(*) 
 
Average marginal effects                          Number of obs   =       6888 
Model VCE    : OIM 
 
Expression   : Pr(_dactive1), predict() 
dy/dx w.r.t. : age 2.educ 3.educ 2.region 3.region 4.region 5.region 2.urban 3.urban 
1.ownshouse ch_under7 from7to17 
               seniors unempladults pensionandsocialpercapita remittancespercapita maxedu 
 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
                          |            Delta-method 
                          |      dy/dx   Std. Err.      z    P>|z|     [95% Conf. Interval] 
--------------------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
                      age |   .0099484   .0005218    19.07   0.000     .0089257    .0109711 
                          | 
                     educ | 
                       1  |          0  (base) 
                       2  |   .1186244   .0148179     8.01   0.000     .0895819    .1476669 
                       3  |   .2032094   .0183902    11.05   0.000     .1671653    .2392534 
                          | 
                   region | 
                       1  |          0  (base) 
                       2  |   .0477345   .0152204     3.14   0.002     .0179032    .0775659 
                       3  |   .0876225   .0131774     6.65   0.000     .0617953    .1134497 
                       4  |   .0800061   .0136817     5.85   0.000     .0531904    .1068218 
                       5  |   .0734309   .0140991     5.21   0.000     .0457971    .1010646 
                          | 
                    urban | 
                       1  |          0  (base) 
                       2  |   .0532475   .0108297     4.92   0.000     .0320217    .0744733 
                       3  |    .008458   .0103864     0.81   0.415     -.011899    .0288149 
                          | 
                ownshouse | 
                       0  |          0  (base) 
                       1  |   .0179763   .0176669     1.02   0.309    -.0166503    .0526028 
                          | 
                ch_under7 |   .0163971   .0076309     2.15   0.032     .0014408    .0313534 
                from7to17 |  -.0164291   .0041616    -3.95   0.000    -.0245857   -.0082725 
                  seniors |  -.0220211   .0081376    -2.71   0.007    -.0379704   -.0060717 
             unempladults |  -.0345635   .0027852   -12.41   0.000    -.0400223   -.0291047 
pensionandsocialpercapita |  -.0012542   .0002469    -5.08   0.000    -.0017382   -.0007702 
     remittancespercapita |   .0000402   .0001081     0.37   0.710    -.0001717    .0002522 
                   maxedu |  -.0085329   .0019416    -4.39   0.000    -.0123384   -.0047275 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
Note: dy/dx for factor levels is the discrete change from the base level. 
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Females’ probability of being active 
. probit _dactive1 c.age c.age##c.age i.educ i.region   i.urban i.ownshouse ch_under7 
from7to17 seniors unempladults pensi 
> onandsocialpercapita remittancespercapita maxedu 
 
note: age omitted because of collinearity 
Iteration 0:   log likelihood = -4157.4635   
Iteration 1:   log likelihood =  -3409.998   
Iteration 2:   log likelihood = -3402.0523   
Iteration 3:   log likelihood = -3402.0355   
Iteration 4:   log likelihood = -3402.0355   
 
Probit regression                                 Number of obs   =       6175 
                                                  LR chi2(18)     =    1510.86 
                                                  Prob > chi2     =     0.0000 
Log likelihood = -3402.0355                       Pseudo R2       =     0.1817 
 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
                _dactive1 |      Coef.   Std. Err.      z    P>|z|     [95% Conf. Interval] 
--------------------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
                      age |    .098757   .0097871    10.09   0.000     .0795745    .1179394 
                      age |          0  (omitted) 
                          | 
              c.age#c.age |  -.0014072   .0001293   -10.88   0.000    -.0016606   -.0011538 
                          | 
                     educ | 
                       1  |          0  (base) 
                       2  |   .7530968   .0427009    17.64   0.000     .6694046    .8367891 
                       3  |   1.592086   .0799236    19.92   0.000     1.435439    1.748734 
                          | 
                   region | 
                       1  |          0  (base) 
                       2  |  -.1302054   .0591041    -2.20   0.028    -.2460472   -.0143635 
                       3  |  -.0554086   .0557292    -0.99   0.320    -.1646357    .0538186 
                       4  |   .6523423   .0530348    12.30   0.000     .5483959    .7562886 
                       5  |   .2770183   .0531094     5.22   0.000     .1729258    .3811107 
                          | 
                    urban | 
                       1  |          0  (base) 
                       2  |  -.2808515   .0491487    -5.71   0.000    -.3771813   -.1845218 
                       3  |  -.0188185   .0409627    -0.46   0.646    -.0991039    .0614669 
                          | 
                ownshouse | 
                       0  |          0  (base) 
                       1  |  -.1339149   .0654316    -2.05   0.041    -.2621585   -.0056713 
                          | 
                ch_under7 |   .0123939   .0279438     0.44   0.657     -.042375    .0671627 
                from7to17 |  -.0708568    .016217    -4.37   0.000    -.1026416    -.039072 
                  seniors |  -.0263815   .0333412    -0.79   0.429    -.0917291     .038966 
             unempladults |  -.1095885   .0122665    -8.93   0.000    -.1336304   -.0855466 
pensionandsocialpercapita |  -.0010476   .0010911    -0.96   0.337    -.0031862     .001091 
     remittancespercapita |  -.0000731   .0003103    -0.24   0.814    -.0006813     .000535 
                   maxedu |  -.0260763   .0064943    -4.02   0.000    -.0388048   -.0133477 
                    _cons |  -1.575273   .2082377    -7.56   0.000    -1.983411   -1.167134 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
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Marginal Effects 
. margins, dydx(*) 
 
Average marginal effects                          Number of obs   =       6175 
Model VCE    : OIM 
 
Expression   : Pr(_dactive1), predict() 
dy/dx w.r.t. : age 2.educ 3.educ 2.region 3.region 4.region 5.region 2.urban 3.urban 
1.ownshouse ch_under7 from7to17 
               seniors unempladults pensionandsocialpercapita remittancespercapita maxedu 
 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
                          |            Delta-method 
                          |      dy/dx   Std. Err.      z    P>|z|     [95% Conf. Interval] 
--------------------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
                      age |  -.0003299    .000459    -0.72   0.472    -.0012295    .0005697 
                          | 
                     educ | 
                       1  |          0  (base) 
                       2  |   .2487803   .0134988    18.43   0.000     .2223232    .2752374 
                       3  |   .5315376   .0229056    23.21   0.000     .4866434    .5764319 
                          | 
                   region | 
                       1  |          0  (base) 
                       2  |  -.0392944   .0177073    -2.22   0.026        -.074   -.0045888 
                       3  |  -.0169482   .0170369    -0.99   0.320      -.05034    .0164436 
                       4  |   .2127411   .0168097    12.66   0.000     .1797947    .2456875 
                       5  |   .0885978     .01701     5.21   0.000     .0552588    .1219368 
                          | 
                    urban | 
                       1  |          0  (base) 
                       2  |  -.0864564    .014864    -5.82   0.000    -.1155894   -.0573235 
                       3  |  -.0059749   .0130039    -0.46   0.646    -.0314621    .0195124 
                          | 
                ownshouse | 
                       0  |          0  (base) 
                       1  |   -.042264   .0208415    -2.03   0.043    -.0831126   -.0014154 
                          | 
                ch_under7 |   .0038673   .0087189     0.44   0.657    -.0132215    .0209561 
                from7to17 |  -.0221099   .0050405    -4.39   0.000     -.031989   -.0122308 
                  seniors |   -.008232   .0104025    -0.79   0.429    -.0286204    .0121565 
             unempladults |  -.0341956   .0037594    -9.10   0.000    -.0415639   -.0268272 
pensionandsocialpercapita |  -.0003269   .0003404    -0.96   0.337    -.0009941    .0003403 
     remittancespercapita |  -.0000228   .0000968    -0.24   0.814    -.0002126     .000167 
                   maxedu |  -.0081367   .0020193    -4.03   0.000    -.0120944    -.004179 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
Note: dy/dx for factor levels is the discrete change from the base level. 
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Appendix 5.2.2 Probability of being employed 
Males probability of being employed 
 
probit _demployed c.age c.age##c.age i.educ i.region   i.urban i.ownshouse ch_under7 from7to17 
seniors unempladults pens 
> ionandsocialpercapita remittancespercapita maxedu 
 
note: age omitted because of collinearity 
Iteration 0:   log likelihood = -3282.1231   
Iteration 1:   log likelihood = -2443.3408   
Iteration 2:   log likelihood = -2434.3804   
Iteration 3:   log likelihood =  -2434.378   
Iteration 4:   log likelihood =  -2434.378   
 
Probit regression                                 Number of obs   =       5387 
                                                  LR chi2(18)     =    1695.49 
                                                  Prob > chi2     =     0.0000 
Log likelihood =  -2434.378                       Pseudo R2       =     0.2583 
 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
               _demployed |      Coef.   Std. Err.      z    P>|z|     [95% Conf. Interval] 
--------------------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
                      age |   .1192612   .0127341     9.37   0.000     .0943028    .1442196 
                      age |          0  (omitted) 
                          | 
              c.age#c.age |  -.0011461   .0001657    -6.92   0.000    -.0014708   -.0008214 
                          | 
                     educ | 
                       1  |          0  (base) 
                       2  |   .2471079   .0641487     3.85   0.000     .1213789     .372837 
                       3  |    .551158   .0959224     5.75   0.000     .3631535    .7391625 
                          | 
                   region | 
                       1  |          0  (base) 
                       2  |   .1394869   .0707214     1.97   0.049     .0008755    .2780984 
                       3  |   .3087118   .0635596     4.86   0.000     .1841373    .4332863 
                       4  |   -.252074    .063525    -3.97   0.000    -.3765808   -.1275672 
                       5  |   .0060322   .0654582     0.09   0.927    -.1222636     .134328 
                          | 
                    urban | 
                       1  |          0  (base) 
                       2  |   .1806352   .0536055     3.37   0.001     .0755703    .2857001 
                       3  |  -.1071511   .0484115    -2.21   0.027    -.2020358   -.0122663 
                          | 
                ownshouse | 
                       0  |          0  (base) 
                       1  |   .4227699   .0783425     5.40   0.000     .2692215    .5763183 
                          | 
                ch_under7 |    .051722   .0342899     1.51   0.131     -.015485     .118929 
                from7to17 |  -.0265576   .0196887    -1.35   0.177    -.0651467    .0120316 
                  seniors |    -.00329   .0383839    -0.09   0.932     -.078521     .071941 
             unempladults |  -.3842031   .0150182   -25.58   0.000    -.4136382    -.354768 
pensionandsocialpercapita |  -.0128624   .0015951    -8.06   0.000    -.0159887   -.0097362 
     remittancespercapita |   -.000292   .0003514    -0.83   0.406    -.0009807    .0003967 
                   maxedu |   .0422828   .0104887     4.03   0.000     .0217254    .0628403 
                    _cons |  -2.226171   .2739983    -8.12   0.000    -2.763198   -1.689144 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
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Marginal Effects 
 
 
. margins, dydx(*) 
 
Average marginal effects                          Number of obs   =       5387 
Model VCE    : OIM 
 
Expression   : Pr(_demployed), predict() 
dy/dx w.r.t. : age 2.educ 3.educ 2.region 3.region 4.region 5.region 2.urban 3.urban 
1.ownshouse ch_under7 from7to17 
               seniors unempladults pensionandsocialpercapita remittancespercapita maxedu 
 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
                          |            Delta-method 
                          |      dy/dx   Std. Err.      z    P>|z|     [95% Conf. Interval] 
--------------------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
                      age |   .0103139   .0005329    19.35   0.000     .0092693    .0113584 
                          | 
                     educ | 
                       1  |          0  (base) 
                       2  |   .0672781   .0180983     3.72   0.000      .031806    .1027501 
                       3  |   .1402498   .0244709     5.73   0.000     .0922877    .1882118 
                          | 
                   region | 
                       1  |          0  (base) 
                       2  |   .0351295   .0177383     1.98   0.048      .000363     .069896 
                       3  |   .0746193    .015314     4.87   0.000     .0446044    .1046343 
                       4  |  -.0686205   .0172764    -3.97   0.000    -.1024816   -.0347594 
                       5  |   .0015644   .0169763     0.09   0.927    -.0317084    .0348373 
                          | 
                    urban | 
                       1  |          0  (base) 
                       2  |    .043981   .0127844     3.44   0.001      .018924    .0690379 
                       3  |  -.0278108   .0126408    -2.20   0.028    -.0525863   -.0030353 
                          | 
                ownshouse | 
                       0  |          0  (base) 
                       1  |   .1147576   .0223946     5.12   0.000     .0708649    .1586502 
                          | 
                ch_under7 |   .0130793   .0086672     1.51   0.131     -.003908    .0300666 
                from7to17 |  -.0067158   .0049766    -1.35   0.177    -.0164698    .0030382 
                  seniors |   -.000832   .0097064    -0.09   0.932    -.0198561    .0181921 
             unempladults |   -.097156   .0031151   -31.19   0.000    -.1032614   -.0910506 
pensionandsocialpercapita |  -.0032526   .0003983    -8.17   0.000    -.0040333   -.0024719 
     remittancespercapita |  -.0000738   .0000888    -0.83   0.406     -.000248    .0001003 
                   maxedu |   .0106923   .0026428     4.05   0.000     .0055125    .0158722 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
Note: dy/dx for factor levels is the discrete change from the base level.   
323 
 
Females probability of being employed 
 
. probit _demployed c.age c.age##c.age i.educ i.region   i.urban i.ownshouse ch_under7 
from7to17 seniors unempladults pens 
> ionandsocialpercapita remittancespercapita maxedu 
 
note: age omitted because of collinearity 
Iteration 0:   log likelihood = -1700.0835   
Iteration 1:   log likelihood = -1175.7391   
Iteration 2:   log likelihood = -1171.2037   
Iteration 3:   log likelihood =  -1171.189   
Iteration 4:   log likelihood =  -1171.189   
 
Probit regression                                 Number of obs   =       2474 
                                                  LR chi2(18)     =    1057.79 
                                                  Prob > chi2     =     0.0000 
Log likelihood =  -1171.189                       Pseudo R2       =     0.3111 
 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
               _demployed |      Coef.   Std. Err.      z    P>|z|     [95% Conf. Interval] 
--------------------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
                      age |   .0504879    .020423     2.47   0.013     .0104597    .0905162 
                      age |          0  (omitted) 
                          | 
              c.age#c.age |  -.0003706   .0002719    -1.36   0.173    -.0009036    .0001623 
                          | 
                     educ | 
                       1  |          0  (base) 
                       2  |   .5673093   .0897029     6.32   0.000     .3914948    .7431238 
                       3  |   1.575741   .1234279    12.77   0.000     1.333827    1.817655 
                          | 
                   region | 
                       1  |          0  (base) 
                       2  |  -.4951613   .1040841    -4.76   0.000    -.6991624   -.2911603 
                       3  |  -.0373249   .1084553    -0.34   0.731    -.2498934    .1752436 
                       4  |  -.1411839   .0888973    -1.59   0.112    -.3154194    .0330515 
                       5  |  -.3022668   .0877396    -3.45   0.001    -.4742333   -.1303003 
                          | 
                    urban | 
                       1  |          0  (base) 
                       2  |  -.1294158   .0877807    -1.47   0.140    -.3014628    .0426313 
                       3  |  -.3865675    .071449    -5.41   0.000     -.526605     -.24653 
                          | 
                ownshouse | 
                       0  |          0  (base) 
                       1  |   .2959875   .1027466     2.88   0.004     .0946078    .4973672 
                          | 
                ch_under7 |  -.1515538   .0507893    -2.98   0.003    -.2510989   -.0520087 
                from7to17 |  -.1545074   .0305031    -5.07   0.000    -.2142923   -.0947225 
                  seniors |   .0043785    .059062     0.07   0.941    -.1113808    .1201379 
             unempladults |  -.4721622   .0249009   -18.96   0.000    -.5209672   -.4233573 
pensionandsocialpercapita |  -.0043111   .0022162    -1.95   0.052    -.0086548    .0000326 
     remittancespercapita |   -.000235   .0003967    -0.59   0.553    -.0010125    .0005424 
                   maxedu |   .0040617   .0113209     0.36   0.720    -.0181269    .0262503 
                    _cons |  -.8207472   .4087019    -2.01   0.045    -1.621788   -.0197063 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
 
.  
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Marginal Effects 
. margins, dydx(*) 
 
Average marginal effects                          Number of obs   =       2474 
Model VCE    : OIM 
 
Expression   : Pr(_demployed), predict() 
dy/dx w.r.t. : age 2.educ 3.educ 2.region 3.region 4.region 5.region 2.urban 3.urban 
1.ownshouse ch_under7 from7to17 
               seniors unempladults pensionandsocialpercapita remittancespercapita maxedu 
 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
                          |            Delta-method 
                          |      dy/dx   Std. Err.      z    P>|z|     [95% Conf. Interval] 
--------------------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
                      age |   .0065423   .0007705     8.49   0.000      .005032    .0080525 
                          | 
                     educ | 
                       1  |          0  (base) 
                       2  |   .1594112   .0239471     6.66   0.000     .1124758    .2063466 
                       3  |   .4429735   .0317148    13.97   0.000     .3808137    .5051334 
                          | 
                   region | 
                       1  |          0  (base) 
                       2  |  -.1307332   .0268133    -4.88   0.000    -.1832863     -.07818 
                       3  |  -.0099567   .0289419    -0.34   0.731    -.0666818    .0467684 
                       4  |  -.0376819   .0237196    -1.59   0.112    -.0841715    .0088077 
                       5  |   -.080473   .0231945    -3.47   0.001    -.1259334   -.0350127 
                          | 
                    urban | 
                       1  |          0  (base) 
                       2  |   -.035457   .0240623    -1.47   0.141    -.0826182    .0117041 
                       3  |  -.1046604    .019231    -5.44   0.000    -.1423525   -.0669683 
                          | 
                ownshouse | 
                       0  |          0  (base) 
                       1  |   .0783486   .0266747     2.94   0.003     .0260671    .1306302 
                          | 
                ch_under7 |  -.0405898   .0135343    -3.00   0.003    -.0671166    -.014063 
                from7to17 |  -.0413808   .0080546    -5.14   0.000    -.0571676    -.025594 
                  seniors |   .0011727   .0158183     0.07   0.941    -.0298306     .032176 
             unempladults |  -.1264565   .0051771   -24.43   0.000    -.1366033   -.1163096 
pensionandsocialpercapita |  -.0011546   .0005923    -1.95   0.051    -.0023154    6.17e-06 
     remittancespercapita |   -.000063   .0001062    -0.59   0.553    -.0002711    .0001452 
                   maxedu |   .0010878    .003032     0.36   0.720    -.0048549    .0070305 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
Note: dy/dx for factor levels is the discrete change from the base level. 
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Appendix 5.3 Stata Output for Estimated Models Using 
Remittances Absolute Value 
Appendix 5.3.1 Probability of being active 
Males probability of being active 
. probit _dactive1 c.age c.age##c.age i.educ i.region   i.urban i.ownshouse ch_under7 
from7to17 seniors unempladults pensi 
> onandsocialpercapita  remittances maxedu 
 
note: age omitted because of collinearity 
Iteration 0:   log likelihood = -3611.0796   
Iteration 1:   log likelihood = -2846.3531   
Iteration 2:   log likelihood = -2831.7853   
Iteration 3:   log likelihood = -2831.7251   
Iteration 4:   log likelihood = -2831.7251   
 
Probit regression                                 Number of obs   =       6888 
                                                  LR chi2(18)     =    1558.71 
                                                  Prob > chi2     =     0.0000 
Log likelihood = -2831.7251                       Pseudo R2       =     0.2158 
 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
                _dactive1 |      Coef.   Std. Err.      z    P>|z|     [95% Conf. Interval] 
--------------------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
                      age |   .2906373   .0101352    28.68   0.000     .2707727    .3105019 
                      age |          0  (omitted) 
                          | 
              c.age#c.age |  -.0036349   .0001299   -27.98   0.000    -.0038895   -.0033803 
                          | 
                     educ | 
                       1  |          0  (base) 
                       2  |   .4542223   .0529945     8.57   0.000     .3503549    .5580896 
                       3  |   .8834613   .0831699    10.62   0.000     .7204513    1.046471 
                          | 
                   region | 
                       1  |          0  (base) 
                       2  |   .1890307   .0617732     3.06   0.002     .0679574     .310104 
                       3  |   .3566982   .0563759     6.33   0.000     .2462034     .467193 
                       4  |   .3297918   .0580396     5.68   0.000     .2160363    .4435472 
                       5  |   .2993699   .0593179     5.05   0.000     .1831091    .4156308 
                          | 
                    urban | 
                       1  |          0  (base) 
                       2  |   .2330348   .0505873     4.61   0.000     .1338856    .3321841 
                       3  |   .0350103   .0441479     0.79   0.428     -.051518    .1215387 
                          | 
                ownshouse | 
                       0  |          0  (base) 
                       1  |   .0748254   .0741345     1.01   0.313    -.0704755    .2201263 
                          | 
                ch_under7 |   .0719499   .0332743     2.16   0.031     .0067335    .1371663 
                from7to17 |  -.0715721   .0181687    -3.94   0.000    -.1071821   -.0359621 
                  seniors |  -.0968368   .0355171    -2.73   0.006     -.166449   -.0272246 
             unempladults |  -.1523527   .0125056   -12.18   0.000    -.1768633   -.1278421 
pensionandsocialpercapita |  -.0054881   .0010814    -5.08   0.000    -.0076076   -.0033686 
              remittances |   .0001782   .0000977     1.82   0.068    -.0000132    .0003697 
                   maxedu |  -.0377691   .0084932    -4.45   0.000    -.0544156   -.0211227 
                    _cons |  -3.945684   .2231816   -17.68   0.000    -4.383112   -3.508256 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
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Marginal Effects  
 
margins, dydx(*) 
 
Average marginal effects                          Number of obs   =       6888 
Model VCE    : OIM 
 
Expression   : Pr(_dactive1), predict() 
dy/dx w.r.t. : age 2.educ 3.educ 2.region 3.region 4.region 5.region 2.urban 3.urban 
1.ownshouse ch_under7 from7to17 
               seniors unempladults pensionandsocialpercapita remittances maxedu 
 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
                          |            Delta-method 
                          |      dy/dx   Std. Err.      z    P>|z|     [95% Conf. Interval] 
--------------------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
                      age |    .009924   .0005209    19.05   0.000     .0089031    .0109449 
                          | 
                     educ | 
                       1  |          0  (base) 
                       2  |   .1193425    .014828     8.05   0.000     .0902802    .1484049 
                       3  |   .2041218    .018393    11.10   0.000     .1680721    .2401714 
                          | 
                   region | 
                       1  |          0  (base) 
                       2  |   .0470389   .0151843     3.10   0.002     .0172782    .0767996 
                       3  |   .0845507   .0132389     6.39   0.000     .0586029    .1104985 
                       4  |   .0788073    .013644     5.78   0.000     .0520655     .105549 
                       5  |   .0721852   .0140766     5.13   0.000     .0445956    .0997748 
                          | 
                    urban | 
                       1  |          0  (base) 
                       2  |    .051611   .0108615     4.75   0.000     .0303228    .0728992 
                       3  |   .0082463   .0103718     0.80   0.427    -.0120821    .0285747 
                          | 
                ownshouse | 
                       0  |          0  (base) 
                       1  |   .0174925   .0176595     0.99   0.322    -.0171195    .0521045 
                          | 
                ch_under7 |   .0164958   .0076251     2.16   0.031     .0015509    .0314407 
                from7to17 |  -.0164092   .0041536    -3.95   0.000    -.0245501   -.0082682 
                  seniors |  -.0222016   .0081317    -2.73   0.006    -.0381394   -.0062637 
             unempladults |  -.0349296   .0027894   -12.52   0.000    -.0403967   -.0294624 
pensionandsocialpercapita |  -.0012582   .0002466    -5.10   0.000    -.0017416   -.0007749 
              remittances |   .0000409   .0000224     1.83   0.068    -3.01e-06    .0000847 
                   maxedu |  -.0086592   .0019419    -4.46   0.000    -.0124653   -.0048532 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
Note: dy/dx for factor levels is the discrete change from the base level. 
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Females probability of being active 
. probit _dactive1 c.age c.age##c.age i.educ i.region   i.urban i.ownshouse ch_under7 
from7to17 seniors unempladults pensi 
> onandsocialpercapita  remittances maxedu 
 
note: age omitted because of collinearity 
Iteration 0:   log likelihood = -4157.4635   
Iteration 1:   log likelihood = -3409.9837   
Iteration 2:   log likelihood = -3402.0479   
Iteration 3:   log likelihood =  -3402.031   
Iteration 4:   log likelihood =  -3402.031   
 
Probit regression                                 Number of obs   =       6175 
                                                  LR chi2(18)     =    1510.86 
                                                  Prob > chi2     =     0.0000 
Log likelihood =  -3402.031                       Pseudo R2       =     0.1817 
 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
                _dactive1 |      Coef.   Std. Err.      z    P>|z|     [95% Conf. Interval] 
--------------------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
                      age |   .0988336   .0097834    10.10   0.000     .0796584    .1180088 
                      age |          0  (omitted) 
                          | 
              c.age#c.age |  -.0014084   .0001292   -10.90   0.000    -.0016616   -.0011551 
                          | 
                     educ | 
                       1  |          0  (base) 
                       2  |   .7530532   .0427001    17.64   0.000     .6693626    .8367437 
                       3  |   1.591889   .0799123    19.92   0.000     1.435264    1.748515 
                          | 
                   region | 
                       1  |          0  (base) 
                       2  |  -.1308009   .0591231    -2.21   0.027      -.24668   -.0149218 
                       3  |  -.0577695   .0559466    -1.03   0.302    -.1674228    .0518838 
                       4  |   .6507222   .0529838    12.28   0.000     .5468759    .7545685 
                       5  |   .2760435   .0531279     5.20   0.000     .1719146    .3801723 
                          | 
                    urban | 
                       1  |          0  (base) 
                       2  |  -.2827905   .0492178    -5.75   0.000    -.3792556   -.1863254 
                       3  |   -.018753   .0409627    -0.46   0.647    -.0990384    .0615325 
                          | 
                ownshouse | 
                       0  |          0  (base) 
                       1  |  -.1336463   .0654429    -2.04   0.041     -.261912   -.0053806 
                          | 
                ch_under7 |   .0125436   .0279413     0.45   0.653    -.0422204    .0673075 
                from7to17 |   -.070654   .0162032    -4.36   0.000    -.1024117   -.0388963 
                  seniors |  -.0266482   .0333507    -0.80   0.424    -.0920145     .038718 
             unempladults |  -.1097008   .0122817    -8.93   0.000    -.1337726   -.0856291 
pensionandsocialpercapita |  -.0010496   .0010915    -0.96   0.336     -.003189    .0010897 
              remittances |   .0000185   .0000735     0.25   0.801    -.0001256    .0001626 
                   maxedu |  -.0259996   .0064872    -4.01   0.000    -.0387142    -.013285 
                    _cons |  -1.577647   .2079965    -7.58   0.000    -1.985312   -1.169981 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
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Margnial Effects 
 
 
 
 
. margins, dydx(*) 
 
Average marginal effects                          Number of obs   =       6175 
Model VCE    : OIM 
 
Expression   : Pr(_dactive1), predict() 
dy/dx w.r.t. : age 2.educ 3.educ 2.region 3.region 4.region 5.region 2.urban 3.urban 
1.ownshouse ch_under7 from7to17 
               seniors unempladults pensionandsocialpercapita remittances maxedu 
 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
                          |            Delta-method 
                          |      dy/dx   Std. Err.      z    P>|z|     [95% Conf. Interval] 
--------------------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
                      age |  -.0003308   .0004589    -0.72   0.471    -.0012303    .0005687 
                          | 
                     educ | 
                       1  |          0  (base) 
                       2  |   .2487646   .0134989    18.43   0.000     .2223072     .275222 
                       3  |    .531484   .0229052    23.20   0.000     .4865907    .5763772 
                          | 
                   region | 
                       1  |          0  (base) 
                       2  |  -.0394869   .0177186    -2.23   0.026    -.0742147   -.0047591 
                       3  |  -.0176705   .0171026    -1.03   0.302     -.051191    .0158501 
                       4  |   .2122468   .0167982    12.64   0.000     .1793229    .2451707 
                       5  |   .0883045   .0170193     5.19   0.000     .0549473    .1216616 
                          | 
                    urban | 
                       1  |          0  (base) 
                       2  |  -.0870375   .0148785    -5.85   0.000    -.1161987   -.0578762 
                       3  |  -.0059546   .0130051    -0.46   0.647    -.0314441    .0195349 
                          | 
                ownshouse | 
                       0  |          0  (base) 
                       1  |  -.0421778   .0208442    -2.02   0.043    -.0830317   -.0013238 
                          | 
                ch_under7 |    .003914    .008718     0.45   0.653    -.0131729    .0210009 
                from7to17 |  -.0220462   .0050362    -4.38   0.000    -.0319169   -.0121755 
                  seniors |  -.0083151   .0104052    -0.80   0.424    -.0287089    .0120788 
             unempladults |    -.03423   .0037639    -9.09   0.000    -.0416072   -.0268528 
pensionandsocialpercapita |  -.0003275   .0003405    -0.96   0.336    -.0009949    .0003399 
              remittances |   5.78e-06   .0000229     0.25   0.801    -.0000392    .0000507 
                   maxedu |  -.0081127    .002017    -4.02   0.000     -.012066   -.0041594 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
Note: dy/dx for factor levels is the discrete change from the base level. 
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Appendix 5.3.2 Probability of being employed 
Males probability of being employed 
probit _demployed c.age c.age##c.age i.educ i.region   i.urban i.ownshouse ch_under7 from7to17 
seniors unempladults pens 
> ionandsocialpercapita  remittances maxedu 
 
note: age omitted because of collinearity 
Iteration 0:   log likelihood = -3282.1231   
Iteration 1:   log likelihood = -2440.7887   
Iteration 2:   log likelihood = -2431.9599   
Iteration 3:   log likelihood = -2431.9573   
Iteration 4:   log likelihood = -2431.9573   
 
Probit regression                                 Number of obs   =       5387 
                                                  LR chi2(18)     =    1700.33 
                                                  Prob > chi2     =     0.0000 
Log likelihood = -2431.9573                       Pseudo R2       =     0.2590 
 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
               _demployed |      Coef.   Std. Err.      z    P>|z|     [95% Conf. Interval] 
--------------------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
                      age |   .1179374   .0127442     9.25   0.000     .0929592    .1429157 
                      age |          0  (omitted) 
                          | 
              c.age#c.age |  -.0011277   .0001658    -6.80   0.000    -.0014527   -.0008027 
                          | 
                     educ | 
                       1  |          0  (base) 
                       2  |   .2507043   .0641741     3.91   0.000     .1249253    .3764832 
                       3  |   .5583311   .0959876     5.82   0.000     .3701989    .7464633 
                          | 
                   region | 
                       1  |          0  (base) 
                       2  |   .1398792   .0707533     1.98   0.048     .0012052    .2785533 
                       3  |    .286604   .0638516     4.49   0.000     .1614572    .4117508 
                       4  |  -.2605724    .063483    -4.10   0.000    -.3849969    -.136148 
                       5  |   .0016769   .0654667     0.03   0.980    -.1266356    .1299893 
                          | 
                    urban | 
                       1  |          0  (base) 
                       2  |   .1669329   .0537312     3.11   0.002     .0616217     .272244 
                       3  |  -.1078562   .0484218    -2.23   0.026    -.2027613   -.0129512 
                          | 
                ownshouse | 
                       0  |          0  (base) 
                       1  |   .4270334   .0784721     5.44   0.000      .273231    .5808358 
                          | 
                ch_under7 |   .0540251   .0342912     1.58   0.115    -.0131844    .1212345 
                from7to17 |  -.0255028    .019675    -1.30   0.195    -.0640651    .0130595 
                  seniors |  -.0036582   .0383779    -0.10   0.924    -.0788774    .0715611 
             unempladults |  -.3867575   .0150857   -25.64   0.000     -.416325     -.35719 
pensionandsocialpercapita |   -.012916   .0015991    -8.08   0.000    -.0160501   -.0097819 
              remittances |   .0001746   .0000801     2.18   0.029     .0000177    .0003316 
                   maxedu |   .0414932   .0104929     3.95   0.000     .0209276    .0620588 
                    _cons |  -2.200393   .2744172    -8.02   0.000    -2.738241   -1.662546 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
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Marginal Effects 
. margins, dydx(*) 
 
Average marginal effects                          Number of obs   =       5387 
Model VCE    : OIM 
 
Expression   : Pr(_demployed), predict() 
dy/dx w.r.t. : age 2.educ 3.educ 2.region 3.region 4.region 5.region 2.urban 3.urban 
1.ownshouse ch_under7 from7to17 
               seniors unempladults pensionandsocialpercapita remittances maxedu 
 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
                          |            Delta-method 
                          |      dy/dx   Std. Err.      z    P>|z|     [95% Conf. Interval] 
--------------------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
                      age |   .0102866   .0005316    19.35   0.000     .0092447    .0113285 
                          | 
                     educ | 
                       1  |          0  (base) 
                       2  |   .0682371   .0181055     3.77   0.000      .032751    .1037232 
                       3  |   .1419042   .0244493     5.80   0.000     .0939844    .1898241 
                          | 
                   region | 
                       1  |          0  (base) 
                       2  |   .0350995   .0176801     1.99   0.047     .0004471    .0697519 
                       3  |   .0693939   .0154159     4.50   0.000     .0391792    .0996086 
                       4  |   -.070844   .0172387    -4.11   0.000    -.1046313   -.0370567 
                       5  |   .0004339   .0169388     0.03   0.980    -.0327657    .0336334 
                          | 
                    urban | 
                       1  |          0  (base) 
                       2  |   .0406774   .0128485     3.17   0.002     .0154948      .06586 
                       3  |  -.0279388    .012619    -2.21   0.027    -.0526716    -.003206 
                          | 
                ownshouse | 
                       0  |          0  (base) 
                       1  |   .1158862   .0224367     5.17   0.000     .0719111    .1598614 
                          | 
                ch_under7 |   .0136462   .0086575     1.58   0.115    -.0033221    .0306145 
                from7to17 |  -.0064418   .0049677    -1.30   0.195    -.0161783    .0032948 
                  seniors |   -.000924   .0096938    -0.10   0.924    -.0199236    .0180755 
             unempladults |  -.0976911    .003124   -31.27   0.000    -.1038141   -.0915681 
pensionandsocialpercapita |  -.0032625   .0003989    -8.18   0.000    -.0040442   -.0024807 
              remittances |   .0000441   .0000202     2.18   0.029     4.51e-06    .0000837 
                   maxedu |   .0104808   .0026413     3.97   0.000     .0053039    .0156576 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
Note: dy/dx for factor levels is the discrete change from the base level. 
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Females probability of being employed 
 
. probit _demployed c.age c.age##c.age i.educ i.region   i.urban i.ownshouse ch_under7 
from7to17 seniors unempladults pens 
> ionandsocialpercapita  remittances maxedu 
 
note: age omitted because of collinearity 
Iteration 0:   log likelihood = -1700.0835   
Iteration 1:   log likelihood = -1175.8751   
Iteration 2:   log likelihood = -1171.3463   
Iteration 3:   log likelihood = -1171.3317   
Iteration 4:   log likelihood = -1171.3317   
 
Probit regression                                 Number of obs   =       2474 
                                                  LR chi2(18)     =    1057.50 
                                                  Prob > chi2     =     0.0000 
Log likelihood = -1171.3317                       Pseudo R2       =     0.3110 
 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
               _demployed |      Coef.   Std. Err.      z    P>|z|     [95% Conf. Interval] 
--------------------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
                      age |   .0509787    .020422     2.50   0.013     .0109522    .0910052 
                      age |          0  (omitted) 
                          | 
              c.age#c.age |  -.0003777   .0002719    -1.39   0.165    -.0009106    .0001552 
                          | 
                     educ | 
                       1  |          0  (base) 
                       2  |     .56639   .0897008     6.31   0.000     .3905796    .7422003 
                       3  |   1.574494   .1234164    12.76   0.000     1.332602    1.816386 
                          | 
                   region | 
                       1  |          0  (base) 
                       2  |  -.4946407   .1041144    -4.75   0.000    -.6987011   -.2905803 
                       3  |  -.0382705   .1085484    -0.35   0.724    -.2510214    .1744804 
                       4  |  -.1432013   .0888729    -1.61   0.107    -.3173889    .0309863 
                       5  |  -.3030547   .0877412    -3.45   0.001    -.4750243    -.131085 
                          | 
                    urban | 
                       1  |          0  (base) 
                       2  |  -.1310991   .0877813    -1.49   0.135    -.3031473     .040949 
                       3  |  -.3862108   .0714349    -5.41   0.000    -.5262206    -.246201 
                          | 
                ownshouse | 
                       0  |          0  (base)  
                       1  |   .2970946   .1028165     2.89   0.004     .0955781    .4986112 
                          | 
                ch_under7 |  -.1513499    .050787    -2.98   0.003    -.2508906   -.0518092 
                from7to17 |  -.1540568   .0304898    -5.05   0.000    -.2138156   -.0942979 
                  seniors |   .0042088   .0591013     0.07   0.943    -.1116276    .1200453 
             unempladults |  -.4717412   .0249005   -18.95   0.000    -.5205454    -.422937 
pensionandsocialpercapita |  -.0043232   .0022195    -1.95   0.051    -.0086734    .0000271 
              remittances |  -.0000235   .0000989    -0.24   0.812    -.0002173    .0001703 
                   maxedu |   .0043873   .0113164     0.39   0.698    -.0177923     .026567 
                    _cons |  -.8342967   .4083385    -2.04   0.041    -1.634626   -.0339678 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
332 
 
Marginal Effects 
 
 
. margins, dydx(*) 
 
Average marginal effects                          Number of obs   =       2474 
Model VCE    : OIM 
 
Expression   : Pr(_demployed), predict() 
dy/dx w.r.t. : age 2.educ 3.educ 2.region 3.region 4.region 5.region 2.urban 3.urban 
1.ownshouse ch_under7 from7to17 
               seniors unempladults pensionandsocialpercapita remittances maxedu 
 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
                          |            Delta-method 
                          |      dy/dx   Std. Err.      z    P>|z|     [95% Conf. Interval] 
--------------------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
                      age |   .0065423   .0007707     8.49   0.000     .0050317     .008053 
                          | 
                     educ | 
                       1  |          0  (base) 
                       2  |   .1591809   .0239538     6.65   0.000     .1122323    .2061296 
                       3  |    .442702   .0317263    13.95   0.000     .3805197    .5048843 
                          | 
                   region | 
                       1  |          0  (base) 
                       2  |  -.1306292   .0268304    -4.87   0.000    -.1832158   -.0780426 
                       3  |  -.0102108   .0289722    -0.35   0.725    -.0669953    .0465737 
                       4  |  -.0382271   .0237163    -1.61   0.107    -.0847102    .0082559 
                       5  |  -.0806974   .0231978    -3.48   0.001    -.1261643   -.0352306 
                          | 
                    urban | 
                       1  |          0  (base) 
                       2  |  -.0359231   .0240649    -1.49   0.136    -.0830895    .0112433 
                       3  |  -.1045844   .0192318    -5.44   0.000    -.1422781   -.0668907 
                          | 
                ownshouse | 
                       0  |          0  (base) 
                       1  |   .0786441   .0266895     2.95   0.003     .0263336    .1309547 
                          | 
                ch_under7 |  -.0405407   .0135359    -3.00   0.003    -.0670705   -.0140109 
                from7to17 |  -.0412658   .0080529    -5.12   0.000    -.0570491   -.0254825 
                  seniors |   .0011274    .015831     0.07   0.943    -.0299008    .0321556 
             unempladults |   -.126361   .0051815   -24.39   0.000    -.1365165   -.1162055 
pensionandsocialpercapita |   -.001158   .0005932    -1.95   0.051    -.0023207    4.68e-06 
              remittances |  -6.30e-06   .0000265    -0.24   0.812    -.0000582    .0000456 
                   maxedu |   .0011752   .0030312     0.39   0.698    -.0047659    .0071162 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
Note: dy/dx for factor levels is the discrete change from the base level. 
 
 
 
 
